JUDGMENT - B.N. SRIKRISHNA, J.:---This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India impugns an Order of the First Labour Court, Pune, dated 9th October, 1984, dismissing Application (IDA/LCP) No. 140 of 1982 made by the petitioner under section 32C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). 2. The petitioner is employed as a driver in the first respondent's corporation, which is a corporation set up under the Road Transport Corporations Act for transport of passengers, repairs of engines, fuel pumps, starters, dynamos etc. The petitioner made an application under section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act, in which he claimed that he and other drivers were employed in the S.T. Central Workshop, Dapodi, which was a 'factory' registered under the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948. He alleged that he was required to work continuously for 11 hours everyday during the period 1st January, 1973 to 13th March, 1982. He claimed that he was entitled to get overtime payment for work done in excess of 8 hours per day under the provisions of section 59 of the Factories Act, 1948, for the aforesaid period, which he estimated to be Rs. 69,585/-approximately. The application prayed for recovery of the said amount from the first respondents's corporation, and for payment thereof to the petitioner. 3. The first respondent opposed the application by contending mainly that the petitioner was a driver who was not attached to any manufacturing work; the main job of the petitioner, as a driver, was to bring workers to the workshop from city and take them back in the evening and occasionally he was given some other jobs such as driving of vehicles going for purchasing of materials, bringing materials from Bombay and also bringing chassis from Amravati. It was, therefore, contended that the petitioner was not employed in any factory or in connection with any manufacturing process in a factory. The claim opposed on the ground that the first respondent's corporation was "a motor transport undertaking" covered by the provisions of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 and that the petitioner was "a motor transport worker" as defined in the said Act; that the permissible spread over of duties of driver as decided was 11 hours, and, for working 11 hours, there was no liability to pay overtime payment under the said Act. The Labour Court recorded evidence of the parties and accepted the contention of the first respondent that his was "a motor transport undertaking" withing the meaning of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961; that the petitioner was "a motor transport worker" within the meaning of the said Act, and further that his spread over of duties as a driver being 11 hours per day, he was not entitled to any overtime, as no work in excess of such spread over has been carried out by him. In this view of the matter, the application of the petitioner was dismissed. 4. Mr. Dharap, learned advocate who appears for the petitioner, has assailed the order of the Labour Court on three grounds, which are as under:--- (i) that, even though the first respondent's corporation may be an undertaking established for carrying passengers for hire or reward, the work in connection with plying of staff buses, which carry its own workmen to and from the workshop registered as a 'factory' does not fall within the purview of the definition "motor transport undertaking" as defined in section 2(g) of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961. (ii) that, assuming the first respondent's corporation to be "a motor transport undertaking" within the meaning of the said Act, the evidence showed that the petitioner was not covered by the main body of the expression "motor transport worker" defined in section 2(h) of the Act. (iii) that, even if the main body of the definition "motor transport worker" in section 2(h) applied to the petitioner, the petitioner is a person who was employed in a 'factory', as defined in the Factories Act, 1948, and, therefore, excluded from the definition by virtue of the Exclusion (i) appended to the said definition. Mr. Dharap, therefore, contended that the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, did not apply to the petitioner, who was, to all intents and purposes, governed by the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948, and, since it was not disputed that he was given duties with 11 hours spread over everyday during the relevant period, he was entitled to overtime in accordance with section 59 of the Factories Act. 5. Taking the first contention of Mr. Dharap, it appears to me that a corporation, which is established, inter alia, for carriage of passengers by road cannot but be "a motor transport undertaking" within the meaning of section 2(g). 5. Taking the first contention of Mr. Dharap, it appears to me that a corporation, which is established, inter alia, for carriage of passengers by road cannot but be "a motor transport undertaking" within the meaning of section 2(g). I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Dharap that all activities carried out by " a motor transport undertaking" having to be dissected, and each activity tested for application of the definition in section 2(g) of the said Act. It is noteworthy that section 2(g) defines the expression "motor transport undertaking" as meaning a motor transport undertaking engaged in carrying passengers or goods or both by road for hire or reward, and includes a private carrier. The emphasis in the definition is on the under taking as a whole and not of specific spheres of activities even if they are distinct. The only exception to this rule appears to be in the inclusive provision of the definition by making it applicable to a private carrier. 6. Mr. Dharap relied upon the judgment of this Court in (Mohamed Zefrul Islam v. Birendra Lall)1, A.I.R. 1965 Bombay 120. This was a case of dispute as to the application of the Motor Transport Workers Act to the activity of the Post and Telegraph Department. This Court took the view that merely because the Post and Telegraph Department maintained a Motor Service, it was not maintained as a "private carrier", and, therefore, the Post and Telegraph Department was not "a motor transport undertaking" within the meaning of section 2(g) of the Act. It was pointed out by this Court that the work that the Central Government does under the Indian Post Office Act was not for the purpose of making gains or profits and could not be construed as carrying on business like the work done by a trading corporation or the work done by other common carriers of passengers and their goods. The Court held that the main purpose of carrying out such activity was to discharge its functions under the Indian Post Office Act, which vested exclusive privilege and/or monopoly in the Central Government of conveying by bus, from on place to another, postal articles. The fact that charges were levied for delivery of goods and articles did not make such activity a commercial or trading activity. The fact that charges were levied for delivery of goods and articles did not make such activity a commercial or trading activity. The work that the Central Government carried out under the Act was merely discharge of needs of public utility and public purpose. In this background of the matter, the Court came to the clear conclusion that the bus service maintained and run by the Post and Telegraph Department did not make the department a "private carrier", nor did the Post and Telegraph Department fall within the definition of the expression "motor transport undertaking" defined in section 2(g) of the Act. I do not see how this judgment can help the petitioner, as, in my view, this judgment is somewhat contrary to the proposition that is being canvassed by the petitioner. Mr. Dharap, however, contended that this judgment was being relied upon by him only to support his argument that each activity has to be emphasized in order to see whether the activity fulfils the test laid down in the definition of the expression "motor transport undertaking" under section 2(g) of the Act. In my view, the argument is slightly misconceived. It is not as if the first respondent, who is doing any other kind of activity is sought to be roped in into the definition of "motor transport undertaking" by relying on the inclusive provision of section 2(g). The first respondents corporation, by its very nature of establishment, is completely covered by the main body of the definition and is, undoubtedly, "a motor transport undertaking" within the meaning of the main portion of the definition in section 2(g) of the Act. Therefore, there is no question of relying upon the inclusive portion of the definition in section 2(g) of the Act by emphasizing the word "private carrier" contained therein. In my view, this judgment does not support the contention canvassed by Mr. Dharaph. 7. Mr. Dharap then referred to the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in (Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others)2, A.I.R. 1972 Madhya Pradesh 188. This was a case where the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, which was not established for the purpose of carriage of passengers by road for hire or reward, had its own goods vehicles utilised for its private carrier activities. This was a case where the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, which was not established for the purpose of carriage of passengers by road for hire or reward, had its own goods vehicles utilised for its private carrier activities. The Madhya Pradesh High Court took the view that at least this portion of the activity would fall within the inclusive part of the definition in section 2(g), and this portion of the activity would, therefore, amount to "motor transport undertaking" within the meaning of section 2(g) of the Act. The Court also pointed out that the Electricity Board would be required to give a declaration under section 3 of the Act for registration purpose declaring only its goods vehicles used for its private carrier activity, but not its staff cars, jeeps etc. which were not connected with such activity. This judgment also does not help the petitioner's contention, for the simple reason that the petitioner was employed in a corporation, which, as I have already held, was undoubtedly a "motor transport undertaking" within the meaning of section 2(g) of the Act. This judgment could have been pressed into service, had the first respondent's corporation been subsumed under the definition in section 2(g) of the Act by virtue of the inclusive portion of the said definition. This not being so, this authority will be of no avail. 8. Mr. Dharap finally contended that the petitioner was employed in the workshop, which was a 'factory' within the meaning of the Factories Act, 1948, and, therefore, he would, at any rate, fall within the exclusive portion of the definition in Clause (i) of section 2(h) of the Act. He referred to the definition of 'Motor Transport worker' in section 2(h) of the Act and pointed out that the sweep of the definition is wide enough to take within its ambit workers working on any other kind of work incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process in a factory. He also placed reliance on a judgment of his Court in (Dr. H.M. Datar v. P.S. Shivam, General Manager, India Security Press)4, decision dated 8.7.1991 in W.P. No. 3846 of 1983 per H.H. Kantharia, J. In my view, this contention is also without merit. For the purpose of deciding as to whether the petitioner is a "motor transport worker" or not. We have to go by the definition in section 2(h) of the Act. For the purpose of deciding as to whether the petitioner is a "motor transport worker" or not. We have to go by the definition in section 2(h) of the Act. Clause (i) provides for a category of employee who is excluded there from, viz, a person who is employed in a factory as defined in the Factories Act, 1948. It is not disputed that the Dapodi Workshop of the first respondent's corporation is a 'workshop' within the meaning of the Factories Act, but what is disputed seriously is that the petitioner was employed in the factory. The learned advocate for the petitioner then contended that the evidence on record unmistakably shows that, at all material times, the petitioner was employed in the Transport Depot. He was not borne on the muster roll of the workshop, which was registered as a factory. He was not subordinate to the in-charge of the workshop but to the Transport Depot Manager. I have been taken through the evidence recorded before the Labour Court. After perusing the oral evidence recorded. I see no reason to defer from the conclusion arrived at by the Labour Court that the petitioner was not employed in the workshop, which was registered as a factory, and that he was employed in the Transport Depot. If, upon the material produced before it, the Labour Court has arrived at this conclusion, there is no reason for this Court to interfere with the same. On the other hand, I am also inclined to take the same view. Once the finding is that the petitioner was employed in the Transport Depot, and not employed in the workshop registered as a factory, the conclusion is inescapable that he would be governed by the provisions of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, inasmuch as he cannot avail of the exclusion provided in Clause (i) to section 2(h) of the Act, and, consequently, his claim for overtime is to be judged only upon the provisions of the said Act. It is not disputed that the spread over of drivers under the Act is 11 hours per day, and, further, that the petitioner was never required to work for more than 11 hours on any day. The claim of the petitioner, therefore, fails, and has been rightly rejected by the Labour Court. 9. It is not disputed that the spread over of drivers under the Act is 11 hours per day, and, further, that the petitioner was never required to work for more than 11 hours on any day. The claim of the petitioner, therefore, fails, and has been rightly rejected by the Labour Court. 9. In the result, on the basis of the evidence recorded in the petitioner's case, the Labour Courts' order is upheld. The petition is dismissed, and the Rule discharged, with no order as to coasts. Petition dismissed. -----