P. K. SHYAMSUNDAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a revision petition by a land owner whose land was acquired and according to him a meager sum was awarded as compensation. It is not in dispute that the notice of award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer dated 13th August, 1973 was actually served on the petitioner on the 20th of August, 1973. It is also not denied that the petitioner withdrew the award amount on 15-9-1973 and according to him under protest, an aspect on which at the moment there is no controversy. Although he received the compensation amount under protest be did not make an application to the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 18 (1) of the Land acquisition Act (for short the Act) till 26-12-1974 asking him to make a reference to the competent Court and that was because the petitioner says the notice served on him under Section 12 (2) of the Act informing him of the passing of the award did not set out the grounds on which the said award had come to be made and hence in order to know whether the award was supported by justifiable grounds he had to make an application for a copy of the award on 20th August, 1973 and having been granted a copy only on 25-11-1974, within a month thereafter he moved the Land Acquisition officer under Section 18 (1) asking him to make a reference to the competent Court. It is also mentioned that the Land Acquisition Officer when he did not make the reference to the Court as solicited by the petitioner he moved the Court by an application made under Section 18 (3) (b) of the Act, which was rejected by the Court as barred by time and thereafter he moved this Court by a revision petition, in which he succeeded and the matter remitted back at which stage an application to condone the delay in making the application under Section 18 (3) (b) was also made. The court having accepted the application made for condonation of delay, condoned the delay involved in the making of the said application and thereafter processed the petitioner's case, but ended up finally by rejecting the petitioner's claim for a reference on the ground that the application made to the Land Acquisition Officer seeking a reference under Section 18 (1) was itself barred by time. The learned Judge has pointed out that when the petitioner withdrew the compensation amount in the year 1973 albeit under protest he must be fixed with the knowledge of the passing of the award at any rate from that date itself. With the result, the judge says he should have atleast made an application within 90 days thereof to the Land Acquisition officer soliciting his assistance in the matter for referring his claim to the Civil court. In this Court the correctness and tenability of the view taken by the learned judge and the consequent order made by him denying the petitioner's right to seek enhanced compensation is challenged. ( 2 ) MR. K. I. Bhatta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, in support of thepetition maintains that albeit a notice under Section 12 (2) of the Act having been served on the petitioner posting him with information that the Land Acquisition officer has passed an award in a particular sum of money, the notice being a bald one, in that being bereft of the grounds on which the Land Acquisition Officer bad passed an award in the sum in question, he was therefore entitled to call for further information by obtaining a copy of the award and thereafter to make an application seeking reference to the Court under Section 18 (1) of the Act. According to the learned counsel the period of limitation under Section 18 (1) in such cases would start running only from the date of obtaining a copy of the award and not from the date of receipt of the notice under Section 12 (2) of the Act Reliance in this connection is placed on a decision of a single Judge of the former High Court of mysore in The Special Land Acquisition Officer v Aparaikrishna Gadakari and others, 1972 (2) Mysore Law Journal 181, wherein it was held that:"where the notice issued by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 12 (2) did not mention the grounds of the award, but only mentioned the amount awarded, a request for reference after the claimant obtains certified copy of the award would be in time". (emphasis supplied) the facts in that case are almost on all fours to the fact in this case. (emphasis supplied) the facts in that case are almost on all fours to the fact in this case. In that case a notice under Section 12 (2) had been served on the land owner, but that notice carried only figures of the award amount and nothing else. In that situation the claimants obtained a certified copy of the award and thereafter filed a petition before the Land acquisition Officer seeking a reference under Section 18 (1) of the Act. It also transpired in that case the claimants had drawn in the meanwhile the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer under protest. In the Courts-below it had been unsuccessfully urged on behalf of the Land Acquisition Officer that the petitions made under Section 18 (1) was barred by time because they came long after the expiry of the 90 days period following the service of notice. That contention having been negatived by the Courts-below the Special Land Acquisition Officer preferred appeals there from to this Court and it is in the context of those appeals the foregoing decision was rendered. The learned Judge followed in that connection a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum and Another, AIR 1963 SC 1604 , where in it had been held that knowledge of the award is not just. The information conveyed to a land owner of the passing of the award, but the communication made to the land owner must be effective, in that it should be self contained and must disclose the contents of the award adumbrating the reasons or the grounds on which the award was passed. It was pointed out that otherwise a bald notice did not satisfy such a requirement being not an appropriate notice in the eye of law at all. Therefore, treating the notice served on him as no notice at all. The Court after laying down the aforesaid principle went on to point out that the land owners must atleast have an opportunity to contradict the award and therefore the period of limitation would start in such circumstances from the date on which the claimants withdrew the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. The Court after laying down the aforesaid principle went on to point out that the land owners must atleast have an opportunity to contradict the award and therefore the period of limitation would start in such circumstances from the date on which the claimants withdrew the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. The dictum of the Supreme Court is succinctly set out in the head note, which reads:-"a literal and mechanical construction of the words "six months from the date of the Collector's award" occurring in the second part of clause (b) of the proviso would not be appropriate and the knowledge of the parly affected by the award, either actual or constructive being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice, the expression used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. Where the award was never communicated to the party the question is when did the party known the award either actually or constructively. Knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party under Section 12 (2) of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party is present in Court either personally or through his representative when the award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award. It was held that such knowledge could not be inferred from the date of petition for interim payment filed by the party when the party had not known of the amount of compensation awarded". Having regard to the scheme of the Act knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award. It was held that such knowledge could not be inferred from the date of petition for interim payment filed by the party when the party had not known of the amount of compensation awarded". (emphasis supplied) probably, I would have bad little difficulty in accepting the contention now urged on behalf of the petitioner asking me to treat the notice served under Section 12 (2) in this case as circumspect as held by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to (supra) followed by this Court in Special Land Acquisition Officer v Aparaikrishna, but for the fact that the learned High Court Government Pleader has drawn my attention to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Special Land Acquisition Officer v dattatraya Nagesh Wader, 1991 (2) Kar. L. J. 116 (DB) : ILR1991 Karnataka 1899, wherein it was held:"it is the elementary duty of the Court to decide as to whether the reference is valid. An application seeking reference under sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the act is required to be made within 90 days from the date on which the award notice is served or the amount of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition officer was received. The power of the Land Acquisition Officer to make reference under Section 18 of the Act, as amended by the Karnataka Land acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1961, comes to an end on the date on which the right of the claimant concerned to make an application before the Civil Judge praying for direction to call for reference under Section 18 of the Act comes to an end and consequently any reference made after the said date and time is invalid. "no doubt, at first flash it appears to support the learned Government Pleader, but a reading of the decision would indicate that the point I am now seized of never arose for consideration in that case. The question which arose for consideration must turn on the facts of that case, involved investigation into the suspicious manner in which the reference purported to have been made by the Land Acquisition Officer. The question which arose for consideration must turn on the facts of that case, involved investigation into the suspicious manner in which the reference purported to have been made by the Land Acquisition Officer. The question whether a notice under Section 12 (2) issued by the Land Acquisition Officer mentioning nothing more than the amount awarded and not making any reference to the grounds on which for the sum mentioned in the notice came to be made, not being effective in law did not arise for consideration. Therefore, it is I think the division Bench ruling in Special Land Acquisition Officer v Dattatraya Nagesh wader does not stand in the way of giving relief to the petitioner and muchless it detract from the earlier decision of this Court in Special Land Acquisition Officer v aparaikrishna. Besides there is yet another decision of the former High Court of mysore, which had taken the same view as pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Kamalajammannivaru v Special Land Acquisition Officer, 1968 Short notes of Recent Decisions - Short Note Item No. 96. The learned High Court government Pleader tried to distinguish this decision by viewing that this being a case in which the claimant had withdrawn the award amount way back in 1973 the period of limitation for making an application under Section 18 (1) must be held to have commenced atleast from that date and in support of this argument he relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v Mst. Qaisar Jelian Begum and Another referred to herein before. As I have pointed out earlier that is a case in which no notice under Section 12 (2) was found to have been served on the land owner and therefore, in the context of such a situation their Lordships said in such a case knowledge of the passing of the award begins at least from the date on which the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer had been withdrawn by the land owner. But, t am afraid that the Court did not lay down any universal dicta applicable to all cases and I am satisfied that the decision does not lay down the modalities of an effective notice under Section 12 (2 ). But, t am afraid that the Court did not lay down any universal dicta applicable to all cases and I am satisfied that the decision does not lay down the modalities of an effective notice under Section 12 (2 ). In that view of the matter I am satisfied that there is no substance in the contention of the learned Government pleader who seeks to rely on the factum of the land owner having withdrawn the award such as far back as 1973 and therefore asking the Court to compute the period of limitation from that date. As held by this Court in Special Land Acquisition Officer v Aparaikrishna the notice under Section 12 (2) if it was intended to serve as the nodal point vis-a-vis the land owner in order to fix him with the knowledge of the passing of the award for the purpose of computing the period of limitation within which he should move the Land Acquisition Officer for making a reference to the court, that notice must carry the essential pre-requisites, namely, the grounds in support of the award albeit in a circumscribed fashion, if not elaboratel. If the notice falls short of this requirement and makes only a reference to the amount awarded and to nothing else, then such a notice, even on service thereof on the claimant would not start the count down for the period of limitation. When that is the situation even in a case where the land owner had withdrawn the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition officer in terms of the award notice and if the land owner applies for a certified copy of the award later on and obtains it, the period of limitation under Section 18 (1) commences only from the date of receipt of the copy of the award and not from the date of service of the notice under Section 12 (2 ). If this is the correct position in law, the conclusion reached by the Court-below treating the application, made by the petitioner, to the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 18 (1) as barred by time is clearly erroneous and in reaching such a conclusion the Court has acted with material irregularity ( 3 ) THEREFORE, it is acting under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, allow this revision petition and set aside the impugned order. The Land Acquisition Officer is now directed to make a reference to the Court for the petitioner's claim of enhancement of compensation under Section 18 (1) of the Act, thereupon the Court will proceed to dispose it off on merits and in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .