JUDGMENT Binod Kumar Roy and I. P. Singh, JJ.- The petitioner prays to quash the order dated 165. 1988 passed by the House Controller, Patna Sadar, Patna (Respondent no 2) in B.B.C. Case No. 378 of 1987 (as contained in Annexure-5) fixing fair rent under the provisions of the Bihar Buildings Lease, Rent and Eviction Control Act. 1982 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) of the buildings not constructed by the lessors (respondents nos. 5 to 20) as also an Order dated 26.8.1988 passed by the Additional Collector, Patna (Respondent No. 4) in B.B.C. Appeal No. 30/68T of 1988-89 (as contained in Annexure-6). The Matrix: 2. There is a land measuring about 1 bigha 7 kathas bearing Municipal Survey Plot No. 214, sheet No. 10. Circle No.6, Holding No. 180/4A, ward No.2 which was leased out by the sons of Late Kannu Lal Sao to one Daya Shankar Sharma by five registered lease deeds between l4.10.1947 to 14.1.1949 leasing out for 25 years with an option for renewal for another 25 years their 25th share to constructing a cinema hall thereon and for using the same for public entertainment or such other structures as the lessee chooses to construct for other industrial or commercial and/or residential purposes. There was a stipulation in the lease deeds that in case a Company is promoted or a partnership is formed for the purpose of acquiring the assets used by the lessee for business, the lessee will have the right of transfer by sale or otherwise the premises and the structures standing thereon and to do all other acts needful for the purpose aforesaid, subject to the terms and condition mentioned in the deeds. Daya Shankar Sharma, aforesaid, subsequently created a partnership firm M/s Ashok Chitra Patna and constructed a building thereon known as Ashok Cinema building, and out houses, garden, park, passage and private road for the use of the building. This partnership firm was later on converted all M/s. Ashok Chitra Private Limited, a Private Limited Joint Stock Company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, who is the petitioner. The cinema building, the out house etc. was made over to the said Company on 3.12.1949 by the said partnership firm and since then the changes were made in the structures of the building by renovating from time to time. The cinema building, the out house etc. was made over to the said Company on 3.12.1949 by the said partnership firm and since then the changes were made in the structures of the building by renovating from time to time. The lessors have been receiving rent of the land in accordance with the terms of the lease deeds. A copy of the lease deed has been appended as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. After the expiry of 25 years, as stipulated in the lease deeds, fresh lease deeds were executed on 10.4.1973, a copy of which has been appended as Annexure-2 to this writ application. Respondents nos. 5 to 20 filed an application on 16.10.1982, a copy of which has been appended as Annexure-3 to this writ application, before the House Controller, Sadar, Patna (respondent no. 2) under sections 5 and 8 of the Act for enhacement of the rent of the premises in question. The petitioner after notice entered appearance and raised objections, inter alia that the Act is not applicable to the premises described in Schedule I of the petition (Annexure-3 that in the petition the structure built up by it has been wrongly included, and that what was lessed out was the vacant land and not the structures. Respondent no. 2 got the matter enquired into. In the enquiry report dated 14.3.1988 it was stated that only vacant and open land was lessed out and that no construction on the same was made by the lessor. It is stated in the writ petition that this report was made on the basis of facts admitted by the respondents concerned. To the said report objection was filed by the respondents trying to make distinctions between the lease deeds of 1949 and 1973- By the impugned order, as contained in annexure 5, the House Controller over ruled petitioner's objection in regard to the applicability of the Act. The petitioner went up in appeal against the said order which was admitted by Order as contained in Annexure-6 with a condition that within 15 days it must deposit the entire arrears of rent as fixed by the House Controller and then only the appeal will be heard further. 3. The petitioner went up in appeal against the said order which was admitted by Order as contained in Annexure-6 with a condition that within 15 days it must deposit the entire arrears of rent as fixed by the House Controller and then only the appeal will be heard further. 3. No counter affidavit has been filed to the writ petition by the respondents concerned, though from the record it appears that they have certain statements in the petition filed for vacating the order of stay and rejoinders to the petitioner's counter. The Submissions :- 4. Mr. Tarakant Jha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits as follows :- (i) The House Controller has erred in law in holding that the provisions of the Act were applicable to the land in question. Accordingly, the impugned order of the House Controller is without jurisdiction, (ii) Since the order of the House Controller was without jurisdiction. the petitioner has come up to this Court after it was directed by the appellate authority vide the order as contained in annexure.6 to deposit the entire arrears of rent as fixed by the House Controller by his order as contained in annexure-5. He places reliance on the decisions of this Court in the cases of Smt. Jugal Kishori Devi vs. Ashok Mills and Foundries reported in A.I.R. 1961, Patna, 330 and Dr. Sacbidanand Sinha vs. The Collector, Patna and others reported in 1989 P.L.J.R., 1141. 5. Mr. S. S Asghar Hussan and following him Mr. Ashok Priyadarshi, learned counsel for respondents nos. 5 to 20, in reply, submits as follows :- (i) The question of applicability of the Act was not raised by the petitioner before the House Controller. Accordingly, the petitioner cannot raise it for the first time before this Court; (ii) The petitioner is also not entitled to any relief from this Court in view of the fact that they have failed to comply with the direction made by the appellate authority (as contained in Annexure-6). (iii) The House Controller interpreting the second lease deed has correctly held that it has jurisdiction to enhance the rent (iv) the lease deed (annoxure-2), if read as a whole, negatives the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the provisions of the Act do not apply. (iii) The House Controller interpreting the second lease deed has correctly held that it has jurisdiction to enhance the rent (iv) the lease deed (annoxure-2), if read as a whole, negatives the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the provisions of the Act do not apply. It has also been submitted that since there is a conflict between the first part and second part of the lease deed, the second part will prevail on the first part. Reliance in this regard has been p laced on a decision of the Supreme Court in Ramkishorelal and another vs. Kamalnarayan reported in A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court, 890. 6. Mr. Jha in reply took us to paragraphs 6 to 12 of the impugned order passed by the House Controller to show that the question of applicability of the Act in question was raised and that there is no merit in the submissions of the learned counsel of the Respondents as what was leased was a vacant piece of land to which the provisions of the Act are not applicable. Our Findings :- 7. The Bihar Buildings Lease, Rent and Eviction Control Act, 1947, was initially enacted as a temporary statute. It underwent changes from time to time and took shape of Act in question. The word 'Building' bas been defined under section 2 (b) of the Act which runs as follows :- "Building" means any building, or hut a part of the building or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes, and includes- (i) the garden, grounds, and out houses, if any appurtenant to such building or hut or part of such building or hut; and (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or hut or part of a building or hut "(emphasis added). 8. A bare perusal of the definition shows that the word 'building' as defined above does not include within its ambit any vacant piece or land. 9. On our asking, learned counsel for the petitioner has filed a supplementary affidavit in the midst of judgment enclosing copies of two earlier lease deeds and copies of all the subsequent lease deeds. 8. A bare perusal of the definition shows that the word 'building' as defined above does not include within its ambit any vacant piece or land. 9. On our asking, learned counsel for the petitioner has filed a supplementary affidavit in the midst of judgment enclosing copies of two earlier lease deeds and copies of all the subsequent lease deeds. It is agreed by the learned counsel for the Petitioner as well as learned counsel for the contesting respondents that by the earlier five lease deeds what was leased was only vacant pieces of land and that the terms and conditions mentioned in the five earlier lease deeds were one and the same. 10. The Jaw in regard to interpretations of documents is well settled and hardly needs reiteration. 11. Perusal of the earlier lease deeds, which are on the record unequivocally show that the lease was for 8 term of 25 years from the 1st September, 1948 to 31st August, 1972 with an option of renewal for another 25 years. 12. Clause 5 (vi) of the earlier lease deed runs as follows :- "That he will at the expiration of the said term of twenty five years, if no renewal of the lease is taken by the Lessee which he has the option to take and in case the lessee renews the lease for the further period of 25 years, then on expiry of the 50th years peaceably and quietly surrender to the Lessor the said land with all constructions made by him thereon free of all costs and without any hitch or reluctance excepting of course the furnitures, fittings, fixtures and machineries and plants etc. and other moveables which the Leasee will be entitled to remove. The buildings with electric wirings and with all their door frames and door leaves etc. will be surrendered intact to the Lessor." 13. Clause 6 (ii) of the earlier lease deed runs as follows :- "That he shall be bound at the request of the Lessee at the end of term of twenty five years hereby granted to execute in favour of the lessee a new lease of demised lands and premises by way of renewal for a further terms of twenty five years on the same covenants and terms herein contained except that relating to the annual rent reserved. Such renewed term shall not exceed the further period of 25 years and the rent for the second term of 25 years shall be twenty five per cent in excess of the rent payable under the present lease." 14. The aforesaid covenants ran with the lands leased. We have also perused the other part of the lease deeds as it is well settled principle of construction that the documents have to be read as whole. The aforementioned terms extracted by us read with subsequent leases un-equivocally show that there was an option of renewal with the lessee which if exercised was binding on the lessor. The sub sequent leases were exercised pursuant to the right of renewal which was exercised by the lessee for further 25 years. The subsequent leases do not show that something more than what was leased earlier has been learned except with a condition that the structures put forth by the lesses shall how belong to the lessors. This position has also been very fairly accepted by the learned counsel for the respondents. We also do nor find any contradiction between the earlier part of the leases with their subsequent parts. 15. In Dr. Sudbir Kumar Mukherjee v. Nirsi Dhobin reported in A.I.R. 1961 Patna 321 and Smt. Jugal Kishori Devi v. Ashok Mills and Foundries reported in A.I.R. 1961 Patna, 330 this Court has repeatedly laid down that a lease of vacant land for erecting building for industrial use is not a building within the meaning of the Act. While interpreting the meaning of the word "accommodation" as defined in U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, the apex Court through a four Judges Division Bench in Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf reported in 1976 (1) S.C.C., 128 held that the Act embraces lease of such an "accommodation" must essentially be of a building not a business or industry together with the building in which it is situated. 16. Thus, we are of the view that the Act was not applicable and its provisions were illegally sought to be invoked by the lessors by filing an application for determination of fair rent. We further hold that the reason3 given by the House Controller for holding to the contrary are not valid on fact and in law and over rule them. 17. We further hold that the reason3 given by the House Controller for holding to the contrary are not valid on fact and in law and over rule them. 17. In regard to the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents that we should not exercise our discretion in view of the fact that the petitioner has not complied with the direction of the appellate authority, namely, to deposit the fair rent which is a condition precedent before the hearing of its appeal is taken up, we hold that since the Act was not applicable the appeal, though filed under some advice by the petitioner which is being dubbed as bonafide, was a misconceived one and cannot stand in our way in exercising out jurisdiction. We, therefore, reject this submission made on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondents. 18. In the result, this writ application is allowed. The impugned orders as contained in annexures 5 and 6 are quashed but in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to cost. 19. Let a Writ of Certiorari issue accordingly.