Tamil Nadu Markergal Sangam v. The Government of Tamil Nadu and others
1991-06-11
SOMASUNDARAM
body1991
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- The petitioner is the Tamil Nadu Markers’ Association represented by its Secretary. 2. The facts leading to the filing of the writ petition are as follows: The petitioner has a membership of nearly 500 markers working throughout Tamil Nadu both government and private colleges and they are engaged in the sports fields. The salary markers employed in the Government as well as private colleges ranges from Rs.200 per month. No other monetary benefits whether by way of regular increment or by way of grant of allowances like Dearness Allowance etc., have been given to them. markers working in the various colleges, work from 8 A.M. to 8 P.M. all the seven days week. There are other categories of employees like attenders, peons, watchmen, gardeners, sweepers etc., who have been working along with the markers in the educational institutions. The other categories of employees referred above have been made permanent employees with all the benefits accruing to the permanent post. As the markers are not even getting minimum wage and since their position is worse than the casual labourers as far as their quantum of remuneration is concerned, the markers, through the petitioner association, made representations to the Chief Minister, the Governor, the Education Minister, and Director of Collegiate Education requesting them to make the markers permanent employees in all the educational institutions-both Government and private. However, by the letter No.Na.Ka.2875 E.16/87, dated 3.4.1987, the third respondent informed the petitioner-association that the Government had informed that regularisation of the services of the markers and making them permanent employees been put off until the improvement of the financial condition. In these circumstances, petitioner has filed the present writ petition for the issue of a writ of mandamus for directing the respondents to make the markers working in the Government and private educational institutions in the State of Tamil Nadu as permanent employees with a pay scale and other benefits equal to the pay scale and benefits given to the markers working in the Government Secretariat and Sports Councils. 3. Mr. K.P. Krishna Shetty, learned counsel for the petitioner contended, in the first that the markers have been working in both the Government and private educational institutions for the last several years for a consolidated salary ranging from Rs.75 to per month; they have to work daily from 6 AM.
3. Mr. K.P. Krishna Shetty, learned counsel for the petitioner contended, in the first that the markers have been working in both the Government and private educational institutions for the last several years for a consolidated salary ranging from Rs.75 to per month; they have to work daily from 6 AM. to 8 P.M. they have neither a retirement nor any retirement benefit; they are liable to be dismissed at any time and there security of job; inspite of all these, the markers stick to their job because of their poverty and since most of the markers get a consolidated salary of Rs.200 and less per month works out to Rs.6-50 per day, which is for less than the minimum wage and, therefore, exploitation and it is a system of forced labour, which is prohibited by Art.23 of Constitution. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that when fundamental right guaranteed to the members of the petitioner-association under Art.23 the Constitution is violated. It is the constitutional obligation of the State to take necessary steps for ensuring the observance of the fundamental rights guaranteed Art.23 and see that the markers are paid reasonable and adequate salary for the work by them and that their services are regularised. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decisions reported in People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1473: 1982 Lab.I.C. 1646: (1982)2 S.C.C. Sanjit Roy v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 328: 1983 Lab.I.C. 312: (1983)1 Lab.L.J. 320: (1983)1 S.C.C. 525 : (1983)1 Lab.LN. 522: (1983)1 S.C.W.R. 346 and P. Vijayakumar v. State, A.I.R. 1988 A.P. 295. 4. The back-drop of law may be examined before going into the factual details of this Art.23 of the Constitution of India prohibits ‘forced labour’ and Art.23(1) reads as follows: "Prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour: (1) Traffic in human beings begar and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of provision shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law." The scope and content of Art.23 of the Constitution has been well examined by the Supreme Court in the decision in People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, A.I.R. S.C. 1473: 1982 Lab.I.C. 1646: (1982)2 S.C.C. 494 .
The complaint in that case was,that contractors were paying the workmen engaged in the construction work for Asiad 1982 less than the minimum wage, that there was an obligation on the part of contractors to such minimum wage and though apparently the workmen had offered their services voluntarily for inadequate remuneration, that was because of economic compulsions and such labour too will fall within the scope of the term ‘ forced labour’ in Art.23 of Constitution. The Supreme Court, dealing with the scope and content of Art.23 of Constitution, observed thus: "Now the next question that arises for consideration is whether there is any breach of when a person provides labour or service to the State or to any other person and is paid than the minimum wage for it. It is obvious that ordinarily no one would willingly labour or service to another for less than the minimum wage, when he knows that under law he is entitled to get minimum wage for the labour or service provided by him. It therefore be legitimately presumed that when a person provides labour or service to another against receipt of remuneration which is less than the minimum wage, he is acting under force of some compulsion which drives him to work though he is paid less than what he is entitled under law to receive. What prohibits is ‘forced labour’ that is labour or service which a person is forced to provide ‘force’ which would make such labour or service ‘forced labour’ may arise in several may be physical force which may compel a person to provide labour or service to another it may be force exerted through a legal provision such as a provision for imprisonment fine in case the employee fails to provide labour or service or it may even be compulsion arising from hunger and poverty, want and destitution. Any factor which deprives of a choice of alternatives and compels him to adopt one particular course of action properly be regarded as ‘force’ and if labour or service is compelled as a result ‘force’ , it would be ‘forced labour’.
Any factor which deprives of a choice of alternatives and compels him to adopt one particular course of action properly be regarded as ‘force’ and if labour or service is compelled as a result ‘force’ , it would be ‘forced labour’. Where a person is suffering from hunger or starvation, when he has no resources at all to fight disease or to feed his wife and children or hide their nakedness, where utter grinding poverty has broken his back and reduced a state of helplessness and despair and where no other employment is available to the rigour of his poverty, he would have no choice but to accept any work that comes way, even if the remuneration offered to him is less than the minimum wage. He would no position to bargain with the employer; he would have to accept what is offered And in doing so he would be acting not as a free agent with a choice between alternatives but under the compulsion of economic circumstances and the labour or service provided him would be clearly (forced labour). There is no reason why the word ‘ forced ’ read in a narrow and restricted manner so as to be confined only to physical or legal particularly when the national charter, its fundamental document has promised to new socialist republic where there will be socio-economic justice for all and everyone adequate means of livelihood. The Constitution makers have given us one of remarkable documents in history for ushering in a new socio-economic order constitution which they have framed for us has a social purpose and an economic and therefore every word or phrase in the Constitution must be interpreted in a which would advance the socio-economic objective of the Constitution. It is not unoften in a capitalist society economic circumstances exert much greater pressure on an in driving him to a particular course of action than physical compulsion or force of provision. The word ‘ force ’ must therefore be construed to include not only physical force but also force arising from the compulsion of economic circumstances which choice of alternatives to a person in want and compels him to provide labour or service though the remuneration received for it is less than the minimum wage.
The word ‘ force ’ must therefore be construed to include not only physical force but also force arising from the compulsion of economic circumstances which choice of alternatives to a person in want and compels him to provide labour or service though the remuneration received for it is less than the minimum wage. Of course, person provides labour or service to another against receipt of the minimum wage not be possible to say that the labour or service provided by him is ‘forced labour he gets what he is entitled under law to receive. No inference can reasonably be such a case that he is forced to provide labour or service for the simple reason that be providing labour or service against receipt of what is lawfully payable to him just other person who is not under the force of any compulsion. We are therefore of that where a person provides labour or services to another for remuneration which than the minimum wage, the labour of service provided by him clearly falls within the and ambit of the words "forced labour" under Art.23. Such a person would be entitled come to the Court for enforcement of his fundamental right under Art.23 by asking the to direct payment of the minimum wage to him so that the labour or service provided ceases to be ‘forced labour’ and the breach of Art.23 is remedied. It is therefore clear when the petitioners alleged that minimum wage was not paid to the workmen employed the contractors, the complaint was really in effect and substance a complaint violation of the fundamental right of the workmen under Art.23." 5. The Supreme Court reiterated what is said in People’s Union for Democratic Rights Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1473: 1982 Lab.I.C. 1646: (1982)2 S.C.C. 494 , subsequent decision in Sanjit Roy v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 328: 1983 Lab.I.C. 312: (1983)1 Lab.LJ. 320: (1983)1 S.C.C. 525 : (1983)1 Lab.L.N. 522: (1983)1 S.C.W.R. 346, in the following terms: "I must, therefore, hold consistently with this decision that where a person provides labour service to another for remuneration which is less than the minimum wage, the labour service provided by him clearly falls within the meaning of the words ‘ forced labour attracts the condemnation of Art.23.
Every person who provides labour or service to another is entitled at the least to the minimum wage and if anything less than the minimum wage paid to him he can complain of violation of his fundamental right under Art.23 and ask Court to direct payment of the minimum wage to him so that the breach of Art.23 may abated." 6. The position of law which emerges from the principles laid down by the Supreme Court the decisions referred above is this. Art.23 of the Constitution strikes at every form of forced labour. It prohibits begar. It also prohibits other similar forms of forced labour. The element of compulsion in forced labour need not necessarily be by reason of enforcement contractual obligations. Social or economic compulsions, may also be the basis of forced labour. The word ‘ forced ’ used in Art.23 of the Constitution must be construed to include only physical or legal force but also force arising from the compulsion of economic circumstances which leave no choice of alternatives to a person in want and compels him provide labour or service even though the remuneration received for it is less than minimum wage Every person who provides labour or service to another is entitled at least to the minimum wage and if anything less than minimum wage is paid to him he complain of violation of his fundamental right under Art.23 and ask the Court to direct payment of minimum wage to him so that the breach of Art.23 may be abated. 7. In P.Bhaskara Vijayakumar v. State, A.I. R. 1988 A.P. 295, the Andhra Pradesh High has taken the view that even prisoners are entitled to adequate remuneration for done by them and directed the State of Andhra Pradesh to pay the prisoners adequately the labour extracted from them, as it was found that the payment made by the State prisoners was lawfully inadequate. 8. In the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions above, let me examine whether the petitioner is entitled to any relief in this writ petition.
8. In the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions above, let me examine whether the petitioner is entitled to any relief in this writ petition. case of the petitioner is that the markers who are the members of the petitioner- are working in both Government and private colleges for a consolidated salary ranging Rs.75 to Rs."200 per month which works out to Rs.6.50 and less per day which is than the minimum wage and that there is no security of job for them. The further case petitioner is that the refusal on the part of the respondents to make the markers permanent employees with a definite and reasonable scale of pay and reasonable hours of work their continuance in their present job with remuneration which is less than the wage and without job security and retirement benefit amounted to forced labour prohibited by Art.23 of the Constitution. The case of the petitioner with regard to the paid to the markers, their working conditions is not denied by the respondents counter-affidavit in this writ petition. The learned counsel for the petitioner brings notice the appointment order issued by the Principal, Arignar Anna Government Cheyyaru, dated 21.7.1976, appointing one Kuppan as a marker in the Department Physical Education on a monthly salary of Rs.75 in order to show that the salary paid markers is too low below the subsistence level and lawfully inadequate. The materials record go to show that the salary paid to the markers working in the colleges both and Government ranges from Rs.75 to Rs.200 per month which is inadequate and the minimum wages prescribed by law. As rightly contended by the learned counsel petitioner, compelling markers to work for such low salary amounts to forced prohibited by Art.23 of the Constitution in view of the principle laid down by the Court in the decisions referred above. When the petitioner-association submitted representation to the Chief Minister, the Governor, the Educational Minister, the Director Collegiate Education etc., requesting them to make the markers permanent employees the educational institutions, the third respondent sent their reply dated 3.4.1987 stating the Government had informed that the regu-larisation of the service of the markers making them permanent employees had been put off until improvement of the financial position.
This reply dated 3.4.1987 sent by the third respondent to the petitioner-association only shows that the respondents are satisfied that the made by the petitioner-association are just and reasonable, but, the respondents unable to comply with those demands only because of financial constraints. When petition was taken up for hearing, Mr.M.A.Sadanand, the Special Government produced a letter dated 10.4.1991 addressed by the Government to him taking same stand, even after four years, that due to financial crunch the Government is create the post of markers in the educational institutions. This reason given respondents in the reply dated 3.4.1987 and in the letter dated 10.4.1991 referred not granting the relief to the members of the petitioner association is not a valid particularly when the Government under G.O.Ms.No.1672, Education, dated granted regular pay scale to markers employed in the Tamil Nadu State Sports Council District Sports Council. The above G.O. shows that the markers working in the Tamil State Sports Council are given the revised -pay scale of Rs.250-5-330-10-400 and are also eligible for Dearness Allowance, House Rent Allowance and City Compensatory Allowance etc As pointed out by the Supreme Court, every person, who provides another, is entitled at least to the minimum wage and if anything less than the wage is paid to him he can approach the Court complaining of violation of his fundamental right under Art.23 of the Constitution and request the Court to direct payment minimum wage to him so that the breach of Art.23 may be abated. It has to be inasmuch as the salary paid to the markers is very low and awfully inadequate and them to work for such low salary amounts to forced labour prohibited by Art.23 Constitution, the members of the petitioner-association are entitled to reasonable the work done by them. Consequently, the respondents have to be directed to members of the petitioner-association reasonable and adequately for the labour from them as it is found that the present salary paid to the markers is grossly and below the minimum wages prescribed by law. I will deal with the question as to the reasonable scale of pay to which the markers are entitled to a little later while with the next submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 9.
I will deal with the question as to the reasonable scale of pay to which the markers are entitled to a little later while with the next submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 9. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the employed in the University of Madras, Annamalai University, Sports Council Government Secretariat, have been made permanent employees. The markers working other educational institutions in the State have been denied similar benefit, and, they have been discriminated again in this respect and it is violative of Art.14 Constitution. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the working in the University of Madras, Annamalai University, Sports Council and Government Secretariat do the same type of work as the markers in other educational institutions markers working in the University of Madras etc., have been given higher remuneration, scale of pay with regular annual increment and allowances and retirement benefits. markers working in all other educational institutions, who are doing the same type of markers working in the University of Madras, Annamalai University, Sports Council Government Secretariat, they are also entitled to get by virtue of Art.14 read with of the Constitution, equal pay and other benefits for their equal work. The learned counsel the petitioner also submitted that the denial of equal pay scale and other equal benefits them for equal work is violative of Art.14 read with Art.39(d) of the Constitution and illegal. In support of this contention the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance the decision in Surinder Singh v. Engineer in Chief, C.P. W.D., A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 584: Lab.I.C. 551: (1986) 1 S.C.C. 639 : (1986)1 Lab.L.J. 403: (1986)1 S.C.J. 241: Lab.L.N. 522. There is merit in this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner It is specifically stated in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition that the working in the University of Madras, Annamalai University, Sports Council and Government Secretariat have been given higher remuneration, a scale of pay with annual increment and allowances and retirement benefits. These averments made affidavit are not denied by the respondents. Further, a perusal of G.O.Ms.No.1672, Education, dated 4.9.1979 shows that the markers working in the Tamil Nadu State Council and District Sports Councils are entitled to a regular pay scale and that they are also eligible for clearness allowance, house allowance and city compensatory allowance.
These averments made affidavit are not denied by the respondents. Further, a perusal of G.O.Ms.No.1672, Education, dated 4.9.1979 shows that the markers working in the Tamil Nadu State Council and District Sports Councils are entitled to a regular pay scale and that they are also eligible for clearness allowance, house allowance and city compensatory allowance. It is not in dispute that the markers working the Madras University, Annamalai University, Sports Council and the Government Secretariat are doing the same type of work as markers working in the colleges both private Government. As the members of the petitioner-association and the markers working Madras University, Annamalai University, Sports Council and the Government Secretariat similarly placed, they must be treated similarly with regard to their emoluments, conditions of service etc. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, since markers working in the colleges both private and Government are carrying on the same of job as markers working in the University of Madras, Annamalai University, Sports and the Government Secretariat, they are also entitled to get, by virtue of Art.14 read Art.39(d) of the Constitution, the same pay which the markers of the Madras University are getting. Even if it is not possible to employ the members of the petitioner-association a regular and permanent basis since there are no sanctioned posts there is no whatsoever why they should be denied pay equal to the pay paid to the markers employed the Madras University, Annamalai University, etc. At this juncture, it is relevant to the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Surinder Singh v. Engineer in C.P.W.D., A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 584: 1986 Lab.I.C 551: (1986)1 S.C.C. 639 : (1986)1 403: (1986)1 S.C.J. 241: (1986)1 Lab.L.N. 522. The petitioners in that case who employed by the Central Public Work Department on daily wage basis and who have working for several years, demanded that they should be paid the same wages as permanent employees employed to do identical work. The Supreme Court held in that case that persons employed on a daily wage basis are entitled not only to daily wages but are to the same wages as other permanent employees in the department employed identical work.
The Supreme Court held in that case that persons employed on a daily wage basis are entitled not only to daily wages but are to the same wages as other permanent employees in the department employed identical work. The Supreme Court dealing with the scope of Art.39, which enshrines principle of equal pay for equal work, observed thus: “The Central Government like all organs of the State is committed to the Directive Principles of State Policy and Art.39 enshrines the principle of equal pay for equal work. In Singh v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 879: (1982)3 S.C.R. 298, this Court had occasion explain the observations in Kishori Mohan Lal Bakshi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. and to point out how the principle of equal pay for equal work is not an abstract doctrine how it is a vital and vigorous doctrine accepted throughout the world, particularly socialist countries. For the benefit of those that do not seem to be aware of it, we may out that the decision in Randhir Singh’s case, (1982)3 S.C.R. 298: A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 879, been followed in any number of cases by this Court and has been affirmed by a Constitution Bench of this Court in D.S.Nakara v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 130: (1983)2 165. The Central Government, the State Governments and likewise, all public undertakings are expected to function like model and enlightened employers and arguments such as those which were advanced before us that the principle of equal pay for equal is an abstract doctrine which cannot be enforced in a court of law should ill-come from mouths of the State and State Undertakings. ” In that case, the Supreme Court directed the respondents to pay to the petitioners and other daily rate employees the same salary and allowances as are paid to regular permanent employees. The Supreme Court also directed the respondents in that case to appropriate action to regularise the services of all those who have been in continuous employment for more than six months. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court above decision is applicable to the facts of the present case and the petitioner-association entitled to a similar direction issued to the respondents in this writ petition. 10.
The principle laid down by the Supreme Court above decision is applicable to the facts of the present case and the petitioner-association entitled to a similar direction issued to the respondents in this writ petition. 10. The reason given by the third respondent in the letter dated 3.4.1987 for the Government inability to regularise the services of the markers, who are the members of the petitioner association is the paucity of finance. I am not at all satisfied that this plea is a plausible an acceptable one. The respondents have not filed any counter-affidavit giving the relevant data and merely satisfied with a bald statement in the letter dated 3.4.1987 that the financial position is not favourable for considering the petitioner’s request for regularising the services of the members of the petitioner-association. In The Church of South India v. The Government of Tamil Nadu, Writ.L.R. 130 (D.B.), a Bench of this Court dealt with the plea of financial constraints forth by the State in answer to the claim for aid after recognition has been accorded following terms: "As for financial liabilities, being fully aware of the protection conferred under Art.30(2) the Constitution and being fully conscious that Minorities have the right to open schools when such schools are being opened year after because of public demand and increase in population there could not be any difficulty for the State to provide contingency funds under the head of ‘Education’ in formulating the Budget. No rupees two hundred crores is spent for free education and hence a few more lakhs unmanageable financial capabilities for this welfare State. Therefore it is not impossible performance to comply with the Constitutional requirements." Further, as observed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Manubhai Vashi v. State, A.I.R. 1989 Bom. 296. "Paucity of finances which Government pleads can be no reason for discrimination." only ground put forth by the third respondent in his letter dated 3.4.1987 for not regularising the services of the markers working in the private and Government colleges and granting pay scale equal to that of the markers working in the Madras University, University, Sports Council and Government Secretariat cannot stand scrutiny of review and it has brought about the discrimination against the markers working colleges and it comes within the scathe Of Art.14 of the Constitution. 11.
11. Under the above circumstances, I am obliged to allow the writ petition and respondents" to pay to the members of the petitioner-association and all other working in the private and Government colleges the same salary and accord the conditions of services as are being received by markers employed in the Madras University, Annamalai University, Sports Council and Government Secretariat with effect from. 12. With regard to the regularisation of the services of the members of the petitioner association, the relief cannot be granted since there are no sanctioned posts. In this context, I record my regret that many of the markers are kept in service for long number of without their services being regularised. I hope and trust that the Government will appropriate action with expedition to regularise the service of all those who have been continuous employment for more than six months. The writ petition is ordered accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.