JUDGMENT - M.F. SALDANHA, J.:---This is an application filed by an under-trial accused who has been in custody since the year 1988. The applicant is facing charges under sections 147, 148 and 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. It is also alleged that the applicant along with his companion accused have committed offences punishable under sections 37(1), 135 and 142 of the Bombay Police Act. Four of the original accused had applied to this Court for release on bail through Criminal Application No. 2573 of 1988. It appears that prior to the filing of this application, the accused had moved the Sessions Court as also third Court for bail and that the application came to be rejected. My brother Kotwal, J., by an order dated 28-12-1988, released accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 but rejected the application of the present applicant. There are no reasons indicated in that order as to why this distinction was made but a perusal of the record indicates that this was obviously done, since there are direct involvements as far as the present applicant is concerned that it was for this reason that his application came to be rejected. Thereafter, on 22-3-1990, the present application was filed. 2. The solitary ground canvassed in this application is that the accused has been in custody since the year 1988, that the trial will still take some time and that consequently, the accused be released on bail as the State cannot act in consonance with the accused's right to a speedy trial. In other words, the question posed is whether, even in the face of rejection of bail by this Court on merits, the accused can renew his application solely on the ground of delay, for which he is not a contributory cause. A corollary to this is the argument that the accused is presumed to be guilty until proved otherwise, and in the event of an acquittal that there are no means of his being compensated for the long, unnecessary detention. 3. In the month of April 1990, my brother K.N. Patil, J., asked for a report from the Thane Sessions Court with regard to the number of pending cases. According to that report, in the month of June 1990, there were as many as 156 sessions cases pending before that Court. This is a charge-sheet of 1988. 3. In the month of April 1990, my brother K.N. Patil, J., asked for a report from the Thane Sessions Court with regard to the number of pending cases. According to that report, in the month of June 1990, there were as many as 156 sessions cases pending before that Court. This is a charge-sheet of 1988. As of June 1990, which is 14 months back, there were 33 sessions cases pending out of which, only 7 related to charge sheets filed prior to the year 1988. As of today, therefore, the trial itself is imminent, rendering the challenge almost futile. 4. Appearing on behalf of the applicant, Mr. Hudlikar, learned Counsel contended that the solitary ground which he has raised in the present application is that the applicant should be released on bail in so far as he has a right to a speedy trial. As has been demonstrated, since it was not possible for the State to put him on trial within a reasonable period of time, the accused should become entitled to release on bail. Mr. Hudlikar has relied on certain judgments for this purpose, the first of them being a decision of the Delhi High Court, reported in (1988 Criminal Law Reports, Vol. II, page 593.)1, In that case, the Delhi High Court took the view that where there was an inordinate delay of 2 1/2 years since the case was committed to sessions, that the accused should be granted bail. It is necessary to point out that, as far as that decision is concerned, the Delhi High Court did consider the case on merits and that the delay in the disposal of the case was only one of the additional considerations and the bail came to be granted. 5. In another decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, reported in (1986 Crimes Judicial Reports, Vol. III, page 429,)2 , the learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court took the view that where more than one year has passed, the trial has not been completed and where nothing was suggested in support of the accused person being required to remain in custody until the disposal of the case, that the accused shall be entitled to the grant of bail. 6. 6. In a more considered judgment, the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in a case reported in (Anurag Baita v. State of Bihar)3,1987 Criminal Law Journal, Page 2037, has taken the view that the reasonable time within which an accused must be put on trial shall be a period of one year. The Full Bench of the Patna High Court was of the view that if the trial cannot be commenced within a period of one year, that it would be an infringement of the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution which has been interpreted in that case and consequently, the accused would be entitled to bail. The Full Bench had, however, qualified that there may be a series of what they defined as horrendous capital crimes, some of which have been set out in the judgment, in which cases, even if there is considerable delay in the trial, the accused ought not to be entitled to bail as of right. 7. It is on the basis of these judgments that Mr. Hudlikar submits that the present applicant must be released on bail in so far as he has been languishing in custody for over three years. 8. Mr. Lambay, learned A.P.P. has countered this submission by pointing out that whereas there is no dispute at all with regard to the principles enunciated by the learned Judges in the aforesaid decisions viz., that an accused in entitled to a speedy trial and that consequently, all efforts must be made to dispose of the cases expeditiously, that it would be too dangerous a situation if the courts were to mechanically hold that if the trials cannot be completed within a prescribed period, that the accused as a matter of right would be entitled to bail. 9. There can be no dispute about the fact that an accused person who starts with the presumption of innocence is entitled to demand a speedy trial if he is not released on bail. However, faced with the limitations as they are and the fact that the courts, even though they are strained to their full capacity cannot dispose of cases as fast as they would like to, it would undoubtedly be an added consideration while granting bail to an accused person to take into account the time factor. However, faced with the limitations as they are and the fact that the courts, even though they are strained to their full capacity cannot dispose of cases as fast as they would like to, it would undoubtedly be an added consideration while granting bail to an accused person to take into account the time factor. As has been done in several of the earlier decisions, including the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court referred to above, the courts have taken into account the fact that it is extremely difficult to predict with a degree of reliability, the outcome of the case even on a careful persual of the case papers and the charge sheet. The fact that an accused person may be acquitted at the trial is a material consideration but the predominant consideration is the question as to whether pending the trial, it is in the public interest and in the interest of the general law and order situation to release a particular accused on bail. These are considerations which are individual and particular to each and every case. There can be no generalisation with regard to these factors but it must be borne in mind that in the case of trials which are likely to be delayed for a considerable period of time, that there must exist very cogent reasons before bail can be refused. It is also true that even if bail is refused at an earlier point of time, that in the changed circumstances, the Courts do consider or reconsider earlier decisions. 10. On a persual of the present application, I find that no changed circumstances whatsoever have been pleaded except the solitary circumstance that the accused has been in custody for a long time. This, to my mind, would not be a sufficient ground to review the earlier order passed by this very Court. Under these circumstances, all that can be done is that the learned Sessions Judge before whom the trial is pending be directed to expedite the trial. Furthermore, the applicant is granted liberty to move either the trial Court or this Court by way of a fresh application making out valid and cogent ground, if any, on the basis of which this Court can reconsider the earlier decision. The application is disposed of accordingly. Rule discharged. Rule discharged. -----