DAVE, J. ( 1 ) SINCE common questions of law and facts arise, at the request and with the consent of the learned Advocates appearing for the parties, all these five petitions are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. ( 2 ) THE central question which is required to be considered and determined is whether Lignite is Coal covered by Entry No. 1 Schedule II Part A of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 and is it the declared goods of special importance under Sec. 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. If yes, whether the restrictions imposed under the provisions of Sec. 15 of the Central Sales tax Act, 1956 would be attracted or not ? ( 3 ) SPECIAL Civil Application No. 2927 of 1991 is filed by M/s. Sagar tiles Company, Morbi while Special Civil Application No. 1861 of 1987 is filed by Morbi Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Associations and Special Civil application Nos. 4220 of 1988, 6583 of 1988 and 3410 of 1989 have been filed by Jiyajirao Cotton Mills Ltd. , Indian Rayon and Industries Ltd. and tata Chemicals Limited respectively. In substance the petitioners pray for declaration that the rate of tax on sales of Lignite stands modified pro tanto to 4% and the respondents be restrained from levying and collecting or recovering sales tax at the rate in excess of 4% of the sale price. The petitioners have also prayed for the refund of the amount of sales tax levied is excess of 4% with interest. ( 4 ) AS provided under Entry 102 of Schedule II Part A of the Gujarat Sales tax Act, 1969 (for short local Act) Lignite is subject to sales tax or purchase tax as the case may be at the rate of 10 paise in rupee. This entry has been inserted by Gujarat Act No. 17 of 1981 and has come into force with effect from 10/04/1981. Entry No. 1 Schedule II Part A of the Local Act provides for levy of sales tax or purchase tax on coal in all its forms (excluding charcoal) at the rate of four paise in rupee. ( 5 ) THAT the Coal is declared goods of Special Importance in inter-State Trade and Commerce under Sec. 14 of the Central Sales Tax, 1956. ( 5 ) THAT the Coal is declared goods of Special Importance in inter-State Trade and Commerce under Sec. 14 of the Central Sales Tax, 1956. Thus by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 15 of the Central Act, the States are prohibited from levying tax under the Local Act on Coal in excess of 4% of the sale or the purchase price. As indicated hereinabove Entry 1 Schedule II Part A of the Local act refers to Coal including coke in all its forms (excluding charcoal) and seeks to levy tax at the rate of 4 paise in rupee. However, the State legislature of the gujarat State, amended the Local Act by Sec. 6 (3) of the Gujarat Act No. 17 of 1981 which has come into force from 10/04/1981. By this amendment entry 102 has been inserted in Schedule II Part A to the Local Act. Initially sales tax on Lignite was imposed at the rate of 6%. Under Sec. 4a of the Local act an additional tax at the rate of 10% of the sales tax is leviable. Thus the effective rate of tax on Lignite came to 6. 6%. The same rate has been increased from 6% to 10% with effect from 1/04/1987 (see Sec. 7 (13) of the Gujarat act No. 16 of 1987) and with the additional tax provided under Sec. 4a of the local Act, the effective rate came to 12%. However, from 1/04/1978, Entry 184 was inserted and sales tax was reduced to 8%, but the effective rate along with the additional tax came to 9. 6%. This entry has been deleted with effect from 1/04/1989. Consequently the rate of sales tax was fixed at 10% but the effective rate with additional tax stood increased to 12% upto 5/08/1988. From August 6, 198 8/07/1989 the effective rate was 10% and from august 1, 198 9/03/1991 it was 9. 6%. The State Legislature has again amended Columns 3 and 4 of Entry 102 with effect from 1/04/1991 and the rate of sales tax has been increased from 10% to 15% and coupled with the additional tax, the effective rate comes to 18% of the sale price. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel Mr. 6%. The State Legislature has again amended Columns 3 and 4 of Entry 102 with effect from 1/04/1991 and the rate of sales tax has been increased from 10% to 15% and coupled with the additional tax, the effective rate comes to 18% of the sale price. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel Mr. R. D. Pathak appearing for the petitioners contended that Lignite is Coal and therefore the provisions of Sec. 14 of the central Act would be applicable to the facts of all the petitions. As natural corollary of this contention it is further contended that the provisions of Sec. 15 of the Central Act would be attracted and the tax on Lignite is subject to restrictions imposed under Sec. 15 of the Central Act. On behalf of the respondents it is contended that Lignite is entirely a different commodity and it cannot be said to be Coal. Therefore, the provisions of Secs. 14 and 15 of the Central Act are not attracted. ( 7 ) IT is contended by Mr. Pathak, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners that in the year 1976, the Gujarat Mineral Development corporation (for short gmdc) had made an application under Sec. 62 of the Local Act for determination of the rate of sales tax, on Lignite. As provided under Sec. 62 of the Local Act the question can be referred to the Commissioner of Sales Tax as to whether any tax is payable in respect of a particular sale or purchase and if yes (he rate at which the tax is payable. If such application is made, the Commissioner is required to pass order determining such questions. Such an application was made by GMDC together with invoice dated 1/03/1975 requesting to determine the rate of tax payable on sale or purchase of Lignite. The Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax had come to a conclusion that Lignite should be treated as coal and therefore tax leviable would be at the rate of 4% on the sale or purchase price of the Lignite. ( 8 ) THE learned Counsel Mr. Pathak has placed heavy reliance on the aforesaid determination order which is produced at Annexure a to the memo of Special Civil Application No. 1861 of 1987. ( 8 ) THE learned Counsel Mr. Pathak has placed heavy reliance on the aforesaid determination order which is produced at Annexure a to the memo of Special Civil Application No. 1861 of 1987. It is submitted that once such determination order is passed by the competent authority, which exercises judicial or quasi-judicial power in nature, it would be binding to the department. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme court in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P. , Luck now v. Super cotton Bowl Refilling Works reported in (1989) 73 STC 61. In this decision, the Supreme Court has held that such a decision would be quasi-judicial or judicial and cannot be characterised as administrative order. But the question as to whether the decision rendered in the determination proceedings would be binding for all the time to come and to all the authorities has not been determined by the Supreme Court. Therefore, this decision does not help the petitioners. On the contrary in the case of Doma Sao Molianlal v. State of Bihar and Ors. , (1971) 27 STC 473, it is held that the order in relation to a particular assessment year cannot be relied on in relation to the recovery proceedings for other period. This is so because each assessment period is distinct and separate and any decision of the authorities declaring liability to tax could not operate as res judicafa in respect of another period. Therefore the reliance placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of super Cotton Bowl Refilling Works (supra) is of no help to the petitioners. ( 9 ) BE it noted that with effect from 10/04/1981, Entry No. 102 in the Local Act has been inserted and Lignite has been given separate treatment. In view of this position, the determination order dated 1/04/1976 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax is of little value while determining the scope of Entry No. 102 inserted with effect from 10/04/1981. When determination order was passed on 1/04/1976 the specific entry dealing with Lignite was not on the statute book. Therefore, the determination order dated 1/04/1976 is of no help in deciding the question raised in these petitions. When determination order was passed on 1/04/1976 the specific entry dealing with Lignite was not on the statute book. Therefore, the determination order dated 1/04/1976 is of no help in deciding the question raised in these petitions. If the argument canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is accepted, it would mean that the determination order would prevent the Legislature from amending the Act. Such an absurd interpretation cannot be accepted. Again it may be noted that the determination order under Sec. 62 of the Local Act is nothing but classification of a particular commodity. The highest departmental authority decides the question as to whether the sale of a commodity is taxable and if so, at what rate. Thus it is nothing but a decision as regards the classification of the commodity and determination as to by which particular entry the sale of such commodity would be covered. Similar questions are being decided by the departmental authorities under the appropriate provisions of Central excises and Salt Act, 1944. In the context of the provisions of the Central excises and Salt Act, 1944, the Supreme Court has held that the classification once made by the departmental authorities can be revised by the department itself. In the case of Plassmac Machine Mfg. Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of central Excise, reported in AIR 1991 SC 999 , it was inter alia contended before the Supreme Court that having earlier approved the article in question as falling under Tariff Item No. 68 (Residuary entry), the department had no jurisdiction to revise the same. Repelling the contention, the Supreme Court held that the contention was not tenable inasmuch as there could be no estoppel against a statute. In para 6 of the reported decision the Supreme Court held that if according to law Tie Bar Nuts fall within Tariff Item No. 52 the fact that the department earlier approved their classification under Tariff Item 68 will not estop it from revising the classification to one under Tariff Item No. 52. The Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision in the case of M/s. Elson Machines Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, AIR 1989 SC 617 , and reaffirmed the same. The Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision in the case of M/s. Elson Machines Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, AIR 1989 SC 617 , and reaffirmed the same. Thus even if the Sales Tax authorities would have taken a different view as regards Lignite, it would have been open to the authorities to revise the decision if the earlier decision was not found to be in accordance with law. In view of this position, the contention that the determination made by the Dy. Commissioner of Sales Tax by order dated 1/04/1976 should prevail has no substance and the same cannot be accepted. ( 10 ) THE main contention of the petitioners is that Lignite is Coal and it cannot be treated as a different commodity. But it is difficult to accept this contention. Even in para 3 of memo of Spl. C. A. No. 6583 of 1988 it is averred that Lignite is substitute for Coal. In para 7 of memo of Spl. C. A. No. 3410 of 1989 it is averred that Lignite is used as an alternative of Coal. Thus according to the petitioners own admission, Lignite is something other than Coal and it is not Coal. It is either substitute for Coal or it is alternative of Coal. In view of this admission of the petitioners, no further evidence is necessary. Moreover, petitioners arc persons who are trading and dealing in Lignite. They themselves consider that Lignite is different from coal. Therefore what they consider regading Lignite is the best evidence for application of common parlance test. Applying this test, Lignite is a commodity other than coal. ( 11 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners referred to encyclopaedia Britanica, 1972 Edition, Vol. V page 962 and read caption coal and Coal Mining. Para I thereof deals with origin of Coal while para II deals with types of Coal. He referred to the following passage in relation to Lignite : "lignite is a law-rank, brown-to-black Coal containing a high percentage of moisture. In dries out and crumbles in air and is liable to spontaneous combustion. Although there are thousands of square miles of lignite deposits in United States, little is mined because of these facts, its relatively small heat value, and its location far away from large industrial areas. In dries out and crumbles in air and is liable to spontaneous combustion. Although there are thousands of square miles of lignite deposits in United States, little is mined because of these facts, its relatively small heat value, and its location far away from large industrial areas. " on the basis of the aforesaid literature it is submitted that Lignite must be taken as Coal and it may be the Coal of a lower rank. ( 12 ) THE aforesaid submission cannot be accepted. Here reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Indo International industries v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1079 . In that case the Supreme Court has laid down the principle as to how the item or entry in the statutes like Excise Tax Act or Sales Tax Act is to be interpreted. While doing so, the Supreme Court has observed :"in interpreting Items in Statutes like the Excise Tax Acts or Sales Tax Acts whose primary object is to raise revenue and for which purpose they classify diverse products, articles and substances, resort should be had not to the scientific and technical meaning of the terms or expressions used but to their popular meaning, i. e. , the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. If any terms or expression has been defined in the enactment then it must be understood in the sense in which it is defined but in the absence of any definition being given in the enactment the meaning of the term in common parlance or commercial parlance has to be adopted. "recently in the case of Dy. Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. M/s. Coco Fibres, reported in AIR 1991 sc 378 , the Supreme Court lias considered the question relating to coconut fibre. The Supreme Court has observed that coconut fibre is commercially a different identifiable commodity than the coconut husk and no one in the market would sell or supply husk when fibre is asked for. In the case of deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), v. G. S. Pai and Co. The Supreme Court has observed that coconut fibre is commercially a different identifiable commodity than the coconut husk and no one in the market would sell or supply husk when fibre is asked for. In the case of deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), v. G. S. Pai and Co. reported in (1980) 45 STC 58 the Supreme Court has stated the same principle that while interpreting the entries in the Sales Tax legislation words used in the entries must be construed not in any technical sense nor from the scientific point of view but the same should be interpreted as understood in common parlance. This principle has been laid down by the supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh, (1967) 19 STC 469. Therein the Supreme court has observed as follows :"while interpreting items in statutes like the Sales Tax Acts, resort should be had not to the scientific or technical meaning of such terms but to their popular meaning or the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them, that is to say, to their commercial sense. " ( 13 ) IN view of the aforesaid principle laid down by the Supreme Court, the reliance placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners on the literature of Encyclopaedia Britanica is of no help to the petitioners. The Court has to avoid the scientific or technical meaning. Instead the Court is required to adopt and apply the popular meaning or the meaning attached to the commodity by those dealing in the same. In view of the aforesaid principle laid down by the Supreme Court the literature that is, Encyclopaedia Britanica referred to and relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is of no help to the petitioners. ( 14 ) IT is urged by Mr. Pathak that Leco is held to be a kind of Lignite and Leco is Coal. Therefore it is submitted that Lignite also should be held to be Coal. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Deputy Commissioner of Commercial taxes, Madras Division v. B R Kuppuswami Chetty, reported in (1980) 45 stc 308 . Therefore it is submitted that Lignite also should be held to be Coal. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Deputy Commissioner of Commercial taxes, Madras Division v. B R Kuppuswami Chetty, reported in (1980) 45 stc 308 . The question before the Madras High Court was as to whether leco is a kind of Coal within the meaning of Sec. 14 of the Central Act it is true that in this decision the Madras High Court held that Leco is a kind of Lignite which goes into the process of making Lignite bricks and as Lignite comes within the category of Coal, Leco was required to be classified as Coal. However, this decision is based upon the dictionary meaning, government circulars and Tribunals decision. With utmost respsct to the honble Judges of the Madras High Court, it is difficult to persuade ourselves to agree with this decision. As laid down by the Supreme Court we are required to adopt commercial parlance test or the popular parlance test while interpreting entries in taxing statute. We cannot adopt and prefer Scientific or technial meaning. For the same reason, we are not in a position to agree with the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Haryana briquettes Industries v. State of Haryana and Anr. , reported in (1987) 64 STC 330 . It is true that Patna High Court has also taken a similar view in the case of Bajrang Coke Enqueuing Industries and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Ors, reported in (1987) 66 STC 128 . Therein the question was as regards the coke briquettes manufactured for domestic consumption by mixing coal dust, soi and molasses. These articles were taken to be Coal falling under the category of declared goods. But this decision also follows the decision of the Madras high Court. For the same reason as indicated hereinabove, we are not in a position to agree with these decisions. ( 15 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Dinabandhu Sahu and Sons. , (1976) 37 STC 583. In that case certain commodities like Jeera, dhania, panmohuri, methi and postak have been accepted as the oil seeds. ( 15 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Dinabandhu Sahu and Sons. , (1976) 37 STC 583. In that case certain commodities like Jeera, dhania, panmohuri, methi and postak have been accepted as the oil seeds. If, in that case, the above said commodities were to be treated as oil seeds within the meaning of Sec. 14 of the Central Act, the assessee was entitled to the benefit of a lower tax rate of 2% as against 5% if the above said commodities were not to be treated as oil seeds. But the above said decision rendered by the Supreme Court is based upon Sec. 14 (vi) of the Central Act saying that the oil seeds yielding nonvolatile oils used for human consumption etc. would be the goods of special importance in industry and/or commerce within the meaning of Sec. 14 of the Central act. On the basis of the analysis regarding the oil contents of the above said articles, the Supreme Court had come to the conclusion that the above said commodities also would be oil seeds. But the distinguishing feature in above said case law is that the above said commodities were yielding nonvolatile oils used for human consumption and therefore they did fall within the purview of Sec. 14 (vi) of the Central Act. Here the case being entirely different we feel that the principle laid down by the Supreme; Court based on the facts and circumstances of that case would not have any application to the present petitions before us. ( 16 ) MR. Pathak, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has also tried to strengthen his position by invoking the principle of functional TEST and by urging that if the said test is to be made applicable Lignite would definitely be Coal for all the purposes. In support of his contention, Mr. Pathak has quoted the principle laid down by the supreme Court in Atul Glass Industries (P) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, (1986) 63 STC 322. In this decision after having carefully considered the process for the manufacture of glass mirrors from glass simpliciter, the Supreme court has taken the view that the Glass Mirror cannot be accepted as Glass ware. In this decision after having carefully considered the process for the manufacture of glass mirrors from glass simpliciter, the Supreme court has taken the view that the Glass Mirror cannot be accepted as Glass ware. The Supreme Court has noticed with due emphasis that after having undergone a certain process, the glass sheet becomes mirror and thereafter the mirror reflects while the Glass Ware does not. Thus adopting the principle of Functional Test the Supreme Court has said that glass mirror would not be glass-ware. Arguing in the same line, Mr. Pathak has urged that Lignite is a substitute for and alternate of Coal because both Lignite and Coal are fuel and mineral. The subsequent submission emerging from the same sought to be canvassed by Mr. Pathak is that therefore Lignite also can be said to be the Coal. But we feel that the facts before the Supreme Court in the above said case law were entirely different. The glass sheet had undergone certain process by which the glass sheet was reflecting and it was being used as a mirror. Because of this added quality of reflecting which is not found to be present in ordinary glass-sheet, the Supreme Court has stated that the mirror and the glass-ware cannot be said to be same commodity. But here by adopting the above said analogy it cannot be said that Lignite would be Coal. This is especially so because here, the commodity namely lignite does not pass through the manufacturing process and come out as a different commodity. No doubt the principle of Functional Test has been invoked but it was applied for the purpose of showing that the function which is being performed by a mirror is never being performed by a glasssheet and therefore mirror which functions differently by reflecting would not be the glass-ware. On the analogy of the above said principle, which is based entirely on different facts and circumstances it cannot be accepted that Lignite would also be Coal on the basis that it is being utilised as substitute for or alternative of Coal and performs the functions of Coal, ( 17 ) MR. Pathak has also placed heavy reliance upon the Supreme Court decision in India Carbon Ltd. v. Superintendent of Taxes, Gauhati and Ors. , (1971) 28 STC 603. Pathak has also placed heavy reliance upon the Supreme Court decision in India Carbon Ltd. v. Superintendent of Taxes, Gauhati and Ors. , (1971) 28 STC 603. In this decision it has been found by the Supreme Court that petroleum coke is included in the entry namely "coal, including coke in all its forms". Here also before us Entry No. 1 Schedule II Part A of the Local act is in the same terms but with slight variation. The entry runs thus : "coal including coke in all its forms (excluding charcoal; 4 paise in rupee is the rate of Sales Tax and Purchase Tax. " but it requires to be appreciated that what the Supreme Court has said in the above said decision is that the petroleum coke would be included in the words "coke in all its forms". It could never have been disputed that petroleum coke would be the coke and therefore naturally when the entry says that coal includes coke in all its forms the petroleum coke would also fall within the above said entry. In our view, therefore, the above said decision would be of no avail to Mr. Pathak in his submission before us. ( 18 ) THE same is the position in respect of another decision of Patna High court in Anil Coke Industries and Ors. v State of Bihar and Ors. , (1988) 71 stc 322 . In this decision it has been pointed out that coke is not a distinct subject-matter for taxation under the Central Act and therefore it falls within the meaning of Coal in the same section of the Act. It has been pointed out by the patna High Court that this is so by legal fiction because in common parlance coke may not be understood as coal. Taking shelter under the above said pronouncement of the Patna High Court Mr. Pathak has tried to urge, before us, that here in the instant petitions also, we should subscribe to the view that Lignite would be Coal because Lignite is not a distinct subject-matter for taxation under the Central Act, and would fall within the meaning of coal under Sec. 14 of the said Act. But as pointed out above in the above said case the question was of coke and coal and not of Lignite and Coal. But as pointed out above in the above said case the question was of coke and coal and not of Lignite and Coal. Viewing this case law from the said angle it becomes clear that the finding of the patna High Court in the above said decision cannot be taken as a persuasive factor or guideline to come to the conclusion that Lignite would be Coal. ( 19 ) FROM the above said analysis of the contentions raised by Mr. Pathak before us it becomes clear that the view sought to be canvassed by the petitioners before us that Lignite would be Coal for the purpose of Secs. 14 and 15 of the Central Act cannot be accepted. ( 20 ) THE learned Counsel Ms. Doshit who appears on behalf of the State and Sales Tax Authorities has urged before us that in the various Mining legislations a separate treatment has been given to the commodities under consideration, namely, Lignite and Coal. Our attention has been firstly invited to the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) act, 1957, Sec 5 (2 ). The said provision of the aforesaid Act says that except with the previous approval of the Central Government, no prospecting licence or mining lease shall be granted in respect of any material specified in the First Schedule. When the reference is made to the 1st Schedule it becomes clear that Entry No 4 reads thus : "coal and Lignite" this phraseology used in Item No. 4 of the 1st Schedule appended to the above said Act of 1957 makes it clear that Coal and Lignite have been treated as different and separate commodities altogether. . ( 21 ) MS. Doshit has also tried to derive some assistance from the definition clause under Sec. 3 of the Coal Mines Act. A reference to the above said definition clause goes to show very clearly that Lignite is not included in the Coal. Section 3 (c) of the Act reads thus : " coal includes coke in all its forms but does not include Lignite. " therefore from the above said definition in the aforesaid Act of 1974 also it becomes clear that the said Central Legislation also says very clearly that Lignite would not be included in Coal, though coke in all its forms would be included in coal. ( 22 ) MS. " therefore from the above said definition in the aforesaid Act of 1974 also it becomes clear that the said Central Legislation also says very clearly that Lignite would not be included in Coal, though coke in all its forms would be included in coal. ( 22 ) MS. Doshit has also read before us the Notification appended to the gujarat Mineral Rights Tax Act, 1985, which also treats Lignite as a separate and distinct commodity. Looking to the above said position emanating from the various Mining Legislations also it becomes clear that Lignite does not get included in Coal and that Coal and Lignite have been defined and treated as two different and separate commodities. In view of this position also the contentions raised by Mr. Pathak, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners before us cannot be accepted. ( 23 ) ON behalf of GMDC, the learned Counsel Mr. Modi has stated that gmdc does not take any side. GMDC followed the decision of the Deputy commissioner of Sales Tax rendered on 1/04/1976. Thereafter if the position of law is changed, GMDC follows that position. Today also it does not take any side and would abide by the decision of the Court. Thus in essence there is no submission either way on behalf of GMDC. ( 24 ) RELYING on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Modi spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Punjab, (1965) 16 STC 310 and the decision in the case of Devi Dass Gopal Krishnan and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. , (1967) 20 STC 430, it is submitted by the learned Counsel Mr. Pathak appearing for the petitioners that if the Court comes to the conclusion that Lignite is Coal, this Court need not strike down the appropriate provisions of the Local Act, but should hold that the pro tanto rate would stand modified and they are subject to the restrictions imposed under Sees. 14 and 15 of the Central Act. However, since we take the view that Lignite is a different and separate commodity other than Coal, it is not necessary to refer to these decisions in detail. In our view, there is no question of two possible views. 14 and 15 of the Central Act. However, since we take the view that Lignite is a different and separate commodity other than Coal, it is not necessary to refer to these decisions in detail. In our view, there is no question of two possible views. we are of the opinion that only one view is possible and that Lignite is a different commodity and it is not Coal. Therefore, the reliance placed by Mr. Pathak on the decision of this Court in the case of Arvind Boards and Paper Products Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, gujarat-IV, (1982) 137 ITR 635 is also of no help to the petitioners. ( 25 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that Lignite cannot be considered to be Coal. Since this question is decided against the petitioner, all other contentions raised in support of this contention also fail. ( 26 ) NO other substatial contention is raised. ( 27 ) ). In the result, all the petitions fail and they are ordered to be rejected. Rule discharged with no order as to costs. .