Judgment :- Ratnam, J.: These appeals have been preferred by the New India Assurance Limited against the common award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (District Ramanatha-puram at Madurai, in M.C.O.P.Nos.481 and 480 of 1988 respectively. stated, the circumstances giving rise to these appeals are as follows: The first respondent both the appeals is the widow of R.Durairaj. Respondents 2 to 4 in C.M.A.No.313 of 1991 the sons of R.Durairaj and the first respondent in these appeals. The second respondent C.M.A.No.312 of 1991, who is also the fifth respondent in C.M.ANo.313 of 1991, is the of the lorry bearing registration No.MDA.6672, insured with the Oriental Insurance Company Limited, which is the fourth respondent in C.M.A.No.312 of 1991 the seventh respondent in C.M.A.No.313 of 1991. The third respondent in C.M.A.No.312 1991, who is the sixth respondent in C.M.A.No.313 of 1991, is the owner of the car registration No.TNU 5580, insured with the appellant in these appeals. On 11.3.1988, R.Durairaj with his wife, sons, uncle and other relations was proceeding in the car TNU belonging to his uncle I.Masilamani Nadar from Virudhunagar towards Sivakasi. When car was just approaching Virudhunagar bye-pass road, the lorry MDA 6672 proceeding Sattur towards Madurai, according to the case of the first respondent and respondent in C.M.A.No.312 and 313 of 1991, was driven rashly and negligently by its driver and against the car TNU 5580 on its left side. It was also alleged that the driver of the car 5580 had driven the car in a rash and negligent manner without observing the traffic and the accident took place as a result of the rash and negligent driving of both the vehicles. In that accident, R.Durairaj died and his wife Kamalam, who is the first respondent in appeals, sustained some injuries. In that accident, R.Durairaj died and his wife Kamalam, who is the first respondent in appeals, sustained some injuries. In M.C.O.P.No.480 of 1988 respondents 1 to C.M.A.No.313 of 1991 claimed that the accident in which R.Durairaj lost his life was outcome of the rash and negligent driving of both the vehicles and that deceased R.Durairaj, who was aged about 57 years at the time of his death, commanded a large and lucrative practice as an Auditor and owing to his sudden death, respondents 1 to 4 in C.M.A.No.313 1991 had lost the benefit of not only the earnings of deceased R.Durairaj for at least years, but had also suffered severe shock and agony resulting in loss of consortium wife and total loss of prospects to the sons of the deceased regarding their future profession. Towards compensation for loss of expectation of life and future loss of and future happiness etc., loss of consortium, mental shock and agony and loss status and future prospects, etc., respondents 1 to 4 in C.M.ANo.313 of 1991 claimed compensation in a sum of Rs.10,00,000 would be awardable, though they restricted claim to Rs.7,00,000. The first respondent in C.M.A.No.312 of 1991,who sustained the very same accident, prayed in M.C.O.P.No.481 of 1988 that she should be awarded sum of Rs.50,000 as compensation for the injuries sustained by her, pain and permanent disability resulting in her not being able to do household duties and participate Badminton tournaments etc. 2. In the counter filed by the appellant in M.C.O.P.No.480 of 1988, it pleaded that the of the lorry bearing registration No.MDA 6672 drove the vehicle in a reckless manner sounding the horn and observing the traffic rules and had entered the road junction Virudhunagar bye-pass road without noticing the vehicle coming from his right side Virudhunagar-Sivakasi road and the accident had taken place only owing to the negligent driving of the lorry MDA 6672. Besides, the appellant also raised some regarding the quantum of compensation claimed by respondents 1 to 4 in C.M.A.No.313 1991. Likewise, the appellant, in his counter in M.C.O.P.No.481 of 1988, reiterated lorry bearing registration No.MDA 6672 was exclusively responsible for the accident rash and negligent driving of its driver and that the compensation prayed for in respect the injuries and disability at Rs.50,000 was on the high side. 3. Likewise, the appellant, in his counter in M.C.O.P.No.481 of 1988, reiterated lorry bearing registration No.MDA 6672 was exclusively responsible for the accident rash and negligent driving of its driver and that the compensation prayed for in respect the injuries and disability at Rs.50,000 was on the high side. 3. In the course of the proceedings before the Tribunal, the owner of the lorry MDA who is the second respondent in C.M.A.No.312 of 1991 and also the fifth respondent C.M.A.No.313 of 1991 remained ex parte. The owner of the car TNU 5580, who is respondent in C.M.A.No.312 of 1991 and also the sixth respondent in C.M.A.No.313 initially filed a counter alleging that the driver of the lorry MDA 6672 had by his negligent driving caused the accident resulting in the death of his nephew R.Durairaj injury to his wife and also damage to the car and that even if any liability for payment compensation was to be fastened on him, the appellant insurance company would to pay the same. However on 5.3.1990, on his counsel reporting no instructions and an endorsement to that effect in the vakalat, he was set ex parte. 4. Since both the claim petitions arose out of the same accident and the parties those petitions desired a conjoint consideration and disposal of both the claims, the Accidents Claims Tribunal enquired into the claims so made on the basis of the evidence M.C.O.P.No.480 of 1988, which was also treated as the evidence in M.C.O.P.No.481 of 1988. Before the Tribunal, on behalf of the claimants in both the petitions, Exs.A-1 to A-36 were marked and P.Ws.1 to 3 gave evidence, while, on behalf others who contested that claims, Exs.B-1 to B-6 were filed and R.Ws.1 to 4 were examined. The Tribunal also deputed a Commissioner to make a local inspection of the place where accident took place and to submit a report as well as a plan and the report and the plan submitted were marked as Exs.C-1 and C-2. On a consideration of the evidence of and 2 and R.Ws.1 to 4 and the relevant documents, the tribunal found that the accident place only on account of the rash and negligent driving of the car bearing registration No.TNU 5580 by its driver without observing the rules of the road and that the driver lorry MDA 6672 was not at all responsible for it. Dealing with the claim for payment compensation in respect of the death of R.Durairaj in that accident, the Tribunal took account the age of the deceased at the time of his death, his income as reflected income-tax returns produced and other circumstances as well and found ultimately respondents 1 to 4 in C.M.A.No.313 of 1991 were entitled to be paid compensation in of Rs.5,00,000 in respect of the death of R.Durairaj, with interest at 12% per annum the date of the claim petition. In so far as the claim of the first respondent in C.M.A.No.312 of 1991 for the injuries sustained by her in the accident was concerned, the Tribunal on the acceptance of the evidence of the doctor that serious injuries and disability had sustained by her and that in respect thereof, she deserved the award of compensation sum of Rs.38,573 together with interest at 12% per annum form the date of the petition. Finally, the tribunal passed an award directing the owner of the car TNU 5580 third respondent in C.M.A.No.312 of 1991 and the sixth respondent in C.M.A.No.313 of and the appellant insurance company to pay the amount of compensation awarded. It correctness of the awards so passed by the Tribunal that is challenged by the appellant insurance company in these appeals. 5. Learned counsel for the first respondent in C.M.A.No.312 of 1991 and respondents in C.M.A.No.313of 1991 raised a preliminary objection that these appeals, at the instance the insurance company questioning the findings of the Tribunal on negligence and quantum of compensation, cannot be entertained, as the defence of the insurance company proceeding claiming compensation is limited to those enumerated under Sec.96(2) Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘ the Act ’ ) and that no such defence been raised before the Tribunal in the course of the proceedings before it, the appellant insurance company cannot now be permitted to canvass the correctness of the passed by the tribunal either on the ground of negligence or even quantum of compensation. Reliance in this connection was also placed by learned counsel on the decision Supreme Court reported in British India General Insurance Company Limited v. Captain Singh, (1960)1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 6: (1960)1 An. W.R. (S.C.) 6: 1960 S.C.J. 149: (1960)1 168: A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1331. Reliance in this connection was also placed by learned counsel on the decision Supreme Court reported in British India General Insurance Company Limited v. Captain Singh, (1960)1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 6: (1960)1 An. W.R. (S.C.) 6: 1960 S.C.J. 149: (1960)1 168: A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1331. On the other hand, learned counsel for the appellant attention to Sec.110-C (2-A) of the Act to contend that in this case, there was collusion between the claimants and the owner of the car, who had also failed to contest the and, therefore, the appellant, as an insurer, had the right to contest the claim on all or the grounds available to the owner of the car against whom the claims had been Attention in this connection was also drawn to some decisions wherein Sec.110- the Act has come up for consideration. 6. Before proceeding to consider the aforesaid submissions, it becomes necessary to set a few undisputed facts. The appellant-insurance company figured as the fourth respondent both the claim petitions, out of which these appeals have arisen, and after receipt of from the Tribunal, had also contested the claim before it. From the counter filed by appellant in the claim petitions, it is seen that it had not raised any of the defences available to it under Sec.96(2) of the Act, but had confined itself to challenging the aspects negligence and quantum of compensation. The owner of the lorry, who is the respondent in C.M.A.No.312 of 1991 and the fifth respondent in C.M.A.No.313 of 1991, remained ex parte even from the outset. The owner of the car TNU 5580, who is the respondent in C.M.ANo.312 of 1991 and the sixth respondent in C.M.A.No.313 of 1991 initially filed a counter to the claim petitions, but had later chosen to remain ex parte 5.3.1990, as could be seen from paragraph 15 of the award. In the course of proceedings before the Tribunal, at the instance of the appellant, there was no whisper or suggestion of collusion between the claimants and the owner of the car TNU 5580. The Tribunal, consideration of the materials, ultimately awarded compensation amounts referred to earlier to the claimants, which, was could be seen from the memorandum of grounds of appeals, questioned on the ground of negligence and also as being excessive. It is in the aforesaid background that the preliminary objection has to be considered. 7. The Tribunal, consideration of the materials, ultimately awarded compensation amounts referred to earlier to the claimants, which, was could be seen from the memorandum of grounds of appeals, questioned on the ground of negligence and also as being excessive. It is in the aforesaid background that the preliminary objection has to be considered. 7. Under Sec.96(2) and (6) of the Act an insurer, who has notice through Court either of bringing of the proceedings claiming compensation or in respect of any judgment, is entitled to be made a party to the proceedings and to defend the proceedings on all or any one of grounds enumerated under Sec.96(2) of the Act, Sub-sec.6(9). Sec.96 of the Act precludes the insurer from avoiding liability otherwise than in the manner provided for in Sub It has already been noticed that in this case, in the course of the proceedings before Tribunal, the appellant-insurance company did not at all put forward any defence, which, permitted to put forward under Sec.96(2) of the Act. It would be useful in this connection refer to British India General Insurance Company Limited v. Captain Itbar Singh, (1960)1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 6: (1960)1 An.W.R. (S.C.)6: 1960 S.C.J. 149: (1960)1 S.C.R. 168 : A.I.R. S.C. 1331. Though that decision had been rendered by the Supreme Court in appeals arising out of suits for damages, Sec.96(2) of the Act employs language like ‘ Court ’‘ Judgment and the decision would, therefore, apply not only to suits for damages in civil courts, but to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals constituted under Sec.110 the Act for adjudicating claims for compensation. The Supreme Court, in the decision referred to earlier, points out that apart from statute an insurer has no right to be made a party to action by an injured person against the insured causing the injury and that though a right be made a party to a proceeding and defend it is conferred under Sec.96(2) of the Act, such a right is essentially a creature of statute and the content of that right depends on provisions of the statute. Interpreting the scope of Sec.96(2) and (6) of the Act, Supreme Court further pointed out that an insurer is entitled to defend an action on any the grounds enumerated and no others and if it was the intention that other grounds would be available, there was no need for enumeration and when specific grounds of defence have been set out, that cannot be added to and to do that, would be adding words to the statute. Referring to Sec.96(6) of the Act, the Supreme Court laid down that it indicated how Sec.96 (2) of the Act should be read and pointed out that it should be read in such a manner laying down that the insurer cannot avoid his liability, except by establishing such defences provided for under Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.96 of the Act and Sub-sec.(6) contemplated defences not mentioned in Sub-sec.(2) cannot be taken as otherwise, the insurance company could avoid its liability in a manner other than that provided for in sub which, stood prohibited by Sub-sec.(6). Ultimately, the Supreme Court laid down that insurer made a party to the action, is not entitled to take any defence, which is not specified in Sec.96(2) of the Act. Applying the aforesaid principle to the case on hand, it is seen the appellant did not at all raise any defence appropriately falling under Sec.96(2) of the and if the defences permitted under the provisions of the Act have not been so raised the raising of other defences is also prohibited under Sec.96(2) of the Act, then, we do see how the appellant can now be permitted to raise any objection with reference to findings of Tribunal on the questions of negligence and quantum of compensation. It is true that under Sec.110-D of the Act, any person aggrieved by an award of a claims tribunal may prefer an appeal, but, with reference to the insurance company, it must be an aggrieved person in the context of an adjudication relating to the right to contest on all or any of grounds conferred under Sec.96(2) of the Act and not in cases like this, where, the appellant had not raised any defence at all under Sec.96(2) of the Act. To permit an appeal under Sec.110-D of the act, even in cases where no defence under Sec.96(2) of the Act is raised, would be to nullify Sec.96(6) of the Act and also to enlarge the scope of a defence, which, otherwise is restricted to cases felling under Sec.96(2) of the Act. Perhaps, realizing difficulty, learned counsel resorted to Sec.110-C (2-A) of the Act. 8. Whether Sec.110-C (2-A) of the Act could be relied on by the appellant to maintain these appeals, may now be considered. That section inserted by Act 56 of 1969 relates to the power of a Tribunal, as distinguished from of a party to defend an action, pending before the Tribunal. Earlier, it has been Sec.96(2) of the Act is exhaustive of all defences, which could be raised by the insurer that no defence outside that can be entertained by virtue of the prohibition contained Sec.96(6) of the Act. Sec.110-C (2-A) of the Act, however, provides that if, in the any enquiry, the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that there is collusion between the making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made, or the person whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, the Tribunal, for reasons recorded in writing, may direct that the insurer, who may be liable in respect of such shall be impleaded as a party to the -proceeding and the insurer so impleaded, thereupon have the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are to the person, against whom the claim has been made. The aforesaid provision nature of a power exercisable by the Tribunal in the course of any enquiry in a before it. The aforesaid provision nature of a power exercisable by the Tribunal in the course of any enquiry in a before it. The requirements to be fulfilled, before the Tribunal can permit the contest the claim, on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against the claim has been made, are these: (1) the Tribunal should be satisfied that collusion between the claimants and the person against whom the claim is made; person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim; (3) the should record reasons in writing for directing that the insurer should be made a party proceeding: and (4) on such impleading, the insurer shall have the right to contest claim, on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person, against whom has been made. It has already been seen that there was no plea of collusion between claimants and the owner of the car, put forward by the appellant. The only circumstance is that the owner of the car, though initially had filed a counter, subsequently remained ex parte. By the filing of a counter, the owner of the contested the proceedings, whatever be the nature of the contest. This cannot therefore, regarded as a case of a failure, on the part of the owner of the car, to contest the true that the owner of the car, which was involved in the accident, had subsequently remained ex parte. The circumstances that the owner of the car remained ex parte proceedings before the Tribunal does not, in our view, either by itself or even lead to the sole inference that there had been a failure to contest the claim on his mere non-appearance on a particular date on which the case is posted, a party may ex parte, but that by itself, would not lead to the conclusion that there was a willful appearance with a view to allow the claimants to succeed in the claim petition. therefore, essential for the insurance company to satisfy the Tribunal that there had failure to contest the claim and in the course of dealing with this question, the necessarily will have to go into the nature of the claim and the circumstances accident, as well as the reasons which may probably be attributed to the omission owner of the vehicle to contest the claim, which would essentially be matters of We may point out that when the matter was before the Tribunal, no attempt was the insurance company to advert to these considerations, much less satisfy the Tribunal the vehicle owner had absented himself with a view to allow a good defence default. There are no materials on the basis of which we can hold that there has failure on the part of the owner of the car to contest the claim. From the mere circumstance that the owner of the car had remained ex parte, it cannot be concluded that the condition Sec.110-C (2-A) of the Act has been satisfied. We may also observe that the power Tribunal under Sec.110-C (2-A) of the Act can be properly exercised in cases, insurance company has not already been impleaded as a party to the proceedings, attempt is made collusively by the claimants and the owner of the vehicle to award fastening liability on the insurance company, without even so much as being the insurance company is already a party to a claim petition, then as pointed out defences would be restricted to the grounds specified in Sec.96(2) of the Act. If, the insurance company, for some reasons, is not made a party to the claim petition, there is an attempt by the claimants and the owner of the vehicle to mulct the company with payment of compensation collusively, then, the insurance company, may be made liable to pay compensation as a result of the collusion between the claimants and the owner of the vehicle, is enabled to be impleaded as a party to the claim petition and on being so impleaded, the insurance company has the right contest the claim on grounds available even to the owner of the vehicle, apart from defences statutorily made available under Sec.96(2) of the Act. The use of the words, the insurer shall be impleaded as a party to the proceeding” contemplates cases where, the course of an enquiry, the tribunal realises that as a result of collusion between claimants and the owner of the vehicle, liability for payment of compensation is sought to fastened on the insurance company in its absence and in such a case, the Tribunal enabled to exercise its powers under Sec.110-C (2-A) of the Act to implead the insurer as party to the proceedings, for reasons to be recorded in writing, and the right of defence available to the insurer so impleaded would include those grounds available to the owner the vehicle against whom the claim has been made. We are, therefore of the view that power conferred under Sec.110-C (2-A) of the Act on the Tribunal is in the nature of special power exercisable on the fulfilment of the conditions enumerated therein and not in case like this, where there was no whisper of any collusion between the claimants and owner of the car or that there was a failure on the part of the person against whom claim has been made to contest it. We may also observe that when the object of exercise of the power of a Tribunal under Sec.110-C (2-A) of the Act is to prevent collusion between the claimant and the owner of the vehicle against whom the claim is made, which may lead to the passing of an award against and fastening of liability on an insurance company, even when it is not arrayed as a party before the tribunal, we do not see serious objection to the Tribunal so exercising its power in a case where the insurance company is already a party to the proceedings and there is an established collusion between the claimant and the owner of the vehicle and a deliberate failure to contest the claim secure an award against the insurance company, though in such cases, it may incidentally widen the scope of the defence beyond what is provided for under Sec.96(2) of the act, such enlargement of the scope of the defence is attributable only to the exercise of power of the Tribunal on its being satisfied that collusion or a failure to contest the claim been made out, and not otherwise. However, in such cases where the insurer is already party to the proceedings, in order to widen the scope of its defence, it would be necessary for the insurer to satisfy the Tribunal, in the course of the proceedings before it that requirements of Sec.110-C (2-A) of the Act are fulfilled and seek an order permitting insurer to raise other pleas open to the owner of the vehicle against whom the claim been made and then proceed to resist the claim on other grounds available to the owner the vehicle, against whom the claim is made. Whatever that may be, on the facts circumstances of this case, we are of the view that the appellant certainly cannot recourse to Sec.110-C(2-A) of the act at all. Though our attention was drawn to decisions, in the view we have taken above, we have found it unnecessary to refer to them. No other point was urged. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeals are, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.