Judgment Sahay, J. This an application for revision of the order dated 21.6.1991 of the Executing Court in Execution case no. 6/88 whereby the petitioner's application for intervention in the execution case to resist the execution of the decree in favour of the opposite party no. 1 has been rejected in the following circumstances. The opposite party no. 1, (caveator) Smt. Jithika Roy filed title suit no. 185/72 against the opposite party no. 2 Smt. Parwati Devi for specific performance of contract for sale of a house. The said suit was decreed on 17.1.1978 and the judgment debtor preferred an appeal against the said decree before this Court in F.A. no. 13/78 (R) which was dismissed on 6.1.1988. Thereafter the judgment debtor filed L.P.A. 10/88 (R) which was also dismissed on 7.8.1988 by this Court. Then the judgment debtor moved the Supreme Court for grant of S.L.P. but leave was refused. The decree holder then filed Execution case no. 6/88 for obtaining delivery of possession of the suit premises. The petitioner was not a party to the suit. He filed an application before the Executing Court purporting to be Under order 21 Rule 36 and 96 of the Code or Civil Procedure alleging that he was a tenant in the suit premises since last 40 years i.e. long before the institution of title suit no. 185/72 and since he was a statutory tenant he could not be evicted without recourse to law as the decree was not binding on him. The Executing court had already directed for delivery of possession of the suit premises to the decree holder. The petitioner, therefore, prayed the said order should be recalled and decree-holder be given only symbolic possession as laid down under order 21 rule 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Executing court rejected the application of the petitioner by orde1 dated 12.4.1991. The Executing Court was of the view that the petitioner not being a party in the suit had no locus standi to object to the Execution decree. 3. The petitioner aggrieved with the said order filed Civil Revision application no. 186/91 (R) which was rejected by S. C. Mookharji, J, on 9.5.1991. The Executing Court was of the view that the petitioner not being a party in the suit had no locus standi to object to the Execution decree. 3. The petitioner aggrieved with the said order filed Civil Revision application no. 186/91 (R) which was rejected by S. C. Mookharji, J, on 9.5.1991. Undettered by the said order the petitioner again filed an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil procedure for resisting the execution decree on those very grounds which he had taken in the earlier application. The executing court repelled the contention of the petitioner that in a suit for specific performance of contract the decree holder cannot be granted actual delivery of possession when the suit premises is in occupation of a tenant. The executing court further held that the petitioner being third party had no right to challenge the execution of the decree. An important fact be stated here that the petitioner has also instituted a title suit being title suit no. 104/91 in the Court of Munsif, Ranchi, against the opposite party in which the petitioner has claimed a declaration of his status as tenant and for injunction restraining this opposite party from evicting the petitioner in Execution case no. 6/88. The petitioner's application for ad interim injunction is pending in the appellate court he having failed to obtain the order of injunction from the trial court. 4 Mr. S. N. Rajgaria learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously argued that the Executing court has no power to grant delivery of possession to the decree-holder when the premises is in occupation of a tenant who cannot be evicted without a decree for eviction against him. It is settled by a series of authorities that a court executing decree for Specific performance of a contract of sale is competent to grant of possession of the property to the decree holder, even though no relief for possession was either asked for in the plaint or awarded by the decree. This has been so held in A.I.R 1957((pat) 701, A.I.R. 1931 pat 179, A. I. R. 1954 Allahabad 643, A. I. R 1955 Cal 276 and A. I. R. 1963 M, P. 86. But here the question for consideration as to whether the Court can execute the decree against the tenant in lawful possession of the suit premises who was not a party to the suit. But here the question for consideration as to whether the Court can execute the decree against the tenant in lawful possession of the suit premises who was not a party to the suit. Order 21 Rule 36 of the Code of Civil procedure provides the mode of Executing a decree for delivery of immovable property when ill occupancy of a tenant and reads as follows : "Where a decree is for the delivery of any immovable property in the occupancy of tenant or other person entitled to occupy the Same and not bound by the decree to relinquish such occupancy, the Court shall order delivery to be made by affixing a copy of the warrant in some conspicuous place on the property, and proclaiming to the customary mode, at some convenient place, substance of the decree in regard to the property." The words" tenant or other person not bound by the decree" mean a tenant or person who is lawfully entitled to retain possession in spite of the decree. It is the petitioner's case that he is possession of the suit premises since long as tenant and if this is true then he comes under the category mentioned above. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Smt. Taher Sayeed V. M. Shanmugma and others in A.I.R. 1987 Andhra Pradesh 206 where the learned single judge K. Ramaswamy, J. (now Hon'ble Judge of the Supreme Court) has held as follows : When the third party, not bound by the decree approaches the court to protect his independent right, title or interest before he is actually dispossessed from immovable property and files an application under O. 21 R. 97, it must be treated to be an intimation to the court as caveat to the decree-holder or purchaser or a person claiming through him and the court is to treat it as a complaint or a counter in opposition as an application for the purpose of O. 21 Rule 97 and to adjudicate it under R. 98 Or R. 101 which shall be final and conclusive between the parties and it shall be treated to be a decree for the purpose of R. 103 and it is subject to appeal and further subject to the result in the prior pending suit under R. 104. This approach is consistent with Ubi Jus ibi remedium, shortens the litigation prevents needless protraction & expenditure. Accordingly the application under Order 21 Rule 97 is maintainable'. The learned Judge further held :- "Even otherwise, inherent power under section 151 also can be successfully invoked by the petitioner, order 21 rule 97 is interpreted strictly, could be available only when the decree holder or purchaser chose to make avail of. Instead, if he persists in execution under order 21 rule 35 against a third party not bound by the decree, on issue of warrant in From XI of appendix E of the schedule to the Code, the plaintiff is bound to execute the decree and delivery physical possession. Thereby, the procedure aids abuse or the process enabling the decree holder of the purchaser to over reach his object to saddle himself in possession of the immovable property depriving the person in possession but not bound by the decree of his valuable right to property. All procedure is an armour to effectuate the right to procedural Safeguard is an inrained fact of fair play in action to sub-serve the legal right and not to extinguish it. The highest duty of a court is to take care that its Act, does not injury a suitor. Thus, in a given situation, if inherent power is not exercise by the court to modulate its procedure, it would facilitate heaping in justice upon rightful person. In an appropriate case, inherent power is to exercise though no in routine but sparingly to prevent abuse of the process of the court or fraud on the' court to meet the ends of justice." In exactly similar situation as present one Dr. T. N. Singh, J of the M.P. High Court in Ramjidas V. Laxmikumar and others A.I.R 19R7 M.P. 78 held :- "Where a decree for eviction was passed against a statutory tenant in execution procedure relating to suit for partition instituted by his landlord who was found to be the benamidar or the decree-holder it was held that the decree for eviction not being passed under Section 12 (1) (a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, was invalid" Full Bench of M. P. High Court in Smt. Usha Jain and others Vs. Bajaj and others reported in A.I.R. 1980 M. P. 146 considered the scope of order 21 rule 35, 36 and 97 of the Code of Civil procedure with reference to the right of 3rd party to object the execution of the decree for possession. J. S. Verma, J (now Judge of the Hon'ble Supreme Court) speaking for the court held. "No enquiry into the title or possession of third party is contemplated at any rate at his instance either under Rules 35, 36 or Rules 95 and 96 of order 21 C. P. C. when decree holder or the auction purchaser apply for obtaining possession Subsequently when the decree holder or auction purchaser is met with obstruction or resistance in obtaining possession one of the options open to him is to apply under Rule 97 but that provision is merely permissive and not mandatory and it is open to the decree holder/auction purchaser to apply instead for a fresh warrant of possession. An enquiry at the instance of a third party in possession is contemplated only under 21 Rule 100 after he was dispossessed and not before it.” His Lordship further held:- "The omission by the executing court to investigate into the objection filed by third party does not result in justice to the third party. It cannot be said that he would have no remedy to protect his possession and have his title judicially investigated prior to his dispossession, his only remedy then being under order 21 rule 100 after dispossession. Another remedy available to such a third party is to institute an independent civil suit for a declaration of his title claiming therein the relief of temporary injunction to protect his possession. "After amendment of order 21 C.P.C. in 1976 a full investigation into the question of title is contemplated under Rule 97 and not summary enquiry. Thus it would cause greater hardships to the decree holder, if every claim by the third party is to be investigated by the executing court. AIR 1974 Madhya Pradesh 26 and 1972 MPLJ 857 ". "After amendment of order 21 C.P.C. in 1976 a full investigation into the question of title is contemplated under Rule 97 and not summary enquiry. Thus it would cause greater hardships to the decree holder, if every claim by the third party is to be investigated by the executing court. AIR 1974 Madhya Pradesh 26 and 1972 MPLJ 857 ". The full Bench Over ruled the earlier decision of the Same High Court reported in A.I.R. 1974 M. P. 26 which had held that "the Executing Court has no jurisdiction under O-21 Rule 35 C. P. C. to remove a third person who is not bound by the decree unless the court holds that such third person is holding on behalf of the judgment-debtor without any just cause and Executing Court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the execution unless it is held on enquiry that the third person is bound by the decree so as to attract the power under order 21 rule 35 or a conclusion in accordance with O.21 Rule 98 after an enquiry into his title is reached. Thus according to the Full Bench of decision of the M.P. High Court (Supra) the third party resisting the execution has no locus standi to claim investigation by the executing court into the alleged right or title prior to his dispossession as order 21 C. P. C. did not contemplate any such inquiry at his instance either under rule 35 and 36. This is the view taken by, the executing court in the present case. 5. In K. N. Prabhakaran V. Kuttain Prakashan and another reported in A.I.R. 1985 (Kerala) 204 a Division Bench of Kerala High Court following full bench decision of the M.P. High Court held - "A plain reading of the aforesaid provision of O. XXI makes it clear that no application for adjudication of the right title and interest of an obstruction would lie before he is disposed in execution of a decree to which he is not a party. If however, held disposed he is given a remedy under R. 99 of O. XXI C. P. C. to apply for restoration of possession to the execution court. If however, held disposed he is given a remedy under R. 99 of O. XXI C. P. C. to apply for restoration of possession to the execution court. The execution court on such application is required to adjudicate the question of the right, title and interest of the dispossessed obstructor and pass appropriate orders under R. 100 and such order of the execution court is to be treated as a decree for all purposes including for the purpose of appeal and second appeal. The only remedy of a dispossessed obstructor is to apply under R. 99 to the execution court and has his claim adjudicated upon by the execution court itself. A separate suit at his instance after dispossession will not be maintainable in view of the aforesaid provisions of the C P. C. as amended in 1976. This does not however, preclude to the obstructor from having recourse to a civil court by way of a separate suit before he is dispossessed in execution of a decree to which he is not a party. No application for adjudication of the rights of the obstructor would, however lie under order XXI R. 97 C. P. C. in anticipation of his dispossession in execution of a decree to which he is not a party". 5. In my opinion, the order 21 rule 36 does not contemplate even a summary inquiry into claims of the third party objecting to the execution of the decree. Further this rule will be applicable only to those cases where there is no dispute that the property in question is in occupancy of tenant and the decree-holder himselfs have applied for symbolic possession. In the instant case the decree holder has alleged the petitioner's claim that he is tenant of the judgment debtor is spurious claim and he has' been set up by the judgment debtor to delay execution of the decree. 6. The decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court Tahar case (supra) and the Madhya Pradesh High Court Ramjit Das case (Supra) no doubt fully supports the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The learned Single Judge decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court has not taken notice of the decision of the full bench reported in A.I.R. 1980 M. P. 146 (supra). These decisions are no doubt based on sound reasoning and advances the cause of justice. The learned Single Judge decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court has not taken notice of the decision of the full bench reported in A.I.R. 1980 M. P. 146 (supra). These decisions are no doubt based on sound reasoning and advances the cause of justice. But it is well settled that it is not open to a court to innovate a procedure not envisaged by law Ramaswami, J. in the Andhra Pradesh High Court decision cited earlier has dissented from the contrary view expressed by the Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Smt. Usha Jain case (supra). Wort, J. in A.I.R. 1936 Pat 453 said that third party-objector cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the executing court before there has been dispossessed of with the following observation :- "There is no jurisdiction in the judge to determine in the form of an anticipatory application, a matter of this kind. It is only when the person is dispossessed, that an application or' this kind come before the judge and he certainly could not make such an order as he has done under order 21 Rule 100". 7. A Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in Nityananda Kanungo Vs. Smt. Pala Devi A.I.R. 1952 Orissa 120 after review all the authorities on the question under consideration held that the Executing Court had no jurisdiction to investigate the claim of third person under section 151 C. P. C. Jagannadha Das C. J. speaking for the full bench held: - Thus, a review of the above cases, which are all that have been brought to our notice as having any bearing on the question before us, shows that except the cases in cut L.T. 49 and AIR (12) 1925 Reng. Page 374. Page 374. there is no case at all, which supports the exercises of any Such anticipatory jurisdiction to inquiry into the question of title of a third-party prospective-obstructor, on an application by him, before he has in fact been dispossessed, though there is some conflict of view as to whether such an inquiry can be made at the instance of the decree-holder himself at the stage when he applies for delivery warrant under order 21 Rule 95" The learned Chief Justice referred to the well known judgment of the justice woodroffe in the leading case in Hukumchand V. Komalanand Singh 1933 Cal 927 which indicates the limits the application of the powers of the court under section 151 C. P. C. In a later case in 'SasiBhusan V. Radha Nath' 1920 Cal L. J. 433 his lordships justice Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee further explained the position in the following terms : 'The principles which regulate the exercise of inherent powers 'by a court were explained in the case of Hukum Chand V. Kamalanand Singh, in 33 Cal 927. It was pointed out that Code of Civil procedure bind all courts so far as it goes but the code is not exhaustive and in matters with which it does not deal, the court will exercise its inherent power to do that justice between the parties which is warranted under the circumstance and which is necessities of the case require. On any point specifically dealt with by the Code, the Court cannot disregard the latter of the enactment according to its true construction, though, as the legislature cannot anticipate and make express provision to cover all possible contingencie, it is the duty of a Judge to apply the provision of the law not only to what appears to be regulate expressly thereby, but also to all case to which a just application of them may be made and which appears to be compreded either with in the express sense of the law or within the consequences that may be gathered from it". Commenting on the above quotation Jagannadha Das C. J. observed :- "But it seems to me equally to imply in relation to a situation which has specifically contemplated and provide by the Code, the exercise of an inherent power by way of a supposed anticipatory jurisdiction to deal with that situation under Sec. 151 of the Civil P. C. is not permissible unless any such exercise of the inherent power is sanctioned by a course of practice of courts relating to that situations". 8. In face of authoritative of the pronouncement of Bench of Orissa High Court, Full Bench of M. P. High Court learned Single Judge of this court referred to above I am unable to follow the decision of the learned judges of Andhra Pradesh High Court and Madhya Pradesh High Court. It may be mentioned the decision of the Orissa High Court was not considered in these two decisions relied upon the learned counsel for the petitioner. 9 Mr. N. K. Prasad learned counsel for the decree holder-opposite party has submitted that the petitioner's earlier application for intervention in the execution proceeding having' been rejected by the Executing Court and affirmed by this court in C.R. No, 186/91 (R) the second application with the same object is hit of principle of res judicata. As held by the Supreme Court in Satyadhyan Ghoshwal Vers. Smt. Deoranjin Devi A.I.R. 1960 S. C. 941 the principle of res judicate applies as also between two stages in the same litigation to this extend that a court whether trial court or higher court, having at earlier stage decide the matter in one way, will not allow parties to reagitate the matter against at the subsequent stages at the same proceeding. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be allowed to agitate the matter again and again for the same relief the petitioner has earlier stated also instituted the suit seeking a declaration that he tenant in the suit premises and not liable to be evicted without recourse to law. This is another reasons why no interference in revisional jurisdiction which is warranted. 10. For the reason stated above this application is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.