JUDGMENT K.M. Agarwal, J. 1. Aggrieved by dismissal of its suit on the ground of limitation, the plaintiff Bank has preferred this First Appeal before this Court. 2. It was not disputed that on 12-12-1973 the respondent No. 1 took a loan of Rs. 11,300/- from the appellant for purchase of a tempo and that the other two respondents stood guarantors for repayment of loan. It was alleged that the loan was repayable with interest at the rate of 5 per cent above the Reserve Bank rate, with a minimum of 12 per cent per annum, in 30 equal monthly instalments commencing from 10-1-1974. As the loan was not repaid, a suit for recovery of Rs. 18,479.73 P. was filed on 23-12-1977 against the respondents. The suit was resisted and dismissed on the ground of limitation. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff has preferred this first appeal. 3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the impugned judgment and decree of the Court below are not sustainable in law and that the appellant is entitled to a decree for Rs. 10,202.90 p. It was specifically pleaded in plaint para 2(d) that the loan amount with interest was repayable in 30 equal monthly instalments commencing from 10-1-1974 as per agreement between the parties. The agreement was proved and exhibited as P-7. Clause 3 of this agreement reads as follows: "I/We hereby agree and undertake to repay the above loan of Rs. 11,300/- in 30 equal monthly instalments of Rs. 380/- each payable on or before the 10th of each calendar month and accordingly the first instalment of the loan will be payable by me/us on 10-1-1974." In the light of this instalment agreement between the parties, Article 36 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, because there is no default clause in the agreement. Article 36 reads as follows :- Description of Period of Time from which period Suit Limitation begins to run. "36. On a promissory Three years. The expiration of the note or bond first term of payment payable by as to the part then instalments payable, and for the other parts, the expiration of the respective terms of payment. Article 36 reads as follows :- Description of Period of Time from which period Suit Limitation begins to run. "36. On a promissory Three years. The expiration of the note or bond first term of payment payable by as to the part then instalments payable, and for the other parts, the expiration of the respective terms of payment. Accordingly the claim arising out of the first 12 instalments, commencing from 10-1-1974 and ending on 10-12-1974, was clearly barred by time, as the suit was filed on 23-12-1977. So far as the claim arising out of defaults made in payment of the remaining 18 instalments, commencing from 10-1-1975 and ending on 10-6-1977, was concerned, the suit could not be said to be barred by time in view of the provisions of Article 36 of the Limitation Act. These 18 instalments work out to a sum of Rs. 6,440.00. Simple interest on this amount at the rate of 12 per cent per annum approximately works out to Rs. 3,122/- from the date of loan, i.e. 12-12-1973 to the date of suit, i.e. 23-12-1977, (i.e. 4 years 12 days). Interest beyond 3 years would be payable, because it was also payable in monthly instalments as contended in plaint para 2 (d). The statement of accounts (EX.P-18) filed by the appellant would show that till 18-2-1975, the respondent No. 1 had paid a total amount of Rs. 4,100/- towards his loan account. However, he cannot claim adjustment of this amount against the decretal amount, because the dues against him till that date exceeded the amount paid. This statement of accounts would also show that an amount of Rs. 1,605.40 p. was debited to the loan account of the respondent against insurance premiums and miscellaneous expenses as per details given below:- Rs. 540.60 Premium paid on 21-1-1975. Rs. 50.00 Legal charges incurred on 8-8-1975. Rs. 542.00 Premium paid on 6-12-1975. Rs. 00.30 Revenue stamp used on 19-1-1976. Rs. 25.00 Advertisment expenses incurred on 10-8-1976. Rs. 35.00 Advertisment expenses incurred on 16-8-1976. Rs. 402.50 Premium paid on 3-1-1977. Rs. 4.00 Typing charges incurred on 12-9-1977. Rs. 6.00 Expenses for affidavit paid on 16-11-1977. ---------------- Rs. 1,605.40 ---------------- Clause 5 of the hypothecation agreement (Ex.P-5) empowered the Bank to insure the vehicle at the borrower's cost, but as pledged in plaint para 7(o), the vehicle was seized by the Bank authorities on 6-6-1975. Rs. 402.50 Premium paid on 3-1-1977. Rs. 4.00 Typing charges incurred on 12-9-1977. Rs. 6.00 Expenses for affidavit paid on 16-11-1977. ---------------- Rs. 1,605.40 ---------------- Clause 5 of the hypothecation agreement (Ex.P-5) empowered the Bank to insure the vehicle at the borrower's cost, but as pledged in plaint para 7(o), the vehicle was seized by the Bank authorities on 6-6-1975. There was, thus, no justification for debiting the amounts of premium paid on 6-12-1975 and 3-1-1977 in the account of the borrower. These amounts work out to Rs. 944.50 p. The other miscellaneous expenses debited in the borrower's account may be justified under ope or the other of the terms of agreement between the parties and I do not propose to go into that detail in view of the fact that these miscellaneous expenses are not more than Rs. 120.30 p. 4. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is that the legally enforceable claim of the appellant with simple interest works out to a sum of Rs. 10,202.90 p. as per details given below : - Rs. 6,440.00 Principal amount. Rs. 3,122.00 Interest. Rs. 640.90 Premium paid and misc. expenses incurred (Rs. 1,605.40 minus Rs. 944.50 = Rs. 660.90). Rs. 10,202.90 paise 5. The agreement between the parties was for payment of compound interest with 6 monthly rests. However, I am not inclined to grant compound interest to the appellant, because it took over possession of the vehicle on 6-6-1975, but took no steps to sell it immediately. It was only after expiry of a period of more than one year that an advertisement was issued inviting offers from intending purchasers, as would be evident from the two entries dated 10-8-1976 and 16-8-1976 of the statement of accounts (Ex.P-18) about advertisement expenses. It also appears from paragraph 10 of the deposition of Ravindra Kumar Shrivastava (P.W.I), the Chief Cashier of the Bank that at the time of seizure, the vehicle was in a running condition. Hence this possibility cannot be ruled out that the vehicle became worthless, because it was kept idle. Even if sold to a "Kabadi" in time, the vehicle might have fetched a substantial amount between 3 to 4 thousand rupees, as it was purchased only in December 1973. Hence this possibility cannot be ruled out that the vehicle became worthless, because it was kept idle. Even if sold to a "Kabadi" in time, the vehicle might have fetched a substantial amount between 3 to 4 thousand rupees, as it was purchased only in December 1973. Unfortunately there is no evidence to show as to what amount could be obtained by sale of the vehicle nearabout the date of its seizure, except the evidence of respondent No. 1 Jagannath Prasad (D.W.I) that he was prepared to pay Rs. 2,000/- towards his loan account and to take back the vehicle after the date of its seizure (see paragraph 5 of his deposition). In these circumstances, I feel that the Bank is not entitled to compound interest, or costs of the suit or appeal. 6. Before parting, it may be observed that cause of action does not mean the dates mentioned in the plaint as dates giving cause of action to the plaintiff. It means the entire bundle of facts providing basis for filing a suit. In plaint para 14, the appellant mentioned, 12-12-1973, 11-1-1975, 6-6-1975, 22-6-1975, 24-9-1976 and 12-10-1977 as the dates giving it cause of action for filing the suit. But as pointed out earlier, in plaint para 2 (d), instalment agreement was specifically pleaded with specific date for payment of the first instalment Under these circumstances, the trial Court committed an error in overlooking the contents of plaint para 2(d) and in coming to a conclusion that the entire suit of the appellant was barred by time. 7. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal partly succeeds and it is hereby partly allowed. The impugned judgment and decree of the Court below are set aside and the plaintiffs suit for a sum of Rs. 10,202.90 p. is decreed with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of this judgment and till the date of payment. In the circumstances of the case hereinbefore mentioned, the parties are directed to bear their costs of both the Courts, here and below, as incurred.