JUDGMENT - DESAI A.A., J.:—This petition by the employee is directed against order dated 24-1-1991 passed by the Industrial Court, Amravati. The question of general importance as involved is, whether the provisions of section 148-A of the Code of Civil Procedure as regards the filing of caveat has an applicability to the proceedings before the Labour and Industrial Courts. 2. The applicant was in the employment of the respondent-Transport Corporation. He was dismissed in a proceeding under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, he was directed to be reinstated with back wages by the Labour Court. The respondent-Corporation, therefore, presented a revision application before the Industrial Court and prayed for setting aside of the order. In these proceedings, the petitioner filed a caveat purported to be under section 148-A of the Civil Procedure Code. The respondent in the revisional proceeding applied under section 30(2) of the Act, for interim stay against order of the Labour Court. The Industrial Court by order dated 9-12-1990 granted ex parte interim stay. The petitioner therefore applied for setting aside the order of stay. This application was rejected by impugned order dated 24-1-1991. The learned Member of the Industrial Court has observed in para 4 that “it has been clearly laid down under law that the provisions of caveat are not applicable to the Industrial Tribunal and Industrial Courts”. On these premises, the Industrial Court has refused to accept the appearance of the petitioner through caveat on hearing of the interlocutory application for grant of stay. 3. For the appreciation of the question as involved, I do not propose to entertain into debate as to whether provision as laid down under section 148-A, Civil Procedure Code has an application mutatis mutandis to the proceedings before the Industrial or Labour Court. However, it is extremely difficult to accept the observation of the Industrial Court as reproduced above. There is no prohibition either under the Act or Rule as considered by the Industrial Court. 4. The parties to the proceedings have a right to appear before the authority either on receiving notice or summons. As a sound judicial practice any order normally is to be passed after hearing both the parties. There is no prohibition either under the Act or Rule as considered by the Industrial Court. 4. The parties to the proceedings have a right to appear before the authority either on receiving notice or summons. As a sound judicial practice any order normally is to be passed after hearing both the parties. In the exceptional circumstances, when there has been no sufficient time to serve the other side and the danger apprehended or complained of is eminent, the Court exercises a power by passing ex parte order. However, when the opposite party himself voluntarily offers to appear, there could not be any impediment — legal or otherwise — to prohibit his appearance. The procedure of caveat though codified and incorporated by recent amendment, it is an evolution of sound judicial practice. It would be always expedient to pass the interlocutory order after hearing the opponent. Such interim order normally entails a civil consequence which are sometimes substantial in nature. Refusing the opponent from putting his appearance on his own, would not in any manner further the cause of justice. Occasionally, and as the experience goes, it tends to defeat the course of justice. In view of this, irrespective of the applicability of section 148-A of the Civil Procedure Code as a just and fair practice, the filing of appearance — may be in the form of caveat, cannot be discouraged by the Industrial or Labour Court or any Authority dealing with judicial or quasi judicial function. The similar view is expressed by a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in a case reported in (Chandrajit v. Ganeshya)1, A.I.R. 1987 All. 360. 5. I, therefore, disapprove the observation made by the Industrial Court in the impugned judgment. 6. As regards the merit, the parties have fairly submitted that the delinquent employee has now been reinstated. The revision is pending. In view of this, expeditious disposal of the revision would meet the ends of justice. Without interfering the impugned order, I pass the following order:— The petition is partly allowed. The Industrial Court at Amravati is hereby directed to entertain the appearance put forth through caveat by the opponent in the proceedings to be tried by them, with a further direction to decide and dispose of the revision within a period of two months. Petition partly allowed. -----