Judgment :- RATNAM, J. 1. These appeals have been preferred by the plaintiff in C.S. 153 of 1990 against the common order passed in Application Nos. 1536 to 1538 of 1990 in C.S. No. 153 of 1990, at the instance of respondents 1 to 3 in these appeals to implead themselves as parties to Application Nos. 840 and 841 of 1990 and the suit C.S. No. 153 of 1990. 2. In C.S. No. 153 of 1990 instituted by the appellant, in a representative capacity for himself and as representing the members of Balija Chetty community residing in and around Mettupalayam, the appellant prayed for a declaration that the temple Arulmigu Prasanna Venkatesa Perumal Temple, Mettupalayam, Madras-33 is a religious denomination residing in and around Mettupalayam and for a permanent injunction restraining the State of Tamil Nadu, the Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department, the Deputy Commissioner, H.R.& C.E. Department and the Executive Officer of Arulmigu Prasanna Venkatesa Perumal Temple, from interfering with the administration and management of the temple and its properties by the members of Balija Chetty Community and for a mandatory injunction directing the aforesaid to hand over the administration and management of the temple and its properties to the members of Balija Chetty Community, represented by its trustees. According to the appellant, the temple in question had been founded and administered and its properties managed, by the members of Balija Chetty Community residing in and around Mettupalayam and the Balija Chetty Community constitutes a religious denomination, whose right of management and administration of the temple, cannot be interfered with. Claiming that the defendants in C.S. 153 of 1990 attempted to interfere with the management and administration of the temple by the appointment of an Executive Officer as well as appointing other community people for the administration of the temple, and that such attempts at interference with the administration and management of the denominational temple and its properties by the religious denomination, is violative of the protection guaranteed under Art. 26 of the Constitution, the appellant, instituted the suit C.S. 153 of 1990 praying for the reliefs set out earlier. 3. Respondents 1 to 3 in these appeals were not originally parties to the suit C.S. 153 of 1990 instituted by the appellant. 3. Respondents 1 to 3 in these appeals were not originally parties to the suit C.S. 153 of 1990 instituted by the appellant. In Application No. 1538 of 1990, out of which, the main O.S. Appeal No. 80 of 1991 has arisen, they prayed that they should be impleaded as parties to the suit, as the temple in question was a public temple and not a denominational one and they had, by resorting to proceedings under the provisions of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, obtained an adjudication to that effect. It was also the further claim of respondents 1 to 3 and that as persons interested in the administration of the temple and its affairs, they would be necessary and proper parties to the suit for a proper and complete adjudication of the controversy arising in the suit, particularly with reference to the character of the Institution in question. In Application Nos. 1536 and 1537 of 1990, respondents 1 to 3 in O.S.A. Nos. 78 and 79 of 1991, prayed that they should be impleaded as parties to Application Nos. 840 and 841 of 1990, filed by the appellant against the four defendants in the suit, praying for an order of interim injunction restraining them from interfering with the administration and management of the temple and its properties by the members of Balija Chetty Community and for a direction to the defendants to hand over the administration and management of the temple, and its properties to the members of the Balija Chetty Community, pending disposal of the suit. 4. In the counter filed by the appellant the claim of respondents 1 to 3 in these appeals, that the temple in question is a public temple, was disputed and the appellant maintained that it is only a denominational temple, founded and managed by Balija Chetty community. It was also the stand of the appellant that the Commissioner, H.R.& C.E., Department, represented the interests of the public and under those circumstances, respondents 1 to 3 would be neither necessary nor even proper parties to the suit or the applications for injunction and direction. 5. All the three Applications were heard together and disposed of by a common order. 5. All the three Applications were heard together and disposed of by a common order. On a consideration of the proceedings taken by respondents 1 to 3 relating to the establishment of the character of the temple earlier and also the interest of respondents 1 to 3 in the administration and management of the temple, the learned Judge concluded that respondents 1 to 3 would be necessary parties to the suit. It was also further found that by the addition of respondents 1 to 3 as parties to the suit and the Applications filed by the appellant, no prejudice would be caused to the appellant. Finally, the learned Judge allowed Application Nos. 1536 to 1538 of 1990 and impleaded respondents 1 to 3 in these appeals, as party-defendants to the suit and also as respondents to Application Nos. 840 and 841 of 1990. It is the correctness of this that is questioned in these appeals. 6. We may at this stage notice a preliminary objection raised by Mr. B.T. Seshadri, learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3 in these appeals. According to learned counsel, by the order appealed against, respondents 1 to 3 have merely been impleaded as parties to the suit C.S. No. 153 of 1990, and the Applications therein and there had been no adjudication of any rights of parties or even termination of proceedings, and as such, the order impleading respondents 1 to 3 would not be a ‘judgment’ within the me aning of clause 15 of Letters Patent. Reliance in this connection was placed by learned counsel upon the decisions reported in Ramaswami Chettiar v. Kanniappa Mudaliar 60 M.L.J. 237 = 32 L.W. 766 and Selvam Mudaliar v. Raju Mudaliar 1952 (II) M.L.J. 653 = 65 L.W. 1000. On the other hand, learned counsel for the appellant submitted, relying upon Gurumauj Saran v. Joyee C. Salim AIR 1990 Delhi 13 that the order impleading respondents 1 to 3, would be a ‘judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent and the appeals were, therefore, competent. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the appellant submitted, relying upon Gurumauj Saran v. Joyee C. Salim AIR 1990 Delhi 13 that the order impleading respondents 1 to 3, would be a ‘judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent and the appeals were, therefore, competent. 7. In order to fall within the meaning of ‘judgment’ under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, the order must contain the traits and trappings of finality either by deciding the questions in controversy in ancillary proceedings or in the suit itself or in a part of the proceedings and such an adjudication must also decide and affect the rights of parties. It has also to be borne in mind that every intermediary order cannot be regarded as ‘judgment’ but only such orders deciding or affecting the rights of parties and putting an end to or terminating the proceedings, can be treated as ‘judgment’. Viewed in the light of the aforesaid well-established principles, we are of the view that the order appealed against, would not fall under ‘judgment’ within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The effect, rather than the form, of the adjudication has to be looked into, and if so done, the order appealed against is nothing but a step towards a final adjudication, in that, new parties are added without in any manner adjudicating upon or setting any substantive rights and could be properly called initiatory in character, in that, new parties are introduced into the arena of litigation in order to project their cause. Such an order does not at all put an end to the litigation or decide the rights of parties. It is true that even intermediary orders may sometimes fall within the expression ‘judgment’ occurring in clause 15 of the Letters Patent, but, in every case, the nature and effect of the order alone would be determinative of its character as a ‘judgment’ for purposes of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. We have earlier pointed out that the effect of the orders appealed against is merely to bring Respondents 1 to 3 in these appeals within the arena of the suit in order that they may put forward their case that the institution in question is a public temple and not a denominational institution. We have earlier pointed out that the effect of the orders appealed against is merely to bring Respondents 1 to 3 in these appeals within the arena of the suit in order that they may put forward their case that the institution in question is a public temple and not a denominational institution. That by no means can be regarded as an adjudication upon either the rights of the parties or even as regards the character of the institution. The order appealed against has also kept alive the suit and the other proceedings. Therefore, judged by the well laid down tests, the order appealed against cannot be regarded as a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. We are also fortified in this view of ours by the decisions to which our attention has been drawn by learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3. In Ramaswami Chettiar v. Kannaiappa Mudaliar 60 M.L.J. 237 = 32 L.W. 766, the question arose whether an order impleading certain parties to the suit instituted on the original side, would be a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Dealing with this question, the Division Bench pointed out that what must be looked into is the general nature and effect of the order, and judged by the tests of adjudication of rights and termination of proceedings, such an order would not be a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In consi dering the nature of the order for impleading parties to a suit, the court pointed out that such an order does not put an end to the suit, but would only be a step towards final adjudication and that there is no settlement of rights other than the right to be heard in the cause and its effect on the newly added parties would be to put them on the road towards adjudication without settling substantive rights. We are of the view that the principles laid down in this decision would be equally applicable here. In Selvam Mudaliar v. Raju Mudaliar 1952 (II) M.L.J. 653 = 65 L.W. 1000 Rajamannar, C.J., and Venkatarama Aiyar, J., considered whether an order allowing an application for addition of parties, would be a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of clause 15 of Letters Patent. In Selvam Mudaliar v. Raju Mudaliar 1952 (II) M.L.J. 653 = 65 L.W. 1000 Rajamannar, C.J., and Venkatarama Aiyar, J., considered whether an order allowing an application for addition of parties, would be a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of clause 15 of Letters Patent. Referring to Ramaswami Chettiar v. Kanniappa Mudaliar 60 M.L.J. 237 = 32 L.W. 766 and applying the ratio of that decision, the Bench took the view that the appeal was not maintainable. In our view, this decision would govern these appeals also. We may also usefully refer in this connection to the decision in Shanti Kumar v. V.H.Ins. Co. AIR 1974 S.C. 1719 . In that case, an application seeking an amendment of the plaint was allowed, but on appeal, that order was set aside. On further appeal to the Supreme Court it was contended that no appeal would lie under clause 15 of the Letters Patent against an order allowing an amendment of the plaint. In dealing with this question, the Supreme Court pointed out that in finding out whether any decision is a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent, each case must be looked into to ascertain whether there is a decision determining the rights or liabilities of the parties affecting the merits of the controversy and it also puts an end to the proceedings so far as the court dealing with it is concerned. However, on the facts of that case, the Supreme Court took the view that by reason of the operation of the law of limitation, the respondent had acquired an immunity from liability and that was sought to be taken away by the amendment and that had touched upon the merits of the question by determining the rights or liabilities based on limitation and the decision was also final so far as the trial court was concerned. It is thus seen that the Supreme Court upheld the maintainability of the appeal on the basis of the order appealed against under clause 15 of the Letters Patent having determined the rights or liabilities of the parties based on limitation, having finality. Such consideration do not arise at all here. It is thus seen that the Supreme Court upheld the maintainability of the appeal on the basis of the order appealed against under clause 15 of the Letters Patent having determined the rights or liabilities of the parties based on limitation, having finality. Such consideration do not arise at all here. Again, in Sahah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben AIR 1986 S.C. 1786 = 94 L.W. 91 S.N, the Supreme Court, considered the question whether an order refusing to appoint a receiver or to grant interim injunction is appealable, under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In a very elaborate judgment, referring to the entire case-law, the Supreme Court pointed out that the word ‘judgment’ occurring in clause 15 of the Letters Patent, should receive a larger, wider and liberal interpretation than the word ‘judgment’ used in the Code, but, at the same time, any order passed cannot be said to be a ‘judgment’. It was also pointed out by the court that a ‘judgment’ could be of three kinds, viz., (1) Final judgment, (2) Preliminary judgment; and (3) Intermediary or interlocutory judgment. Obviously, in this case, there is no question of any final ‘judgment’, because the suit or action brought by the appellant has neither been dismissed nor decreed either in part or in full. Nor can the order in this case, be regarded as a preliminary judgment affecting the rights of the appellant or the proceeding as a whole. If at all, the order appealed against, would fall only under the category ‘intermediary or interlocutory judgment’ but even then, the order must directly affect a valuable right of the appellant or decide am important aspect of the trial. The order appealed against, in this case, does neither. The Supreme Court also catalogued the instances of interlocutory or intermediary orders, which may be regarded as ‘judgment’ and an order of the kind forming the subject matter of these appeals, is not one among them. However, the decision in Gurmauj Saran v. Joyee C. Salim AIR 1990 Delhi 13 proceeds to hold that an order impleading a party to the suit would be a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of sub-S. (1) of S. 10 of the Delhi High Court Act. However, the decision in Gurmauj Saran v. Joyee C. Salim AIR 1990 Delhi 13 proceeds to hold that an order impleading a party to the suit would be a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of sub-S. (1) of S. 10 of the Delhi High Court Act. That conclusion has been arrived at on the reasoning that addition of a party against the will of the plaintiff enlarges the scope of the suit and would amount to a de novo trial as far as the newly added party is concerned and therefore, it cannot be said that such an order is not a ‘judgment’. It had also been stated that vital and valuable rights of the plaintiff are affected. The impleading of new parties and the consequential amendment of the plaint on such addition and other related steps, as pointed out earlier, would all be purely procedural and initiatory and would not in any manner either decide the right of parties or determine the proceeding finally, in so far as the Court is concerned and under those circumstances, we are unable, with respect, to accept the reasoning that vital and valuable rights of the plaintiff are affected and therefore, the order would be a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Thus, on a due consideration of the nature of the order passed in Application Nos. 1536 to 1538 of 1990, we are of the view that no right of the parties had in any manner been touched upon or adjudicated or settled and that the proceedings before the Court had also been left in tact and under these circumstances, the common order passed in the Applications cannot be regarded as ‘judgment’ within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. We, therefore, hold that the appeals are not maintainable and deserve to be dismissed. 8. We may, however, proceed to consider the propriety of the order appealed against on merits as well. It is seen that the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department had appointed an Executive Officer for the Institution in question. We, therefore, hold that the appeals are not maintainable and deserve to be dismissed. 8. We may, however, proceed to consider the propriety of the order appealed against on merits as well. It is seen that the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department had appointed an Executive Officer for the Institution in question. An Association called ‘Balija’ Chetty Association, represented by its Secretary, A.K. Radhakrishnan’ instituted a suit in O.S. No. 200 of 1982 before the VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, for a declaration that Sri Prasanna Venkatesa Perumal Temple is a denominational temple and for an injunction restraining the trustees appointed by the Department from interfering with the rights of Balija Chetty community, to manage and administer the Institution. During the pendency of that suit, five other persons claiming to be representatives of Balija Chetty community, filed O.A. No. 43 of 1986, under S. 64(1) of the H.R. & C.E., Act (Act 22 of 1959) before the Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Department for framing a scheme for the appointment of non-hereditary trustees from among the Balija Chetty community, residing permanently in and around Mettupalayam and as recommended by the samoogam. The Deputy Commissioner passed a preliminary order on 2.6.1987 framing a draft scheme, but later, perhaps realising that the Deputy Commissioner was likely to appoint trustees only from the Balija Chetty community in his final order, the suit O.S. No. 200 of 1982 was withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. Later, by order dated 17.10.1988, the Deputy Commissioner framed a scheme appointing members of Balija Chetty community as trustees and against that order, respondent 1 and 2 herein preferred an appeal to the Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Department, under S. 69(1) of Tamil Nadu Act 22 of 1959. Later, by order dated 17.10.1988, the Deputy Commissioner framed a scheme appointing members of Balija Chetty community as trustees and against that order, respondent 1 and 2 herein preferred an appeal to the Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Department, under S. 69(1) of Tamil Nadu Act 22 of 1959. In that appeal, the 3rd respondent got itself impleaded as a party and during the pendency of the appeal before the Commissioner, respondents 1 to 3 herein filed a revision petition before the Commissioner for the removal of the trustees, and the Commissioner, by order dated 5.2.1990, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner, and also set aside the appointment of trustees made by him and against that order, O.S. No. 2889 of 1990 had been filed by five persons, and in that suit, respondents 1 to 3 herein figure as defendants 4 to 6, which suit has also been transferred to the Original Side of this Court to be tried along with C.S. 153 of 1990 as per the order passed in Application No. 5524 of 1990 in C.S. 153 of 1990, affirmed in O.S.A. 90 of 1991. It is obvious from the proceedings taken by respondents 1 to 3 herein that they are persons interested in the administration and affairs of the temple, as otherwise, it was wholly unnecessary for two of them to have preferred appeal against the order of the Deputy Commissioner in O.A. 43 of 1986 and for the third to have got impleaded as a party to the appeal during its pendency. We are therefore, of the view that the presence of respondents 1 to 3, in C.S. 153 of 1990, would be necessary in order to enable the Court to properly adjudicate upon the character of the temple, which is in dispute. A faint attempt was made by learned counsel for the appellant to contend that the presence of the Commissioner of the H.R. & C.E. Department is more than adequate to take care of the interest of the members of the public. On the facts and the circumstances of the case, particularly in view of the proceedings before the Commissioner initiated by respondents 1 to 3, which forms the subject matter of the suit in O.S. 2889 of 1990, the presence of the Commissioner alone would not be adequate to protect the interests of respondents 1 to 3. On the facts and the circumstances of the case, particularly in view of the proceedings before the Commissioner initiated by respondents 1 to 3, which forms the subject matter of the suit in O.S. 2889 of 1990, the presence of the Commissioner alone would not be adequate to protect the interests of respondents 1 to 3. Learned counsel for the appellant also attempted to urge that the 3rd respondent being an Association, cannot be impleaded as a party as a worshipper. We have already referred to the impleading of the 3rd respondent in the course of the proceedings before the Commissioner against the order of the Deputy Commissioner in O.A. 43 of 1986, and no objection had been raised then. Even in the course of the counter filed by the appellant, we do not find any specific or categoric objection to the impleading of the 3rd respondent on the ground of its being an Association. Even otherwise, we are satisfied that among the members of the Association, there must be numerous worshippers, and instead of all of them being impleaded, the Association has been impleaded to protect and safeguard the interests of all the worshippers and we do not see any serious objection to that. No other point was urged. We, therefore, dismiss these appeals. There will however, be no order as to costs in these appeals.