JUDGMENT - SALDHANA M.F., J.:—In this appeal, preferred by the State of Maharashtra, the short question that arises for determination is as to whether the learned Special Judge for Greater Bombay was justified in extending the benefit of section 360, of the Criminal Procedure Code to the respondent, who was admittedly, convicted for corruption charges. 2. The learned A.P.P. has referred to the relevant provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act viz., sections 18 and 19 thereof and there can be no dispute about the fact that the learned Special Judge was in error, he having extended the benefit to the accused. The question, therefore, arises as to whether that order requires to be interfered with and if so, what orders in the alternative and required to be passed in this case. 3. The learned Counsel representing the respondent pointed out, that if this Court were to consider the imposition of any other punishment, that the entire matter is thrown open and that he is entitled in law to argue that the accused should be acquitted. It is correct as submitted by the learned Counsel that in the aforesaid circumstances, he would be justified in arguing the appeal on merits and in convincing this Court that the conviction itself is assailable. However, the record indicates that the accused himself did not prefer any appeal against the conviction and the appeal memo filed by the State also indicates that the State was only concerned with the corrective action. Under these circumstances, I consider it unnecessary to enter into a debate with regard to the merits of the matter. Undoubtedly, the learned Special Judge ought to have, with the assistance of the learned Prosecutor, considered the provisions of law very carefully before committing the error in question. 4. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (State of Gujarat v. V.A. Chauhan)1, reported in A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 395. That case was identical to the present one in so far as the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act had been extended to an accused even though the provisions of law prohibited it. That case was identical to the present one in so far as the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act had been extended to an accused even though the provisions of law prohibited it. The Supreme Court took into consideration an entirely different aspect of the matter viz., the question as to whether, after a long lapse of time, such an error even if committed, could be rectified and the sentence imposed on the accused who has enjoyed the benefit of that order for several years. The Supreme Court has observed, at page 360, as follows:— “The matter seems to be concluded by the decision of this Court reported in ( 1972(3) S.C.R. 497 )2, where it has been held that the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act cannot be given to an accused convicted of an offence punishable with imprisonment for life. We entirely agree with this decision and hold that the Probation of Offenders Act is not applicable, but in the instant case, as the respondent has already been given the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, we do not think it is in the interest of Justice to interfere with it at this stage, after so many years”. 5. In the light of the aforesaid decision, which applies squarely to the facts of the present case, it is very clear that the Supreme Court has enunciated the principle that an error of the present type, even if committed, cannot be remedied after a long lapse of time because of the adverse consequences which such a procedure will entail to the accused. In this view of the matter, and in keeping with the law as laid down by the Supreme Court, even though the present appeal filed by the State is justified, no action would be permissible at this point of time. 6. The appeal accordingly fails and stands dismissed. Appeal dismissed. -----