Judgment :- RATNAM, J. 1. This appeal had been preferred against the order passed in Application No. 5524/90 in C.S. No. 153/1990. In that application, respondents 1 to 3 herein, who had been impleaded as parties to C.S. No. 153/1990 and who are defendants 4 to 6 in C.S. No. 2889/1990 on the file of V Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras prayed under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent that this court should withdraw O.S. No. 2889 of 1990, V Assistant City Civil Judges Court, Madras, to the file of the Original Side of this Court, to be taken up and tried along with C.S. No. 153 of 1990. In the affidavit filed in support of that application, respondents 1 to3 have set out the circumstances leading to the institution of O.S. No. 2889 of 190 and C.S. No. 153 of 1990 and stated that the question that arose for consideration in both the suits was the character of Sri Prasanna Venkatesa Perumal Temple, Mettupalayam, viz., whether it is a denomination temple or public temple and that with a view to avoid conflict of decisions in the determination of the common issues of fact and law involved in both the suits, O.S. No. 2889 of 1990 should be withdrawn to the file of the Original Side of this Court to be tried along with C.S. No. 153 of 1990 now pending before this Court. The appellants, in their counter, opposed the prayer for transfer on the ground that the identity of issues arising for decisions in the suit on the original side of this court in C.S. No. 153 of 1990 and in O.S. No. 2889 of 1990 V Asst. City Civil Court, Madras, instituted under S. 70 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endownments Act, would not justify the transfer prayed for. The application for transfer filed by respondent 1 to 3 was also characterised as one intended to delay the proceedings. 2. City Civil Court, Madras, instituted under S. 70 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endownments Act, would not justify the transfer prayed for. The application for transfer filed by respondent 1 to 3 was also characterised as one intended to delay the proceedings. 2. The learned Judge took the view that a common question arose for decision in both the suits, viz., whether the temple in question is a denominational temple belonging to Balija Community or a public temple and that eventhough O.S. No. 2889 of 1990 had been instituted under S. 70 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endownments Act, that does not in any manner fetter the power conferred on this Court under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent, to remove and try and determine any suit, inclusive of suits like O.S. No. 2889 of 1990, and further that, when the controversy to be tried and resolved is common in both the suits, in the interests of justice and equity and also with a view to avoid conflict of decisions, both the suits should be tried and disposed of by the same court. Ultimately, Application No. 5524 of 1990 was allowed and the suit O.S. No. 2889 of 1990 along with an interlocutory application therein, were withdrawn and transferred to the file of this Court, to be tried along with C.S. No. 153 of 1990. Aggrieved by this order of transfer of the suit O.S. No. 2889 of 1990 to the file of this court, on the Original Side, in the exercise of powers conferred under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent, the appellants have preferred this appeal. 3. When the appeal came up for admission before us, learned counsel for the appellants, was called upon to satisfy us regarding the maintainability of the appeal, as an order for withdrawal and transfer of a suit, in the exercise of the powers under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent, would not be a judgment within Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Learned counsel for the appellant was unable to satisfy us that the order passed in Application No. 5524 of 1990 by the learned Judge, either affect the merits of the controversy between the parties in the suit nor does it terminate or dispose of the suit on any other ground. Learned counsel for the appellant was unable to satisfy us that the order passed in Application No. 5524 of 1990 by the learned Judge, either affect the merits of the controversy between the parties in the suit nor does it terminate or dispose of the suit on any other ground. We may refer in this connection to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Asrumathi Deb v. Rupendra Deb A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 198 = 66 L.W. 371, where an identical question regarding the maintainability of an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, against an order for transfer made under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent, came to be considered. At page 200, the Supreme Court observed thus; “The question that requires determination in an application under Cl. 13 of the Letters Patent is, whether a particular suit should be removed from any court, which is subject to the superintendence of the High Court and tried and determined by the Letter, as a court of extraordinary original jurisdiction. It is true that unless the parties to the suit are agreed on the point, there must arise a controversy between them, which has to be determined by the court. In the present case, a single Judge of the High Court has decided this question in favour of the plaintiff in the suit; but a decision on any and every point in dispute between the parties to a suit is not necessarily a ‘Judgement’. The order in the present case neither affects the merits of the controversy between the parties in the suit itself, nor does it terminate or dispose of the suit on any ground. An order for transfer cannot be placed in the same category as an order rejecting a plaint or one dismissing a suit on a preliminary ground, as has been referred to by Couch, C.J. in his observations quoted above. An order directing a plaint to be rejected or taken off the file amounts to a final disposal of the suit so far as the Court making the order is concerned. That suit is completely at an end and it is immaterial that another suit could be filed in the same or another court after removing the defects which led to the order of rejection. On the other hand, an order of transfer under Cl. That suit is completely at an end and it is immaterial that another suit could be filed in the same or another court after removing the defects which led to the order of rejection. On the other hand, an order of transfer under Cl. 13 of the letters patent, is, in the First place, not at all an order made by the Court, in which the suit is pending. In the second place, the order does not put an end to the suit which remains perfectly alive and that every suit is to be tried by another court, the proceedings in the latter, to be taken only from the stage at which they were left in the court in which the suit was originally filed.” Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Division Bench holding that the order transferring the suit, was not a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of Letters Patent. 4. In yet another decision Govindarajulu v. Devar & Co.A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 248 = 66 L.W. 914, Rajamannar, C.J. and Venkatarama Aiyar, J. had to consider the maintainability of an appeal under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent against an order transferring a suit from one Court to another. While holding that the appeal so preferred was incompetent, the Division Bench pointed out that the appeal purporting to be under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent, was directed against an order of the Learned Judge transferring a suit and that, according to the decision of the Supreme Court referred to earlier such an order transferring a suit from one court to another, is not a ‘Judgment’ within the meaning of Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. We, therefore, held that the order of the learned Judge neither affects the merits of the controversy between the parties nor does it put an end to or terminate or dispose of the suit on any other ground, but merely transfers the suit now pending before one court to another court and such an order cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said to be a ‘Judgment’ within Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal.