This revision petition is by the defendant who lost in both the Courts below. 2. The opposite party herein as plaintiff filed a suit against the present petitioner for ejectment from the suit premises on the grounds that the suit house is required for bonafide use and occupation by the plaintiff; that the petitioner-defendant has violated the terms of the tenancy by making addition/alteration of the suit premises; and that the petitioner-defendant is defaulter in respect of rent from the month of December, 1981. It is not disputed that the tenancy was a monthly tenancy, rent being payable in the first week of the month. 3. The learned trial Court framed as many as seven issues and held that the suit premises is required for bonafide use and occupation by the plaintiff; that the defendant could not prove that under the terms of the lease the suit premises could be altered and, accordingly, held that principle of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence is not attracted and that the defendant is a defaulter. 4. The learned lower appellate Court did not accept the findings of the learned trial Court that the suit premises is required by the plaintiff for his own use and occupation and that there was violation of the terms of the lease by altering or modifying the suit premises. However, the learned lower appellate Court accepted the finding of the learned trial Court that the defendant is a defaulter and, accordingly, the suit w s decreed. 5. The only point that requires consideration in the present petition is whether the defendant was a defaulter in respect of rent. The first point that has been urged is whether this Court sitting as a revisional Court can interfere with the findings of facts of both the Courts below regarding default. 6. In Manick Chandra Nandy vs. Debdas Nady & others, AIR 1986 SC 446 , the powers of revisional Court under section 115, Civil Procedure Code was considered and it was held that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction is confined to questions of jurisdiction and while in a first appeal the Court is free to decide all questions of law and fact which arise in the case, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction the High Court is not entitled to re-examine or re­assess the evidence on record and substitute its own findings on facts for those of the subordinate Court. The High Court may at times have to go into a jurisdictional question of law or fact, that is, it may have to decide collateral ques­tions upon the ascertainment of which the decision as to jurisdiction depends. 7. In Smti Rajbir Kaur & another vs. M/s S. Chokesiri & Co., (1989) 1 SCC 19 , their Lordships in paragraphs 42 and 43 of the judgment held that the scope of the revisional jurisdiction depends on the language of the statute conferring the revisional jurisdiction. It was further held that revisional jurisdiction is only a part of the appellate jurisdiction and cannot be equated with that of a full-fledged appeal. Though the revisional power depending upon the language of the provision, might be wider than revisional power under section 115, Civil Procedure Code, yet, a revisional Court is not a second or first appellate Court. According to their Lordships when the findings of fact recorded by the Courts below are supportable on the evidence on record, the revisional Court must, indeed, be reluctant to embark upon an independent reassessment of the evidence and to supplement a conclusion of its own, so long as the evidence on record admitted of and supported the one reached by the Courts below. 8. The case in hand is governed by the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 and there is no separate provision for revision and, as such, this petition has been filed under section 115, Civil Procedure Code. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramkaran Agarwalia vs. Radheshyam Agarwalla 1989 (1) GLJ 135 on the reference made by the learned Single Judge on the question as to when finding relating to a tenant being a defaulter or the premises being needed bonafide by the landlord can be interfered by exercise of powers under section 115, Civil Procedure Code, held that this Court can interfere by exercising powers under section 115, Civil Procedure Code where the finding relating to default by a tenant or the landlord needing the premises bonafide, or finding on any other plea available to a landlord under this Act, is palpably wrong being based on surmises and conjectures or in disregard of relevant pieces of evidence which have not been contro­verted. The reason for coming to the above finding by the Division Bench was that any wrong decision in these matters would either result in failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in law or in exercising a jurisdiction not vested by law. While arriving at the above decision, this Court considered various decisions of the Judicial Committee, the Apex Court as well as of this Court. Manik Chand Nandi (supra) was also considered. The above ratio laid down by the Division Bench being binding on this Court, I do not find any reason to take a contrary view and, therefore, the present petition has to be examined in the light of the above law. 9. In arriving at the decision that the defendant was a defaulter, the learned Courts below took into consideration the fact that the refusal of rent by the plaintiff has not been proved. It was so held because of vital discrepancies in the evidence of DWs 1 and 2. That apart, the Courts below also took into consideration the fact that the rent for the month of December was deposited in Court prior to alleged refusal as brought out in evidence. The learned Courts below also noted that the defendant-petitioner has not proved payment of rent subsequent to the month of December/82. The defendant also did not produce any evidence to show that the rent for the subsequent months were also deposited by him on being refused by the plaintiff. 10. I have gone through the judgment of the Courts below and I do not find any palpable wrong in the above findings. I further hold that the finding is not based on surmises and conjectures. That being the position, in my opinion there is no jurisdictional error for interference by this Court. Being revisional Court, it is also not necessary to re-apprise or re-appreciate the evidence on record. 11. I find from the judgment of the learned lower appellate Court that the learned Court placed reliance on a decision of Ram Sewak vs. Munnalal, AIR 1988 SC 452 wherein the provision of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act was considered, more particularly section 7 of the said Act. Section 7 (c) of the said Act is in perimeter with section 5(4) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972. Section 7 (c) of the said Act is in perimeter with section 5(4) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the learned lower appellate Court rightly placed reliance on the above decision. 12. In Jogesh Dey vs. Manoram Saikia, (1988) 2 GLR 225 a Single Bench of this Court considered section 5(4) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 and held that deposit in Court without prior tender of the same to the landlord cannot be held as a valid deposit under the above section. In arriving at the above decision, the Court also considered the ratio laid down in Ram Sewak (supra). Thus, as the Courts below have held on tae basis of the evidence on record that there was no valid tender of rent, the defendant-tenant cannot get the advantage of depositing rent in Court under section 5 (4) of the above Act. 13. Situated thus, I do not find any merit in the present petition and, therefore, the same is liable to be dismissed, which I hereby do. 14. In the result, the revision petition is dismissed. I leave the parties to bear their respective costs.