SHIVASHANKAR BHAT, J. ( 1 ) THE pclitioncr seeks the quashing of the order of second respondent as affirmed by respondents 2 and 3 and seeks further a writ of mandamus directing them to grant refund sought by the petitioner earlier from them. ( 2 ) THE pclilioncr carries on business of manufacturing and sale of poly vinyl chloride footwear having the manufacturing unit at rajajinagar, Bangalore. For this purpose the petitioner requires poly vinyl chloride resin. The petitioner used to import the same from foreign countries such as singapore, korea and u. s. a. ( 3 ) BY a notification dated 15th march, 1979 the government of India exempted the whole of the basic duly on the import of this material. This notification was in force upto 31st august, 1979. By another notification of the said date the exemption was extended upto 31st march, 1980, which was again extended upto 31st march, 1981. Thus, according to the pclitioncr the whole of the import duly on the goods in qucslion was ex empted upto 31sl march, 1981. During this period the pclitioncr cnlcred into a contract with an american company on 9th July,, 1980 as well as on 16th July, 1980 for supply of the said goods to the petitioner, for which purpose the pclilioncr opened idlers of credit through state bank of India, Rajajinagar, Bangalore. The goods arrived in India during November and december, 1980. The customs department demanded duly thereon purporting to relied upon a notification dated 16lh october, 1980 (Annexure-D ). As per this notification the earlier notifications were superseded, on the central government being satisfied that it was necessary in the public interest so to do and exempted the goods in question when imported into India from so much of the duty of customs as in excess of 40% advatorcm. The result is the import duty payable was 60% of the prescribed rale. The petitioner paid the same under protest and cleared the goods. Thereafter the petitioner ap plied for refund of the two sums of Rs. 92,61/- 31/- and Rs. 99,570-32/ -. The refund applica tions were rejected and have thus become the subject matter of this writ petition. The result is the import duty payable was 60% of the prescribed rale. The petitioner paid the same under protest and cleared the goods. Thereafter the petitioner ap plied for refund of the two sums of Rs. 92,61/- 31/- and Rs. 99,570-32/ -. The refund applica tions were rejected and have thus become the subject matter of this writ petition. ( 4 ) THE contention of the petitioner is that the petitioner entered into contract with the foreign company at a time when the exemption notifications were in force and the petitioner entered into such an agreement in view of the representation held out that the duties were exempted under those notifications and therefore according to the petitioner the respondents were estopped from levying any duty eventhough the goods actually reached India after those notifica tions were superseded. According to the petitioner, the earlier three notifications exempt ing import duty governed the importation of the goods in question because the pctilioncr had acted upon the said notifications while entering into the contract with the foreign seller. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is thus sought to be extended to the imporlation in question and the levy of duty thereon. ( 5 ) THE learned senior standing counsel for central government raised a preliminary objection about the maintainability of the writ petition before this court. It was pointed out by the learned counsel that the imporlation of the goods and the levy of the duty in question were at Bombay and the petitioner filed the applications for refund at Bombay and the entire cause of action for the writ petition arose outside Karnataka and therefore this court's writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked. The learned counsel also submitted, on merits of the case and con tended that the power of exemption traced to Section 25 of the custom's act is not an executive power, but a legislative power and therefore the doctrine of estoppel was not applicable; there cannot be any estoppel against the exercise of the legislative power. ( 6 ) TWO questions therefore arise for con sideration: (1) whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition? (2) whether the pctilioncr is entitled to the refund of the import duty paid and whether the doctrine of promissory es toppel could be invoked by the pctilioncr in support of the claim? ( 6 ) TWO questions therefore arise for con sideration: (1) whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition? (2) whether the pctilioncr is entitled to the refund of the import duty paid and whether the doctrine of promissory es toppel could be invoked by the pctilioncr in support of the claim? Regarding point No. 1: ( 7 ) PCLILIONCR is carrying on its business in karnalaka, the goods were imported at Bombay. Customs duty was levied at Bombay; pctilioncr qucslioncd it by seeking its refund by approach ing the authority at Bombay, (he statutory ap peals resorted to by the petitioner were also outside karnalaka. In these circumstances, the question to be considered is, whether any part of the cause of aclion to file the writ pctilion arose in karnalaka. ( 8 ) "cause of aclion" means every fact which,if traversed, it would be necessary for the petitioner to prove in order to support ils claim for the relief; it is a bundle of essential facts and any one of the essential facts, if tocated within the state, high court's jurisdiction may be in voked. But, the existence of the petitioner as a legal person and that the pclilioner is carrying on ils aclivily wilhin the stale, by themselves, arc not part of this bundle of facts. ( 9 ) ARTICLE 226 (2) of the conslilulion is clarificatory in nalure. Evcnthough the respondents scat of power or residence is outside the stale, still a high courl may issue the wrils against such a respondent, if any part of the cause of aclion arises wilhin the said high court's territorial jurisdiction. This clarification was necessitated by the decision of Supreme Court in election commission, India v Saka Venkata Rao, AIR 1953 SC 210 , wherein it was held that seat of election commissioner being outside Madras state, Madras High Court could not issue any writ to the election commissioner, cventhough, the cause for the aclion arose in Madras slate. ( 10 ) ARTICLE 226 (2) in no way enlarges the high court's jurisdiction to issue the wrils to the central government and ils departments, solely because, the central government's presence can be traced throughout India. ( 10 ) ARTICLE 226 (2) in no way enlarges the high court's jurisdiction to issue the wrils to the central government and ils departments, solely because, the central government's presence can be traced throughout India. The inaclion or the aclion complained of against the central government and ils departments should have a reasonable nexus, wilhin the high court's territorial jurisdiction, to the cause pleaded by the petitioner, to entitle the petitioner to move the particular high court. ( 11 ) A few decisions would highlight the principle in Shiv Shankar Lal Gupta v The Commissioner of income-tax, Bombay and others, AIR 1968 Delhi 295, petitioner's premises were searched and certain seizures effected at Bombay. Petitioner challenged this, atong with the vires of Section j32 of the income-tax act before the Delhi High Court. The division bench of Delhi High Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable before it, eventhough, central government was a parly to the writ petition and its scat is in Delhi. The facts in M/s. Asiatic Labour Corporation v Union of India and others, AIR 1983 Gujarat 86 are quite relevant to the instant case. Certain "goods handling contracts" were the cause for the writ petitions filed in gujarat high court. One of the contract was referred as bharatpur contract, which was in respect of an area outside the state of gujarat; the contract was awarded by the offices at Bombay and contract was to be performed in bharalpur within Rajasthan slate. Petitioners contended that their offices were in gujarat, from there lenders could have been submitted, and therefore the writ petitions pertaining to the contract can be filed in gujarat high court. This plea was rejected by Justice a. m. ahmadi at page 101: "merely because the petitioners have their offices wilhin the state of gujarat wherefrom they could have submitted tenders if the railway administration had resorted to the open lender system, it cannot be validly contended that that part of the cause of action has arisen wilhin the state of gujarat. In the present case the contract was entered into at Bombay, its exeution i. e. , performance was to lake place at bharatpur, all payments in respect of the said contract were to be made cither at Bombay or bharatpur, that is to say, no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this court and hence this court has no jurisdiction to entcrlain and dispose of the pclilions in so far as they rclalc to the bharatpur contract. " In the matter of bharat sugar mills Ltd. And another, AIR 1984 Calcutta 102, is also instruc tive. The central government fixed the prices of levy sugar in respect of sugar mills. Petitioner's sugar mills were in Bihar state; the office of the petitioner-company was in calcutta. Challenging the fixation of sugar price, writ petition was filed in calcutta, which was dismissed as not maintainable. The petitioner's contention is found at page 103 which reads: "it has been submitted by Mr. Bajoria, learned Advocate for the petilioner that this order was published in the gazelle of India which also appeared in the state of West Bengal and the office of this sugar mill is silualed at r. n. mukherjee road wilhin the territorial jurisdiclion of this court and the petitioner has got a licence to sell sugar under the sugar licencing and control order. Il has also been submit led lhal this mill has a godown wilhin the slalc of wcsl bengal where from the mill sells sugar to the various retailers. Il has been further submitted that some of the shareholders of this mill arc residenls wilhin the state and if sugar is allowed to be sold al the price as delcrmincd by the impugned Order, it will cause a substantial financial toss not only to the sugar mills but also to the shareholders as the price of the shares will be greatly affected. On these allegations it has been submitted by Mr. Bajoria that part of the cause of aclion arises within the territorial limits of this court and as such this court has got jurisdiclion to issue appropriate writs, orders or directions in accordance wilh the Provisions of Article 226 sub-articlc (2) of the constitulion. On these allegations it has been submitted by Mr. Bajoria that part of the cause of aclion arises within the territorial limits of this court and as such this court has got jurisdiclion to issue appropriate writs, orders or directions in accordance wilh the Provisions of Article 226 sub-articlc (2) of the constitulion. " This was repelled by holding al page 104: "the order has been made by the ccnlral government al New Delhi, the sugar mill is situaled in the slalc of Bihar and the levy sugar al the price delcrmincd by the impugned order has to be sold and delivered to the agencies or the food corporalion of India as per direction given by the central government by the pclilioncr sugar mill al the gale of the mill premises in the state of bihar. Il is nol dispulcd nor doubled lhal so far as the levy sugar is concerned the sugar mill has gol no power to sell it to any agency other than those agencies which are directed by the central government to be sold. The mill can only dispose of sugar which is levy free and for which undoubtedly there is no price fixation. Therefore sale of such sugar in the open market is not in the least affected by the impugned order fixing the price of levy sugar. The subm/ssion that the company will sustain loss or the shareholders will sustain loss is in no way comprised of the part of the cause of action which needs to be proved in order to succeed in this application that the impugned order is bad, ar bitrary, unreasonable and illegal being not in accordance with the norms laid down in sub-section (3c), Section 3, essential com modities act. Therefore, considering all these aspects I am unable to hold that any part of the cause of action arises within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of this court. " The Supreme Court in state of Rajasthan and others v M/s. Swaika properties and another, AIR 1985 SC 1289 has an occasion to consider another aspect of the same question. Acquisition notice was served on the petitioner in West Bengal, though lands were in rajasthan. The petitioner challenged the acquisition by the state of Rajasthan in Calcutta high court on the ground a part of the cause of action arose in West Bengal by the service of notice. Acquisition notice was served on the petitioner in West Bengal, though lands were in rajasthan. The petitioner challenged the acquisition by the state of Rajasthan in Calcutta high court on the ground a part of the cause of action arose in West Bengal by the service of notice. This contention which seem to have been accepted by Calcutta high court was reversed by the Supreme Court. Mere service of notice to acquire the land was held as not part of the cause of actions entitling to invoke the writ jurisdiction at calcutta. ( 12 ) THE fact that the petitioner-company is located within this state has no relevancy at all to constitute 'cause of action' to challenge the levy of customs duty at Bombay. The 'cause of action' arose entirely outside Karnataka. The preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the central government has to be ac cepted. Since, arguments were addressed on the merits of the case, I consider it proper to express myself on the said question also. Regarding point No. 2: ( 13 ) IN Indian express newspaper (Bombay)private Ltd- and others etc. Etc. V Union of India and others, AIR 1986 SC 515 Supreme Court did not express a definite opinion as to whether the power to exempt under Section 25 is a legislative power or a simple executive power. The decision commencing at page 541 (para 71 of the air) shows that the Supreme Court assumed the power to be a legislative power and then proceeded to apply the principles governing the validity of exercise of such a power. The Supreme Court held: "we shall assume for purposes of these cases that the power to grant exemption under Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1962 is a legislative power and a notification is sued by the government thereunder amounts to a piece of subordinate legisla tion. Even then the notification is liable to be questioned on the ground that it is an unreasonable one. " Again at page 542 (para 73): "a piece of subordinate legislation docs not carry the same degree of immunity which is enjoyed by a statute, passed a competent legislature. Subordinate legislation may be questioned on any of the grounds on which plenary legislation is questioned. In addi tion it may also be questioned on the ground that it docs not conform to the statute under which it is made. Subordinate legislation may be questioned on any of the grounds on which plenary legislation is questioned. In addi tion it may also be questioned on the ground that it docs not conform to the statute under which it is made. It may further be ques tioned on the ground that it is contrary to some other statute. That is because sub ordinate legislation must yield to plenary legislation. It may also be questioned on the ground that it is unreasonable, un reasonable not in the sense of not being reasonable, but in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary. In england, the judges would say "parliament never in tended authority to make such rules. They are unreasonable and ultra vires. " However, some of the principles governing the validity of the exercise of administrative power are not attracted, such as principles of natural justice. At page 543 the Supreme Court emphasised that: "the power to grant exemption should, however, be exercised in a reasonable way. " Nowhere the Supreme Court held that doctrine of prom/ssory estoppel would apply against the exercise of a legislative power to withdrew the notification issued under Section 25 of the act. The ultimate decision in the said case was based on the principle. "in view of the intimate connection of newsprint with the freedom of the press, the tests for determining the vires of a statute taxing newsprint have, therefore, be different from the tests usually adopted for testing the vires of other taxing statutes. In the case of ordinary taxing statutes, the laws may be questioned only if they are either openly confiscatory or a colourable device to confiscate. On the other hand, in the case of a tax on newsprint, it may be sufficient to show a distinct and noticeable burdensome- ness, clearly and directly attributable to the tax" (words highlighted here ). This idea permeates the subsequent discus sions also. If the exercise of the power under Section 25 is a legislative power - be that as a delegates or in any other capacity - then, the said power cannot be curtailed by the doctrine of promissory estoppel. This idea permeates the subsequent discus sions also. If the exercise of the power under Section 25 is a legislative power - be that as a delegates or in any other capacity - then, the said power cannot be curtailed by the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Estoppel cannot operate against statute; this principle governs all kinds or flavours of estoppel in Union of India and others v Godfrey Philips India Ltd. , Air 1986 SC 806 at 815 the principle is stated thus: "of course we must make it clear and that is also laid down in motilal padampat sugar mills case, AIR 1978 SC 621 (supra), that there can be no promissory estoppel against the legislature in the exercise of its legislative functions nor can the government or public authority be debarred by promissory estoppel from enforcing a statutory prohibition. It is equally true that promissory estoppel cannot be used to compel the government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the government or of the public authority to make. We may also point out that the doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires, if it can be shown by the government or public authority that having regard to the facts as they have transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it, the court would not raise an equity in favour of the person to whom the promise or representation is made and enforce the promise or repre sentation against the government or public authority. The doctrine of promissory es toppel would be displaced in such a case, because on the facts, equity would not require that the government or public authority should be held bound by the promise or representation made by it. This aspect has been dealt with fully in motilal padampat sugar mills case (supra) and we find ourselves wholly in agreement with what has been said in that decision on this point. " In assistant commissioner of commercial taxes (asst.), Dharwarand others v Dhamrendra Trading Company etc. Etc. , Air 1988 SC 1247 the court had no occasion to consider the withdrawal of the exemption notification. " In assistant commissioner of commercial taxes (asst.), Dharwarand others v Dhamrendra Trading Company etc. Etc. , Air 1988 SC 1247 the court had no occasion to consider the withdrawal of the exemption notification. Ex emption notification continued to operate, but the procedure to grant exemption and certain conditions were altered; this, the Supreme Court held as impermissible under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The union of India and others v Mis. Anglo Afghan Agencies etc. , Air 1968 SC 718 was also a case where export promotion scheme was is sued by the government, but, benefit thereunder was refused on the ground that the scheme was under administrative power not binding on the ground; doctrine of promissory estoppel was applied to hold that the government was precluded from denying the benefit held out by it under the scheme; there was no question of withdrawal of the scheme promulgated earlier; the defence of the government was based on executive necessity, which was repelled by the Supreme Court; the court held: "we are unable to accede to the contention that the executive necessity releases the government from honouring its solemn promises relying on which citizens have acted to their detriment. Under our con stitutional set up, no person may be deprived of his right or liberty except in due course of and by authority of law; if a mem ber of the executive seeks to deprive a citizen of his right or liberty otherwise than in exercise of power derived from the law - common or statute - the courts will be competent to, and indeed would be bound to, protect the rights of the aggrieved citizen. " , in view of the enforceability of the terms of the scheme, relief was granted to the claimant of the benefit under the scheme. In Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd. And another v The Ulhasnagar Municipal Council and another, AIR 1971 SC 1021 the petitioner invoked the doctrine of promissory estoppel, on the basis of the alleged representation made by the municipal council to the petitioner. The matter, on merits, was not decided by the Supreme Court. Poumami oil mills, etc. V state of Kerala and another, AIR 1987 SC 590 , again, is similar to dhannendra trading company's case, AIR 1988 SC 1247 . The matter, on merits, was not decided by the Supreme Court. Poumami oil mills, etc. V state of Kerala and another, AIR 1987 SC 590 , again, is similar to dhannendra trading company's case, AIR 1988 SC 1247 . The industrial undertakings set up during the period when the exemption order was in force, were held to be entitled to the benefit; the Supreme Court had no occasion to consider the validity of the withdrawal of the order by a subsequent notification. At page 593, it is observed: "it is not disputed that the first order namely, the one dated 11-4-1979 gave more of tax exemption than the second one. The second notification withdrew the exemption relating to purchase lax and confined the exemption from sales tax to the limit specified in the proviso of the notification. All parties before us who in response to the order of April 11, 1979 set up their in dustries prior to 21-10-1980 within the state of Kerala would thus be entitled to the ex emption extended and/or promised under that order. Such exemption would con tinue for the full period of five years from the date they started production. New in dustries set up after 21-10-1980 obviously would not be entitled to that benefit as they had notice of the curtailment in the exemp tion before they came to set up their in dustries. " The above principle certainly would have been applied to grant the relief to the petitioner in the instant case, if the importation of the goods in question had taken place before the cancel lation of the exemption notification. The earlier decision of the Supreme Court in mis. Molllal padampat sugar mills co. Ltd. V the state of U. P. , AIR 1979 SC 621 , again, is distinguishable; the appellant therein had estab lished its factory when the exemption was in force; the appellant was told of the exemption specifically, at the time it established the factory (vide page 649 at para 32 ). It is unnecessary to multiply the citations. ( 14 ) THE short question, therefore, iswhether, an importer is entitled to the benefit of the exemption from the levy of customs duty, only because, he entered into an agreement to purchase and import the goods during the period of the exemption notification. It is unnecessary to multiply the citations. ( 14 ) THE short question, therefore, iswhether, an importer is entitled to the benefit of the exemption from the levy of customs duty, only because, he entered into an agreement to purchase and import the goods during the period of the exemption notification. By the time goods crossed the customs barrier, if the exemption notification is withdrawn, can he still claim the benefit of the exemption, pleading bar of promissory estoppel against the revenue from resiling from the exemption notification? ( 15 ) THE notification operates only on the levyof customs duty. It is now well settled that, subject to certain procedural conditions, such as Section 15, the duty leviable is with reference to the date when the goods cross the customs barrier. The charging provision is Section 12, which enables the levy of customs duty on "goods imported into" India. ( 16 ) THE levy of customs duty and exemption the refrom depend upon exigencies of public revenue and the public interest. The concept of public interest is incapable of precise definition. Customs duly has a bearing on the international trade and commerce and in levying duty on im port of any particular goods, the parliament (including the government) may consider the international situation, foreign market-condi tions, trade agreements with foreign countries, requirements of this country and many such other factors. Similar factors would influence the exercise of power under Section 25 also. Every importer and exporter is aware of fast changing situations in intcrnalional trade. The risk of fluctuating prices and other elements af fecting an import-trade is known to all importers. ( 17 ) IN the very nature of things,, the government cannot keep alive the benefit of an exemption notification to govern the purchase agreements entered into during the existence of the notification issued under seclion 25; if the governmenl were to be compelled to grant such a benefit, situalions would develop wherein for years together, the exemplion may have to be kept alive. It will be inequitable lo compel the government to keep alive an exemption notification, indefinitely to enable a person to complete the importalion of goods for which he entered into an agreement earlier. ( 18 ) WRIT petition is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs. Writ petilion dismissed. --- *** --- .