P. N. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) OSTENSIBLY, challenge is to the charge framed as per impugned order against the accused/petitioner under Section 379, IPC. Shri Bhargava, learned counsel appearing for him, has, however, given a new twist to the case and has contended seriously that the institution of the prosecution was itself void and, therefore, there was no scope for trial Court to frame any charge. ( 2 ) TO a certain extent, Shri Bhargava is right because the prosecution concerns theft of electricity and yet the special provision of Section 39 of Indian Electricity Act, 1910, for short, the 'act', has apparently been overlooked in passing the impugned order. It is conceded very fairly and rightly by Shri Khot that the trial Court should have added also Section 39 of the Act to the charge framed under Section 379, IPC, to make the charge clearly understandable to the accused/petitioner. Apparently, Section 39 is explanatory of Section 379, IPC when that is applied to theft of electrical energy. However, what I find from records is that in drawing up the charge in the statutory form, care was taken by the trial Court to make the position clear that the accused was required to stand trial for the charge under Section 379, IPC read with Section 39, Indian Electricity Act. ( 3 ) HOWEVER, the serious contention which Shri Bhargava has raised, merits serious consideration and discussion. Facts are not disputed that the prosecution report was lodged by K. K. Jain, Junior Engineer, M. P. Electricity Board (for short, MPEB), Jigni, District Morena. Prosecution's case was that the accused/petitioner was operating a pumping machine with the help of electrical energy to irrigate his field and he was drawing electrical energy from main line without registering himself as a consumer. The case of the prosecution was that theft was clear, naked and without any cover whatsoever because no semblance of any authority to use electrical energy could be pleaded in any manner. In the F. I. R. , it was stated that as a result of the device used by the accused/petitioner, distribution centre of M. P. E. B. , at Jigni, was suffering heavy loss inasmuch as a 10 Horse Power electric motor was being used for operating the pump and for the electrical energy consumed no payment was made. In the F. I. R. , it was stated that as a result of the device used by the accused/petitioner, distribution centre of M. P. E. B. , at Jigni, was suffering heavy loss inasmuch as a 10 Horse Power electric motor was being used for operating the pump and for the electrical energy consumed no payment was made. Shri Bhargava has submitted that the Junior Engineer could not have instituted the prosecution inasmuch as Section 50 denies him that competence. Counsel has also cited two decisions of this Court in support of his contention. ( 4 ) IT is true, Section 50 contemplates that no prosecution in respect of any offence under the Act shall be instituted "except at the instance of the Government or an Electrical Inspector, or of a person aggrieved by the same". Much stress is, therefore, laid by Shri Bhargava on the words "electrical Inspector" to submit that the Junior Engineer not being an "electrical Inspector", the prosecution was void and unauthorised. Counsel's reliance on two decisions of this Court in support of that contention is appropriate, but in my view, misconceived; according to me, law is settled otherwise at the Summit level in Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 666 : (1965 (1) Cri LJ 605 ). ( 5 ) SHRI Bhargava is right and very right indeed in contending that Avtar Singh's decision (supra) has been considered in Suleman's case, 1980 JLJ 117 by a learned single Judge of this Court and yet in that case, the view taken is that the prosecution launched by a "supervisor" of M. P. E. B. , who was not an "electrical Inspector", was incompetent. Another learned single Judge of this Court in Surendra Singh's case, 1991 (II) MPWN 20, has also taken the same view holding that the "sub-Engineer" of M. P. E. B. had no authority to launch such prosecution as he was an unauthorised person. ( 6 ) HOWEVER, in both decisions, I do not find any other reason given by the two learned Judges of this Court in reaching their conclusions that the person launching the prosecution could not be treated as an authorised person in terms of Section 50 of the Act except that the person concerned was not an "electrical Inspector". ( 6 ) HOWEVER, in both decisions, I do not find any other reason given by the two learned Judges of this Court in reaching their conclusions that the person launching the prosecution could not be treated as an authorised person in terms of Section 50 of the Act except that the person concerned was not an "electrical Inspector". Avtar Singh (supra), however, leaves nothing in doubt and is very clear, leaving no scope for interpreting Section 50 to limit the prosecuting authority only to an "electrical Inspector". At para 9, their Lordships observed : "it seems to us that the object of S. 50 is to prevent prosecution for offences against the Act being instituted by anyone who chooses to do so because the offences can be proved by men possessing special qualifications. That is why it is left only to the authorities concerned with the offence and the person aggrieved by it to initiate the prosecution. " (Emphasis added ). The Electrical Inspector's image as such totally vanishes from the landscape depicted in the holding of their Lordships. Obviously, because, that term itself is not defined in the Act. Their Lordships gave judicial definition to the term stating that such a person has to possess "special qualification" and has to be "concerned with the offence. " ( 7 ) IT is noteworthy that although Section 36 of the Act contemplates appointment by the appropriate Government of "duly qualified persons" as Electrical Inspectors, they can exercise only such functions as are entrusted to them under the Act in specific terms and as are delegated to them under Section 55 by the State Government. Under Section 26, Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, the State Electricity Board (and for that matter, M. P. E. B.) has been vested with powers and obligations of the "licensee" contemplated under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. Those are obviously not affected in any manner by the provisions of Section 50 because under the 1948 Act, generation and supply of electricity by the Board throughout the State is entrusted to the Board and the Board, for the management of its affairs, can appoint such servants and officers as may be necessary and expedient for due discharge of Board's obligations in exercise of its powers in respect to supply and generation of electricity. Any servant or officer of the Board who is also a "duly qualified person" possessing requisite technical knowledge would be evidently in a position to launch prosecution under Section 50 as the Board would be certainly "aggrieved" when the electricity generated by it is pilfered and is not paid for. ( 8 ) TRUE, reliance is also placed by Shri Khot, besides Avtar Singh, on a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Jhalkan Singh, 1981 MPLJ 409 : (1981 Cri LJ 1230), but that itself is based on Avtar Singh's case and does not expose any new dimension of law despite, of course, the decision running counter to the view expressed in Suleman and Surendra Singh (both, supra ). There is, however, no scope for me evidently to refer to Larger Bench the question of difference of opinion in view of the clear and categorical holding at the Summit level in Avtar Singh's case which has authoritatively settled the law beyond any pale of controversy. Suffice it to say this much in this respect that I am bound hand and foot to follow punctiliously the "law of the land" declared by the Supreme Court and to enforce the same as mandated by Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution. ( 9 ) APPLYING Avtar Singh's twin tests to the instant case, I have found no merit in Shri Bhargava's contention. By no stretch of imagination it can he said that the Junior Engineer of M. P. E. B. who was in-charge of the Distribution Centre at Jigni was not an authority" concerned with offence" or that he had no "special qualification". Evidently, as an Engineer, duly qualified, he possessed the requisite technical qualification and knowledge to detect the theft of the electrical energy of the accused who had not registered himself as a consumer; it cannot be said that he did not possess "special qualification" needed for that purpose. Besides, he was a person who was immediately and highly "aggrieved" by the theft. Besides, he was a person who was immediately and highly "aggrieved" by the theft. He was responsible for managing properly and efficiently the Distribution Centre at Jigni and the place of occurrence was within his jurisdiction; M. P. E. B. was the owner of the electrical energy distributed through that centre under his control and as a servant of the Board, charged with the duty of managing the affairs of the Centre he was required to prevent any wrongful loss being caused to the Board. He was "aggrieved" because the dishonest act of the accused impinged on due discharge of his duties. ( 10 ) A fervent plea, Shri Bhargava also made that in the F. I. R. , it was stated that during the course of checking an 20-3-1985 unauthorised use of electric motor was detected and, therefore, by lapse of time the prosecution has become stale. I do not agree with him that the proceedings should be dropped merely because it is a case of an agriculturist irrigating his field several years ago or that he was a poor and illiterate villager. On the other hand, I am of the view that the Green Revolution is not meant to bleed white a Public Sector Undertaking providing essential services to all consumers alike, rural and urban. Law is meant to deal with all persons fairly and squarely and to punish alike dishonesty of all persons. This Court's duty it is to ensure rather that no offence goes unpunished; that Rule of Law prevails and justice is administered according to law. ( 11 ) FOR all the reasons aforesaid, the petition fails and is dismissed. Petition dismissed. .