Judgment :- Venkataswami, J. 1. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree in C.S. No. 420 of 1979. on the file of this Court, the plaintiff as well as the defendant have filed these two appeals. 2. The plaintiff in the suit is the appellant in O.S.A. No. 106 of 1986. The defendant in the same suit is the appellant in O.S A. No. 118 of 1987. For the sake of convenience and easy reference, hereinafter the parties are referred to as ‘plaintiff and ‘defendant’. 3. The plaintiff filed C.S. No. 420 of 1979, claiming the following reliefs:— a) a direction to the defendant to specifically perform the agreement dated 12-11-1974 and surrender the entire superstructure constructed on plaintiffs property, to execute a deed of surrender and/or to execute a deed of gift in respect of the suit property; b) directing the defendant to deliver possession of the entire suit property; c) directing the defendant to execute a lease deed in respect of 36 shops; d) directing the defendant to pay arrears of rent amounting to a sum of Rs. 4,112,90. Ps.: e) directing the defendant to pay mesne profits at the rate to be determined by the court From March 1977 to date of suit, and future mesne profits at the rate to be determined by the court; f) directing the appointment of a Commissioner to ascertain the mesne profits payable by the defendant; and g) to direct the defendant to pay costs of the suit. 4. Briefly stated, the facts are the following: The defendant entered into an agreement with the plaintiff represented by its then Trustees and Executive Officer on 12.11.1974, agreeing to construct 40 shops on the three sides of the Temple tank facing Ekambaraswarar Agraharam Street, and for lease of 36 shops out of the 40 shops, as per the terms mentioned in the said agreement. The sum and substance of the plaint is that the defendant failed to strictly adhere to the terms and conditions of the said agreement which necessitated the plaintiff filing the suit. According to the plaintiff, the defendant ought to have commenced and completed the construction according to the plan approved by the Appropriate Authority within nine months from the date of the agreement failing which the plaintiff Temple is entitled to forfeit the initial deposit of Rs. 25,000/- made by the defendant. According to the plaintiff, the defendant ought to have commenced and completed the construction according to the plan approved by the Appropriate Authority within nine months from the date of the agreement failing which the plaintiff Temple is entitled to forfeit the initial deposit of Rs. 25,000/- made by the defendant. Likewise, the defendant, according to the agreement, ought to have executed a deed of gift surrendering the entire construction to the plaintiff (Devasthanam) without claiming any compensation, and further, ought to have executed the necessary lease agreement on the completion of the construction. As per the terms of the lease, the defendant was obliged to hand over four shops to the plaintiff (Devasthanam) for their use. The plaintiff further stated the the defendant, instead of adhering to, the original plan, had deviated and constructed 42 shops in the ground floor in addition to 30 rooms and two halls in the basement below the ground floor and 31 rooms and three halls in the first floor above the ground floor and also a hall and three rooms in the second floor with latrine facilities in all the floors. Correspondingly, the defendant must be directed to pay the mesne profits for additional superstructure, and he (defendant) has no right to occupy the extra construction put up by him (defendant). The plaintiff also demands surrender of the entire construction without claiming any compensation and to execute necessary documents. The plaintiff also claimed that the defendant was liable to pay rent a according to the terms of the agreement, from August 1975. It is the case of the plaintiff that the defendant has not complied with all the above demands of the plaintiff. Hence the suit. The plaintiff has made it clear that it was always ready and willing to perform its part of the agreement as per the terms of the agreement. 5. The suit was resisted by the defendant contending inter alia that the Temple tank was being misused by the residents of the surrounding area and the plaintiff had no funds to utilise the tank in a proper manner. It was in those circumstances, at the request of the trustees of the plaintiff, the defendant agreed to put up the superstructure as per the terms of the agreement dated 12.11.1974. It was in those circumstances, at the request of the trustees of the plaintiff, the defendant agreed to put up the superstructure as per the terms of the agreement dated 12.11.1974. The terms were settled by the plaintiff and the defendant was asked to accept and sign the draft sent by the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endownments Board, without giving reasonable time to study the agreement, and on the assurance by the Trustees that they would make things easy for him. The defendant denied the claim of the plaintiff that the monthly rents were payable from August, 1975. Though it is for the plaintiff to get the plans sanctioned by the Corporation, the defendant took all necessary steps by submitting necessary plan and paying the fee therefor. The plan was rejected by the Corporation on account of non-production of pattas by the plaintiff and for other reasons. Ultimately, the plan was sanctioned only on 13-6-1975 and the same was received only on 21-7-1975. The defendant commenced the construction immediately thereafter. It is the specific case of the defendant that the Trustees of the plaintiff and the officials of the H.R. & C.E. Board visited the site before, during and after the construction. The defendant stoutly denied the allegation that the deviation was unliaterally made by him. According to the defendant, the plaintiff got the plan revised and got the approval of the M.M.D.A. According to the defendant, it was the plaintiff who suggested the construction of R.C. columns instead of filling up the tank. The plaintiff having acquiesced to various changes in the plan and having been a party to the alteration, cannot now turn round and blame the defendant, and the plaintiff is estopped from contending that the contract has been varied unilaterally by the defendant. In fact, though the defendant was obliged to put up a construction at a cost of Rs. 1.60 lakhs, he has spent more than Rs. 5 Lakhs, and the entire advantage goes to the plaintiff. The construction was completed in September, 1977. The defendant has reserved four shops as per the terms of the agreement for the use of the plaintiff, and it is the plaintiff who refused to take possession of the four shops reserved for its (Devasthanams) use for reasons best known to it. According to the defendant, taking into account the advance already paid, namely, a sum of Rs. The defendant has reserved four shops as per the terms of the agreement for the use of the plaintiff, and it is the plaintiff who refused to take possession of the four shops reserved for its (Devasthanams) use for reasons best known to it. According to the defendant, taking into account the advance already paid, namely, a sum of Rs. 25,000/-, and further payment of Rs. 55,000/-towards rent, there was no amount due by way of rent, and actually the rent has been paid in excess. The defendant was always ready and willing to execute the gift deed, and in fact, a draft was sent for approval to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff did not take any further step. Therefore, the defendant was not responsible for the non-execution of the gift deed. The defendant has admitted in the written statement that he has already deliveredposses-sion of the entire superstructure to the plaintiff by paying rent and claiming himself as a tenant. According to the defendant, the plaintiff-Devas-thanam is in possession through its tenant, namely, the defendant. In such circumstances, according to the defendant, there cannot be any relief for specific performance as claimed by the plaintiff. The defendant, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the suit 6. The plaintiff has filed a reply statement reiterating the contentions narrated in the plaint. 7. On the basis of the pleadings, the following issues were framed: “1. Whether the defendant has committed breach of the agreement dated 12-11-1974? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to forfeit the deposit of Rs. 25,000/-? 3. Whether the defendant has made unauthorized construction? 4. Whether the defendant has committed default in executing the gift deed in favour of the plaintiff Devasthanam? 5. Whether the defendant has committed default in handing over the four shops to the Devasthanam and whether the defendant is liable for mesne profits in respect them of? 6. From what date is the defendant liable to pay rent and for which portion? 7. Whether the defendant is liable to pay mesne profits for the extra construction and surrender the same? 8. To what reliefs, are the parties entitled? 8. 6. From what date is the defendant liable to pay rent and for which portion? 7. Whether the defendant is liable to pay mesne profits for the extra construction and surrender the same? 8. To what reliefs, are the parties entitled? 8. The learned trial Judge, on a careful consideration of the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence and also after considering the arguments of the counsel on both sides, found that the defendant has not committed breach of the agreement dated 12-11-1974, that the plaintiff is not entitled to forfeit the deposit of Rs. 25,000/-, that the additional construction made was not unauthorised one, that the defendant has not committed default in executing the gift deed, and that the defendant has not committed default in handing over the four shops to the plaintiff Devasthanam, and, therefore, the defendant was not liable for mesne profits in respect of the four shops. The learned Judge also held that the defendant is liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 2,500/- from 13-3-1976 till 1-8-1982, and from 1-8-1982 the defendant must pay a sum of Rs. 7,750/- by way of rent for the period ending with 31-7-1989. The learned Judge has not said anything about possession. It may immediately be noted that the increase in rent from Rs. 2,500/- to Rs. 7,750/- and the enlargement of the lease period by the learned judge was mainly on the basis of the letter (Ex. P-19) given by the defendant on 28-7-1982 during the pendency of the suit expressing his willingness to settle the matter on the basis of the terms contained in that letter. 9. Now these appeals are filed, one by the plaintiff substantially aggrieved by the fact that no decree for possession was given by the learned trial Judge though other incidental points are also urged, and another appeal by the defendant for not enlarging the terms of the lease upto the period 12-3-1991. 10. Mr. R. Desabandhu, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff (appellant in O.S.A. No. 106 of 1986) though submitted that the learned judge erred in finding Issue Nos. 1 to 5 against the plaintiff, really concentrated his argument only with regard to the relief relating to recovery of possession of the party. 11. Mr. 10. Mr. R. Desabandhu, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff (appellant in O.S.A. No. 106 of 1986) though submitted that the learned judge erred in finding Issue Nos. 1 to 5 against the plaintiff, really concentrated his argument only with regard to the relief relating to recovery of possession of the party. 11. Mr. K. Rangavajjula, learned counsel appearing for the defendant-appellant in O.S.A. No. 118 of 1987 while submitting that the plaintiffs appeal was without substance, further contended that there was no justification for the learned trial judge for partly accepting the terms of the defendants letter. According to the learned counsel, the learned trial Judge either ought to have accepted Ex. P-19 (letters) in full or totally rejected the same, and decided the issue. According to the learned counsel, the conclusion reached by the learned Judge by partly accepting the terms of the letter for enhancing the rent and correspondingly enlarging the period of lease not to the extent asked for, cannot be sustained. In opposing the relief regarding recovery of possession, learned counsel pointed out that at the time of filing of the suit, really speaking, there was no cause of action for claiming the relief of recovery of possession. Therefore, that relief cannot be granted. 12. In answer to that, Mr. R. Desabandhu, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant in O.S.A. 106/86 placing reliance on a judgment of this Court in Rajammal v. Raja Magindira Kottai Nayaka Thelungal alias Balija Kulathavar Sangam , Kancheepuram represented by its President) 1981 T.L.N.J. 553 and another judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s. Variety Emporium v. V.R.M. Mohd Ebrahim Naina 1985 (1) M.L.J. page 1 (S.C.) = (1985)98 L.W. 26, submitted that having regard to the subsequent events, namely, the expiry of the period, the relief of recovery of possession can be granted by this Court. 13. In the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel on both sides, we find that the substantial questions that arise for consideration in both the appeals are, whether the relief for possession can be granted, and whether the learned trial Judge was right in enhancing the rent partly accepting the terms of the letter, namely, Ex. P-19. 13. In the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel on both sides, we find that the substantial questions that arise for consideration in both the appeals are, whether the relief for possession can be granted, and whether the learned trial Judge was right in enhancing the rent partly accepting the terms of the letter, namely, Ex. P-19. We may add that other minor points were also urged by the learned counsel for the appellant in O.S.A. No. 106 of 1986, but we do not find any substance in those arguments and we will deal with those aspects immediately. 14. The learned Judge, in the course of his Judgment, has repeatedly pointed out that the evidence let in on the side of the plaintiff, namely, P.W. 1 is of no use at all as he joined the service as Executive Officer only recently and he has candidly admitted in more than one place that he did not know anything about the terms of the agreement, construction of the superstructure and other attendant circumstances. On the other hand, the defendant as D.W.I has categorically deposed, which stands unrebutted, about the commencement of the construction, alterations in the plan and the delay in getting the plan sanctioned. Likewise, regarding the reservation of four shops as well as draft gift deed sent by the defendant the evidence given by the defendant stand unrebutted. In those circumstances, the learned trial Judge accepted the evidence of D.W.I and found Issue Nos. 1 to 5 against the plaintiff. After carefully going through the evidence of P.W. 1 and D.W.I and the judgment of the learned trial Judge, we do not find any case for taking a different view. As we are accepting the discussion and the reasonings of the learned trial Judge on Issue Nos. 1 to 7, reserving some comments to be made at the appropriate place regarding enhancement of rent from 1-8-1982 and enlargement of lease upto 31-7-1989, we do not consider it necessary to narrate the facts once again, discuss the same and render findings once over. 15. It has been brought to our notice that subsequent to the judgment in the suit, the defendant has also executed a registered gift deed on 20-5-1986 in favour of the plaintiff. 16. 15. It has been brought to our notice that subsequent to the judgment in the suit, the defendant has also executed a registered gift deed on 20-5-1986 in favour of the plaintiff. 16. Before taking up the substantial point that has to be considered in the plaintiffs appeal (O.S.A. 106/86) regarding decree for possession, we consider that we can dispose of the defendants appeal (O.S.A 118/87). 17. We have already noticed that the grievance of the defendant as expressed in the grounds of appeal and also argued before us is, that the learned Judge went wrong in partly giving effect to the letter written by the defendant and marked as Ex. P-19, for enhancing the rent and for partly enlarging the period of lease deed. In other words, according to the learned counsel for the defendant (appellant in O.S.A. 118/87), the learned Judge ought to have accepted the terms and Exhibit P. 19 in toto and moulded the relief accordingly. On this aspect, this is what the learned Judge has stated in the judgment: ‘Taking into consideration the fact that the defendant has expended over Rs. 5,00,000/- much more than the original estimate of Rs. 1,60,000/-, the fact that the defendant has offered to pay rent at 7,750/- from 1-8-1982, I think it is just and proper that he is granted lease of the entire construction excepting the four shops for a further period of five years from now, that is, till 31 -7-89. It is obvious that the learned Judge was influenced by the terms of compromise suggested by the defendant in the letter marked as Ex. P.-19 While taking the terms of Exhibit P. 19 for enhancement of rent, the learned Judge has not given full effect to the terms of Ex. P.-19 regarding further period of lease. The defendant offered to pay enhanced rent at Rs. 7.750/- on the condition that he be given further lease upto 12-3-1991. We have already observed that we concur with the conclusions of the learned Judge on all the issues reserving our comments regarding enhancement of rent and enlargement of period of lease. After hearing learned counsel on both sides, we find force in the argument of the learned counsel for the defendant (appellant in O.S.A. 118/87). Therefore, we hold that at the enhanced rate of rent, namely Rs. After hearing learned counsel on both sides, we find force in the argument of the learned counsel for the defendant (appellant in O.S.A. 118/87). Therefore, we hold that at the enhanced rate of rent, namely Rs. 7.750/- per mensem from 1-8-1982, the defendant is entitled to be in possession of the entire superstructure except the four shops, upto 12-3-1991. We have come to this conclusion, apart from the terms of Ex. P-19, for an additional reason as well. When we took up the appeals for disposal, the enlarged period of lease asked for by the defendant had come to an end. Therefore, we thought that in the interest of both parties and having regard to the investment made by the defendant, he should be allowed to be in possession of the premises as desired by him in his letter (marked as Ex. P-19). At the same time, we hasten to add that the defendant must have definitely reaped the fruits of his investment long ago. The defendant should bear the liability of paying the property tax upto 1-8-1982, and thereafter the liability to pay the property tax has to be borne by the plaintiff. In the light of the above discussion, the defendants appeal (D.S.A. 118/87) is allowed accordingly. 18. Coming to the plaintiffs appeal (O.S.A. 106/86), regarding the prayer for recovery of possession, we presume that the learned Judge has not given that relief though such a relief has been prayed for in the plaint as on the date of disposal of the suit, such relief could not have been granted. It is important to note that the defendant while writing Ex. P-19, has never asked for further renewal of Tease beyond 12-3-1991. The period asked for by the defendant having come to an end, can the court now grant the relief for recovery of possession has to be considered. It is in that context Mr. R. Desabandhu, learned counsel for the plaintiff (appellant in O.S.A. 106/86) placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in 1985 (1) M.LJ.page 1 = (1985)98 L.W. 26 (S.C) and also a judgment of this Court in 1981 T.N.L.J. 553 (supra). 19. In 1985(1) M.LJ. It is in that context Mr. R. Desabandhu, learned counsel for the plaintiff (appellant in O.S.A. 106/86) placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in 1985 (1) M.LJ.page 1 = (1985)98 L.W. 26 (S.C) and also a judgment of this Court in 1981 T.N.L.J. 553 (supra). 19. In 1985(1) M.LJ. Page 1 = (1985) 98, L.W. 26 (S.C.)(supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed as follows: “No authority is needed for the proposition that, in appropriate cases, the court must have regard to events as they present themselves at the time when it is hearing the proceeding before it and mould the relief in the light of those events. We may, however, draw attention to a decision of this Court in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, (1981) 3 S.S.C. 103:= A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1711: (1981) 3 S.C.B. 608, the ratio of which may be stated thus: “When an action is brought by a landlord for the eviction of a tenant on the ground of personal requirement, the landlords need must not only be shown to exist at the date of the suit, but it must exist on the date of the appellate decree, or the date when a higher Court deals with the matter. During the progress and passage of proceeding from court to court, if subsequent events occur which, if noticed would non-suit the landlord, the court has to examine and evaluate those events and mould the decree accordingly. The tenant is entitled to show that the need of requirement of the landlord no more exists by pointing out such subsequent events, to the Court, including the appellate Court. In such a situation, it would be incorrect to say that as a decree or order for eviction is passed against the tenant, he cannot invite the court to take into consideration subsequent events. The tenant can be precluded from so contending only when a decree or order for eviction has become final.” See pages 606 — 607 Justice R.S. Pathak, who concurred with Justice D.A. Desai and Justice Venkataramiah, expressed the same view that. The tenant can be precluded from so contending only when a decree or order for eviction has become final.” See pages 606 — 607 Justice R.S. Pathak, who concurred with Justice D.A. Desai and Justice Venkataramiah, expressed the same view that. “It is well settled now that in a proceeding for the ejectment of a tenant on the ground of personal requirement under a statute controlling the eviction of tenants, unless the statute prescribes to the contrary, the requirement must continue to exist on the date when the proceeding is finally disposed of either in appeal or revision, by the relevant authority. That position is indisputable. See Page 644. 20. In Rajammal v. Raja Magindiri Kottai Nayaka, etc. (supra) , 1981 T.L.N.J. 553 Ramanujam, J., after refer ring to earlier Division Bench judgments of this Court, has answered a similar question in the following manner. “Then the question is, whether the suit is liable to be dismissed on the ground that on the date of the suit, the plaintiff had no cause of action to recover possession of the property on the basis that the lease under Ex. A-3 has expired on 9-12-1974. The learned counsel for the respondent Plaintiff contends, “that though the plaintiff had no cause of action to file a suit for recovery of possession on the date of suit, since the ten years period referred to in Ex. A-3 had come to an end on 7-8-19.79, even on the basis that the lease, Ex. A-3, was operative only from 6-8-1989, the court can take the said subsequent event, i.e, the expiry of the lease on 7-8-1979, and grant the relief of possession to the plaintiff without approving the decree for possession granted by the courts below. It is submitted by the learned counsel that though normally the rights of parties have to be determined as on the date of commencement of the suit:, the court can take note of the subsequent events and grant the relief in the suit suitably so as to shorten the litigation and to avoid the multiplicity of suits. It is submitted by the learned counsel that though normally the rights of parties have to be determined as on the date of commencement of the suit:, the court can take note of the subsequent events and grant the relief in the suit suitably so as to shorten the litigation and to avoid the multiplicity of suits. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the respondent, though the suit on the date of its filing was premature for the reason that the lease in favour of the first defendant has not expired, and now that the lease had expired in the year 1979, this Court can grant the relief of possession,, claimed by the plaintiff, taking note of the said subsequent event of the expiry of the lease, that if the suit is fil ed thereafter, it cannot be disputed that the suit is filed after the expiry of the period mentioned in the lease deed, Ex. A-3, and that the plaintiff will be entitled to the relief of recovery of possession as the suit is based on tenancy. Thus, the question to be considered is as to whether this court can take note of the expiry of the lease after filing of the suit and when the appeal was “pending before the lower court and sustain the decree for possession granted by the court below. The learned counsel refers to certain decisions rendered by this Court and other courts, which lay down that the appeal is a continuation of the suit and that the appellate court can take note of the suosequent event, which will entitle the plaintiff to get the relief sought for in the suit, though at the time of filing of the suit he was not entitled to the relief. As a matter of fact, one decision has gone to the extent of saying that it is the duty of the court to take note of the subsequent events so as to shorten the litigation. The earliest case, referred to by the learned counsel, is (Thimnayya v. Siddappa) A.I.R. 1925 Madras 63=75 LC 112. In that case, the plaintiff had no right of suit at the date of institution but he acquired the right through inheritance opening in his favour after the filing but before the disposal of the suit. The earliest case, referred to by the learned counsel, is (Thimnayya v. Siddappa) A.I.R. 1925 Madras 63=75 LC 112. In that case, the plaintiff had no right of suit at the date of institution but he acquired the right through inheritance opening in his favour after the filing but before the disposal of the suit. The question arose as to whether the subsequent event of acquisition of right by the plaintiffs could be taken into account and the plaintiffs title upheld. A Division Bench of this Court held; “Even though the plaintiff had no title on the date of suit, very soon after th e suit was filed and before the case was disposed of by the trial Court, title to the suit property has vested with the plaintiff by inheritance and therefore, he can be given the relief sought for by him without even a formal amendment of his plaint”. In (Mammad v. P.K Veerarayan) 1929 Madras Weekly Notes 165 where a suit was brought by the plaintiffs a month before the lease had expired, and the suit was resisted on the ground that the plaintiffs had no cause of action on the date of suit as the lease was subsisting on that date. The lower courts took the view that it is unnecessary to drive the plaintiff to file a fresh suit and to incur additional expenditure, especially when it is seen that the lease had come to an end after the filing of the suit but before the trial. When the judgments of the lower courts were challenged before this court, it was held that: “It cannot be doubted that courts have jurisdiction to take notice of subsequent events in a proper case when it will tend to shorten the litigation provided that the defendant is not prejudiced thereby. In this case no prejudice has been shown to the defendant by the plaintiffs instituting their suit just a month before the expiry of the full term Authorities of this Court have always held that in a proper case courts can take cognizance of events subsequent to the institution of a suit. In this case no prejudice has been shown to the defendant by the plaintiffs instituting their suit just a month before the expiry of the full term Authorities of this Court have always held that in a proper case courts can take cognizance of events subsequent to the institution of a suit. In ( P.V. Janaki v. Kalliani Anuna ) A.I.R. 1934 Madras 675 the plaintiff filed a suit on the ground of forfeiture of lease while the lease deed provided that a suit for forfeiture can be filed only after six years from the date of lease and that period had not expired. At the stage of the appeal, the six years’ period had expired. Taking note of that subsequent event, the appellate court decreed the suit for forfeiture even though on the date of suit he was not entitled to that relief. This Court held that a court is entitled to take in to consideration events subsequent to the date of the plaint provided this could be done without prejudice to the parties. The decision in (Janaki v. Kalliani Ammal) A.I.R. 1934 Madras 675 has been followed by Andhra Pradesh High Court in A.I.R. 1959 Andhra Pradesh 9 wherein a Division Bench of that Court had observed:” It is now well settled that in proper case the court is entitled to take note of the subsequent events and grant relief to the parties accordingly, if by so doing it can shorten iigitation and best attain the ends of justice”. It also held: “The power to take note of the subsequent events, may be exercised even by this Court of appeal as ah appeal is only in the nature of a re-hearing”. In that case reference has been made to a decision of this Court in (Valluru Applasuri v. Sasappa Kannamma Nayuralu)49 M.LJ. 479=22 L.W. 287 wherein it was held:”events that happen even after the tiling ot tne suit including those that and to the title of the plaintiff may be taken notice of. In R.M. Subramaniam v. N. Sundaram Iyer) A.I.R. 1968 Madras 217 =76 L.W. 40 (Full Bench), a Full Bench of this Court reiterated the view taken by this Court in the earlier cases which have been referred to above. The Full Bench observed: (omited). The Supreme Court has also expressed the same view in A.I.R. 1974; Supreme Court 199 (Sri Mahuilinga Thambiran v. Arulnandi Thainbiran). The Full Bench observed: (omited). The Supreme Court has also expressed the same view in A.I.R. 1974; Supreme Court 199 (Sri Mahuilinga Thambiran v. Arulnandi Thainbiran). The common principle underlying the above decisions appears to be based on the fact that it is the duty of the court which still retains control of the judgment to take such action as will shorten litigation, preserve the rights of both parties, and best subserve the ends of justice. As pointed out by Mr Justice Gray in (18955) 159 U.S. 651(D), right to take notice of the subsequent events is not only a power but may also sometimes be the duty of the court to do so. In this case it is true that the courts power or the duty to take subsequent events into account to shorten the process of litigation, have to be exercised provided no prejudice is caused to the other side. In this case, it cannot be said that the defendants are prejudiced merely by the plaintiff filing a suit prematurely.” A careful perusal of the above passages clearly indicates that the relief for recovery of possession on the facts and circumstances of this case can be granted at the appellate stage. At the risk of repetition, we would like to point out that the period of enlargement of lease asked for by defendant came to an end on 12-3-1991. We have also taken note of the admission by the defendant in the gift deed that the plaintiff is a public religious and charitable institution. Consequently we hold that the provisions of the Rent Control Act and the protection given to the tenants under the said Act are not available to the defendant. Therefore, we feel this is a fit case where we must grant the relief for recovery of possession to shorten the litigation and to avoid multiplicity of suits between the parties. No doubt, Mr. K. Rangavajjula, learned counsel appearing for the defendant (appellant in O.S.A. 118/87) placed reliance on the decision in Sathyanaiyanamurthy v. Venkata Pitchaiah A.I.R. 1946 Madras 56 = (1945)58 L.W. 550 . No doubt, Mr. K. Rangavajjula, learned counsel appearing for the defendant (appellant in O.S.A. 118/87) placed reliance on the decision in Sathyanaiyanamurthy v. Venkata Pitchaiah A.I.R. 1946 Madras 56 = (1945)58 L.W. 550 . After going through the said judgment, we do not think that any proposition as such is laid down therein, to support the case of the defendant, and in any event, we are of the view that the cases relied on by the learned counsel for the plaintiff are more apposite than the case relied on by the learned counsel for the defendant. For these reasons, we hold that the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the entire superstructure from the defendant. The mesne profits payable by the defendant for possession of the superstructure from 13-3-1991 till date of delivery of vacant possession will be decided by separate proceedings under Order 20 Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appeal (O.S.A. No. 106 of 1986) is accordingly partly allowed. There will be no order as to costs in both the appeals.