A. KABIR, J. ( 1 ) THE short point for decision in this appeal which has been preferred against the order dated 5th February, 1989, passed by a learned Single Judge in Matter No. 4777 of 1986, is whether the learned Single Judge was justified in directing the respondents in the writ application to allow the writ petitioner to join his duty forthwith, and further directing that the petitioner should be deemed to be in service all along without any break, and should be paid all arrears of his salary, after adjustment in respect of the subsistence allowance which had already been paid to him. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY speaking, the case of the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 in the writ petition was that he was appointed as a Group 'd' employee under the District Magistrate and Collector, 24-Parganas (North ). On 10th May, 1979 the petitioner was taken into custody in connection with Barrackpore P. S. case No. 6 dated 10th May, 1979 under sections 409, 406 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner was charge sheeted and suspended and enquiry proceedings were, thereafter, commenced against him. According to the writ petitioner, he was found not guilty in respect of the charges levelled against him, and the District Magistrate submitted a report accordingly. ( 3 ) THE grievance of the writ petitioner was that, although the departmental proceedings against him were dropped, and he was found not guilty in respect of the charges, the suspension order passed against him had not been withdrawn. ( 4 ) AFTER considering the respective submissions of the parties the learned Single Judge was of the view that there was no reason why the writ petitioner should not be allowed to resume his duty forthwith. The learned Single Judge passed an order directing the respondents to allow the writ petitioner to join his duty forthwith and that the petitioner should be deemed to be in service all along without break. The learned Single Judge also directed that the writ petitioner be paid all his arrear salary for the period that he was kept under suspension after adjustment of the subsistence allowance which had already been paid to him. ( 5 ) IT is against the aforesaid order of the learned Single Judge that the present appeal has been filed by the District Magistrate and Collector, 24-Parganas (North ). ( 6 ) MR. ( 5 ) IT is against the aforesaid order of the learned Single Judge that the present appeal has been filed by the District Magistrate and Collector, 24-Parganas (North ). ( 6 ) MR. Tapan Sengupta, learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that in view of the provisions of Rule 7 (3) of the West Bengal Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1971, once the petitioner had been placed under suspension, he could not be reinstated in service, till such time further orders were passed by the concerned authorities revoking the said order of suspension made under sub-rule 3 of Rule 7 of the aforesaid Rules. Mr. Sengupta submitted that in view of the fact that no further order had been passed revoking the order of suspension passed against the writ petitioner, the learned Single Judge was wrong in directing the respondent concerned to allow the writ petitioner to resume his duties forthwith and to pay him all his arrear salaries for the period for which the writ petitioner was placed under suspension. ( 7 ) IN support of his contention, Mr. Sengupta relied on several decisions of the Supreme Court, as well as the different High Courts. Mr. Sengupta first referred to the case of Mihir Kumar Das v. State of West Bengal and Ors, reported in 84 CWN at page 339, in which a learned Single Judge of this Court had held that as soon as a Government employee is detained in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours he is ipso-facto placed under suspension. The said suspension order does not stand revoked automatically. As soon as he is released from custody or acquitted of the criminal charge, the appointing authority is required to make an order revoking the order of suspension which has occurred under Rule 7 (3) of the West Bengal Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1971. Mr. Sengupta submitted that in view of the wording of sub-rule 3 of Rule 7, where it has been mentioned that the order of suspension would remain "until further orders", the writ petitioner could not be allowed to resume his duties without an order being made revoking the suspension order which had earlier been passed under sub-rule 3 of Rule 7 of the aforesaid Rules. Mr. Sengupta also relied on the case of Balvantrai Ratilal Patel v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1968 SC at Page 800. Mr. Sengupta also relied on the case of Balvantrai Ratilal Patel v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1968 SC at Page 800. In the said case also, the Supreme Court was considering an order of suspension which has been passed "pending further orders". In the said case, the concerned employee was placed under suspension under the Bombay Civil Service Rules pending enquiry of alleged misconduct. The order of suspension recited that the, employee should be suspended with immediate effect pending further orders. The proceedings in connection with the charge against the concerned employee ended in his acquittal by the High Court. The Supreme Court, however, held that despite his acquittal of the charges, in respect of which he had been placed under suspension, the order of suspension could not be automatically terminated, but would have to be terminated by another order of the Government. Until a further order of the State Government was made terminating the suspension, the employee had no right to be reinstated in service. ( 8 ) IN this context, Mr. Sengupta also referred to the case of Jagdish Chander v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in AIR 1957 Allahabad, at page 436 and also the case of S. Gopalan Nair v. State of Kerala, reported in AIR 1970 Kerala at page 70. ( 9 ) MR. Sengupta also submitted that it was up to the discretion of the authorities concerned to revoke the order of suspension, and, as has been indicated in the above mentioned cases such suspension order could not be revoked before the result of the criminal case. Mr. Sengupta further submitted that while passing the order on 2nd October, 1987, dropping the departmental enquiry against the writ petitioner, the District Magistrate, 24-Parganas (North) had observed that the charge of defaulcation could not be established in the enquiry, since it required criminal detection and investigation. ( 10 ) MR. Sengupta submitted that in view of the similar views expressed by the Supreme Court, this Court and other High Courts, on the self-same point, the directions given by the learned Single Judge were liable to be set aside. ( 11 ) WHEN this appeal was taken up for hearing, both on the last occasion and today no one appeared on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1, Narendra Nath Das. ( 11 ) WHEN this appeal was taken up for hearing, both on the last occasion and today no one appeared on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1, Narendra Nath Das. However, we have gone through the paper book ourselves and have taken into consideration: the relevant documents in connection with the case. It may be mentioned that an application for stay had been filed on behalf of the appellants and the same came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court on 29th August, 1989. The Division Bench was of the view that the writ petitioner should be allowed to rejoin his duties, but stayed the direction of the learned Trial Judge regarding payment of the arrear salaries, till the disposal of the appeal or until further orders. ( 12 ) ON enquiry, it has been submitted by Mr. Sengupta that the writ petitioner had rejoined his duties but had not been paid the arrear salaries for the period for which he was placed under suspension. ( 13 ) WE have carefully considered the findings of the District Magistrate, 24-Parganas (North), dated 2nd October,1987, while dropping the departmental proceedings against the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1. We have also taken into consideration the fact that the writ petitioner was placed under suspension as far back as on 23rd May, 1979, by an order passed by the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Barrackpore. ( 14 ) FROM the order passed by the District Magistrate, 24-Parganas (North), the appellant herein, it appears that the charges against the petitioner were not proved and unless evidence could be produced, the proceedings could not be allowed to continue. The appellant very fairly stated in the said order that there was no evidence against the writ petitioner that he had ever been entrusted with the money alleged to have defaulted by him. ( 15 ) IN view of the fact that the writ petitioner was placed under suspension as far back as in May, 1979, and such suspension has been allowed continue for more than 11 years, and despite the fact that the departmental proceedings against the writ petitioner was dropped four years ago owing to lack of evidence, in our view any further continuance of the order of suspension can only tantamount to a penalty. Till now, except for the criminal case in connection with which the petitioner had been arrested, there is nothing definite against the writ petitioner. ( 16 ) IN this connection, we may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of O. P. Gupta v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1987 SC at page 2257. In the said case, the Supreme Court was considering a situation where the appellant had been kept under continued suspension for 11 years and the departmental proceedings were also kept pending for 20 years. Although the suspension order was subsequently revoked and an order of reinstatement was made, there was a further order withholding increments at the efficiency bar, without giving the appellant-employee, an opportunity of hearing. While considering the said case, the Supreme Court observed that there was no occasion whatever to protract the departmental enquiry for 20 years and to keep the appellant under suspension for a period of nearly 11 years, unless it was actuated with a malafide intention of subjecting him to harassment. The Supreme Court further observed that the charge framed against the appellant was serious enough to merit his dismissal from service. Apparently, the departmental authorities were not in a position to substantiate the charge. But that was no reason for keeping the departmental proceedings alive for a period of 20 years and not have revoked the order of suspension for over 11 years. The Supreme Court also went on to consider the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution and observed that suspension in a case like the present, where there was no question of inflicting any departmental punishment, prima facie tantamounts to imposition of penalty, which is manifestly repugnant to the principles of natural justice and fairplay in action. ( 17 ) VARIOUS similarities can be drawn between the facts and the case before the Supreme Court and the facts of the case before us. In the instant case also, the writ petitioner was placed under suspension in May, 1979, and the order dropping departmental proceedings was ultimately passed on 2nd October, 1987, after a period of more than 8 years. Thereafter, another 4 years have passed and yet the order of suspension has been continued, although, there is nothing on record to show that the original proceedings are at the stage of completion. Thereafter, another 4 years have passed and yet the order of suspension has been continued, although, there is nothing on record to show that the original proceedings are at the stage of completion. ( 18 ) ACCORDING to us, the views expressed in the various cases referred to by Mr. Sengupta, were fully justified in the facts and circumstances of those cases. What makes this case different from those cited by Mr. Sengupta is the prolonged and continued suspension of the writ petitioner, despite the fact that the departmental proceedings against him were dropped as there were no materials against the writ petitioner, and that, if at all the charge of defaulcation could be proved, the same would have to be done by way of criminal detection and investigation. This factor in our view, puts the case before us in para material with O. P. Gupta's case (supra ). ( 19 ) COMING now to the question of payment of arrear salaries, we must keep in mind the fact that by virtue of the order of suspension the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 was prevented from discharging his duties. He did not stay away from his duties on his own volition. In this connection we may refer to one of the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Devendra Pratap Narain Rai Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. , reported in AIR 1962 SC at page 1334 = 1962 (1) Labour Law Journal, at page 266. In the said case the dismissal of a civil servant was declared illegal on the ground that the order was passed in contravention of the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that since the order of dismissal had been declared invalid by a Civil Court, he had been reinstated. The effect of the decree in such a case would be that the concerned public servant should never be deemed to have been lawfully dismissed from service. It would not in such a contingency be open to the authority to deprive the public servant of the remuneration which he would have earned had he been permitted to work. ( 20 ) WE may also refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Shyamsunder Dubay and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. , reported in AIR 1965 Calcutta at page 281. ( 20 ) WE may also refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Shyamsunder Dubay and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. , reported in AIR 1965 Calcutta at page 281. In the said case, a learned Single Judge of this Court had arrived at the finding that an employee of the Government could not be deprived of his emoluments by an order of suspension which was passed on mere allegation and which the Government had subsequently withdrawn, after the employee had taken resort to a Court of Justice. ( 21 ) IN keeping with the sentiments expressed in O. P. Gupta's case, we are of the view that the order of suspension passed against the petitioner ought to have been revoked after the departmental proceedings against him were dropped eight years after he had initially been placed under suspension. In our view, after such a long period, the suspension order ought not to nave been continued on the assumption that the writ petitioner might ultimately be found guilty in the criminal case, particularly when prima facie there were no materials against him, as was very fairly observed by the appellant while dropping the departmental proceedings. In our view, the expression "until further orders" does not necessarily mean a specific order revoking the order of suspension only. The said expression could very well include the order passed by the appellant dropping the departmental proceedings, the consequence of which would be to pass an order revoking the order of suspension. ( 22 ) IN that view of the matter, we are not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge and we, accordingly, dismiss the appeal. The writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 will be entitled to all his arrear salaries for the period during which he was placed under suspension, after making necessary adjustment, as directed by the learned Single Judge by his order dated 8th February, 1989. Such payment is to be made to the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 within 8 (eight) weeks from the date of communication of this order. ( 23 ) THE appellant and/or the concerned authority is further directed to pass a formal order revoking the order of suspension dated 23rd May, 1979, with effect from the date, on which the writ petitioner was allowed to resume his duties. ( 23 ) THE appellant and/or the concerned authority is further directed to pass a formal order revoking the order of suspension dated 23rd May, 1979, with effect from the date, on which the writ petitioner was allowed to resume his duties. ( 24 ) THIS will not, however, prevent the authorities concerned from taking steps under the provisions of sub-rule 2 of Rule 7 of the West Bengal Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1971. There win be no order as to costs. ( 25 ) ALL parties to act on the operative part of this judgment on usual undertaking. P. K. Mukherjee, J. , I agree. Appeal dismissed.