S. D. JHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS second appeal by defendant-tenant, who was unsuccessful in two courts below, was admitted for final hearing by order dt. 25-2-1988 :- (1) Whether the learned lower courts, could have considered and decided the point of nuisance when the same was directly involved in a suit between the parties filed earlier to the present suit? (2) Whether accommodation of Joint family could be ignored for the purpose of deciding availability of alternative accommodation to the landlady? ( 2 ) THE plaintiff-presented suit for eviction against the defendant on grounds under Clauses (c) and (a) of sub-section (1) of S. 12 of M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter called 'the Act) - plaintiff's case briefly stated was that defendant was earlier tenant in three rooms of ground floor of House No. 680, Dhan Gali Mhow, of the earlier owners of house No. 680 named Sarfuddin and Chhuttan. The house was purchased by the plaintiff by registered sale deed dt. 15-5-1979 from earlier owners Sarfuddin and Chhuttan and thereafter the defendant attorned the plaintiff as his landlady and paid her monthly rent Rs. 34/ -. Portion occupied by the defendant is shown in the map with letters 'aa', Ba 'sa' and 'da'. The plaintiff's case is that in the portion occupied by the defendent there is a common toilet, bathroom, staircase and drain which the occupants of the other portions of house i. e. plaintiff landlady, her husband and children are also entitled to use. The plaintiff was also entitled to make use of common electricity connection. The defendant, however, did not allow the plaintiff, her husband and children to make use of the staircase and toilet and interfered with the same plaintiff had, therefore, filed another civil suit No. 25-A/78 claiming permanent injunction against the defendant. The defendant had made false allegation against son of the landlady leading to registration of a criminal case. The defendant unnecessarily quarrels with the plaintiff and his behaviour is objectionable. The plaintiff also claimed that defendant was in arrears of rent but now the point does no survive for consideration. The plaintiff further claimed that the portion occupied by the defendant was required bona fide by the plaintiff for herself and members of her family and that she was not possessed of any other alternative accommodation of her own in the town of Mhow. The plaintiff further claimed that the portion occupied by the defendant was required bona fide by the plaintiff for herself and members of her family and that she was not possessed of any other alternative accommodation of her own in the town of Mhow. ( 3 ) THE defendant resisted the suit of various grounds. While not disputing that he was tenant of the plaintiff landlady the defendant submitted that under agreement with earlier owners of the house No. 680, the defendant has been exclusively using the toilet, bathroom and staircase and this was to the knowledge of the plaintiff and her husband. Bona fide requirement of the plaintiff in respect of the accommodation was said to be false and the suit filed with an ulterior motive. The plaintiff was possessed of another alternative suitable accommodation for herself and her family and her husband had in the house at Chhota Bazar Mhow vacant possession of three rooms from another tenant Narayanlal. It was also pleaded that defendant was obtaining electricity from the neighbouring house. Claim of arrears of rent made by the plaintiff was said to have been adjusted as per particulars of para 6 of the written-statement. Nuisance as alleged by the plaintiff was denied. It was submitted that plaintiff's son had been caught committing theft in the house of the defendant and for this reason criminal case was lodged against him. It was also submitted that on the allegations of nuisance another Civil suit No. 25-A/78 had been filed in the court and therefore, under S. 10 of Civil P. C. this suit could not proceed and ought to be stayed. ( 4 ) THE trial court by judgment and decree dt. 15-1-1986 found that the plaintiff was entitled to make use of common facility like use of electricity and water connection, use of staircase, toilet and bathroom, and that the defendant had interfered with the same. ( 4 ) THE trial court by judgment and decree dt. 15-1-1986 found that the plaintiff was entitled to make use of common facility like use of electricity and water connection, use of staircase, toilet and bathroom, and that the defendant had interfered with the same. The defendant was found to be in arrears of rent as claimed; that the plaintiff required the suit accommodation bona fide for her own use and for purpose of her family; that the portion of the House No. 680 in possession of the plaintiff is unsufficient and uncomfortable for use of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff except for house No. 680 has no other house of her own in her possession in Mhow; that the defendant had caused nuisance; that due to pendency of suit No. 25-A of 1978 the present suit could not be stayed under S. 10 C. P. C. on the above findings the trial court directed, eviction of the defendant from the suit accommodation two months after the date of judgment and decree. The trial court also directed payment of mesne profit and costs as set out in para 17 therein. In appeal by the defendant the First Appellate court, Additional Judge (Mhow) to the court of District Judge, Indore by judgment and decree dt. 16-12-1987 found against the defendant, dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. Hence the present second appeal. ( 5 ) AT the time of final hearing of the appeal an application purporting to be under O. 41, R. 27, C. P. C. (I. A. No. 1021/90) was made said to be based on subsequent events: (1) that Shri Ramlal Gattani, one of the brothers of the respondent's husband, living, jointly with her died on 28-8-1984 and (2) the plaintiff-respondent's elder daughter Kiran got married on 12-12-1988 and left the home of the plaintiff for her husband place. The application further stated that in view of this subsequent events the bona fide need of members of the family had been extinguished and her need can be said to be satisfied by the subsequent events. It was also prayed that defendant-appellant be allowed to lead evidence on the aforesaid subsequent events and matter remanded for the purpose to the trial court for amendment and pleadings and recording evidence. It was also prayed that defendant-appellant be allowed to lead evidence on the aforesaid subsequent events and matter remanded for the purpose to the trial court for amendment and pleadings and recording evidence. ( 6 ) THE application was orally and strongly opposed by plaintiff-respondent's counsel Shri A. R. Tiwari, who submitted that the application was filed only to protract the proceeding, the proposed amendment was unrelated to substantial question of law framed in the case which had nothing to, do with the application now made. It was also submitted that in the meanwhile the plaintiff's son had got married so marriage of elder daughter Kiran would make no difference to the plaintiff. As for death of Husband's elder brother Ramlal Gattani, it was submitted that he was not residing with the plaintiff nor did the plaintiff ever put up such a case. The application was heard along with arguments in the main appeal. ( 7 ) ). Shri Kokje learned counsel representing the defendant-appellant submitted that plaintiff had bought litigation and its effect in the present suit had not been considered. He also submitted that courts below had not properly appreciated the evidence on the point of plaintiff's bona fide need, hence this court would be justified in reappreciating the evidence and if necessary interfering with the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the courts below. For the purpose he relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Hiralal v. Gajjan, (1990) 1 JT (SC) 95. Proceeding further Shri Kokje submitted that plaintiff was possessed of other joint Hindu family accommodation. It might not technically belong to plaintiff herself but it was certainly a factor to be considered while considering bona fide requirement of the landlady. He submitted that neither the ground of nuisance recorded by the court below was made out nor bona fide requirement in favour of the plaintiff. ( 8 ) AFTER the arguments had been heard Shri Kokje submitted that he will file a formal application raising additional grounds. In the application so filed he has proposed the following substantial questions of law:- (I) Whether the learned Lower courts have failed to appreciate the evidence in the case properly on the point of nuisance and genuine requirement as grounds of eviction under S. 12 (1) (c) and (e) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961? In the application so filed he has proposed the following substantial questions of law:- (I) Whether the learned Lower courts have failed to appreciate the evidence in the case properly on the point of nuisance and genuine requirement as grounds of eviction under S. 12 (1) (c) and (e) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961? (ii) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the suit was rightly decreed by the learned lower courts? ( 9 ) CONTROVERTING Shri Kokje's contention Shri A. R. Tiwari, learned counsel representing the plaintiff-respondent submitted that so far as the first substantial question of law formulated above is concerned, the question was not even proposed by the defendant-appellant and it was not incumbent for the court to consider a question for formulation of law when it was not proposed. He also submitted that no effort was made by the defendant-appellant before the trial court to have the suit stayed on the ground as aforesaid and before the first appellate court, this ground was not taken and the question No. 1 formulated above does not arise for consideration before this court. For the argument he relied on a decision of this court Sudhanshu Bhushan Tyagi v. Saifa College, Bhopal, (1987) 2 MPWN 148, he also relied on Gangaprasad v. Mt. Banaspati, AIR 1937 Nag 132 and R. M. K. A. R. Arunachallam Chettyar v. R. M. K. R. A. V. Vallipa Chettyar, AIR 1938 Rang 130 (FB ). ( 10 ) ABOUT plaintiff's bona fide need Shri Tiwari, drew attention to para 13 of the trial court judgment and para 4 of the written-statement and emphasized that defendant had made amendment in the written-statement after close of evidence. The accommodation which the defendant claim to have been acquired by the plaintiff_s husband was far away from the disputed accommodation and was mainly non-residential having one room, Kitchen and the toilet. There was no pleading by the defendant as to plaintiff being possessed of other joint family accommodation and therefore the argument on the point could not be considered. In that connection Shri Tiwari drew attention to statement of plaintiff herself examined on commission, and Sitaram and paras 7, 8 and 10 of the first appellate court judgment. He urged for dismissal of the appeal. In that connection Shri Tiwari drew attention to statement of plaintiff herself examined on commission, and Sitaram and paras 7, 8 and 10 of the first appellate court judgment. He urged for dismissal of the appeal. ( 11 ) TAKING up the interlocutory application under O. 41 R. 27 for additional evidence as also praying for amendment it may be pointed out that at the time of admission no substantial question of law as to bona fide need of the plaintiff in respect of the accommodation in question was formulated. The present application would, therefore, appear unrelated to the substantial question of law as formulated as the outset. From the pleadings before the lower court it does not appear that it was ever the plaintiffs case that Ramlal Gattani plaintiffs husband's brother was living jointly with her. Therefore, his death or 28-8-84 as now claimed by the defendant/ appellant should not in any way affect the bona fide need in respect of the accommodation of the plaintiff. ( 12 ) AS to other ground of plaintiffs eldest daughter Kiran having got married on 12-10-1988 and left plaintiff's house for her husband's place, Shri Tiwari has contended in the meanwhile plaintiff's son had got married. This contention of Shri Tiwari was not challenged by the learned counsel for the appellant. Even otherwise, such isolated influx and exodus from the family would appear natural and believable. Therefore, merely on the ground that the plaintiff's daughter Kiran got married during pendency of the appeal before this court would not affect the plaintiffs bona fide need in respect of the accommodation because as already observed incoming of a bride for the unmarried son would be natural and probable. In this view of the matter, based on this application it would not be proper to formulate another substantial question of law as to plaintiffs bona fide need in respect of the accommodation having come to an end consequent on marriage of the plaintiff's daughter. In the light of the aforesaid reasoning the application for additional evidence and amendment I. A. No. 1021/90 deserves rejection and is hereby rejected. ( 13 ) TAKING up next, the first substantial question of law as to stay of the suit framed vide order dt. 25-2-83 reproduced in the first para of the Judgment, it would suffice to say that point was not urged before the first appellate court. ( 13 ) TAKING up next, the first substantial question of law as to stay of the suit framed vide order dt. 25-2-83 reproduced in the first para of the Judgment, it would suffice to say that point was not urged before the first appellate court. Even before the trial court except for raising the plea in the written statement, no attempt was made to have this suit stayed. The question of stay of the suit under S. 10, C. P. C. is not a pure question of law. Besides, as held in Gangaprasad v. Mt. Bangaspati, AIR 1937 Nag 132, institution of the second suit is not barred by S. 10, all that it says is that trial of the suit cannot be proceeded with. It is consequently a rule of procedure pure and simple and rules of procedure in civil cases can be waived with the consent of the parties. ( 14 ) A Full Bench of Rangoon High Court in R. M. K. A. R. Arunachallam Chettyar v. R. M. K. A. R. V. Villiappa Chhetyar, AIR 1938 Rang 130, held that direction in S. 10, C. P. C. that suit shall be stayed until an earlier suit in which the same matter is in issue is decided is a mere rule of procedure, it confers no legal right on any party. In the instant case, except for raising the plea in written statement, the defendant took no steps to have the suit stayed before the trial court and the point was not even urged or prayer made to that effect before the first appellate court, Therefore, the objection on that ground must be taken to have been waived and the first substantial question of law formulated and reproduced above, must be answered against the defendant-appellant. ( 15 ) THE two courts below have found that the plaintiff is not possessed of any alternative accommodation. The argument that the plaintiff-landlady is possessed of joint family accommodation and that should have been taken into consideration for judging alternative in her possession was not specifically raised in written-statement and, therefore, the court below were under no duty to consider the evidence on the point or the argument on the same. The argument that the plaintiff-landlady is possessed of joint family accommodation and that should have been taken into consideration for judging alternative in her possession was not specifically raised in written-statement and, therefore, the court below were under no duty to consider the evidence on the point or the argument on the same. Nevertheless, it is observed that the trial court in para 14 of the judgment and the first appellate court in para 9 of the judgment considered this aspect of the matter and alternatively held that in spite of the same bona fide requirement of plaintiff and her family which besides her husband consists of two sons and daughters persisted. ( 16 ) ABOUT another house, in Chhota Bazar belonging to the plaintiff's husband, the courts below held that it is at a considerable distance and part of it is used for nonresidential purpose and it is not suitable for plaintiff's residence. In view of this the finding against the second substantial question of law formulated above would be that the courts below committed no legal error in recording finding in favour of the plaintiff on the point of non-availability of alternative accommodation to the plaintiff landlord-respondent. ( 17 ) THE power of this court to reappreciate evidence and if necessary to interfere with the concurrent finding of fact recorded by courts below in appropriate cases where courts below had not properly appreciated the evidence as held in Heeralal's case (supra) cannot be denied but before this is done a case for doing so should be made out. In the instant case the Trial court against issue No. 1 discussed along with other issues in paras 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment on evidence of plaintiff herself (P. W. 1) Kanhiyalal (D. W. 1), Chhuttan (D. W. 2) and Gopikishan (D. W. 3) found that the defendant was preventing the plaintiff from use of common facilities like lavatory, drain and water tap-connection and thus committed nuisance within the meaning of sub-section (c) of S. 12 (1) of the Act. The first appellate court in para 7 of its judgment after discussing the aforesaid evidence negated the plea of defendant that the lavatory and bathroom were to be exclusively used by defendant-tenant and held this to be false and an after-thought. The first appellate court in para 7 of its judgment after discussing the aforesaid evidence negated the plea of defendant that the lavatory and bathroom were to be exclusively used by defendant-tenant and held this to be false and an after-thought. Relying on plaintiff's statement and statement of her husband Sitaram (P. W. 3) he also held that the facilities of water-tap-connection, electricity, bath-room, lavatory were common and that the defendant by preventing the plaintiff from use of the facilities was committing nuisance and upheld the finding of the trial court. This concurrent finding of two courts below based on evidence and the inference of nuisance drawn on its basis could not be interfered with in this second appeal. ( 18 ) THE argument that the plaintiff bought litigation by buying the accommodation is not helpful to defendant-appellant because in most cases where landlord is transferee of accommodation such situation might arise. If grounds for eviction of defendant-tenant are otherwise made out, the suit cannot be thrown out on that account. ( 19 ) THERE would appear no reason to interfere with the judgment and decree passed by the court below. The appeal, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed. The appellant shall pay costs of the respondent of this appeal and bear his own. Pleader's fees according to Schedule of certificate whichever is less. The defendant is granted two months' time to vacate the accommodation and hand over possession of the same to the respondent. Appeal dismissed. A decree be drawn up accordingly. Appeal dismissed. .