ORDER Dr. T.N. Singh, J. -- 1. The sister, plaintiff in the trial Court is the appellant, pitted against her own brother who figured as defendant in the trial Court and is respondent No. 1 in this appeal. She is aggrieved because her prayer for appointment of a Receiver in the Partition Suit she instituted, has been rejected. 2. Admitted facts provide indeed the clue for the decision to be rendered in this appeal and they are few. Chhotelal, father of plaintiff/appellant and defendant/respondent, died in the year 1968. He has three separate houses in the Lohiya Bazar area of Gwalior city. One of the houses is occupied solely by defendant/respondent Bhagwandas, Chhotelal's son, for his residence. In a part of another house, plaintiff/appellant is residing and the third house is wholly and fully let out to tenants. In 1985, precisely on 21.11.1985, through her lawyer, Shri B.G. Apte, the plaintiff caused a notice to be sent to defendant Bhagwandas, stating that she was entitled to 1/3rd share in the properties of deceased Chhotelal. She was residing in a part of one of the houses owned by deceased Chhotelal during his life-time and she also stated that Bhagwandas had been managing the properties of Chhotelal, being the only son of Chhotelal. When she claimed her share from him of the rental income of the properties of deceased Chbotelal, that was refused to her. However, the further fact admitted is that the said defendant/respondent Bhagwandas instituted a suit in 1986 against his sister, plaintiff/appellant, for her eviction from the premises in her occupation on the ground of non-payment of rents since November, 1982. 3. In the Court below in the suit and in this appeal also, deceased Chhotelal's other daughter Bhaggobai has also been impleaded. However, neither in the trial Court nor here, she has appeared. She did not file any written statement even/in the trial Court while Bhagwandas filed his written statement claiming that he was the sole owner of the entire properties left by his father Chhotelal because in his favour, the said Cbhotelal bad executed a will in 1966. He also stated in his written statement that since his father's time, plaintiff was allowed to live in a portion of one of the houses of his father as a tenant and she bad been paying originally rent at the rate of Rs. 10/- and then Rs. He also stated in his written statement that since his father's time, plaintiff was allowed to live in a portion of one of the houses of his father as a tenant and she bad been paying originally rent at the rate of Rs. 10/- and then Rs. 25/- per month. 4. The short question to be decided is whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the plaintiff/appellant is entitled for an order of appointment of a Receiver in respect of the properties of deceased Chhotelal, now after lapse of 19 years merely because a partition suit bas been filed; alternatively, what other interim relief, in the facts and circumstances of the case, can be granted to her. Law, in my view, is well-settled that power to appoint a Receiver is a discretionary power and that discretion is to be exercised judicially "where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient" to make such an appointment; the purpose is to confer power on Receiver for, among others, realising rents and profits of the property and managing, protecting, preserving and making improvement of the property to be exercised in the manner as an "owner" does. That is the purport of sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of order XL. CPC; and sub-rule (2) circumscribes the discretionary power of the Court contemplating that no person in possession or custody of the property can be removed by Court at the behest of any party to the suit who bas not a present right so to remove him. 5. A Receiver acts as a custodia legis and Courts are very• slow in appropriating to themselves rights and obligations of an "owner" of a property lawfully exercising his rights in that regard and the power is usually exercised only when the Court finds it "just and convenient" to do so. The remedy is an equitable' remedy and Courts are bound to take into consideration equities operating on either side. True, the nature of the order is an interlocutory order, but if the order is passed without judicious exercise of discretion, that is likely to cause serious injury to a lawful owner exercising legally his lawful rights in respect of the property in question. If there is any equity operating in his favour, such order is not to be passed as is likely to defeat that equity. 6. If there is any equity operating in his favour, such order is not to be passed as is likely to defeat that equity. 6. In the instant case, facts are tell-tale. Even if the claim of the plaintiff/appellant, on its face value, is accepted, there is no escape from the conclusion that she has been sleeping over her legal right for a long period of 19 years. Indeed, her own case, as stated above, is that she had been living in a portion of one of the suit houses since her father's life-time and if the father had not made any provision for any part of the profit to be given to her during his life-time or made any provision for her to share that profit after his demise, that fact explains her silence and her acquiescence in the situation. Whether the will, pleaded by defendant/respondents is true or false is not the question to be considered at this stage in this matter. What is to be considered, on the other hand, is, whether a very strong case is made out by the plaintiff/appellant for appointment of a Receiver to deprive defendant/respondent who admittedly, even in right of intestate succession, was• a legal owner of the properties left by his father late Chhotelal and that right he had been exercising without let and hindrance from any body for along period of 19 years. 7. Shri Mangal, learned counsel, appearing for plaintiff/appellant, has cited decisions galore, but on facts, those, I find, have no relevance to the plea agitated. The short- noted decision of this Court in Narayandas ( 1982 MPWN 161 ) did not arise from a partition suit The words "just" and convenient", it was held, have been construed to mean "it is practicable and the interests of justice require it". That was a case of property of a charitable trust and the Court held that for keeping the property intact, Receiver had to be appointed to protect the rights of the plaintiff because appellants failed to show that they had been properly managing the property and had been keeping accounts of income and expenditure. Afsar Jahan 's case (1980-I-MPWN 33) is also a short-noted decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court. Parties were Mahomedans and they were agitating rival claims with respect to a Deed of Gift. Afsar Jahan 's case (1980-I-MPWN 33) is also a short-noted decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court. Parties were Mahomedans and they were agitating rival claims with respect to a Deed of Gift. The property in question was a cinema-house which required proper management and the question was of immediate protection of that property. Another decision of another learned Single Judge, also a short-noted one, Damodar Prasad's case (1957 MPU NOC 57) is pressed in service, but that matter arose out of a case of dissolution of partner ship and accounts. Much reliance is placed by Shri Mangal on a D.B. decision in Kamal Chaudhary's case (AIR 1976 Patna 366) because in that case it is held that in a partition suit when one co-owner occupies the whole property and excluded the other co-owners from the shares of rents and profits of the property, a case for appointment of receiver is made out. The question in the instant case evidently is whether admitted facts project plaintiff/appellant as a co- owner of the properties left by her father Chhotelal and whether she had been wholly excluded from possession of his property. Unfortunately for her, position of facts is disadvantageous for her. Her own acts and omissions, as discussed above, and the facts and circumstances pointed out above, do not raise any equity in her favour to claim that at any time, she had exercised any right of a co-owner so as to debar her brother defendant/respondent from continuing to exercise rights of ownership and possession as he has been doing for the last 19 years. Chavali Venkataswami ( AIR 1962 AP 14 ) is also a D.B. decision, but that does not help, in my view, in any manner, the plaintiff/appellant It has been held that for passing an order under Order XL, Rule 1, the Court is to be convinced that it would be just and convenient to do so for the protection of the interests of the parties. In any case, the property in that case was not immovable property, but the question was of appointment of Receiver for motor buses and lorries in respect of which permits stood in the name of one of the parties. 8. In any case, the property in that case was not immovable property, but the question was of appointment of Receiver for motor buses and lorries in respect of which permits stood in the name of one of the parties. 8. Reliance is placed by Shri Jain on Sitaram Kundanlal (AIR 1957 Nag 1) and in that case, appointment of Receiver was claimed in a partition suit This Court held that particularly in cases of partition between members of a joint Hindu family, where they are in separate possession of property which has not been disputed from a long time, there should be no appointment of a receiver without consent unless the plaintiff proves prima facie that he has an excellent chance of succeeding in establishing the case made out in the plaint, and that the property in possession of the opposite party is in danger of being wasted. The Court allowed the appeal having found on fact that it was unjust and inequitable in the circumstances of the case to appoint the receiver and the order made in that regard by the trial Court was vacated. Reliance, however, on Rasi Dei (AIR 1965 Orissa 20) of Shri N.K. Jain, in my view is misconceived as in that case in the partition suit, there was a scramble for possession of land and ouster from possession was apprehended by one of the parties. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in Benoy Krishna Mukerjee's case (AIR 1928 PC 49) stated succinctly the settled law that order contemplated under order XL, R. 1. CPC was discretionary in nature and that is made to prevent "irreparable mischief. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case discretion was properly exercised by the trial Court must be considered in appeal taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of the case. In Muniammal (AIR 1955 Madras 571), another significant dimension of the law on Receiver is stated, observing that an application for appointment of Receiver should always be made promptly and delay in making it is a circumstance unfavourable to such an appointment. 9. In Muniammal (AIR 1955 Madras 571), another significant dimension of the law on Receiver is stated, observing that an application for appointment of Receiver should always be made promptly and delay in making it is a circumstance unfavourable to such an appointment. 9. Having regard to the judicial consensus and the facts and circumstances of the case, I am clearly of the view that plaintiff/appellant has not made out any case for appointment of a Receiver so as to dispossess her brother defendant/respondent from exercising right of ownership and possession in respect of the suit properties of his deceased father. True, she now apprehends dispossession herself and may be, that worked with her when she took a decision for instituting the present suit out of which this appeal has arisen. She is entitled, therefore, for a appropriate protection of her rights to continue in possession in the manner she has been enjoying any part of the suit property before institution of the suit. That apart, for protecting her interests and allaying her apprehension, it shall be in the interest of justice to injunct the defendant/respondent from alienating the property during pendency of the suit. 10. In the result, therefore, the appeal succeeds in part. The application for appointment of Receiver stands rejected. However, I direct that no steps shall be taken by the defendant/respondent to dispossess the plaintiff from the part of the suit property which was in her possession prior to institution of the suit I also direct that he shall not alienate the suit property in any manner during the pendency of the suit Another direction is prayed by Shri Mangal and that is also a reasonable prayer, if not for any reason, for the sole reason that harmony is to be maintained in the family and to ensure that the brother and the sister do not cut each other's throat During pendency of the suit, no rent shall be realised or shall be due payable by the plaintiff/appellant for the premises in her occupation. Apprehending delay in disposal of the suit, Shri Jain has protested against these directions. To satisfy him and his client and to allay their apprehension, I further direct that steps shall be taken by the parties for expeditious disposal of the suit. Apprehending delay in disposal of the suit, Shri Jain has protested against these directions. To satisfy him and his client and to allay their apprehension, I further direct that steps shall be taken by the parties for expeditious disposal of the suit. Written statement having been filed, within one year, the suit shall be disposed of and parties are directed accordingly to cooperate with the Court by keeping their witnesses present on the dates fixed for evidence. It is made clear also that any observation made herein on the merits of claim of any of the parties shall not weigh with the trial. Court in passing final order while disposing of the suit.