Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar — 1991 DIGILAW 405 (PAT)

JUDGMENT S.B. SINHA, J. 1. In this writ application the petitioner has prayed for issuance of a writ of or in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to forbear from giving effect to the seizure dated 18.6.1987 and the prosecution lauched as against the petitioners pursuant thereto being Complaint No. C-2 625/87 and for a further declaration that sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of Section 3 of the Arms Act is ultra vires and unconstitutional or in the alternative declare that Section 3 (2) thereof is restricted to natural person alone and thus have no application in respect of a juristic person. 2. The petitioner have filed an application for amendment of the writ petition and therein, inter alia, it has been prayed that the orders which are contained in Annexure-6, 6/A, 6/B, 6/C, 6/D, 6/E and Annexure 7 and 7/A as also Annexure-8 and 8/A be also quashed, by issuance of an appropriate writ. 3. The fact of the matter may be noticed in brief. 4. The petitioner no. 1 is an existing company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1956. Petitioner nos. 2 and 3 are its Chairman-cum-Managing Director and the Divisional Manager of Security Services respectively. 5. The petitioner-company allegedly owns and possesses about 150 fire arms for the purpose of their use by about 2400 of its security personnel. 6. According to the petitioners, the petitioner no. 1 has various vital installations which come within the purview of the definition of protected place under the Bihar Protected Places Act, 1979 as would appear from Annexure 1 and 2 to the writ application. The petitioner no. 1 has also been declared to be public utility service. According to the petitioners, 2400 personnel have been deployed for the purposes of enforcing security of the properties of the Company including those of collieries and other mines belonging to it. For the said purpose, petitioner-company has taken out licences for about 150 fire arms details whereof are contained in Annexure-4 to the writ application. The petitioners have also given a list of the works and vital installations which are required to be guarded by the security personnel of petitioner no. 1 which is contained in Annexure-5 to the writ application. 7. On or about 22.3.1987, 4.5.1987 and 6.5.1987 the petitioners received notices from the respondent no. 3 calling upon them to deposit all arms. The petitioners have also given a list of the works and vital installations which are required to be guarded by the security personnel of petitioner no. 1 which is contained in Annexure-5 to the writ application. 7. On or about 22.3.1987, 4.5.1987 and 6.5.1987 the petitioners received notices from the respondent no. 3 calling upon them to deposit all arms. The said notices are contained in Annexure 6 to 6/E, Annexure 7, 7/A and Annexure 8 and 8/A to the writ application. 8. By letter dated 18.5.1987, petitioner no. 1 requested the respondents not to pursue the matter as the same would result in security problem of the petitioner company and its various vital important installations would be exposed to danger. It was further contended that petitioner would approach the Central Government for exemption from the operation of the said Act in terms of the provisions of Section 41 of the side Act. 9. On or about 27.5.1987, the petitioner filed an application under Section 41 of the Arms Act before the Government of India through the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Steel and Mines and Ministry of Internal security, a copy whereof is contained in Annexure-10 to the writ application. The petitioners by another letter dated 22.5.1987 addressed to respondent no. 3 brought to its notice that an application for exemption had already been filed before the Central Government and the receipt of the said letter had already been acknowledged. 10. Respondent no 3, however, by a letter dated 9.6.1987 asked the petitioner-company to send its representative to attend his office for a meeting on 16.6.1987 at 10 a.m. Petitioner no. 3 went to attend the said meeting, but respondent no. 3 was not present and the same was conducted by the District Magistrate in-charge, Arms, Jamshedpur. 11. On 18.6.1987, however, respondent no. 5 seized two of the guns of petitioner no. 1 being S.B. Barrel Gun Nos. 69216 and 69141 held under licence no. 4 of Bistupur Police Station. The petitioner, thereafter, immediately approached the Central Government by sending telegrams on 3.7.1987 which are contained in Annexure 16 and 17 to the writ application. 12. In the meantime, however, a complaint petition was filed in the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur which was registered as Complaint Case No. C/2 625 of 1987. 13. The petitioner, thereafter, immediately approached the Central Government by sending telegrams on 3.7.1987 which are contained in Annexure 16 and 17 to the writ application. 12. In the meantime, however, a complaint petition was filed in the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur which was registered as Complaint Case No. C/2 625 of 1987. 13. It appears that the Ministry of Home Affairs by a communication dated 6.7.1987 asked the State not to proceed with the matter any further. Similar advises were sent by the Ministry of Steel which is contained in Annexure 21 to the writ application. The petitioners, thereafter, sent two telegrams to respondent nos. 3 and 5 requesting them not to take any coercive action and to release the seized guns. 14. The petitioner approached this Court at that stage. An additional affidavit has been filed on behalf of the petitioners wherein it has been contended that the Central Government has granted exemption to all concerned including the petitioner-company by notification dated 8.12.1987, a copy whereof is contained in Annexure-25 to the said additional affidavit. 15. In this case, a counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents wherein it has been stated that the provisions of Section 3 (2) of the said Act is applicable to the petitioner company also. It was further stated that the petitioner did not file any show course pursuant to the notice issued to it on 2.3.1987, 4.5.1987 and 6.5.1987. 16. It has further been contended that upon receipt of the communication from the Central Government, no further action has been taken. 17. Mr. K. Lahiri learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, raised three questions in support of this writ application. Learned counsel firstly submitted that in view of the subsequent event whereby the Central Government has exercised its jurisdiction under Section 41 of the Arms Act, this Court should hold that the petitioner has not committed any offence in holding more than three fire firms, is laid down in sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the said Act inserted by reason of the provisions of Arms (Amendment) Act, 1983. 18. 18. Learned counsel also submitted that in any event, in view of the enactment of the Repealing and Amending Act, 1988 (Act No. 19 of 1988) whereby inter alia the Arms (Amendment) Act, 1983 has been repealed, the exemption notification issued by the Central Government cannot be questioned inasmuch as even the invalidity of an action of the Central Government is not open to question in view of the provision contained in Section 4 of the said Act 19 of 1988. 19. It was further submitted that in the event if it be held that the petitioners can be prosecuted for violation of Section 3 (2) of the Arms Act as it then existed, the same should be held to be unconstitutional inasmuch as the word person used therein must be restricted to natural person and not to juristic person. 20. Learned counsel submitted that if only a juristic person like the petitioner or Reserve Bank of India or any other Bank or other Industries are prohibited from keeping more than three arms, the same would cause extreme hardship. 21. According to Mr. K. Lahiri from a perusal of section 33 of the said Act, it would be evident that the offence by the companies have been dealt with separately and thus an offence committed by a natural person cannot be equated with offences committed by a Company which is indicative of the fact that Section 3 (2) of the said Act as amended in the year 1983 applies only to a natural person. 22. Mr. Debi Prasad, learned Standing Counsel Central Government however, submitted that the provisions contained in Section 3 (2) of the Arms Act as inserted by reason of Arms (Amendment) Act, 1983 cannot be said to be unconstitutional. 23. Learned counsel further submitted that the word person used in Section 3 (2) of the Act embraces within its fold a juristic person also. 24. Learned counsel, however, submitted that it would be proper if no further action is taken as against the petitioner in view of the exemption notification issued by the Central Government in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Section 41 of the said Act as in view of the Repealing and Amending Act, 1988. 25. Mr. 24. Learned counsel, however, submitted that it would be proper if no further action is taken as against the petitioner in view of the exemption notification issued by the Central Government in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Section 41 of the said Act as in view of the Repealing and Amending Act, 1988. 25. Mr. M.Y. Eqbal, the learned Government Pleader No. 1 on the other hand submitted that the petitioners are not protected under Section 4 of the Repealing and Amending Act, 1988 in view of Section 6 (e) of the General Clauses Act. Learned counsel submitted that the offences were committed in the year 1983 itself and despite the fact that the said Act was subsequently repealed, the investigation and prosecution initiated as against the petitioner shall operate to continue under Section 6 (e) of the General Clauses Act. Learned counsel in this connection has relied upon Jayantilal Amratlal vs. The Union of India & others reported in AIR 1971 SC 1193 . 26. In view of the rival contentions of the parties, as noticed hereinbefore, the questions which arise for consideration in this application are:– (i) Whether section 3 (2) of the Arms Act as inserted by Arms (Amendment) Act, 1983 is unconstitutional and/or applies only in case of a natural person? (ii) Whether in view of Section 4 of the Repealing Amending Act, 1988 (Act 19 of 1988) the petitioners cannot be prosecuted any further? (iii) Whether by reason of the exemption notification dated 8.12.1987, the petitioners are absolved from their criminal liabilities? (iv) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioners are entitled to the relief prayed for in the writ application? 27. Re. Question No. (i) Arms Act, 1959 was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to arms and ammunitions. Section 3 of the said Act provides that no person shall acquire, have in his possession or carry any fire arms or ammunition unless he holds in this behalf a licence issued in accordance with the provisions of this Act and rules made thereunder. 28. By reason of Arms (Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act No. 25 of 1983) Section 3 was renumbered as Section 3 (1) and sub-sections (2) to (4) thereto were inserted, which read as follows:– "2. 28. By reason of Arms (Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act No. 25 of 1983) Section 3 was renumbered as Section 3 (1) and sub-sections (2) to (4) thereto were inserted, which read as follows:– "2. Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), no person, other than a person referred to in sub-section (3), shall acquire, have in his possession or carry, at any time, more than three fire arms:– Provided that a person who has in his possession more fire arms than three at the commencement of the Arms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983 may retain with him any three of such fire arms and shall deposit, within ninety days from such commencement, the remaining fire arms with the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station or subject to the conditions prescribed for the purposes of sub-section (1) of Section 21, with a licensed dealer or where such person is a member of the Armed Forces of the Union, in a unit armoury referred to in that sub-section. (3) Nothing contained in sub-section (2) shall apply to any dealer in fire arms or to any member of a rifle club or rifle association licensed or recognised by the Central Government using a point 22 bore rifles or an air rifle for target practice. (4) The provisions of sub-sections (2) to (6) (both inclusive) of Section 21 shall apply in relation to any deposit of fire arms under the proviso to sub-section (2) as they apply in relation to the deposit of any arm or ammunition under sub-section (1) of that section." 29. By reason of the aforementioned Amending Act of 1983, the provisions of Section 41 of the said Act was also amended. 30. From a bare perusal of the aforementioned provisions it is evident that sub-section (2) of Section 3 contains a non-obstante clause. Section 21 provides for deposit of arms etc. on possession ceasing to be lawful. 31. In Kapildeo Singh vs. State of Bihar reported in 1987 PLJR 385 , a Full Bench of this Court held:– "Before one proceeds to microscopically examine the provisions under section 17 of the Arms Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') the broad approach to the issue may be first settled. on possession ceasing to be lawful. 31. In Kapildeo Singh vs. State of Bihar reported in 1987 PLJR 385 , a Full Bench of this Court held:– "Before one proceeds to microscopically examine the provisions under section 17 of the Arms Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') the broad approach to the issue may be first settled. In our Constitution and jurisprudence there is no fundamental right to bear arms un like the Second Amendment to the American Constitution which at least suggests such a right in the following terms:– "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." In construing the aforesaid provision the Supreme Court of the United States in Presser vs. Illinois (116 US 252) has observed as under:– It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserve military force or reserve militia of the United States as well as of the States and in view of this prerogative of the Federal Government as well as of its general powers, the States cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in question out of view, prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of the rightful resource for maintaining the public security and disable the people from performing their duty to the General Government but we think it clear that the section under consideration do not have this effect. However, it is not to notice that in modern times even in the United States any constitutional right to possess and bear arms has now come under carping criticism in view of the raising of the ugly heads of gun-running, gangsterism and the mafia. In sharp contrast therewith there is no such analogous provision in other jurisprudential system and indeed under the Indian Law the right to carry arms is a privilege conferred by the Act and other similar statutes which primarily leave the grant thereof in the discretion of the licensing authority." 32. In sharp contrast therewith there is no such analogous provision in other jurisprudential system and indeed under the Indian Law the right to carry arms is a privilege conferred by the Act and other similar statutes which primarily leave the grant thereof in the discretion of the licensing authority." 32. The Full Bench upon consideration of the provisions of Section 3, 13 and 14 of the said Act observed:– "It would be manifest from the aforesaid provisions that under the Act there is first legal bar for having in possession or carrying a fire-arm unless a valid licence is first secured in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Secondly even the original, grant under, Section 13 (2A) is vested entirely in the licensing authority and it seems that the widest discretion has been given to it. Even after conforming to the procedural requirements, the licensing authority may, as regards the general category of arms, either grant the licence or refuse to grant the same. This discretion in this context has perhaps been deliberately kept untrammelled. Further under Section 14 the law mandates a refusal to grant licence even where the licensing authority as reason to believe that the applicant is for any reason unfit for licence under the Act. The larger tilt of the law in this context is thus somewhat too plain to call for further elaboration." It is, therefore clear that no person has any fundamental right to possess arms and in that view of the matter Section 3 (2) of the said Act is not unconstitutional. 33. Maintenance of general law and order is primarily a duty of the State. This, however, does not mean that power to grant licenses for carrying arms and/or the number thereof can be arbitrarily exercised by the authorities concerned. 34. Mr. K. Lahiri is correct in his submission that if an industrial undertaking of the magnitude of the petitioner is allowed to have three fire arms only, the same would not serve its purposes at all regard being had to its requirement but, in my opinion, hardship which may be faced by a person because of the enactment per se is not sufficient to strike down Section 3 (1) of the said Act as unconstitutional. A Parliamentary Act carries with it a presumption of constitutionality. 35. A Parliamentary Act carries with it a presumption of constitutionality. 35. The very fact that the Central Government has been granted with a power to exempt any person or class of persons is a pointer to the fact that in appropriate cases the Central Government would be entitled to issue a exemption notification. It may be noted that scope of section 41 of the said Act was enlarged by Act No. 25 of 1983 itself; as a result whereof the Central Government was empowered not only to exempt any person or class of persons but also company, firm, bank or industrial or other establishment in the matter of fire arms required for safeguarding the property and personnel. In fact it is the petitioner's case itself that the Central Government has exercised its jurisdiction under Section 41 of the said Act and had issued the notification bearing S.O. No. 954 dated 8.12.1987. 36. Section 3 (2) of the said Act, therefore, will have to be read conjointly with Section 41 thereof and, thus, in view of the fact that Central Government has been given a wide power to exempt a person or class of persons from the purview of operation of any provisions of the Act; ex-facie sub-section (2) and (3) of the said Act cannot be said to be unconstitutional. 37. The submission of Mr. K. Lahiri to the effect that sub-section (2) of Section 3 has to be read down so as to confine its application only to a natural person cannot be accepted. The word person has been used not only in sub-section (2) as also sub-section (1) thereof. Thus same meaning has to be assigned to the word person occurring both in sub-section (1) and (2) thereof. 38. In of Section 3 (42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, a person shall include any Company or Association or body of individual whether incorporated or not. 39. In this view of the matter, there cannot be any doubt that word person used in sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act would also include a Company. 40. If the submission of Mr. K. Lahiri is to be accepted then the same would give rise to an anomalous situation inasmuch as in such an event, no company can be granted a licence under the said Act. 41. Reference to Section 33 of the said Act by Mr. 40. If the submission of Mr. K. Lahiri is to be accepted then the same would give rise to an anomalous situation inasmuch as in such an event, no company can be granted a licence under the said Act. 41. Reference to Section 33 of the said Act by Mr. K. Lahiri indeed is wholly misplaced inasmuch as Section 33 mainly contemplates as to who should be proceeded against along with the Company in the event the offence has been committed by a Company. A provision like Section 33 of the said Act is to be found in various statutes. Section 33 of the said Act, in my opinion, is not a penal section as is contended by Mr. K. Lahiri but merely an enabling provision whereby a person other than a Company may also be prosecuted along with the Company. 42. The said provision had to be inserted by the Parliament keeping in view the fact that the Company being a juristic person cannot be imposed with a punishment of imprisonment and, thus, those persons who are directly responsible for the conduct of business of the Company may also be prosecuted along with the Company itself. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, Section 3 (2) of the Act cannot be said to be unconstitutional. Re-Question (iii) 43. The Central Government had enacted the Repealing and Amending Act, 1988 being Act No. 19 of 1988, which received the assent of the President of India on 31 3.1988. The said Act was enacted to repeal certain enactments and to amend certain other enactments. 44. By Section 2 of the said Act, some enactments specified in the schedule were repealed to the extent and in the manner mentioned in the 4th column thereof. 45. In terms of the said provision, inter alia, the entire Arms (Amendment) Act, 1983 being Act No. 25 of 1983 was repealed. 46. Section 4 of the said Act No. 19 of 1988 reader as follows:– "4. Savings: The repeal by this Act of any enactment shall not affect any other enactment in which the repealed enactment has been applied, incorporated or referred to. 46. Section 4 of the said Act No. 19 of 1988 reader as follows:– "4. Savings: The repeal by this Act of any enactment shall not affect any other enactment in which the repealed enactment has been applied, incorporated or referred to. And this Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity, effect or consequences of anything already done or suffered or any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred or any remedy or proceeding in respect thereof or any release or discharge of or from any debt, penalty, obligation, liability claim of demand or any indemnity already granted, the proof of any past act or thing. Nor shall this Act affect any principle or rule of law or established jurisdiction, from or course of pleading, practice or procedure or existing usage, custom, privilege, restriction, exemption, office or appointment, notwithstanding that the same respectively may have been in any manner affirmed or recognised or derived by in or from any enactment hereby repealed. Nor shall the repeal by this Act of any enactment revive or restore any jurisdiction, office, custom, liability, right, title, privilege, restriction, exemption, wage, practice procedure or other matter or thing not now existing or in force." 47. Mr. K. Lahiri submitted that as in terms of the aforementioned provision not only the validity of an act but also the invalidity of an act have been condoned, thus, any criminal proceeding for any offence committed by the petitioner in terms of the provisions of the said Act cannot further be pursued. 48. Mr. K. Lahiri further submitted that in this case Section 6 (e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, will have no application inasmuch as the same would apply if there is no enactment to the contrary. 49. There cannot be any doubt that if a different and contrary intention appears in any other Statute, the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will have no application. Reference in this connection may be made to AIR 1971 SC 1193 upon which reliance has been placed by M.Y. Eqbal. 50. On a plain reading of Section 4 of the Act No. 19 of 1988 it is evident that the same provides for a different and contrary intention vis-a-vis provisions of Section 6 (e) of the General Clauses Act. Reference in this connection may be made to AIR 1971 SC 1193 upon which reliance has been placed by M.Y. Eqbal. 50. On a plain reading of Section 4 of the Act No. 19 of 1988 it is evident that the same provides for a different and contrary intention vis-a-vis provisions of Section 6 (e) of the General Clauses Act. It is true that Section 4 of the Act No. 19 of 1988 is wide in its application, but it is not correct to contend that by reason of the saving clause, the offence committed by the petitioners had not been condoned inasmuch as the said Act does not affect the obligation or liability already incurred or penalty obligation, liability, claim or demand of any indemnity already granted by any person. 51. By reason of Act No. 25 of 1983, any obligations and liabilities suffered by the petitioner are the not at all affected in terms of Section 4 of the Repealing and Amending Act, 1988. In this view of the matter, the second submission of Mr. K. Lahiri also cannot be accepted. 52. Re. Question No. (iii) By reason of a notification bearing no. S.O. 954 dated 8.12.1987 the Central Government in exercise of its power exempted from the operation of the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the said Act the fire arms required for safeguarding the property and personnel of any company firm bank or industrial or other establishment subject to the following conditions, namely:– "(i) The licensing authority shall after taking into account the size, nature and location of the establishment and such other factors as such licensing authority may consider relevant and after considering the views of the establishment determine the number of fire arms that may be acquired or possessed by such establishment. (ii) A licence shall be obtained from the licensing authority for each such fire arm in favour of the person in charge of the security of such establishment or where there is no such functionary the person in charge of the management of such establishment, by designation. (ii) A licence shall be obtained from the licensing authority for each such fire arm in favour of the person in charge of the security of such establishment or where there is no such functionary the person in charge of the management of such establishment, by designation. (iii) Upon such determination and issue of licenses every such establishment in possession of fire arms in excess of the number for which licenses have been granted shall forthwith surrender such excess fire arms to the officer in charge of the nearest police station or with a licensed dealer in the manner laid down under Section 21 of the said Act read with Rule 46 of the Arms Rules, 1962." 53. In terms of Section 41 of the said Act as amended by the Arms (Amendment) Act, 1983, the Central Government is empowered not only to exempt any person or class of person in relation to a description of arms or ammunitions but also exclude in the description of arms and ammunitions or withdraw any part of India from the operation of or any of the provisions of the said Act. By reason of the aforementioned notification, the Central Government has exempted the Reserve Bank of India other Banks and Industries from the operation of the provisions of Section 3 (2) of the said Act. When a Statute empowers a delegatee to exercise such a wide power on granting exemption, by necessary implication, it must be held to have power to grant such exemption with retrospective effect. 54. In Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Punjab reported in 1990 (3) SCC 87 , it was held:– "This court in Kailash Nath vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 790 , has held that the notification having been made in accordance with the power conferred by the statute has statutory force and validity and, therefore, exemption is as if contained in the Act itself. The Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act by Section 24 (4) confers rule making powers on the State Government. Section 25 confers power on the State Government to issue notifications with retrospective effect. Hence, it cannot be disputed that the exemption notification is the exercise of the legislative power. This Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Renusagar Power Co. (1988) 4 SCC 59 , 100 has held that the power to grant exemption is quasi legislative. Section 25 confers power on the State Government to issue notifications with retrospective effect. Hence, it cannot be disputed that the exemption notification is the exercise of the legislative power. This Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Renusagar Power Co. (1988) 4 SCC 59 , 100 has held that the power to grant exemption is quasi legislative. In Narinder Chand Hem Raj vs. Lt. Governor Administrator U.T. Himachal Pradesh (1971) 2 SCC 747 , it was held that the exercise of power is legislative whether it is by the legislature or by the delegate." 55. The power to grant exemption, thus, being legislative or quasi legislative in character, can also be given retrospective effect. Exemption as has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary 5th edition page 512, is to release, discharge, waive, to relieve from liability, to relieve, to excuse, to set free from duty or service etc. By reason of the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act, the licensee was commanded upon to deposit all arms within 90 days from the date of coming into force thereof, namely, 26.6.1983. 56. Admittedly the petitioners did not comply with the said provisions and therefore, they became liable to be prosecuted therefore. 57. However, the Central Government by reason of the aforementioned exemption notification dated 8.12.1987 exempted from the operation of provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the said Act, the fire arms required for safe guarding the property and personnel of any company, firm, bank or industrial or other establishment subject to the conditions mentioned therein; one of the conditions being that upon determination as to the number of fire arms that may be required or possessed by such establishment, licenses are to be issued. Such establishments in possession of fire arms in excess of the number of fire arms for which the licences have been granted are required to forthwith surrender/ deposit such excess fire arms to the officer in-charge of the nearest police station or with a licensed dealer in the manner laid down under Section 21 of the said Act read with Rule 46 of the Arms Rules 1962. 58. In this view of the matter, the Licensing Authority was required to determine the number of fire arms necessary to be kept by the Establishments mentioned in the said exemption notification. 59. 58. In this view of the matter, the Licensing Authority was required to determine the number of fire arms necessary to be kept by the Establishments mentioned in the said exemption notification. 59. In view of the aforementioned exemption notification, thus, the liability to deposit excess arms so far as the establishments like the petitioner is concerned arises only upon the determination of the number of arms required by it. The exemption notification, thus, being remedial in nature, will have retrospective effect. 60. In Collector of Central Excise Bombay & another vs. M/s. Parle Exports (P) Ltd. reported in (1989) 1 SCC 345 , the Supreme Court observed:– "It is a well settled principle of interpretation that courts in construing a statute or notification will give much weight to the interpretation put up on it at the time of enactment of issue, and since by those who have to construe, execute and apply the said enactments." The Supreme Court proceeded:– "How then should the courts proceed? The expressions in the schedule and in the notification for exemption should be understood by the language employed therein bearing in mind the context in which the expressions occur. The words used in the provision imposing taxes or granting exemption should be understood in the same way in which these are understood in ordinary parlance in the area in which the law is in force or by the people who ordinarily deal with them. It is, however, necessary to bear in mind certain principles. The notification in this case was issued under Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules and should be read along with the Act. The notification must be read as a whole in the context of the other relevant provisions. When a notification is issued in accordance with power conferred by the statute, it has statutory force and validity and therefore the exemption under the notification is as if it were contained in the Act itself." It was further held that in the event of there being area difficulty in ascertaining the meaning of a particular enactment that the question of strictness or of liberality of construction arises. It was further held:– "While interpreting an exemption clause, liberal interpretation should be imparted to the language thereof, provided no violence is done to the language employed." 61. The exemption notification dated 8.12.1987, thus read, must be held to operate retroactively. 62. It was further held:– "While interpreting an exemption clause, liberal interpretation should be imparted to the language thereof, provided no violence is done to the language employed." 61. The exemption notification dated 8.12.1987, thus read, must be held to operate retroactively. 62. In this case, the Central Government immediately on receipt of the application from the petitioner opined that the State should not proceed as against them any further. It further shows that the Central Government intended to issue the exemption notification with retrospective effect. Unless a retroactive operation is given to the said notification, it will become otiose and wholly inoperative. 63. Taking thus, all the facts and circumstances into consideration, I am of the view that by reason of the notification the petitioner having been exempted from the purview of the operation of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the said Act, the seizure of the two guns as also prosecution of the petitioners can no longer continue. 64. Re. Question No. (iv) In this case evidently despite coming into force of the Arms (Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act No. 25 of 1983) fire arm licences granted to the petitioner no. 1 which were about 150 numbers had been renewed from time to time (vide Annexure-6). Prior to the issuance of notice dated 22.3.1987, 4.5.1987 and 6.5.1987, the respondents did not ask the petitioners to deposit the arms. 65. The very fact that even the respondents were not aware of the fact of the Arms (Amendment) Act, 1983 and/or effect thereof goes to show that all the parties were either ignorant of the said amendment or were not sure about the effect thereof. 66. The petitioners immediately upon receipt of the aforementioned notices which were contained in Annexure 6 to 6/E, Annexure 7, 7/A and Annexure 8 and 8/A to the writ application, filed an application before the Central Government for exempting it from the purview of the said Act. It is obvious that even the Central Government was not aware of the implication of the aforementioned provision in respect of the application of the said provisions in respect of Reserve Bank of India, Banks and other large industrial Establishments. 67. It is obvious that even the Central Government was not aware of the implication of the aforementioned provision in respect of the application of the said provisions in respect of Reserve Bank of India, Banks and other large industrial Establishments. 67. The Central Government, therefore, immediately took action in the matter and even asked the State not to proceed in the matter any further as is evident from the letter dated 6.7.1987 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs which is contained in Annexure to the writ application. 68. It is also an admitted case that the Central Government realised the implications of the provisions and issued a general notification dated 8.12.1987 which, inter alia has embraces within its fold all the Companies like the petitioner company. 69. By reason of the said notification, the conditions for grant of licence had also been prescribed and the licenses were directed to surrender excess fire arms only upon determination of the number of fire arms that may be acquired or possessed by such establishments. 70. Evidently, the Parliament was also satisfied about the unworkability of the said provision and therefore, repealed the Arms (Amendment) Act, 1983 in its entirety. 71. The purported seizure and the criminal case instituted as against the petitioner must be viewed in the background of the case as mentioned hereinbefore. 72. Violation of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Arms Act is an offence punishable under Section 25 (1) (b) (h) of the Arms Act and the minimum punishment therefore is one year which may extend to three years. 73. It is now well known that in relation to such statutory offence existence of a guilty intent is an essential ingredient of a crime, the principle in respect whereof is expressed in maxim actus non-facit reum nisi mens sit rea. 74. The crime involving mens rea are of two types:– (i) Crimes of basic intent. (ii) Crimes of specific intent. In the former category of crime, the mens rea does not go beyond the actus reu's where as in the second category of crime mens-rea goes beyond the contents of the prohibited act and foresight of its consequence and has a purposive element. See, Director of Public Prosecutions vs. Majewaki reported in 1976 (2) All E.R. 142. 75. In the former category of crime, the mens rea does not go beyond the actus reu's where as in the second category of crime mens-rea goes beyond the contents of the prohibited act and foresight of its consequence and has a purposive element. See, Director of Public Prosecutions vs. Majewaki reported in 1976 (2) All E.R. 142. 75. The absence of mens-rea consists of an honest and reasonable cause entertained by the acceptance of the fact which if proved would make an act charged against him innocent. 76. It is now well known that the courts regard the absence of mens rea as a fundamental principle of an offence unless from a consideration of the terms of the Statute and other relevant circumstances it clearly appears that the (sic) must have been the intention of the Parliament. Reference in this connection may be made to Nathlal vs. State of M.P. reported in AIR 1966 SC 43 and in Indersan vs. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1973 SC 2309 . 77. Taking thus all facts and circumstances into consideration and particularly in view of the fact that the Central Government itself has issued an exemption notification in exercise of its power under Section 41 of the Arms Act, I am of the view that if the criminal proceedings are allowed to continue, the same shall amount to abuse of the process of court and in the interest of justice, the criminal proceedings as also the seizure of the fire arms should be quashed. 78. In the result, this application is allowed and the proceedings pending before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur in Complaint Case No. C/2 625/87 as also the seizure of two fire arms being S.B. Barrel gun nos. 69216 and 69141 in terms of Annexure 16 and 17 are quashed. There will, however be no order as to costs.