S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) SPECIAL Civil Application No. 2702 of 1991 arises out of an interim relief order passed by the industrial court Ahmedabad in Reference (IT) No. 310 of 1986 below interim relief application Ex. 67 moved by the respondent No. 2 union. Being aggrieved by the said interim order granted by the Industrial court the petitioner employer has filed this petition under Articles. 226/227 of the Constitution which is in substance wholly one under Article 227 thereof. MCA 763 of 1991 is filed under the contempt of Courts Act 1971 by respondent No. 2 union alleging non-compliance with the interim order granted by this Court pending hearing of Special Civil Application No. 2702 of 1991 while Special Civil Application No. 4771 of 1991 is moved under Article 226 by the rival union of employees named and stated as Mafatlal Apparel Kamdar Sangathan Nadiad. Thus in short these three proceedings reflect a triangular contest between the employer Mafatlal Apparel Manufacturing Company Limited on the one hand and the two rival unions of workmen on the other. ( 2 ) IN order to appreciate the nature of controversy in this triangular contest it would be necessary to note a few background facts. Introductory Facts: ( 3 ) FOR the sake of convenience we will refer to the petitioner concerned in Special Civil Application No. 2702 of 1991 as the employer while the two contesting rival unions as Majdoor Panchayat and Kamdar Sangathan respectively. ( 4 ) THE petitioner concern is running a garment manufacturing industry at Nadiad in Kheda district and mostly women are working in the said concern as workmen. The then workmens union representing majority of working women had raised an industrial dispute about revision of pay scales of these workmen. That dispute was referred by the State of Gujarat for adjudication of Industrial court at Ahmedabad and it was registered as Reference (IT) No. 310 of 1986 which is still pending before the Industrial court. This reference is pending since five years and we are told that it is at its fag end and likely to be decided soon. At the time when the reference was sought the parties to the reference were the petitioner concern on the one hand and Mafatlal Apparel Workers Union on the other which was the sponsoring union. This reference is pending since five years and we are told that it is at its fag end and likely to be decided soon. At the time when the reference was sought the parties to the reference were the petitioner concern on the one hand and Mafatlal Apparel Workers Union on the other which was the sponsoring union. But it appears that during the currency of this reference that union came to be replaced by Majdoor panchayat which claimed majority of membership of employees and had applied to be joined as party to the reference and it was accordingly joined as party to the said reference. That sponsoring union is respondent No. 1 in Special Civil Application No. 2702 of 1991 while the Majdoor panchayat is respondent No. 2. During the pendency of these reference proceedings it appears that there was some labour unrest on the premises of the employer and according to the employer it was not possible to continue the manufacturing activity and consequently with effect from 30-1-1991 it declared lock out. That thereafter an agreement was entered into on 22 between the employer on the one hand and Mafatlal Apparel Kamdar Sangathan on the other which seems to have come into existence by about that time and which claims to have got sizeable number of female employees as its members. The Majdoor panchayat claims that this Sangathan is sponsored by the employer and it is its own creation. We are not concerned with the said controversy in the present proceedings. The fact remains that the agreement under Section 2 (P) was arrived at between the Sangathan on the one hand and the employer on the other. By the terms of the settlement certain revised pay scales were agreed to be received by the workmen towards the full and final settlement of their claims in the pending reference and other matters which would be pending between the employer and the workmen. It was also agreed by the concerned workmen that they will give production of 8 shirts per day per work-woman and will work with cooperation and discipline. It was also agreed by the concerned workmen that they will give production of 8 shirts per day per work-woman and will work with cooperation and discipline. The period of settlement was from 1-4-1991 to 31 As per Clause 9 all the claim demands and dispute which are subject-matter of reference (IT) No. 310 of 1986 pending before the Industrial court Ahmedabad and incidental and ancilliary matters arising therefrom and all other disputes demands and claims pending before various judicial quasi-judicial and executive authorities under different labour laws were not to be pressed by the workmen and the said disputes demands and claims shall stand disposed of in view of the settlement. As per Clause 12 of the settlement it was agreeed by and between the parties that in view of the settlement normal manufacturing operations of the company shall be resumed in a phased manner with the help of the workmen who are signatories to this settlement having accepted the said terms and conditions and accordingly the said workmen shall be employed in a phased manner the last one being employed within four weeks from the date of the said settlement. The members of the Sangathan who signed this settlement were offered work by the employer in a phased manner from the date of the settlement. As noted earlier the lock out was declared by the employer with effect from 30 As per the settlement only those workmen who were signatories to the settlement were to be given work on resumption of manufacturing activity meaning thereby those who were not signatories would not be given work and moment the settlement was signed the signatories had to withdraw from the reference and that the industrial dispute in the reference was to be treated to have been settled in terms of settlement. The Majdoor panchayat which was prosecuting the reference in place of the sponsored union having come to know about this settlement and offer of work by the employer only to the signatories to the settlement applied in the pending reference by Ex. The Majdoor panchayat which was prosecuting the reference in place of the sponsored union having come to know about this settlement and offer of work by the employer only to the signatories to the settlement applied in the pending reference by Ex. 67 for interim relief on the ground that the employer was following unfair labour practice and was trying to scuttle the pending reference by coercing the workmen by entering into such settlement by insisting that only those workmen who signed the settlement would be given work and not those workmen who were not signatories to such settlement and that this had tendency to displace the reference and to make proceeding for adjudication of the workers claim in the pending reference nugatory. Appropriate interim direction were therefore sought against the employer by the Majdoor panchayat by way of application Ex. 67. After hearing the concerned parties the Industrial court at Ahmedabad by the impugned order dated 12-4-1991 directed the employer to give up the policy of offering work only to those workmen who signed the settlement 22 entered into between the Sangathan and the employer and it was further directed to offer work to all workmen whether they were signatories to the settlement or not and if the employer failed to carry out these directions it will have to pay wages to the workmen who were not offered work from the date on which it offered work to other workmen who were signatories to the settlement. It was further directed that in order to show bona fide the employer may publish a notice on the factory notice board that work will be offered even to the workmen who had not signed the settlement dated 22-3-1991 and accordingly the workmen may resume their duties. At the request of the employer the impugned order was stayed for a week by the industrial tribunal subject to certain conditions as the employer wanted to approach this court against the said order. On 25-4-1991 Special Civil Application No. 2702 of 1991 was admitted to final hearing by the division bench consisting of one of us (S. B. Majmudar J.) and S. M. Soni J. and so far as interim relief was concerned it was granted subject to terms and conditions laid down in the said order. On 25-4-1991 Special Civil Application No. 2702 of 1991 was admitted to final hearing by the division bench consisting of one of us (S. B. Majmudar J.) and S. M. Soni J. and so far as interim relief was concerned it was granted subject to terms and conditions laid down in the said order. In short it was directed by the said interim order of this Court that the impugned order may remained stayed subject to the condition that the concerned employees who were still not permitted to resume their duties shall be permitted to resume their duties by the employer subject to their giving a written undertaking to the industrial court to the effect that they will work peacefully and will not create any disturbance in the factory during the time they work as such and they shall also undertake to give the same out-turn of work as was actually given by their other colleagues who might be signatories to the agreement dated 22-3-1991 and that this undertaking will be without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the workmen and the employer when it permits the workmen to resume their duties will also do so without prejudice to the rights and contentions in the main reference and in this petition. The petitioner was also required to pay to the concerned employees who resumed their duties pursuant to the order of this court wages which are payable under the interim award dated 23-1-1991 passed by the Industrial court in this very reference and which was the subject-matter of companion petition. The employer was directed to permit the concerned workmen to resume their duties moment the aforesaid undertakings were signed and maximum period of four weeks was given to them to offer work to all these employees in a phased manner. This interim order came to be modified later on on 22-8-1991 so far as the format of undertaking to be given by the signatories was concerned. We shall refer to this later order at appropriate stage in the course of this judgment. This interim order came to be modified later on on 22-8-1991 so far as the format of undertaking to be given by the signatories was concerned. We shall refer to this later order at appropriate stage in the course of this judgment. ( 5 ) SO far as MCA No. 763 of 1991 is concerned it is contended by the Majdoor panchayat that despite the order of this court dated 25-4-1991 the employer has not permitted the workmen to resume their duties though they had signed the requisite undertaking and consequently action may be taken against the employer under the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 and consequential monetary benefits also may be made available to the workmen from the date they were ready to resume their duties by signing the undertaking till their actual reinstatement. ( 6 ) SO far as Special Civil Application No. 4771 of 1991 is concerned the Sangathan as a petitioner contends that the management should be directed to offer work to those workmen only who have arrived at 2 (P) settlement even though they may be junior to other non-signatory workmen. They have also contended that the competent authority under the Act should be directed to look into the complaint of the Sangathan about unfair labour practice on the part of the management. ( 7 ) AS all these proceedings involve consideration of common questions and they centre round interim order passed by the Industrial court and the interim orders passed by this court pending the proceedings in this court against the said interim order all these proceedings were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. ( 8 ) RIVAL Contentions: Special Civil Application No. 2702/91. The learned Advocate for the petitioner-employer vehemently contended that the order passed by the Industrial could below Ex. 67 is ex facie without jurisdiction and null and void. He contended that the reference was regarding revision of pay scales. It had nothing to do with lock out and lifting thereof. That the management due to unavoidable circumstances and recalcitrant attitude adopted by the labour was forced to declare lock out on 30-1-1991. That members of the Sangathan agreed to sign 2 (P) settlement arrived at between the Sangathan and the management and consequently lock out was partially lifted qua only signatories of 2 (P) settlement and rest of the lock out had continued. That members of the Sangathan agreed to sign 2 (P) settlement arrived at between the Sangathan and the management and consequently lock out was partially lifted qua only signatories of 2 (P) settlement and rest of the lock out had continued. As the Majdoor panchayat was voicing grievance on behalf of the workmen who had not signed such settlement lock out qua them was not lifted. That the effect of the interim order of the Industrial court is to direct the management to lift the lock out. That such a direction was totally de hors the limited scope and ambit of the reference regarding revision of pay scales and hence the order is null and void. That such an order does not flow from the terms of reference nor does it pertain to any incidental questions. Consequently such order is beyond the scope of Section 10 (4) of the I. D. Act. ( 9 ) IT was next contended that question about legality of the lock out dated 30-1-1991 was already pending in conciliation and if ultimately any reference is made for resolving the said dispute it would be a fresh cause of action and separate and distinct dispute and only the competent court to which such reference is made can consider the question of granting appropriate relief whether final or interim in such reference. But so far as the present reference was concerned such type of question was totally outside the scope and ambit of the reference. It was next contended that this interim order could not have been passed without hearing the Sangathan as 2 (P) settlement was arrived at with the Sangathan and it was entitled to put forward its say in connection with the said settlement. ( 10 ) MR. Shahani for the Majdoor panchayat on the other hand submitted that the reference for revision of wage scale was pending since 1986 before the Industrial court. That pending this reference a situation was created by the employer with a view to seeing that this pending reference gets scuttled. For that purpose they first declared a lock out on 30-1-1991 and closed the shutters against all the employees. Thereafter they lifted the shutters in March 1991 by arriving at a settlement under Section 2 (P) with chosen few who were members of the Sangathan which was the managements sponsored union. For that purpose they first declared a lock out on 30-1-1991 and closed the shutters against all the employees. Thereafter they lifted the shutters in March 1991 by arriving at a settlement under Section 2 (P) with chosen few who were members of the Sangathan which was the managements sponsored union. Be that as it may when the management decided to lift the lock out in March 1991 and permitted all workmen to resume their duties a very curious unfair labour practice was followed by the management by only permitting the signatories to the settlement to resume work. Consequently after 22-3-1991 in fact there was no lock out in the factory. It was lifted for all workmen but only signatories to the settlement were permitted to enter the factory and resume their work. In view of this stand adopted by the management pending reference for revision of wage scale would naturally get obstructed and ultimately scuttled. That situation would arise in twofold manner. Firstly those workmen who signed the settlement were to be given work. Those who did not sign were left starving. Thus undue pressure of coercion and temptation was imposed on these workmen with a view to seeing that if they do not want to starve and if they want to get work in the factory which was starting its manufacturing activities after lifting lock out these were forced to sign such settlement. This type of undue pressure and coercion would result in unwilling worker willingly signing this 2 (P) settlement with the result that ultimately such settlement could be produced in the pending reference regarding revision of wage scale and the court would be presented with a situation in which it could be effectively urged that majority of workmen have signed the settlement which should be treated as just and fair and award be passed in terms of the settlement. That would really put the adjudication on merits of the dispute about the revision of wage scale. Secondly once workmen are forced to sign such settlement because of Clause 9 of the settlement they would be compelled to withdraw the Industrial dispute pending in these proceedings. So by that clause adjudication on merits of the dispute would get frustrated and obstructed. Secondly once workmen are forced to sign such settlement because of Clause 9 of the settlement they would be compelled to withdraw the Industrial dispute pending in these proceedings. So by that clause adjudication on merits of the dispute would get frustrated and obstructed. Even the Industrial court would be deprived of an opportunity to consider the justness and fairness of settlement on the basis that majority of workmen have signed such settlement. Such a situation would automatically get bypassed on account of such insistence on the part of the management that only signatories to the settlement to whatever unions they belong will be given work even though there was enough work in the factory for all the workmen after 22 and in fact lock out was lifted. It was submitted that there was no partial lifting of lock out as alleged by the management. In fact lock out was fully lifted but entry of the workmen within the factory premises was restricted by imposing the impugned condition of signing the settlement before entry in the factory premises. That once this was pointed out to the Industrial court it was not only its right but its duty to see that such impediment in the adjudicatory process in pending reference created by one of the parties to the reference is eradicated and avoided and set at naught. Thus the order passed by the Industrial court is from all viewpoints an incidental order passed in the pending reference with a view to seeing that the reference does not get scuttled. It was further contended that there is no question of waiting for a proper reference against the illegal lock out and then getting such order from the reference court as in that reference all that would be disputed would be legality of the lock out dated 30-1-1991. That was not the question the Industrial court when it decided application Ex. 67. The question was entirely different and it was whether one of the parties to the reference could create such an impediment in the way of adjudicatory process of the Industrial court by coercing the other party to enter into 2 (P) settlement as judgment to be order by the management and its puppet union viz Sangathan. 67. The question was entirely different and it was whether one of the parties to the reference could create such an impediment in the way of adjudicatory process of the Industrial court by coercing the other party to enter into 2 (P) settlement as judgment to be order by the management and its puppet union viz Sangathan. This type of interim relief had nothing to do with adjudication of the disputes regarding legality and propriety of the lock out dated 30 which had admittedly continued till 2 (P) settlement was arrived at between the management on the one hand and its puppet union on the other. Mr. Shahani also submitted that there is no question of hearing the Sangathan before passing the impugned order. That firstly the Sangathan had never appeared before the Industrial court in the pending reference nor had it requested to be joined as party till the impugned order was passed. It is only thereafter that it moved an application to be joined as party and the Majdoor panchayat could not have any objection if such application is granted by the Industrial court. But till the impugned order was passed no such application was moved by the Sangathan. It is true that when the Majdoor panchayat filed the complaint under Section 33a of the Act before the Industrial court in this connection the Sangathan applied to be joined as a party. But the said complaint was an independent proceeding though before the same court. But its appearance here cannot automatically project its appearance in the main reference unless the Sangathan so moved and it thought it fit not to do move till the impugned order was passed. It is obvious that Sangathan was in know of this development in the reference and filing of application Ex. 67 by the Majdoor panchayat as it was a rival union and in the normal course of events it could have got full information from the management in this connection as 2 (P) settlement was arrived at between the employer and the Sangathan. Hence it cannot be said that the order could not have been passed without hearing the Sangathan. 67 by the Majdoor panchayat as it was a rival union and in the normal course of events it could have got full information from the management in this connection as 2 (P) settlement was arrived at between the employer and the Sangathan. Hence it cannot be said that the order could not have been passed without hearing the Sangathan. Further it was submitted that the impugned order does not hurt the Sangathan at all and all that the Industrial court has done is to direct the employer to give work also to workmen who have not signed the 2 (P) settlement. No order is passed that those who nave signed 2 (P) settlement should not. be given any work. It may be that the effect of the impugned order will be that if non-signatory workmen are given work and if they are senior to signatory workmen then senior would displace the junior. But this is a logical and legal consequence of the order and when the Sangathan had not cared to remain present for opposing passing of such order it would be too late for the employer to submit in these proceedings that non-hearing of Sangathan by the Industrial court would vitiate the order in anyway. ( 11 ) MR. Nanavati for the employer in rejoinder reiterated his basic contention that the impugned order is beyond the scope of reference regarding revision of wage scale and it is null and void order and that in substance it amounts to directing the management to lift the lock out qua non-signatory workmen. ( 12 ) XX xx xx xx ( 13 ) XX xx xx xx ( 14 ) XX xx xx xx ( 15 ) XX xx xx xx ( 16 ) XX xx xx xx ( 17 ) XX xx xx xx ( 18 ) IN view of the aforesaid rival contentions the following points for determination arise in these proceedings:1 Whether the interim order below Ex. 67 for interim relief passed by the industrial court in reference (IT) No. 310 of 1986 suffers from any patent error of law or jurisdiction. 2 Whether the respondent concern is guilty of any breach of interim order passed by this Court on 253 Whether the petitioner Sangathan is entitled to any relief in Special Civil Application No. 4771 of 1991. 2 Whether the respondent concern is guilty of any breach of interim order passed by this Court on 253 Whether the petitioner Sangathan is entitled to any relief in Special Civil Application No. 4771 of 1991. 4 What final orders ?we shall deal with the aforesaid points seriatim. POINT No. 1:- We have already noticed the factual backdrop in the light of which this controversy has to be resolved. A reference for revision of wage scale is pending in the industrial court since 1986. Earlier the sponsoring union was Mafatlal Apparel Workers union but subsequently it receded in background and Gujarat Majdoor panchayat respondent No. 2 took over the reins of the reference on behalf of the workmen. This reference was ripe for hearing before the Industrial court but at that stage a lock out was declared by the concern on 30-1-1991 on the ground that because of indisciplined workmen it was impossible for the concern to continue its manufacturing activities. It is thereafter that some of the workmen are alleged to have got tired of the respondent No. 2- panchayat and to have formed a new union viz. the Sangathan and arrived at 2 (P) settlement dated 22-3-1991. It is vehemently contended by the learned Advocate for the panchayat that this union is a stooge of the management and it is its own creature. For resolving the present controversy it is not necessary for us to say anything in this connection. But the fact remains that the petitioner concern had agreed to offer work after resuming manufacturing activities to all the employees who were lock out from 30-1-1991 if they had signed the said 2 (P) settlement. We have been taken through the relevant clauses of the said settlement. Two clauses which the Industrial court found to be objectionable and which if accepted by the signatories would amount to scuttling the reference are Clauses 9 and 12 of the settlement. We have been taken through the relevant clauses of the said settlement. Two clauses which the Industrial court found to be objectionable and which if accepted by the signatories would amount to scuttling the reference are Clauses 9 and 12 of the settlement. They read as under9 The workmen/sangathan agree that this settlement is arrived at between the parties by way of full and final settlement of : (i) all the claims/demands and disputes which are the subject-matter of reference (IT) No. 310/86 pending before the Industrial tribunal Ahmedabad and incidental and ancillary matters arising therefrom and (ii) all other disputes demands and claims pending before various judicial quasi-judicial and executive authorities under different labour laws and therefore the workmen do not press the said disputes demands and claims and the same shall stand disposed off in view of this settlement. 12 It is agreed by and between the parties that in view of this settlement normal manufacturing operations of the company will be resumed in a phased manner with the help of the workmen who are signatories to this settlement having accepted the said terms and conditions and accordingly the said workmen will be employed in a phased manner the last one being employed within 4 weeks from the date of this settlement. ( 19 ) A mere look at these terms shows that even though the management was in a position to offer work to all locked out employees in a phased manner within a period of one month from 22-3-1991 the date of the settlement it did not offer work to those who did not sign the settlement including the aforesaid two terms. It is obvious that the panchayat was agitating for revision of wage scale since years in the pending reference and the reference was almost five years old on the file of the Industrial court. It cannot be disputed that workmen can voluntarily arrive at any settlement of the pending industrial dispute but the essence of such settlement should be that it springs out of voluntariness. In the background of the facts situation which prevailed on 22-3-1991 it has to be visualised that the workmen were facing unemployment since 30-1-1991 due to lock out. These were all female employees who were mostly destitutes and widows. In the background of the facts situation which prevailed on 22-3-1991 it has to be visualised that the workmen were facing unemployment since 30-1-1991 due to lock out. These were all female employees who were mostly destitutes and widows. When they were facing such unemployment if an inducement is given to them that if they sign the settlement they would be given work such type of clause in the settlement would obviously be an unfair clause and if the workmen signed such settlement to avoid future unemployment it cannot be said that his/her signature on the settlement was voluntary and not as a result of force coercion or undue pressure because it was made clear by the management that unless the workmen signed such settlement they would not be permitted to resume work. Even that apart moment such settlement is signed the concerned workman has to give up the industrial dispute which was pending for adjudication since 1986 Thus the insistence on the part of the management on the signatures of the concerned workmen on the settlement before offering work on resumption of manufacturing activities after 22 had two fold pernicious effects on the pending adjudicatory process in the reference. Firstly the workmen would be coerced or pressurised to sign such settlement even though they were not willing otherwise to sign such settlement and were not agreeable to all terms including the condition to give production of eight shirts per day per workman. This type of pressure and undue influence or coercion was implicit in term No. 12 of the settlement as the alternative was to continue to starve even though lock out was lifted for all of her colleagues who signed the settlement and if majority of workmen were so induced or coerced to sign the settlement a stage would be reached in the course of the pending reference where 2 (P) settlement can be produced by the management before the court with a request to make it a rule of the court on the ground that it was signed by majority of workmen. This would certainly result in forestalling the decision on merits of the dispute on account of such settlement which would lead to almost snatching the settlement from unwilling workmen. The second pernicious effect of the aforesaid clauses was that the concerned signatories had to withdraw from the pending reference and to give up the dispute. This would certainly result in forestalling the decision on merits of the dispute on account of such settlement which would lead to almost snatching the settlement from unwilling workmen. The second pernicious effect of the aforesaid clauses was that the concerned signatories had to withdraw from the pending reference and to give up the dispute. Consequently for the concerned otherwise unwilling signatories the Industrial Court would lose an opportunity to adjudicate upon the question of revision of wage scale as the dispute would get scuttled because of operation of Clause 9. Mr. Nanavati for the management submitted that the management was not insisting that only members of the Sangathan can sign such settlement. Any workmen including members of the rival union can also sign the settlement and resume work. This amounts to oversimplification of the matter. In fact any such insistence reflects the real rub of the matter. Even though workmen may not be members of the Sangathan and may be members of the panchayat which was agitating the question regarding revision of wage scale before the Industrial Court in Reference (IT) No. 310 of 1986 they will be tempted or in a way coerced to sign such settlement before they can hope to get work after 22-3-1991. Mr. Nanavati made it clear that Clause 12 has to be insisted upon for all the signatories. Same will be the position for Clause 9 It was therefore rightly contended in the interim relief application Ex. 67 that such type of unfair labour practice followed by the management should not be permitted to encouraged pending the reference proceedings and if that was not stopped the entire reference would get frustrated and when the concern which was one of the parties to the reference was indulging in such type of sharp and clever practice against the other party viz. the members of the panchayat then such practice should be restrained and the impedimant projected by such practice to the smooth adjudication of the pending reference was required to be interdicted by appropriate interim relief. This is what the Industrial court has done. We do not find any error in passing such order. the members of the panchayat then such practice should be restrained and the impedimant projected by such practice to the smooth adjudication of the pending reference was required to be interdicted by appropriate interim relief. This is what the Industrial court has done. We do not find any error in passing such order. It is obvious that when adjudication proceedings are pending if one of the parties becomes smart and tries to overreach the other party and consequently the Court and tries to create a situation which affects smooth adjudication of the reference proceedings it will not only be the right but also duty of the Court to nip such mischief in the bud and for that purpose to restrain the party in the wrong from indulging or continuing such an exercise. In fact in appropriate cases the party in the wrong can legitimately be treated to have committed contempt of the court by interfering with free flow of administration of justice. The Industrial court on facts of the present case has not gone that far. Hence we may not say anything more about it. 19 Mr. Nanavati for the management submitted that lock out was already declared by the management on 30 On 22 3-19919 what the management did was to enter into 2 (P) settlement with the members of the rival union who were willing to sign settlement and it is that settlement which was insisted upon for signature before any workman was permitted to resume work. Thus qua signatories lock out was lifted qua non-signatories lock out continued and what the Industrial court has done bypassing the impugned order is to indirectly call upon the management to lift the lock out and such type of order is totally de hors the terms of reference and cannot be said to be an incidental order. For supporting this contention he invited our attention to various decisions of the Supreme Court and other High Courts. We may briefly refer to them at this stage. In the case of India General Navigation and Railway Company v. Their Workmen reported in 1965 (II) LLJ 437 the Supreme Court laid down limits of jurisdiction of the courts when called upon to reverse the decisions of the industrial tribunal. We may briefly refer to them at this stage. In the case of India General Navigation and Railway Company v. Their Workmen reported in 1965 (II) LLJ 437 the Supreme Court laid down limits of jurisdiction of the courts when called upon to reverse the decisions of the industrial tribunal. Considering the powers of the Supreme Court it was observed: Where the finding on a question of fact referred to the industrial tribunal is patently and palpably erroneous and where it would have a serious impact on the employer in their dealings with a number of their employees in future such interference would be justified. We are not concerned with any such situation. If Mr. Nanavatis contention is right viz. the tribunals order is beyond its jurisdiction then there would be no doubt that this court can interfere under Article 227 against such order. But the question is whether the interim order is beyond the jurisdiction of the industrial court. ( 20 ) IN the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills v. Its Workmen AIR 1967 SC 469 it has been laid down as under: When the reference of the industrial dispute was in connection with dispute of legality and justification of strike and lock out in a particular mill the tribunal had to confine its decision only to the question whether strike and lock out was legal and justified or not and it could not enlarge the scope of its jurisdiction and decide that there was no strike or lock out at all. . ( 21 ) IT is obvious that reference in that case itself postulated that there were in fact strike and lock out. There was no dispute on this aspect. The short question was whether such strike and lock out were legal and justified. Under these circumstances it was held that the tribunal could not enlarge the scope of reference and adjudicate upon the factual existence of such strike or lock out. We fail to appreciate how this decision can be of any help to Mr. Nanavati. Here the question is entirely different. Under these circumstances it was held that the tribunal could not enlarge the scope of reference and adjudicate upon the factual existence of such strike or lock out. We fail to appreciate how this decision can be of any help to Mr. Nanavati. Here the question is entirely different. In a pending reference for revision of wage scales of workmen one of the parties to the dispute is alleged to be trying to act in such a manner that adjudicatory process will get scuttled and obstructed and the pending reference would become otiose if no stitching in time is made and with a view to seeing that pending dispute does not get thwarted the industrial court is called upon to restrain the party in the wrong from persisting with such wrong practice. As noted earlier granting of such interim relief is not only within the right but also becomes a duty of the court. ( 22 ) IN the case of Precision Bearings India v. Baroda Mazdoor Sabha AIR 1978 SC 419 the Supreme Court was concerned with the dispute whether all workmen should be paid dearness allowance at the rate of 100% dearness allowance paid to the workers of the Cotton Textile Mills at Ahmedabad. While adjudicating that reference the tribunal also allowed additional dearness allowance to wage earners of higher income brackets. It was held that such type of award did not flow from the terms of reference and was therefore beyond the terms of reference and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal. It becomes at once clear that in that decision the Supreme Court was not concerned with the question whether any impediment caused by one of the parties to the reference against smooth adjudication of the industrial dispute on merits can be eradicated by the tribunal by passing appropriate interim relief order and whether such power can be said to be exercise of power of the tribunal for any incidental matter. The aforesaid decision therefore cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. ( 23 ) MR. Nanavati next invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat v. Perfect Pottery Co. AIR 1979 SC 1356 . The aforesaid decision therefore cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. ( 23 ) MR. Nanavati next invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat v. Perfect Pottery Co. AIR 1979 SC 1356 . Therein it was laid downas under the jurisdiction of the tribunal in industrial dispute is limited to the points specifically referred for its adjudication and to matters incidental thereto and the tribunal cannot go beyond the terms of reference. The question before the Supreme Court in that case was whether the tribunal can go into the question about the fact of closure when the only dispute referred to it was to decide whether the closure was proper or Justified. That question was answered in the negative. It is obvious that the aforesaid decision is on the same lines on which earlier decision in AIR 1967 was rendered. As already shown earlier such is not a question here. ( 24 ) MR. Nanavati then took us to the decision of the Supreme Court in Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. v. The Workmen AIR 1981 SC 1626 In that case the only industrial dispute referred for adjudication under Section 10 of the Act was about reinstatement of the concerned workmen; while the tribunal had adjudicated upon an entirely different dispute arising out of subsequent event viz. that certain workmen only were reinstated and that there was discrimination and also unfair labour practice involved in the matter. That obviously gave a new cause of action for the workmen for raising a fresh industrial dispute. Consequently it was held by the Supreme Court that the issue of unfair labour practice or discrimination by reason of subsequent reinstatement on a permanent basis of some and not all workmen was not a matter referred to the tribunal for adjudication nor it could be said to be in any way connected with or incidental to the right of reinstatement claimed by the workmen from the date of their dismissal. This decision itself makes it clear that if any subsequent grievance in a pending dispute is connected with or incidental to the main dispute it can be looked into by the tribunal but not an independent and separate dispute based on subsequent events. We fail to appreciate how this decision can be of any help to Mr. Nanavati. This decision itself makes it clear that if any subsequent grievance in a pending dispute is connected with or incidental to the main dispute it can be looked into by the tribunal but not an independent and separate dispute based on subsequent events. We fail to appreciate how this decision can be of any help to Mr. Nanavati. As seen earlier on the facts of the present case the main reference is about revision of wage scales. It is pending since 1986. Pending this reference it is alleged that a situation is created by the other party which has direct impact on smooth functioning of adjudication of the dispute and if not corrected in time would result in aborting the reference. Such situation is on account of subsequent conduct of the party pending the reference. It has got to be held that it is connected with or incidental to the main claim in the pending reference. ( 25 ) MR. Nanavati also invited our attention to a decision of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Jaipur Spg. and Wvg. Mills v. J. A. and W. Mills Mazdoor Union 1959 (II) LLJ 656. It has been laid down therein as under:the position seems to be well settled that by an interim award only such relief can be granted as can be given in a final award. The grant of relief at an interim stage which cannot appropriately be granted at a final stage may instead of facilitating adjustment create inherent difficulties in adjustment in the final award. THE word incidental according to its dictionary meaning and the ordinary accepted popular sense implies a subordinate and subsidiary thing related to some other main or principal thing requiring casual attention while considering the main thing. Obviously matters which require independent consideration or treatment and have their Own importance cannot be considered incidental. IN that case the dispute referred was about adjudication of increase in work load. It was held that the industrial tribunal could not grant interim relief by passing an interim award directing the continuance of the increased workload on payment of higher wages. The question of wages in the circumstances must be considered to be wholly independent and foreign to their question referred to the tribunal. In the light of the main reference which was referred for adjudication such interim relief was beyond the scope of main reference. The question of wages in the circumstances must be considered to be wholly independent and foreign to their question referred to the tribunal. In the light of the main reference which was referred for adjudication such interim relief was beyond the scope of main reference. On the facts of the present case this decision also cannot be of any assistant to Mr. Nanavati. We may now turn to the decisions cited by Mr. Sahani for the Panchayat. ( 26 ) IN the case of Herbertsons Ltd. v. Workmen AIR 1977 SC 322 the Supreme Court had to consider the question of justness and fairness of a settlement of the industrial dispute between the parties. It was held that while judging this aspect of the matter the tribunal is not required to consider it by invoking the principles applicable in adjudicating the dispute between the parties but its overall justness and fairness has to be seen. ( 27 ) MR. Shahani for the panchayat who invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Tata Engg. and Locomotive Cc. Ltd. v. Their Workmen AIR 1981 SC 2163 . It has been laid down therein as under:if the settlement had been arrived at between the company and the union of the workers by a vast majority of the concerned workers with their eyes open and was also accepted by them in its totality it must be presumed to be just and fair and not liable to be ignored merely because a small number of workers were not parties to it or refused to accept it or because the tribunal was of the opinion that the workers deserve marginally higher emolument than they themselves thought they did. A settlement cannot be weighed in any golden scales and the question whether it is just and fair has to be answered on the basis of principles different from those which come into play when an industrial dispute is under adjudication. A settlement cannot be weighed in any golden scales and the question whether it is just and fair has to be answered on the basis of principles different from those which come into play when an industrial dispute is under adjudication. THESE judgments were pressed in service to demonstrate that if the pending dispute about revision of wage scale was likely to get impeded by the management by getting signatures of large number of workmen on the settlement due to coercion or force as a result of which only those who have signed such settlement would be permitted to resume duties and such settlement said to be signed by majority of workmen and which ultimately may be placed before the tribunal a situation would be created wherein the tribunal will feel helpless and on the ground that majority have signed the settlement presumption of its justness and fairness would arise. That only bona fide and voluntary settlement can be pressed in service for passing orders in terms of settlement. But if it was alleged that so called settlement is being forced upon unwilling workmen and if they do not sign there was threat to continue their unemployment such unfair labour practice followed by one of the parties has got to be set right so that pending reference does not-get scuttled and that is precisely what the tribunal has done. We find considerable force in this contention of Mr. Shahani. It is not as if the 2 (P) settlement is voluntarily signed by workmen similarly situated and it is then to be presented to the tribunal for considering its justness and fairness. Here is a case in which a sort of inducement or force is imposed upon unemployed workmen requiring them to sign such settlement before they can hope to get resumption of duties and work. It is obvious that as these women workmen were locked out since 30 due to economic strain and stress they would fall prey to such temptation offered by the management and will any how sign the settlement to avoid starvation for them and their family members. It is this obnoxious pressure or coercion which is sought to be removed by the tribunal by its impugned interim relief order. It is this obnoxious pressure or coercion which is sought to be removed by the tribunal by its impugned interim relief order. Once this is removed and once all workmen are placed on par and are permitted to resume their work whether they sign the settlement or not thereafter there would be no coercion or undue pressure left in the field and thereafter if they still voluntarily sign such settlement it would be of their own choice and such settlement would be a free and voluntary settlement. Its justness and fairness can therefore be examined by the tribunal in the pending reference and the tribunal can come to its own conclusion and make it a rule of court if thought fit. But even this opportunity was denied to the tribunal by the management by forcing the unemployed workmen to sign the settlement before they can hope to getting renewal of their bread and butter. That certainly impeded the smooth adjudication of the pending dispute or even consideration on merits of the question whether 2 settlement was just and fair from all its angles. Consequently the impugned order passed by the Industrial court cannot be said to be beyond its jurisdiction. On the contrary it was purely an incidental order which was imminently required in the facts and circumstances of the case otherwise pending reference would have got totally scuttled. The question arises whether in such circumstances the tribunal or court should feel helpless and sit with folded hands and ask the aggrieved party to get a new reference made and then only give relief whether final or interim or whether the court can act in time with a view to seeing that the pending reference does not get thwarted and courts jurisdiction is not displaced for decision on the main issue by one of the parties. In our view the court is not in such a helpless position. In such circumstances it behoves the court to act in time before it is too late and before it is forced to close its shutters on the adjudication proceedings in the pending reference. ( 28 ) MR. Nanavatis contention based on Section 2 of the Act defining lock out is also besides the point. In such circumstances it behoves the court to act in time before it is too late and before it is forced to close its shutters on the adjudication proceedings in the pending reference. ( 28 ) MR. Nanavatis contention based on Section 2 of the Act defining lock out is also besides the point. It is no doubt true that a lock out can be temporary closing of a place of employment or the suspension of work or the refusal by an employer to continue to employ any number of persons employed by him. But it cannot be said that on the facts of the present case on 22 3 the management had partially lifted the lock out as submitted by Mr. Nanavati. It is to be kept in view that total lock out was declared on 30 and the factory was closed by the management on the ground that it was not possible for the management to continue the manufacturing activities due to unruly behaviour of the workmen. On 22-3-1991 however the situation turned the corner and the management found it feasible to lift the shutters and to resume manufacturing activities and it gave open invitation to all the workmen to come for resumption of duties in a phased manner latest within one month provided they signed 2 (P) settlement which the Sangathan had entered into with the management. Thus it is not as if the management was not in a position to offer work to all the employees who were earlier lock out. But while permitting them to enter the factory gate on resumption of manufacturing activities a condition was imposed that first they must sign 2 (P) settlement whether they belonged to Sangathan or any other union and thereafter only they can enter the factory gate. Thus the alleged situation which had existed on 30 which made it impossible for the management to continue the manufacturing activities had gone by 22-3 1991 on the managements own saying and it was in a position to offer employment to all their workmen who were earlier locked out. We pointedly asked Mr. Nanavati as to whether the management would have given work to all the workmen even if they were members of panchayat or who were not members of any union if they had signed 2 (P) settlement and his answer was in the affirmative. We pointedly asked Mr. Nanavati as to whether the management would have given work to all the workmen even if they were members of panchayat or who were not members of any union if they had signed 2 (P) settlement and his answer was in the affirmative. This shows that by 22-3-1991 even according to the management the earlier alleged situation which had forced it to declare a lock out had ceased to exist and the management had voluntarily opened its shutters and the factory gates welcoming all workmen to re-enter and resume work provided they signed 2 settlement. It was the insistence on the part of the management to permit workmen to enter the factory gate provided they were willing to sign 2 settlement that amounted to unfair labour practice which had effect of thwarting the pending reference and its adjudication. Such unfair labour practice was sought to be restrained by the impugned order of the tribunal. The tribunal cannot be said to have asked the management to lift the lock out for non-signatory workmen as tried to be submitted by Mr. Nanavati. Lock out was already lifted by the management of its own volition by 22-3-1991 and that lifting was for all workmen who were locked out on 30-1-1991 but permission to resume work was given to only signatory workmen. That would certainly amount to unfair labour practice as laid down by Section 2 of the Act used with Schedule and item No. 9 viz. to show favouritism or partiality to one set of workers regardless of merit. It cannot be said that the workmen who signed 2 (P) settlement become meritorious and not the non-signatory workmen. Therefore prima facie the management was guilty of unfair labour practice pending the proceedings and when such practice had direct linkage with the main industrial reference and its adjudication and had a tendency to frustrate to its adjudication on merits it gave rise to grievance on the part of the aggrieved workmen which was clearly incidental to the main dispute and therefore the tribunals jurisdiction was rightly invoked for restraining the party guilty of such sharp practice from continuing such practice so that the pending reference can be properly adjudicated upon. This was nothing more than trying to remove spoke in the free movement of adjudicatory wheel in the pending reference. This was nothing more than trying to remove spoke in the free movement of adjudicatory wheel in the pending reference. It has to be kept in view that it was not alleged before the tribunal that original lock out dated 30 was illegal. This certainly would be an independent dispute which cannot be considered by the Industrial court in the present reference. But such a grievance has nothing to do with the grievance that even though the management had lifted the lock out in March 1991 and was in a position to offer work to all it was indulging in unfair labour practice of discriminating against non-signatory workmen in not permitting them to resume duty though the management was in a position to offer them work. It is therefore not possible to agree with the contention of Mr. Nanavati that the impugned order amounts to compelling the management to lift the lock out against non-signatory workmen. Reliance placed by Mr. Nanavati in this connection on a decision of the Bombay High Court reported in 1989 (1) LLJ 134 and on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1960 (1) LLJ 244 also will be of no assistance to him as this is not a case of not lifting lock out for all workmen unless certain conditions imposed on them were complied with. On the other hand in the present case by 22-3-1991 lock out is lifted qua all the workmen who were earlier locked out but entry in the factory was restricted to only signatory workmen. As a result of the aforesaid discussion therefore it is held that the impugned order does not suffer from any jurisdictional error or a patent error. ( 29 ) AT this stage we may make it clear that we express no opinion on the question whether the imposing of lock out dated 30-1-1991 was legal or propel as that question is not before us. Similarly whether on 22-3-1991 the said lock out stood legally lifted for all workmen is also a question on which we express no final opinion. We have only prima facie found that practice indulged into by the management on 22-3-1991 in not offering work to all workmen was an unfair labour practice. Similarly whether on 22-3-1991 the said lock out stood legally lifted for all workmen is also a question on which we express no final opinion. We have only prima facie found that practice indulged into by the management on 22-3-1991 in not offering work to all workmen was an unfair labour practice. For deciding that limited question these observations are made and will of course not preclude the parties from putting forward all these relevant contentions both factual and legal in connection with the legality and justness of the lock out dated 30-1-1991 and its continuation and termination in the pending dispute about it which is in conciliation. ( 30 ) WE may refer to one aspect of the matter which was submitted by the learned advocate for the management. He stated that the tribunal could not have passed any order without hearing the Sangathan. As noted earlier the Sangathan had never applied to be joined as a party to the present reference by the time the impugned order came to be passed. Only because it had appealed in the complaint under Section 33a centering round this very question it cannot be said that it was a party to the present reference. No one prevented the Sangathan from applying for being made a party in the present reference and to be heard before the impugned order was passed. Application for being joined as a party in the reference was moved after the impugned order was passed and the said application is pending for hearing. Consequently no grievance can be made on behalf of the Sangathan or by the management. But that apart the impugned order nowhere hurts the Sangathan. Members of that union have already signed 2 (P) settlement. The tribunal has not decided about the justness and fairness of the settlement until now. That stage is yet to come. When that stage is reached it is obvious that the Sangathan would be required to be heard. The learned Advocate for the panchayat made it clear that he will have no objection if the Sangathan is made a party and is heard on merits of 2 (P) settlement and about its justness and fairness. The impugned order has only directed the management not to discriminate between signatory and non-signatory workmen while offering work. The learned Advocate for the panchayat made it clear that he will have no objection if the Sangathan is made a party and is heard on merits of 2 (P) settlement and about its justness and fairness. The impugned order has only directed the management not to discriminate between signatory and non-signatory workmen while offering work. It has never directed that those who are signatories to the settlement should not be given work if enough work is available. Consequently the impugned order in no way adversely affects the Sangathan and its members. It was therefore not required of the Industrial court to hear the Sangathan before passing the impugned order and the said order cannot in anyway be said to be illegal on the score that the Sangathan was not heard before passing the said order. For all these reasons there is no substance in the contentions of Mr. Nanavati centering round point No. 1. Point No. 1 therefore answered in the negative. ( 31 ) XX xx xx xx ( 32 ) XX xx xx xx ( 33 ) XX xx xx xx ( 34 ) XX xx xx xx ( 35 ) XX xx xx xx ( 36 ) XX xx xx xx ( 37 ) XX xx xx xx order accordingly. .