JUDGMENT : B.N. Srikrishna, J.—By this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order of the Industrial Court, Nasik, dated 31st March, 1986 made in complaint (ULP) No. 193 of 1985 under the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). 2. The petitioner is the son of retired employee of the first respondent-Corporation, which is a Corporation set up under the Road Transport Corporation Act, for carrying out the work of conveying of passengers for hire. 3. By a Circular dated 20th February, 1984 issued by the Chief Personnel Manager, instructions and guidelines had been laid down for recruitment in various unit cadre posts. The circular provided that, generally for the purpose of recruitment, names had to be called for of suitable candidates from the local Employment Exchange/Special Welfare Officer / Sainiki Board/Social Employment Exchange for Physically Handicapped. It is also, inter alia provided that one dependent of employee, who has retired from Slate Transport Service or who is likely to retire from State Transport Service within one year, can apply for the post for which the recruitment was being undertaken without his name being sponsored by the Employment Exchange. However, the registration number with the Employment Exchange would have to be mentioned in the application form. 4. There was an occasion for recruitment of employees in the first respondent-Corporation. The petitioner applied for being selected for the post of a helper, on the strength of the said circular, by pointing out that he was the son of a retired employee of the first respondent-Corporation. It appears that the petitioner was selected by the Selection Committee and even sent for Medical examination. At this stage, it was noticed that the petitioner had neither been sponsored by the local Employment Exchange or other body as contemplated under the aforesaid circular, nor did be indicate the registration number in the local Employment Exchange. Although, after selection, the petitioner's name was put on the select list, he was not given any appointment order or posting. The petitioner challenged this action of the first respondent by a complaint u/s 28 of the Act by invoking Items 5, 6 and 9 of Schedule IV of the said Act. Although, after selection, the petitioner's name was put on the select list, he was not given any appointment order or posting. The petitioner challenged this action of the first respondent by a complaint u/s 28 of the Act by invoking Items 5, 6 and 9 of Schedule IV of the said Act. The Industrial Court, on the basis of the material before it, came to the conclusion that the petitioner had not registered himself with the local Employment Exchange, and hence, had not indicated the registration number on his application. The Industrial Court, therefore, was of the view that the petitioner was not entitled to the benefits of the circular dated 20th' February, 1984 issued by the first respondent, though the other qualification, viz., of being the son of a retired employee, had been fulfilled by the petitioner. The Industrial Court took the view that selection of the petitioner and inclusion of his name in the in the Select List, was through inadvertence, and merely because his name had been included in the Select List through inadvertence, the petitioner did not get any vested right of employment, as he did not fulfil one of the major conditions for the selection to the post of helper by failing to register his name in the local Employment Exchange. For this reason, the learned Judge of the Industrial Court held that there was no failure to implement the terms of any agreement, award or settlement within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. He also rejected the contention based on discrimination with reference to the material on record, which did not, support such a conclusion. He, therefore, held against the petitioner on another item of unfair labour practice, viz., Item 5 of Schedule IV of the Act. He also held against the petitioner with regard to the unfair labour practice under Item 6 of Schedule IV of the Act, as the contention that the petitioner was already working as an employee of the first respondent-Corporation was not pressed. The Industrial Court, having found against the petitioner on all points, dismissed the complaint. 5. Mr. Kochar, learned advocate for the petitioner, strongly contended that the complaint ought to have been allowed under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. The Industrial Court, having found against the petitioner on all points, dismissed the complaint. 5. Mr. Kochar, learned advocate for the petitioner, strongly contended that the complaint ought to have been allowed under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. He could not deny that the effect of the circular dated 20th February, 1984 was that all candidates were required to be sponsored by the local Employment Exchange or other agency, and in case of children of retired employees of the first respondent-Corporation, the only concession was that they could apply directly without being sponsored by the local Employment Exchange or other agency but that they must have registered with the local Employment Exchange, and they required to indicate such registration number on the applications. But Mr. Kochar contends that, since the terms of the circular was clear, and the Selection Committee had yet selected the petitioner, it was not open to the first respondent to deprive the petitioner of whatever his rights were on the ground that the first respondent had committed a mistake. He also contended that removal of the petitioner's name from the Select List was illegal and could not have been done without notice to him or hearing. He relied on the judgement of our High Court in Shri Devendra Savalaram Jade v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. 1988 I CLR 143 for the former proposition and on the judgement of the Supreme Court in S. Govindaraju v. K.S.R.T.C. and Anr. 1986 LIC. 1191. 6. In Devendra's case (supra), the petitioner had been appointed as a clerk in a purely temporary capacity and in leave vacancy. Though he was placed in the Waiting List, the Waiting List was not to be kept alive for more than one year. By mistake, his name continued thereafter in the Waiting List. When this came to notice, his service was terminated. A Division Bench of this Court took the view that, in the circumstances of the case, terminating his service, at that stage, would be unjust, since the petitioner would have lost all his chance of getting employment anywhere else, may be because of age bar or other conditions. This judgement, in my view, does not help the petitioner, as this was not a case where the employee was not entitled to be selected at all in the first place. This judgement, in my view, does not help the petitioner, as this was not a case where the employee was not entitled to be selected at all in the first place. This was a case where the employee, who fulfilled the criteria for selection, had been wrongly carried over. 7. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Govindaraju's case also will not be of assistance to the petitioner, as that was also a case where the candidate, who was properly selected because he complied with the criteria of selection, was put in the Select List prepared for appointment of a conductor as and when the future vacancy arose, His name had also been included in the Badli List of Workers, in pursuance of which he was allowed to be in continuous service for a period of more than one year. It is only at this stage that his name was removed from the Select List, and his service terminated abruptly, without giving a hearing to him or giving him any opportunity to have his say. The Supreme Court deprecated this, and held that, since the removal of the candidate's name from the Select List resulted in serious consequences such as forfeiture of his right to employment in future, it was necessary to give him a hearing before doing so. In my judgement, this authority does not help the present petitioner as this was a case where the candidate fulfilled the criteria and had been rightly selected. As the Industrial Court has rightly held, the petitioner did not fulfill the requisite criteria and he could not have been selected at all. 8. The result is that there is no infirmity in the impugned order of the Industrial Court, which calls for interference. The petition is dismissed and the Rule discharged. However, there will be no order as to costs. 9. Before parting with the judgement, I might place on record a statement made by Mr. C.J. Sawant, learned counsel for the first respondent, that, if the petitioner complies with the terms of the circular, viz., registration with the local Employment Exchange and makes an application in future, his case will be considered sympathetically.