B. N. KIRPAL J. ( 1 ) THE grievance of the petitioners is that in respect of built-up space in Nirmal Commercial Building. Bombay. the petitioners are being treated as the owners by virtue of the provisions of Section 27 (iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The contention of the petitioners is that a part of the bulding of which the petitioners are licencee, is owned by a separate juristic entity viz. , Nirmal Commercial Ltd. and that the petitioers are not the owners thereof but are merely a licencee. Because income therefrom has been taxed in the hands of the petitioners by virtue of the assessment orders which have been passed by the assessing authority at Delhi, the petitioners have chailenged the said assessment orders and have also challenged the vires of Section 27 (iii) of the Act. ( 2 ) AS regards the assessment orders, the petitioners have already filed appeals against the same. In view of the fact that the petitioners have availed of alternative remedy open to them under the Act. we do rot propose to exercise our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioners have adequate qemedy and questions of fact and law can be agitated before the appellate authorities ( 3 ) THE vires of Section 27 (iii), however, cannot be agitated before the authorities constituted under the Act. We. therefore, propose to deal with this contention in this petition. ( 4 ) IT is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner while relying upon 27 ITR (1) 1, 52 ITR (2) 524, 72 ITR 60 (3) and 86 ITR i33 (4) that a share-holder of a company does not become the owner of the property of the company. The Subcussion of the learned counsel is that a share-holder and a company are two distinct juristic entities and that if the company owned property on its own behalf, its share-holders cannot be regarded as the owners of that property which is owned by and registered in the name of the company. According to die learned counsel, Section 27 (iii) of the Act purports to set at naught the said principle because it seeks to vest ownership right of the property of the company in the share-holders. According to die learned counsel, Section 27 (iii) of the Act purports to set at naught the said principle because it seeks to vest ownership right of the property of the company in the share-holders. ( 5 ) SECTION 27 (iii), before its amendment by the Finance Act of 1987, inter alia, provided that for the purposes of Sections 22 to 26 of the Act, a member of a cooperative society to whom a building or a part thereof is allotted under the house building scheme, shall be deemed to be the owner of the building or part thereof. This provision was amended w. e. f. 1st April, 1988 and in addition to the same being applicable to cooperative societies, the said sub-section was also made applicable to campanies and other associations of persons. The provision as it now stands, provides that if a member of a cooperative society. , company or other association of persons, to whom a building belongs, is allotted a building or a part thereof under the scheme of the society, company or association, then that person is deemed to be the owner of that building or part thereof. ( 6 ) THERE is an inherent fallacy in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that such a member or shareholder is deemed to be the owner of the building in the genuine legal sense. As is evident from the provisions of Section 27 (iii) itself, such a member, as contemplated by Section 27 (iii) is deemed to be an owner only for the purposes of Sections 22 to 26 of the Income Tax Act. In other words, the legal ownership will not vest in such a person but in order to decide under what head he should be taxed. Section 27 (iii) deems such a number to be the owner. Once he is deemed to be the owner, then income from house property will be taxed under the provisions of Sections 22 to 26 of the Act. We may here note that there was a confict of judicial opinions in this reward, viz. , under what provision of the Income Tax Act can an income from house property be taxed if a member of an association of persons or a company is allotted a building but the sale deed in his name has not been registered. We may here note that there was a confict of judicial opinions in this reward, viz. , under what provision of the Income Tax Act can an income from house property be taxed if a member of an association of persons or a company is allotted a building but the sale deed in his name has not been registered. This Court in the case of Sushil Ansal Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, 160 ITR 30s (5) had come to the conclusion that an allottee of a flat in a multi-storeyed building is not the owner and, therefore, income from house property will be taxed only under the head "other sources" viz. , under Section 56 of the Act. It is quite obvious that in order to mitigate the hardships of a large number of flat and property owners who derived their right, title and interest from cooperative societies. , companies or associations of persons that an amendment was made in Section 27 (iii ). By being deemed to be the owner for the purposes of Sections 22 to 26, such member would now become entitiled to the deductions winch are available under these provisions. The tax is to be computed not under Section 56 but will be computed under Sections 22 to 26. This being so, it is wrong to contend that Section 27 (iii) vests the property of the company in the members of shareholders. ( 7 ) IN any case we do not find any case being made out for our coming to the conclusion that Section 27 (iii) is ultra vires. The Income Tax Act is replete with deeming provisions, for example if a closely held company does not declare dividend, then under certain circumstances, dividend is deemed to have been declared. Another example is where tile income of a spouse and minor children is clubbed together. These are deeming provisions which are enacted by the Parliament in exercise of its Legislative competence under List I of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. We find no Legislative infirmity in the Parliament enacting a provision like Section 27 (iii ). Such a provision is infact of assistance and help to inembers of the cooperative societies, companies and associations of persons who are allotted buildings or flats. We also do not find the said prnvision being in conflict with any of the other provisions of the Constitution. Such a provision is infact of assistance and help to inembers of the cooperative societies, companies and associations of persons who are allotted buildings or flats. We also do not find the said prnvision being in conflict with any of the other provisions of the Constitution. We cannot agree with the learned counsel for the petitioners that this provision is arbitrary. ( 8 ) IT is contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that there is no house building scheme and therefore. Section 27 (iii) does not apply. This is a contention on merits and can be agitated by the petitioner before the authorities under the Act. ( 9 ) IT is also contended that there is double taxation in this case. The submission of the learned counsel is that the company is being taxed under the Wealth Tax Act as well as Income Tax Act. It is quite evident that it is only for the purposes of Sections 22 to 26 of the Income Tax Act, the person liable to pay tax is the one provided by Section 27 (iii) ( 10 ) ANY contention with regard to interpretation of Section27 (iii) can be agitated before the appellate authorities. ( 11 ) THE petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. The interim orders are vacated.