N. Y. HAMUNANTHAPPA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the order passed by the learned single judge of this court in W. P. nos. 17263 and 7621 of 1986, dated 8-9-1987. Appellants herein were the petitioners in W. P. No. 17263 of 1986, whereas six others of kolar district were the petitioners in W. P. No. 7621 of 1986. Both the petitioners in the above two writ petitions had sought for a writ of certiorari to quash the order passed by the first respondent in order No. Rdp 143 dtr 85/bangalore, dated 26-11-1985 and corrigendum No. Rdp 143 dtr 85/bangalore, dated 26-12-1985. The learned single judge by the common order dated 8-9-1991 dismissed both the writ petitions. ( 2 ) SINCE the petitioners in W. P. No. 17263/1986 alone have preferred this appeal, for disposal of this appeal, it is sufficient if a few facts are narrated which necessitated to prefer this appeal. The case of the appellants is that it is a trust, made an application to respondent-1 for according permission to start a rural medical college in kolar taluk. The slate cabinet on 23-9-1985 resolved to grant permission to the appellants to start medical college in kolar taluk. So also granting permission to adi chunchanagiri education trust at bellur. On 7-10-1985 the said resolution was modified substituting the name of respondent-2 in its place. The subsequent resolution dated 7-10-1985 challenged by the appellant before this court in W. P. nos. 15793 and 16517 of 1985. By an order dated 30-4-1986 the modified resolution of the state government dated 7-10-1985 was quashed by this court. On 26-11-1985, when the writ petitions were pending, the state government passed an order granting 8 acres of land and panchayat RAJ training centre building in sy. No. 159 of tamaka village, kolar taluk, to the second respondent on the basis that on 29-6-1985 the chairman of the second respondent trust had requested the government to grant land to the trust for establishing a medical college. The said order of grant produced as Annexure-A is extracted hereunder and the corrigendum is at anncxure-b, which is also extracted hereunder: "proceedings of the government of karnatyka. Sub: grant of land in sy. No. 159 of tamaka village, kolar district to Sri devaraj urs education trust (regd.) For backward classes/castes, belonging to ati, mysore. The said order of grant produced as Annexure-A is extracted hereunder and the corrigendum is at anncxure-b, which is also extracted hereunder: "proceedings of the government of karnatyka. Sub: grant of land in sy. No. 159 of tamaka village, kolar district to Sri devaraj urs education trust (regd.) For backward classes/castes, belonging to ati, mysore. Order No. Rdp 143 dtr 85, Bangalore, dated 26th november, 1985. Read: 1. G. o. No. Rdc 156 dtr 80, dated 13/14-7-1982. 2. Representation dated 29-6-1985 of the chairman, Sri devaraj urs educaliona! Trust for backward classes/castes (regd.), tamaka village, kolar tq. Preamble: the chairman, Sri devaraj urs educational trust for backward classes/castes (regd.) Tamaka village, kolar taluk in his representation read at (2) above has requested for grant of 10 acres of land in sy. No. 159 of tamaka village, kolar district on lease or on a nominal rent or to sell the same on a nominal price for establishing a medical college. Ii. Brief facts of the case arising out of the requests are in the government order read at. (1) above government decided to discontinue the scheme of panchayat RAJ training centre and to transfer prtc building, tamaka along with 8 acres of land to the administrative training institute, Mysore for locating the district training institute. Remaining two acres of land were allotted to department of horticulture for development of horticultural farm. Further the director of horticulture was requested to take possession of 10 acres of land and building and then hand-over 8 acres of land and building to administrative training institute, mysore, for its use. The director of horticulture is now in possession of 10 acres of land and building except one room which is still in occupation of the Karnataka panchayal RAJ parishad, Bangalore. Order in supersession of government order read at (1) above government are pleased to accord sanction to the allotment of 8 (eight) acres of land and panchayat RAJ training centre building in sy. No. 159, tamaka village, kolar taluk, more fully described herein below to Sri devaraj urs educational trust for backward classes/castes (regd.) Tamaka village, kolar taluk on lease for a period of twenty years subject to the following conditions: a) rents payable by the trust to government are 1) at rs- 100/- (one hundred only) per acre of land per annum; ii) at Rs. 500/- (five hundred only) per month towards the existing building for the first ten years and at Rs. 3,500/- (three thousand five hundred only) per month for the next ten years; area of building:- a) plinth area - 3925 sft; b) rent area (140' x 150') - 20,000 sft. Rents are payable from the date of taking possession of land and building; c) that after the expiry of the period of lease of 20 years (twenty years) the land/and any new structure put up by the" trust shall be transferred to government at both value i. e. , capital cost minus depreciation; d) that if the trust docs not receive affiliation from the university or recognition from medical council for the medical college to start this in a period of two years from the date of this Order, the property shall revert to and vest with the government; and d) any other conditions that the government in the department of law and parliamentary affairs stipulate in the lease deed to be registered between the parties. 2. The deputy commissioner, kolar district, kolar will get a plan prepared in respect of land and building and forward 10 government a copy thereof for reference of government. Further, the deputy commissioner shall forward a draft lease deed to be entered into and regisvred between the government and the trust for scrutiny. ( 3 ) THE trust shall deposit in advance two month's rent of Rs. 6,600/- (six thousand six hundred only) and report the same to deputy commissioner, kolar. ( 4 ) THE trust shall deposit rent into government's treasury at above rates underthe head of accounl:-"144 community development 3 other receipts iii other items every month". ( 5 ) THE deputy commissioner, kolar, is authorised to hand-over possession ofland and building, to collect rents and in case of default to take action as per the rules. By order and in the name of the government of karnataka. Sd/- (m. s. basavarajaiah), under secretary to government, rural development and panch. Raj dept. Government of Karnataka No. Rdp 143 dtr 85 Karnataka government secretariat, iii stage, m. S. Building, Bangalore. Dated: 4th december, 19s5. Corrigendum: sub. :- grant of land in sy. No. 159 of tamaka village, kolar district to Sri devaraj urs educational trust (regd.) For backward classes/castes, belonging to administrative training institute, mysore. Raj dept. Government of Karnataka No. Rdp 143 dtr 85 Karnataka government secretariat, iii stage, m. S. Building, Bangalore. Dated: 4th december, 19s5. Corrigendum: sub. :- grant of land in sy. No. 159 of tamaka village, kolar district to Sri devaraj urs educational trust (regd.) For backward classes/castes, belonging to administrative training institute, mysore. Ref,:- g. O. No. Rdp 143 dtr 85, dated 26-11-1985. In the government order referred to above, for the word appearing in the third line of clause (d) of para 1 of the order portion of the government Order, the word 'within' shall be substituted. By order and in the name of the governor of karnataka. Sd/- (m. s. basavarajaiah) under secretary to government, rural development and panch. Raj dept. 3. Aggrieved by the orders of lease at annexures-a and b, these appellants and other villagers of kolar district filed writ petitions referred to earlier on the following grounds: (1) government leased the land in question including the building to the second respondent with a mala fide intention to help respondents-2 and 3; (2) the said lease was made at the instance of respondent-3 who was a minister at the time of the grant; (3) order of lease is quite arbitrary as the government leased the same against the principles of Justice and fair play; (4) the lease in question not for any public purpose but to favour respondent-3 who was a minister at that time, which is nothing but misuse of powers vielding to respondent-3; (5) the lease in question not only in violation of the Provisions of the Karnataka land revenue Act, 1964 read with land grant rules, 1969 but clear case of violation of article 14 of the Constitution of india. On these grounds, the appellants requested that the orders at annexures-a and b be quashed. 4. Respondents-1 to 3 filed their statement of objection denying the contentions raised by the appellants. On these grounds, the appellants requested that the orders at annexures-a and b be quashed. 4. Respondents-1 to 3 filed their statement of objection denying the contentions raised by the appellants. The first and foremost attack of the respondents to the allegations made by the appellants was that the writ petition has to be dismissed on the grounds delay and laches because orders at annexures-a and b were passed on 29-11-1985 whereas the writ petition was filed somewhere in the month of september, 1986; (2) challenge to the order of lease cannot be considered as appellants have no locus standi to file the petition as in respect of lease made in favour of second respondent-trust appellants were not the applicants for the said land; (3) mere applications filed seeking permission to start a medical college in kolar district not a ground to challenge the order of lease made in favour of second respondent-trust; (4) the appellants filed the writ petition not with a view to expose public cause but with a view to expose their personal grievance against the second respondent and the government; (5) the order of lease made in favour of second respondent was not with any mala fide intention, so also not yielding to the pressure of respondent-3. But the same was made after taking into consideration the need and importance to start a medical college at tamaka village of kolar taluk as its establishment would cater to the needs of the rural people of the district; (6) rejection of the appellants application for according permission to start a medical college in kolar district cannot be made a basis in the petition to challenge the order of lease made in favour of respondent-2. 5. After hearing both sides and going through the pleadings and other connected records, the learned single judge passed an order dated 8-9-1987 dismissing the petitions for the following reasons: (1) contention of the appellants that their request for according permission to start medical college was incorrectly rejected by the government has been concluded by the judgment of this court in writ petition No. 16157/1986; (2) rules 19, 21 and 27 of the land grant rules empower the authorities concerned to lease land for educational institutions. Rule 27 empowers the state government to relax the Provisions of these rules and issue directions for grant of land; (3) the authorities relied upon by the petitioners therein which dealt about correctness on the part of the government in parting with the public property have no application to the case on hand as in the instant case the land has been leased for 20 years as empowered under Rule 19 of the land grant rules, that too for an educational inslitution. In addition to this, the same land was earlier granted to the panchayat RAJ training centre. ( 6 ) THE other contentions raised by the appellants therein were unconvincing innature to the learned single judge. Hence, the learned single judge rejected the said writ petitions. ( 7 ) IN this appeal, appellants have once again attacked the order of lease, so alsothe order of the learned single judge on the grounds which urged before the learned single judge in support of their case. They also relied upon some of the decisions of this court and the Supreme Court as well. 7 (a): the appellants' grounds of attack in the appeal are: (1) the learned single judge was not right in coming to the conclusion that the appellants failed to prove they arc interested in the land granted merely because they had not filed application seeking grant of land, without noticing that they are not only persons interested in the issue relating to order of lease but they are aggrieved by the same; (2) no property belong to the government can be transferred or granted by the government without observing the mandatory requirements of K. L. R. Act, 1964 and Karnataka land grant rules, 1969, as otherwise such an act would amount to abuse of the powers conferred; (3) order of lease is a clear case of violation of article 14 of the Constitution of india; (4) the land in question has been leased to the second respondent-trust yielding to the pressure of the third respondent who was minister at that time. 7 (b): whereas, respondents submit that all these contentions were already considered by the learned single judge, as such the same now do not deserve any consideration. 7 (b): whereas, respondents submit that all these contentions were already considered by the learned single judge, as such the same now do not deserve any consideration. 7 (c): the authorities which both sides relied upon are as follows: (1) AIR 1966 SC 828 , gadde venkateswara rao v government of andltra pradesh and others; (2) AIR 1975 SC 2092 , bar council of Maharashtra v m. v. dabholkar, etc. , etc. ; (3) AIR 1976 SC 578 , jasbhai motibhai desai v roshan kumar, haji bashir ahmed and others; (4) AIR 1979 SC 1628 , ramana dayaram shetty v the international airport authority of India and others; (5) AIR 1980 SC 1992 , M/s. Kasturi lal lakshmi reddy etc. V the state of jammu and kashmir and another, (6) AIR 1981 SC 344 , fertilizer corporation kamgar union (regd.), sindri and others v union of India and others; (7) AIR 1986 SC 1158 , chenchu rani reddy and another v the government of Andhra Pradesh and others; (8) AIR 1987 SC 251 , state of m. p. and others, etc. , etc. V nandlal jaiswal and others, etc. , (9) AIR 1987 SC 1109 , Shri sachidanand pandey and another v the state of West Bengal and others; and (10) 1967 (1) mys. Lj. 301, venkataramaiah and others v state of Mysore and another. ( 8 ) IN the case of venkataramaiah v state of Mysore and others, reported in1967 (1) mys. L. j. 301, while interpreting scope of sections 36, 39, 40 and 233 of land grant - (Amendment) rules, 1960, read with rules 42 and 43-l, this court held as follows: "respondent-2's prayer for grant of land was rejected by the deputy commissioner. An appeal was presented to the divisional commissioner and he recommended to the government the grant of eight acres and thereafter the gram was made by the minister. An appeal was presented to the divisional commissioner and he recommended to the government the grant of eight acres and thereafter the gram was made by the minister. The order of the government did not refer to any relaxing the operation of any of the land grant rules, as required by Rule held: (1) before government itself could exercise the power to grant land, (delegated by Rule 42 of the land grant rules, 1960 to various authorities), the government should be of opinion that it was just and reasonable to relax the Provisions of the rules, then direct by order that such relaxation was being made subject to the conditions specified therein and it was only thereupon that the land may be granted. (2) Rule 43-l requires the government to expressly state in the order that it had formed such an opinion and that it is just and reasonable to relax the relevant rules. The requirement of Rule 43-l not having been satisfied, the grant had to be struck down. (3) the recommendation by the divisional commissioner and grant by the government did not tantamount to an order passed by the divisional commissioner in appeal. The divisional commissioner abdicated his powers and the government acted without jurisdiction. (4) the effect of sections 36 and 39 land revenue code is that even though the deputy commissioner has power to make grant of lands vested in government, the power vested is a statutory power to be exercised in conformity with the rules. Even the power of the government of making a grant under Rule 43-l is a statutory power and any exercise of the power without conforming to the Rule will not be legal. (5) when a person applies for grant of land, the whole or part of which is reserved for public use or purpose or is subject to any kind of right of an individual or group of individuals, any proceeding taken for deciding whether a grant should or should not be made, will necessarily involve a lis and the power exercisable will of a quasi-judicial nature, amenable lo writ jurisdiction. But this case was earlier to coming into force of the Karnataka land grant rules, 1969. Rules 19,21 and 27 of the land grant rules arc relevant for consideration ofthe case on hand, which reads as follows: "rule 19. Lease of lands. But this case was earlier to coming into force of the Karnataka land grant rules, 1969. Rules 19,21 and 27 of the land grant rules arc relevant for consideration ofthe case on hand, which reads as follows: "rule 19. Lease of lands. (1) the deputy commissioner may, subject to availability, lease lands to:- (a) educational institutions; (b) co-operative farming societies; (c) village panchayats and taluk development boards; and (d) any company or association for purposes of agriculture, industry, or any public utility. (2) (a) the extent of land to be leased in favour of the educational institutions such as schools, colleges, training institutions for social welfare workers and students (other than the government schools, colleges and hostels) recognised by the director of public instruction or any other authority for cultivation by the students of the institution hectares in each case. (b) the extent of land that may be leased in favour of the co-operative farming societies registered under the Karnataka Co-Operative Societies Act, 1959 (karnataka act ii of 1959) for cultivation, shall be determined by the deputy commissioner with reference to the number of members of the society on the basis of two hectares per each member of the society. (c) the extent of land that may be leased in favour of a village panchayat or a taluk development board for raising vegetable gardens and fruit trees, and farm forestry shall not exceed five hectares of wet land or ten hectares of dry land. (d) the extent of land that may be leased to any company or association for non-agricultural purposes, shall not exceed four hectares. (d-i) the extent of land that may be leased to any individual shall not together with any land already held by him exceed the limits prescribed for a sufficient holder in Rule 2 (15 ). (e) in any other case in excess of the extent specified above the proposal shall be submitted to the government for sanction. (d-i) the extent of land that may be leased to any individual shall not together with any land already held by him exceed the limits prescribed for a sufficient holder in Rule 2 (15 ). (e) in any other case in excess of the extent specified above the proposal shall be submitted to the government for sanction. (3) the period for which lands may be leased under this Rule shall not, (a) except with the previous sanction of the state government, be more than five years, in the case of an individual, company or association; and (b) be less than ten years and more than thirty years in other cases: provided that the deputy commissioner shall be competent to renew the lease after the expiry of this period for a further period of five years. (4) (a) lease of lands under sub-rule (1) for agricultural purposes shall be subject to the following conditions also:- (i) the lease shall not do anything which is destructive or permanently injurious to the land; (ii) the lessee shall not sublet or alienate the land; (iii) the land shall be cultivated personally or by the members of the respective institutions, as the case may be; (iv) the land shall not be utilised for any purpose other than that for which it is leased; (v) the lessee shall pay annually a rent not exceeding ten times the land revenue plus water rale, if any, payable in respect of such land subject to the condition that the waler rate to be taken into account while fixing the rent shall not exceed Rs. 16. 50 per acre in respect of 'a' class of lands, Rs. 11-00 per acre in respect of 'b' class of lands and Rs. 5-50 per acre in respect of c' class of lands; explanation:- for purpose of this item, 'a' class, 'b' class or 'c' class of lands shall have the meaning assigned to them in schedule i to the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (karnataka act No. 10 of 1962 ). 5-50 per acre in respect of c' class of lands; explanation:- for purpose of this item, 'a' class, 'b' class or 'c' class of lands shall have the meaning assigned to them in schedule i to the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (karnataka act No. 10 of 1962 ). (vi) the lease shall be liable to be terminated when registration of the institution is cancelled; (vii) the lessee shall at all times allow the deputy commissioner or any person authorised by him to inspect the land to satisfy himself that the conditions of the lease arc not violated; (viii) if the land or a portion of the land is required for any public purpose, the authority sanctioning the lease can resume the land after issue of three months notice to the lessee; (ix) the lease shall be liable to be terminated for contravening any of the aforesaid conditions. (b) in respect of the lands for non-agricultural purpose, the deputy commissioner shall fix the rent payable in respect of such land taking into account the locality, the purpose for which the land is utilised, etc. He may also impose such conditions as he deems necessary having regard to the circumstances of each case. (5) wherever any lease is granted under this Rule, the lessee shall execute a lease deed in form iii or iv incorporating all the terms of the lease. ""rule 21. Grant of land to religious and charitable institutions.-- notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the deputy commissioner may grant lands uplo an extent of one hectare and with the prior approval of the divisional commissioner upto an extent of two hectares and with the prior approval of the state government upto any extent, to any religious or charitable institutions for non-agricultural purposes on payment of the price to be fixed by him and subject to such other conditions as he may impose. Rule 27. Powers of the state government. Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding rules, the state government may, suo motu, or on the recommendation of the divisional commissioner or the deputy commissioner, if it is of the opinion that in the circumstances, of any case or classes of cases, it is just and reasonable to relax any of the Provisions of these rules, it may. Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding rules, the state government may, suo motu, or on the recommendation of the divisional commissioner or the deputy commissioner, if it is of the opinion that in the circumstances, of any case or classes of cases, it is just and reasonable to relax any of the Provisions of these rules, it may. By order direct such relaxation, recording the reasons for such relaxation, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the orders and thereupon lands may be granted in such a case or classes of cases in accordance with such direction. "hence, it has to be said that the said ruling has no application to the case. ( 9 ) IN the case of cadde venkateswara rao v government ofandhra Pradesh and others, reported in AIR 1966 SC 828 , while interpreting scope of article 226 and who can file such a petition, at para 8, the Supreme Court held as follows; "the first question is whether the appellant had locus standi to file a petition in the high court under article 226 of the constitution. This court in Calcutta gas co. (proprietary) ltd. V state of West Bengal, (1962) supp. 3 scr 1 at p. 6; AIR 1962 SC 1044 at p. 1047, dealing with the question of locus standi of the appellant in that case to file a petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the high court, observed: article 226 confers a very wide power on the high court to issue directions and writes of the nature mentioned therein for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by part iii or for any other purpose. It is, therefore, clear that persons other than those claiming fundamental right can also approach the court seeking a relief thereunder. The article in terms does not describe the classes of persons entitled to apply thereunder but it is implicit in the exercise of the exlraordinary jurisdiction that the relief asked for must be one to enforce a legal right. The right that can be enforced under article 226 also shall ordinarily be the personal or individual right of the petitioner himself, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo qarranto this Rule may have to be relaxed or modified. The right that can be enforced under article 226 also shall ordinarily be the personal or individual right of the petitioner himself, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo qarranto this Rule may have to be relaxed or modified. Has the appellant a right to file the petition out of which the present appeal has arisen? The appellant is the president of the panchuyat samithi of dharmajigudcm. The villagers of dharmaji gudem formed a committee with the appellant as president for the purpose of collecting contributions from the villagers for setting up the primary health centre. The said committee collected Rs. 20,000 and deposited the same with the block development officer. The appellant represented the village in all its dealings with the block development committee and the panchayat samilhi in the matter of the location of the primary health centre at dharmaji gudem. His conduct, the acquiescence on the part of the other members of the committee, and the treatment meted out to him by the authorities concerned support the inference that he was authorised to act on behalf of the committee. The appellant was, therefore, a representative of the committee which was in law the trustees of the amounts collected by it from the villagers for a public purpose. We have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that the appellant had the right to maintain the application under article 226 of the constitution. This court held in the decision cited (supra) that "ordinarily" the petitioner who seeks to file an application under article 226 of the Constitution should be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject matter of the petition. A personal right need not be in respect of a proprietary interest: it can also relate to an interest of a trustee. That apart, in exceptional cases as the expression "ordinarily" indicates, a person who has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority can file a writ even though he has no proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the subject-matter thereof. The appellant has certainly been prejudiced by the said order. The petition under article 226 of the constitution at his instance is, therefore, maintainable. The appellant has certainly been prejudiced by the said order. The petition under article 226 of the constitution at his instance is, therefore, maintainable. " from the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above case it is clear that in order to assert that a person has locus standi to file a writ petition he has to prove that (a) 'ordinarily' such a person has a personal interest or individual right in the subject-matter; (b) such a person has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority which act complained of in the writ petition. On facts it can be said that the principles laid down in the above decision have no application to the case on hand as the appellants neither proved that they are personally interested nor have a right in the subject-matter or not established they are prejudicially affected by an order of lease. ( 10 ) ANOTHER decision cited at the bar, namely, the case of jasbhai motibhai desaiv roshan kumar, haji bashir ahmed and others, reported in 1976 (1) SCC 671 , wherein it is dealt about the aggrieved person and when a rival applicant seeking a dincma licence can challenge no objection issued in favour of another person. The Supreme Court at paragraphs 39 and 50 held as follows:"to distinguish such applicants from 'strangers', among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are: whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense, that his interest, recognised by law, has, been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something? Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or in convenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or in convenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of the words "person aggrieved" is being considered, a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community? Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals?""while a procrustean approach should be avoided, as a Rule, the court should not interfere at the instance of a 'stranger' unless there are exceptional circumstances involving a grave miscarriage of Justice having an adverse impact on public interest. Assuming that the appellant is a 'stranger', and not a busybody, then also there are no exceptional circumstances in the present case which would justify the issue of a writ of certiorari at his instance. On the contrary, the result of the exercise of these discretionary powers, in his favour, will, on balance, be against public policy. It will eliminate healthy competition in this business which is so essential to raise commercial morality; it will tend to perpetuate the appellant's monopoly of cinema business in the town; and above all, it will in effect, seriously injure the fundamental rights of respondents nos. 1 and 2, which they have under article 19 (l) (g) of the constitution, to carry on trade or business subject to 'reasonable restrictions imposed by law. "the principles laid down in the said decision, on facts, can be conveniently said have no application to the case on hand. So also principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of fertilizer corporation kamgar union (regd.), sindri and others v union of India and others, reported in 1981 (1) SCC 568 which held at paras 47 and 48 as follows:"in the present case a worker, who, clearly, has an interest in the industry, brings this action regarding an alleged wrong doing by the board of management. Article 43-a of the Constitution confers, in principle, partnership status to workers in industry and we cannot, therefore, be deterred by technical considerations of corporate personality to keep out those who seek to remedy wrongs committed in the management of public sector. Locus standi and justiciability arc different issues, as I have earlier pointed out. This takes us to the question of justiciabilily of questions like sale of public property by public bodies. Certainly, it is not part of the judicial process to examine entrepreneurial activities to ferret out flaws. The court is least equipped for such oversights. Nor, indeed, is it a function of the judges in our constitutional scheme. We do not think that the internal management, business activity or institutional operation of public bodies can be subjected to inspection by the court. To do so, is incompetent and improper and, therefore, out of bounds. Nevertheless, the broad parameters of fairness in administration, bona fides in action, and the fundamental rules of reasonable management of public business, if breached, will become justiciable. ""if a citizen is no more than a wayfarer or officious inlervener without any interest or concern beyond what belongs to any one of the 660 million people of this country, the door of the court will not be ajar for him. But, if he belongs to an organisation which has special interest in the subject-matter, if he has some concern deeper than that of a busybody, he cannot be told off at the gates, although whether the issue raised by him is justiciable may still remain to be considered. I, therefore, take the view that the present petition would clearly have been permissible under article 226. "likewise, principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of bar council of Maharashtra V M. V. Dabholkar, etc. , etc. , reported in 1976 (1) scr 306 , are not applicable. I, therefore, take the view that the present petition would clearly have been permissible under article 226. "likewise, principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of bar council of Maharashtra V M. V. Dabholkar, etc. , etc. , reported in 1976 (1) scr 306 , are not applicable. ( 11 ) IN the case of ramana dayaram shetty v the international airport authorityof India and others, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628 , the Supreme Court held that where a corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the government while dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contract or otherwise, it cannot act arbitrarily by entering into relationship with any person as it likes, but its action must be in conformity with some principle which meets the lest of reason and relevance. Reiterating the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the similar manner in its earlier decisions, namely, (1) rasbihari panda v state of orissa, AIR 1969 SC 1081 ; (2) e. p. royappa v state of tamil nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 and maneka gandhi v union of india, AIR 1978 SC 597 and other decisions. The court laid stress on, that acts of state or corporation shall be reasonable and there shall be rationale behind it, and such acts shall not be arbitrary and discriminatory in nature. In the case on hand though the appellant made an attempt so as to bring the act of the government in leasing out the land in question to the second respondent-trust within the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case referred to above, but on facts it has to be said the same has no application; firstly, the appellants failed to establish how the order of lease is arbitrary or discriminatory in nature when the same has been granted keeping in mind scope of rules 19, 21 and 27 of the land grant rules, 1969, that too, for public purpose, namely, to start a medical college in rural area. Secondly, the lease in question not in perpetuity but it is only a lease for a period of 20 years on certain conditions and the main being that after completion of lease period the lessee shall vacate and hand-over the area leased and the building constructed thereon to the government. Secondly, the lease in question not in perpetuity but it is only a lease for a period of 20 years on certain conditions and the main being that after completion of lease period the lessee shall vacate and hand-over the area leased and the building constructed thereon to the government. Thirdly, as explained earlier attack to the lease not by a person interested in exposing public cause. 1 l (a): reliance of the appellants to the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of M/s. Kasturi lal lakshmi reddy v the state of jammu and kashmir and another, reported in AIR 1980 SC 1992 has to be held as inapplicable to the case on hand. ( 12 ) AGAIN reliance placed by the appellants to the decision of the Supreme Courtin the case of chenchu rami reddy and another v the government of Andhra Pradesh and others, reported in AIR 1986 SC 1158 , not helpful to the appellants as that was a case where land belonging to a charitable endowment came to be sold by the government by private negotiations instead of public auction contravening the Provisions of the act and the rules. In fact, reliance placed by the appellants to another decision of the Supreme Court decided in the case of state of m. p. and others v mondial jaiswal and others, reported in AIR 1987 SC 251 , which dealt about scope of Section 62 (2) (h) of m. p. Excise Act, 1915 and Rule 22 of the rules framed there under regarding granting of licence for manufacture and sale of country liquor and modes given for disposal. The court held the state is empowered to adopt any one of the modes explained in Rule 22 to grant of licence to establish distillery and no necessity to advertise and invite offers for putting up such industry. On the other hand, the state government is entitled to negotiate with those who come up with an offer to set up such industry. At para 23 it also discussed to entertain writ petition where it suffers from delay and laches. Such an act the Supreme Court held neither a mala fide one nor guided by any collateral consideration. On the other hand, the state government is entitled to negotiate with those who come up with an offer to set up such industry. At para 23 it also discussed to entertain writ petition where it suffers from delay and laches. Such an act the Supreme Court held neither a mala fide one nor guided by any collateral consideration. In the case on hand the lease was for a purpose to put up building to locate medical college on payment of rent, that too for a period of 20 years and to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the land with buildings etc. ; to the government after the expiry of the lease period. Further, the said lease was in conformity with rules 19, 21 and 28 of the land grant rules. Lastly, it has to be said that the appellants neither have exposed the cause of the public nor shown any one of their rights affected or abridged so as to attack the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Shri sachtdanand pandev and another v the state of West Bengal and others, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1109 , where the court held as follows: "today public spirited litigants rush lo courts lo file cases in profusion under this attractive name. They must inspire confidence in courts and among the public. They must be above suspicion. Public interest litigation has now come to slay. But one is led to think that it poses a threat to courts and public alike. Such cases arc now filed without any rhyme or reason. It is, therefore, necessary to lay down clear guidelines and to outline the correct parameters for entertainment of such petitions. If courts do not restrict the free flow of such cases in the name of public interest litigations, the traditional litigation will suffer and the courts of law instead of dispensing justice, will have to take upon them selves administrative and executive functions. This does not mean that traditional litigation should stay put. If courts do not restrict the free flow of such cases in the name of public interest litigations, the traditional litigation will suffer and the courts of law instead of dispensing justice, will have to take upon them selves administrative and executive functions. This does not mean that traditional litigation should stay put. "it is only when courts are apprised of gross violation of fundamental rights by a group of a class action or when basic human rights are invaded or when there are complaints of such acts as shock the judicial conscience that the courts, especially the Supreme Court, should leave aside procedural shackles and hear such petitions and extend its jurisdiction under all available Provisions for remedying the hardships and miseries of the needy, the under-dog and the neglected. It is necessary to have some self-imposed restraint on public interest litigants. "from the above discussion, it is clear that the appellants neither shown how they are affected by grant of lease made in favour of second respondent-trust nor shown the grant of lease in any way arbitrary and illegal. In our view, there is no good reason to interfere with the order passed by our learned brother judge murlidhcr rao. ( 13 ) HENCE, this appeal is dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .