JUDGMENT J.K. Mathur, J. - By this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the order of dismissal passed against him on 2841990. 2. The petitioner was working as driver in the office of Land Acquisition Officer, Bahraich. He alleges that the conduct of respondent no. 3 was not desirable and certain complaints were filed against him by the petitioner. A chargesheet dated 10490 was served on the petitioner containing eleven charges. In some of those charges the petitioner had cited himself as witness. The opposite party no. 3 himself started conducting enquiry. A letter was sent by the petitioner on 26490 saying that he should not conduct the enquiry and that it should be conducted by some other officer. According to the petitioner he went to opposite party no. 3 with a reply to the chargesheet on 28490 but it was not accepted. The petitioner thereupon sent the reply by post to opposite party no. 2 with copies to the District Magistrate and the Chief Revenue Officer. On 551990 the petitioner was served with an order fixed at his door dismissing him. 3. This order has been challenged firstly on the ground that opposite party no. 2 was the complainant and a witness himself and could not have acted as an inquiry officer, which he did inspite of representation made by the petitioner, that the order has been passed malafidely and arbitrarily in violation of principles of natural justice. No documents were furnished and no oral evidence was recorded. The impugned order is a nonspeaking one passed without application of mind. The inquiry report was not served on the petitioner. 4. Parties having exchanged affidavits, the petition was heard at the stage of admission finally and is being disposed of. The impugned order runs as follows: MATTER IN HINDI 5. It may also be pointed out at the very outlet that annexure 5 is a charge sheet served on the petitioner on 1041990 by the opposite party no. 3 J.P. Gupta. In this charge no. 5 relates to the absence of petitioner on 821990 on which date he was required to come for going to Lucknow but he did not and instead moved an application which was not granted. In this the opposite party no. 3 has himself cited as a witness. Similarly in charge no. 3 J.P. Gupta. In this charge no. 5 relates to the absence of petitioner on 821990 on which date he was required to come for going to Lucknow but he did not and instead moved an application which was not granted. In this the opposite party no. 3 has himself cited as a witness. Similarly in charge no. 7 relating to tools from the jeep having been stolen by the petitioner and in charge no. 8 alleging that the petitioner was used to drinking and misbehaving while being drunk, the opposite party no. 3 has cited himself as the witness without there being any other material to support these charges. 6. The main grounds on which the impugned order has been challenged is firstly that the petitioner was biased because the petitioner had complained against him and also because he himself was a witness in at least three of the charges. The second ground on which the petitioner has challenged the order is that no finding of misconduct was recorded by opposite party no. 3 and lastly it is alleged to be bad for reason that no notice was given before awarding the punishment. 7. A perusal of chargesheet, copy of which is annexure5 to the petitioner's affidavit, itself shows that it was served by opposite party no. 3 Sri J.P. Gupta and that in respect of charges mentioned at nos. 5, 7 and 8, he had mentioned that he himself was a witness for those facts. The opposite party no. 3 wanted the reply to be given to him. He did not appoint any other person as inquiry officer. Ultimately the order was also passed by him. 8. One of the grounds which vitiate any such administrative action is bias. In an inquiry if the person who conducts the inquiry is himself a witness, he is necessarily biased in favour of his own testimony and cannot objectively conduct the inquiry. He being so biased, the inquiry conducted by him is not a fair one and is not sustainable in law. 9. In the case of State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh ( AIR 1958 SC 86 ) the Deputy Superintendent of Police who conducted the inquiry was also a witness in the inquiry. This was found to be a grievous violation of principles of natural justice. As such the inquiry was found to be unacceptable. 9. In the case of State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh ( AIR 1958 SC 86 ) the Deputy Superintendent of Police who conducted the inquiry was also a witness in the inquiry. This was found to be a grievous violation of principles of natural justice. As such the inquiry was found to be unacceptable. This case has been followed in number of subsequent cases. 10. On this ground alone the inquiry conducted against the petitioner stands vitiated and the consequent order liable to be quashed. 11. The petitioner also appears to have made number of complaints against opposite party no. 3, the copies of which are contained in Annexures 1, 2 and 3. 12. In respect of first two complaints the opposite party has stated that he did not have any knowledge of these. However, knowledge of complaint annexure 3 has not been specifically denied. 13. This would be an additional factor showing bias of opposite party no. 3 against the petitioner. 14. The order passed by Opposite party no. 3 shows that the charges were delivered to the petitioner on 1141990 and he was given a fortnight's time to file a reply. Admittedly no reply was given till 2841990 on which date this order was passed. 15. According to the petitioner he had tendered the reply on 28490 but it was not accepted. 16. Even if the reply was not received by opposite party no. 3, the punishment could be inflicted upon the petitioner only when the opposite party no. 3 was satisfied about the truth of the charges levelled against the petitioner. The inquiry to be conducted under Rule 55(1) of the Civil Services Classification (Control and Appeal) Rules requires a sufficient record of evidence and statement of findings and the grounds thereto. An enquiry is essential before dismissal under Art 311(2) of the Constitution. The proceeding of an inquiry has two stages. The first is coming to a conclusion on the evidence and the second is the action taken. There is just one continuous proceeding though there are two stages in it. The first is coming to a conclusion on the evidence as to whether the charges alleged against the Government servant are established or not and the second is reached only if it is found that they are so established. That stage deals with the action to be taken against the Government servant concerned. The first is coming to a conclusion on the evidence as to whether the charges alleged against the Government servant are established or not and the second is reached only if it is found that they are so established. That stage deals with the action to be taken against the Government servant concerned. In has been so held in the case of Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1963 SC 395 (at page 397)] 17. There must be a finding about the truth of the allegations made against the delinquent officer necessarily before any action can be taken against him. This view was also taken in the case of A.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corp. of India Ltd [1984 (2) SLR 546]. 18. In the case of State of Madras v. A.R. Srinivasan [ AIR 1966 SC 1827 (at page 1832] it was held: It may be that in disciplinary proceedings taken against public servants, the technicalities of criminal law cannot be invoked, and the strict mode of proof prescribed by the Evidence Act may not be applied with equal rigour; but even in disciplinary proceedings, the charge framed against the public servant must be held to be proved before any punishment can be imposed on him. Under the aforesaid disciplinary rules, a punishment can be inflicted only for good and sufficient reasons. Unless there is a specific finding that the delinquent officer has been guilty of a specific misconduct, no punishment can be awarded. 19. In the present case, there is no finding at all in respect of any of the charges mentioned in the chargesheet. The only ground mentioned is that the petitioner having not filed an explanation, he has accepted the charges. This proposition is not tenable. If the delinquent officer has not filed a reply to charge sheet even then the principle that the punishment may be inflected only when the authority concerned is satisfied about the truth of the charges would stand. In the present case, the charge itself stated that in case the explanation was not given the proceedings would be conducted exparte. 20. The exparte proceedings are different from the regular proceeddings only to the extent that they can be conducted in absence of delinquent officer, yet there should be some material and clear findings based on them. 21. In the present case, the charge itself stated that in case the explanation was not given the proceedings would be conducted exparte. 20. The exparte proceedings are different from the regular proceeddings only to the extent that they can be conducted in absence of delinquent officer, yet there should be some material and clear findings based on them. 21. There is no material which was considered & no specific finding recorded. 22. A Court can always see the basis for the finding in exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution against such orders, as has been held in the case of Union of India v. H.C. Geol ( AIR 1964 SC 364 ). In dealing with writ petitions filed by public servants who have been dismissed or otherwise dealt with so as to attract Article 311 (2), the High Court under Article 226 has jurisdiction to interfere where the conclusion of the Government on which the impugned order of dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all. 23. This order is entirely based upon the default of the petitioner in filing his explanation. It does not rest on any evidence or material at all nor is there any specific finding that the petitioner had in fact been guilty of any of the misconducts allegations of which were contained in the charge sheet served upon him. 24. Even in an exparte inquiry the disciplinary authority is bound to confirm with essential requirements of the proceedings as contained in the aforesaid rules. As quoted above, the disciplinary authority has to record his finding with reasons and also have been evidence on record. There being no enquiry held, finding recorded, much less any ground given, the order passed by disciplinary authority is in clear violation of the basic requirements of the aforesaid rules and the Constitution. 25. Even in absence of the delinquent officer, the disciplinary authority has to satisfy himself about the truth of the allegations. It is only when he is so satisfied, that he would be able to inflict punishment. Merely a default in filing the explanation cannot itself be a reason to be visited with punishment of dismissal. 26. I, therefore, find that the order itself suffers from serious infirmity, being not based on any material at all and not containing any specific finding. Merely a default in filing the explanation cannot itself be a reason to be visited with punishment of dismissal. 26. I, therefore, find that the order itself suffers from serious infirmity, being not based on any material at all and not containing any specific finding. In view of this the consequent order of dismissal lacks any basis and is bad on that score. 27. The last point raised on behalf of the petitioner was that no notice had been given to him before the award of punishment. For this, reliance has been placed by him upon the case of Union of India v. Mohd. R. Khan reported in Judgment Today 1990(4) SC 456. 28. Before considering this case, it may be pointed out that earlier subArticle (2) of Article 311 after it was amended in 1963 provided that no person shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry and also after having been given a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed after the inquiry. This provision was deleted subsequently. 29. In this case it was held that where the disciplinary authority is not the inquiring officer, the report submitted by him has to be given to the delinquent officer before the punishment can be inflicted. He has also to be heard. This, however, would not apply where the inquiry has been conducted by the disciplinary authority itself. This decision will not, therefore, help the petitioner in the present case where the disciplinary authority himself conducted the inquiry. 30. Still another reason for not being able to get support from this case is the specific direction of the Supreme Court contained in the judgment itself that this judgment shall have only prospective application and no punishment already imposed shall be open to challenge on this ground. 31. However, in view of the fact that the disciplinary authority was manifestly biased in this case and also because it has not complied with the basic requirements of conduct of an inquiry in not considering any material and recording any findings, the consequent order of dismissal is patently (illegal) and cannot be sustained. 32. As a result, the writ petition is allowed. The order passed on 28/3041990 contained in Annexure 8 to the writ petition is hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to be reinstated and get all the wages due.