JUDGMENT - S.M. DAUD, J. :---This is a petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'. 2. Petitioner and respondents Nos. 2 to 13 were Directors of a Provisional Board of Directors appointed by the Director of Sugar with the approval of the State Government. Respondent No. 1, hereinafter referred to as 'the complainant' is a political rival of the petitioner and possibly respondents Nos. 2 to 13 also. In 1981, the petitioner and respondent Nos. 2 to 13 were elected to the Board of Directors of the Sugar factory joined as respondent No. 14 to this petition. After the 5 year term of the Board was over., elections for electing the new Board of Directors were scheduled in December 1986. On 29th October 1986, the complainant came forth with a complaint to the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Barshi in the District of Sholapur, ascribing to petitioner and respondents Nos. 2 to 13 the commission of an offence punishable under section 406 r/w. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Shortly stated, it was contended that petitioner and respondents Nos. 2 to 13 had been acting arbitrarily in the management of the factory's affairs and had been so callous and negligent in the conduct of their duties as Directors that the total loss in the year ending 1985-86 came to about Rs. 10 crores. They had been making purchase for the factory at double the market rate and this was being done to benefit themselves though in different names. Petitioner and respondent Nos. 2 to 13 had collected monies on various pretext but had not made deposits to the funds for which they were supposed to have made deductions. A sum of Rs. 55,490/- had been accumulated for the ostensible purpose of being made over to the Chief Minister's Relief Fund. The amount had not yet been made over. As a result of all these acts, the persons accused were liable to be proceeded against for the commission of an offence punishable under section 406 r/w. 34 I.P.C. After the presentation of the complaint, the 1st respondent was examined. To some extent, what is summarised above was narrated by him in his preliminary statement. The Magistrate thereafter directed the issue of process against petitioner and respondents Nos. To some extent, what is summarised above was narrated by him in his preliminary statement. The Magistrate thereafter directed the issue of process against petitioner and respondents Nos. 2 to 13 to answer the accusation of having committed criminal breach of trust punishable under section 406 r/w. 34 IPC. Immediately, the news was flashed in newspapers having some sort of circulation in the Sholapur District inclusive of Barshi. 3. In the present petition exception is taken to the issue process order on three counts. First, it is contended that the petitioner and respondents Nos. 2 to 13 were public servants within the meaning of section 197 of the Code, regard being had to sections 2(20), 78 and 161 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Act, 1960 (Act). Sanction of the Government had not been taken for the launching of the prosecution for that reason the Magistrate was not entitled to take congnizance of the offence ascribed to those named as culprits in the complaint. Secondly, the complaint was vague and did not give details of what each of the culprits was said to have done. Vague and omnibus allegations had been levelled against all those impleaded as accused persons. On the basis of such allegations, congnizance could not be taken. Lastly, the complaint was politically motivated and its timing showed that it was part of a political vendatta to prevent or make difficult the re-election of the petitioner and respondents Nos. 2 to 13. 4. To take up last contention first, I shall assume that the complainant is inspired by political motives and not to put too fine a gloss on the accusation, the object of the complaint is to somehow so defame the petitioner and respondents Nos. 2 to 13, that they would find it difficult, if not impossible, to get re-elected to the Board of Directors. The election was schedule in December 1986 and the complaint was filed in the last week of October 1986 when the election process had or was about to begin. But even so, considerations which inspired the making of a complaint are not relevant for deciding the aspect of maintainability. In other words, the motives which actuate a prosecution are not initially relevant for the purpose of deciding a quashing petition. 5. The second contention of the petitioner is equally without merit. This not to say that the complaint could not have been better drafted. In other words, the motives which actuate a prosecution are not initially relevant for the purpose of deciding a quashing petition. 5. The second contention of the petitioner is equally without merit. This not to say that the complaint could not have been better drafted. But reading paras 2 to 6 of the complaint, it is clear that what is ascribed to the accused is not pure mismanagement. The complaint recites that the accused have directed deductions and collection of monies from constituents on the pretext of these deduction being meant for different types of funds. It is then said that the amounts deducted have not been credited into the different funds for which deductions were made. A specific allegation is made in regard to deductions from the bills of constituents for being forward as a donation to the Chief Minister's Relief Fund and the amounts collected not having been so dispatched. The complainant contends that the reasons given out for the deductions were mere pretexts to accumulate monies in the hands of the Directors i.e., the petitioner and respondents Nos. 2 to 13, so that they could use it for purpose other than remittances to the various funds. The allegation of dishonesty is also to be fund in the complaint. In the face of all this, it cannot be said that the complaint lacks the relevant particulars for the issuance of an order directing the accused to show-cause against the accusations level against them. 6. The last submission I consider is of some importance and particularly because it has found favour with two learned Single Judges of this Court. Rele, J., in Criminal Revision Application No. 24 of 1980 decided on 18-12-1980 and Salve, J., in Criminal Application Nos. 360 of 1987 decided on 23-3-1988 upheld the contention that the elected members of Co-operative Societies were public servants and the condition precedent for taking cognizance of offences ascribed to them, was a sanction of the Government. Rele, J., in Criminal Revision Application No. 24 of 1980 decided on 18-12-1980 and Salve, J., in Criminal Application Nos. 360 of 1987 decided on 23-3-1988 upheld the contention that the elected members of Co-operative Societies were public servants and the condition precedent for taking cognizance of offences ascribed to them, was a sanction of the Government. With respect to the learned Judges, they appear to have over looked an important requirement of section 197 of the Code, In so far as the Act is concerned, the defining section---section 2 - in Clause (20) defines an Offer as : "a person elected or appointed by a society to any office of such society according to its bylaws; and includes a chairman, vice-chairman, president, vice-president, managing director, manager, secretary, treasurer, member of the committee and any other person elected or appointed under this Act, the rules or the by-laws, to give directions in regard to the business of such society". Section 161 to the extent relevant reads as follows :--- "..... an officer as defined in Clause (20) of section 2........ or section 78...............shall be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code". Section 78 of the Act empowers the Register to remove any member of the Committee who acts in various ways which can be said to be against the interest of the Society. Having regard to section 220 and 161 of the Act, it is clear that the petitioner and respondents Nos. 2 to 13 answer to the description of 'public servant' within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, section 197(1) of the Code is worded as under :--- "When any person who is or was ..... a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction--- (a) ...... (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the allegated offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the State Government". Therefore, it is not enough that the person sought to be prosecuted is a public servant. (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the allegated offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the State Government". Therefore, it is not enough that the person sought to be prosecuted is a public servant. The additional requirement is that he should not be removable from his offices save by or with the sanction of the Government, and , in the instant case, the State Government. Now section 78 of the Act does not require the Register to obtain the sanction of the Government for the removal of an erring officer. The Register is empowered to pass an order of removal on his own, subject of course to the conditions requisite for such removal being made out. Mr. Katkar submits that whatever be the true import of section 197 of the Code, I am bound by the view taken by Rele and Salve, JJ. With respect to the learned Judges, they appear to have over-looked the basis requirement of section 197, in that the protection given to public servants by that action, is not to public servants pre se, but such public servants who are not removable from their office save by or with the sanction of the Government. Petitioner and respondents Nos. 2 to 13 do not qualify for the protection of section 197(1) of the Code. This makes the judgments relied upon per incuriam and therefore, not binding upon me. The result of the forgoing discussion is that the application fails and the stay granted, stands vacated. Rule discharged. Rule discharged. *****