Judgment :- Mishra, J. The three defendants in C.S.No.175 of 1989 pending trial on the original side this Court have preferred these appeals against the order of Srinivasan, J. under which order their respective applications for revocation of the leave to sue granted to the plaintiff Application No.1194 of 1989 have been dismissed. 2. The plaintiff has instituted the above mentioned suit for cancellation and setting the sale agreement dated 24.2.1989 filed as suit document No.1 and for granting injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with or disturbing the plaintiffs possession of immoveable property mentioned in the schedule. The material facts as stated in the plaint presented to court are as follows: (i) the plaintiff is the wife of one P.K.Unni, a Hindu, aged 42 years permanently residing No.55, S.R.P.Nagar, Saibaba Colony, Coimba-tore-9 now temporarily staying at Madras; (ii) the first defendant-appellant in O.S.A. No.151 of 1989 is residing and carrying business at No.26-A, Sir C.P.Ramaswamy Road, Madras, within the jurisdiction of this Court; (iii) the second defendant-appellant in O.S.A. No.166 of 1989 is a resident of 1/22, Kasthuri Naickenpalayam, Vadavalli Post, Coimbatore-41; (iv) the third defendant-appellant in O.S.A.No.165 of 1989 is a business concern owned controlled by one S. Balas-ubramaniam. Its exact legal constitution is not known to plaintiff. It has got its office at No.1, Gopalapuram 2nd Street, Coimbatore. (v) Plaintiffs husband Unni lost heavily almost about Rs.50 lakhs or even more in the business of film production, although several persons owed money to the tune of lakhs to him. He was unable to recover any amount ‘due to his soft nature’. His creditors harassed him and even threatened with criminal action, especially by the 1st and defendants. The plaintiff ’ s husband and third defendant had entered into an agreement dated 8.12.1987 at Madras under which the former granted some rights over a ‘Kalaiyum Neeye Malayum Neeye’ which he produced in partnership with one Sundararajan and Poon-uraj. This agreement led to claims and counterclaims between them. The plaintiff ’ s husband and third defendant had entered into an agreement dated 8.12.1987 at Madras under which the former granted some rights over a ‘Kalaiyum Neeye Malayum Neeye’ which he produced in partnership with one Sundararajan and Poon-uraj. This agreement led to claims and counterclaims between them. In October, 1988, the plaintiffs husband issued a cash cheque in favour of the3rd defendant which for some other transaction, but when the third defendant presented the said cheque South Indian Bank Ltd., Mylapore Branch, Madras, on 28.1.1989, the same was returned unpaid, the third defendant filed a police complaint against the plaintiff ’ s husband on basis; (vi) The third defendant ’ s henchmen started creating problems at the plaintiffs house Coimbatore pelting stones, threatening and abusing the plaintiff and her son for the of the claim of the third defendant not paid by her husband. The plaintiffs husband police complaint at Coimbatore which however invoked no response. (vii) A local Police Officer at Coimbatore by name Mr.Nizzammuddin at that juncture came the plaintiffs house, threatened to arrest the entire family in the event of their not the claim of the 3rd defendant. The plaintiffs husband got anticipatory bail on 1.2.1989 2.2.1989 apprehending action by the Crime Branch, Egmore, Madras and B2 Police Station, Coimbatore, in Crl.M.P.Nos.1225 and 1226 of 1989; (viii) The first defendant also started threatening the plaintiffs husband holding him ransom on the basis of the blank papers on which the plaintiff ’ s husband had signed borrowing monies. The third defendant and the 1st defendant started acting hand in with each other. The plaintiffs husband filed I.P.No.3 of 1989 on the file of this Court and himself adjudicated as insolvent on 10.2.1989. He also obtained on 10.2.1989 an order interim protection against arrest with reference to any of his debts in Application No.63 1989 in this Court, (ix) In spite of the above orders, the third defendant’s complaint against the plaintiffs husband was somehow taken on file by B-2 police station, Coimbatore, in Crime No.327 1989. The plaintiff’s husband was arrested on 19.2.1989 at her Coimbatore house within jurisdiction of B-2 Police Station. The plaintiff’s husband was arrested on 19.2.1989 at her Coimbatore house within jurisdiction of B-2 Police Station. The plaintiff came to know of this only on 21.2.1989 she had gone to Chittlancheri to her sister-in-law’s house; (x) On 21.2.1989, the plaintiff as well as her sister-in-law were arrested by Coimbatore Police at Chittlancheri, Palghat District, Kerala, at the house of the plaintiff’s sister This arrest was effected, for, "it seems the Coimbatore Police has made a requisition Alathoor Police Station that the plaintiff and her sister-in-law here required to be them for interrogation. Hence a police officer, or may be a constable, from Alathoor had also accompanied the Coimbatore Police when the plaintiff and her sister-in apprehended at Chittlancheri". The plaintiff and her sister-in-law were first taken to a house’s farm house’ at the outskirts to Coimbatore and detained there, where presence of Police Sub Inspector Mr.Madhavan, the third defendant, another person by Prabhakaran, a local political leader, who had also accompanied the police took signatures the plaintiff on several blank papers under coercion and threats." On 21.2.1989 itself and her sister-in-law were brought to A-3 Police Station and illegally detained there evening of 23.2.1989. Her son was also under illegal detention in B-3 Police Station this period having been apprehended from Coimbatore on 21.2.1989. During this they were humiliated, threatened and nagged constantly. The third defendant with men was present. One Srinivasulu owner of Alanker Theatre, Coimbatore, had also behalf of the 3rd defendant to settle the issue. They (the plaintiff, her sister-in-law son) were warned that unless they signed proper documents conveying the plaintiffs to the third defendant, a series of serious criminal cases would be filed against them they would be in prison for the rest of their lives. (xi) In the meantime on 20.2.1989, the plaintiffs husband had been remanded to Prison, Coimbatore, and released on bail only in the afternoon of 23.2.1989. From itself he was brought straight to B-3 Police Station and from there the plaintiff, her husband, son and sister-in-law were taken to the office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police Coimbatore. The first defendant was present at the office of the Deputy Superintendent Police, Coimbatore, along with 2nd and 3rd defendants besides Prabhakaran and Srinivasulu. From itself he was brought straight to B-3 Police Station and from there the plaintiff, her husband, son and sister-in-law were taken to the office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police Coimbatore. The first defendant was present at the office of the Deputy Superintendent Police, Coimbatore, along with 2nd and 3rd defendants besides Prabhakaran and Srinivasulu. "The D.S.P. threatened and warned that unless the plaintiff and her husband agreed the house and pay off 4.25 lakhs to the 3rd defendant and Rs.3.25 lakhs to the defendant, they would not be let from.....At about midnight on 23.2.1989 stamp were brought by the 1st defendant ’ s servant and a sale agreement was got typed on the plaintiff agreed to sell her house for Rs.9 lakhs to the 1st and 2nd defendants and received on that day Rs.7,50,000 as advance in cash from them and handed over possession of the property to them." 3. Asserting the facts as noted above, the plaintiff has alleged that the said amount Rs.7,50,000 was never paid, "instead the 1st and 2nd defendants gave cash receipts plaintiff ’ s husband for Rs.3,25,000 and Rs.4,25,000 respectively in full discharge of claims against the plaintiff ’ s husband". The suit was filed on the original side of this with a petition for leave to sue pleading inter alia that one of the defendants (defendant No.1) resided and carried on business within the jurisdiction of this Court, but since 12 of the Letters Patent did not expressly provide for a case where there are more than defendants, Sec.20, C.P.C. alone would apply and that even otherwise a substantial cause of action as alleged in the plaint arose within the jurisdiction of this Court. The also alleged that claims and counter-claims arose in pursuance of the agreement the third defendant and her husband and in settlement and discharge of which document was purported to have been executed at Coimbatore and that the said agreement came to be executed at Madras and that the cheque for Rs.2 lakhs was given at which cheque had been presented by the 3rd defendant for encashment to South Bank Ltd., Mylapore, Madras, followed by her husband applying and being declared insolvent on 10.2.1989 in I.P.No.13 of 1989 by this Court. This Court granted leave according defendants were put on notice of the lodgment of the suit. This Court granted leave according defendants were put on notice of the lodgment of the suit. They applied revocation of the leave to sue contending (i) No part of the cause of action arose within jurisdiction of this Court; and (ii) Sec.20 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable suit instituted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent of this Court. They also alternatively contended that the suit was one for land situated in Coimbatore and consequently this could not entertain this suit. 4. The learned single Judge answered the three contentions holding, (i) one of the on which the agreement dated 24.2.1989 is attacked is that the object thereof is the law of insolvency and therefore it is illegal and unenforceable and hence the of the plaintiff’s husband is a fact which if traversed it will be necessary to be proved plaintiff in order to entitle the plaintiff to a judgment of this Court. Therefore, undoubtedly a part of the cause of action. (ii) The question as to whether on principle Sec.20 of the Code of Civil Procedure read in Clause 12 of the Letters Patent of this Court or independent of it, and a suit maintainable before this Court if one of the defendants, if there are more then residing within the jurisdiction of this Court, is of considerable importance which should be examined at the stage of deciding the question as to whether to grant the leave revoke the leave granted, (iii) It is not a suit for land situated in Coimbatore and consequently the contention suit is not maintainable is not acceptable. 5. 5. The civil jurisdiction of this Court having its local limits as described in Clause amended Letters Patent, by the Madras High Court (Jurisdictional Limits) Amendment 1927 has got jurisdiction as to suit as ordained in Clause 22 of the Letters Patent "to try and determine suits of every description, if, in the case of suits for land immovable property, such land or properly shall be situated, or, in all other cases, cause of action shall have arisen either wholly or, in case the leave of the Court shall been first obtained, in part, within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction said High Court; or if the defendant at the time of the commencement of the suit shall dwell or on business or personally work for gain, within such limits.....The words in this clause Letters Patent do not appear to incorporate a provision like one to be found in Sec.20(b) the Code of Civil Procedure. Sec.16 of the Code of Civil Procedure provided that ordinarily suits have to be instituted in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction property is situate. The other provisions in the Code however specify for the suits immoveable property situate within the jurisdiction of different courts, place of institution suit where local limits of jurisdiction of courts are uncertain, suits of compensation wrongs to person or movables and other suits to be instituted where defendants reside cause of action arises; the last being a prescription in Sec.20 of the Code having Clause above-mentioned which runs as follows: "Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction. (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the court is given, the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business or personally work for gain, aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. "The chartered High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay besides this Court are having the original juris-diction as found in Clause 12 of Letters Patent. "The chartered High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay besides this Court are having the original juris-diction as found in Clause 12 of Letters Patent. They have to find before a suit is entertained on original side that it satisfied the requirements of the land or other immovable property, in the case of suit for land other immovable property that the land or other immovable property is situated within local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the court, and in all other cases whether the cause of action wholly arises within the local limits of extraordinary original jurisdiction, or in case the leave of the court is asked for, whether the cause of action arises in within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the court of not. Besides this, there would be no difficulty in entertaining a suit under Clause 12, if the defendant at time of commencement of the suit, dwelt or carried on business or personally worked gain within the ordinary original jurisdiction of this Court. The court ’ s special jurisdiction under its Letters Patent has been left free from some of the provisions of the Code of Procedure, including Secs.16, 17 and 20, by Sec 120 thereof, for the Letters Patent has only fixed a territorial jurisdiction, but has in Clause 12 declared that in the case of suits land or other immoveable property, such land or property should be found within territorial jurisdiction and in all other cases if the cause of action is found either wholly or part arising within the jurisdiction of the court or the defendant is found at the time commencement of the suit dwelling or carrying on business or personally working for gain within such territory. We do not have much guidance from the precedents of this Court the matter that we have to resolve in this case. We do not have much guidance from the precedents of this Court the matter that we have to resolve in this case. If there is one defendant in a suit and resides within the local limits of the jurisdiction of this Court, the suit would be maintainable and if there are more than one defendant in the suit and all of them are found residing within the local limits of the jurisdiction of this Court, the suit would still be maintainable; but in a case where there are more than one defendant in the suit, but only one or some them are found residing within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court and another some of them are not found residing within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court, the suit maintainable or not and whether in such a case the leave would be granted or and if granted it could be revoked for the defect of jurisdiction or not, ‘ Srinivasan, J. referred to a Bench judgment of this Court reported in P.M.Parameswara Pattar v. Vivathan Mahadevi, A.I.R. 1923 Mad. 272: 1922 M. W.N. 841, in which a broad reference has been made to what may be found in the four corners of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent of Court. One of the Judges constituting the Division Bench has observed: "It is urged that, some of the defendants are within the jurisdiction, this Court has right to bring before it this suit defendants not within jurisdiction. This is a right which, under Sec.20 of the C.P.C., is possessed by courts in the mofussil. The application of Sec.20 to this Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction expressly excluded by Sec.120, C.P.C. and, if we have the power, it must be found within four corners of Sec.12 of the Amended Letters Patent. The words are ‘or if the defendant the time of the commencement of the suit shall dwell or carry on business within such The principal defendant does not dwell here. The section does not say. "if the defendant, there are more than one defendant any of them, shall dwell or carry on business within limits ’ , and, in my view I cannot read the provisions of the amended Letters Patent conferring jurisdiction upon this Court in case where one or more of the several defendants reside within jurisdiction. The section does not say. "if the defendant, there are more than one defendant any of them, shall dwell or carry on business within limits ’ , and, in my view I cannot read the provisions of the amended Letters Patent conferring jurisdiction upon this Court in case where one or more of the several defendants reside within jurisdiction. The point is free from authority except the case in Hajee Hajee Hubbeeh v. Hajee Mohammed Judhee JoosubRehima Bye v. Hadjee Mohamed Joosub, 13 Beng. L.R. 91, which I read as affirming the view I am now expressing, it has been read by a learned author Mr.Broughton as giving the High Courts power leave to sue in such cases. However in the view I have expressed in this case, namely, on balance of convenience this case should be brought in Malabar and not here, that too does not directly arise for decision." The other learned Judge when confronted with this, has answered by saying "as question whether we should give leave to bring the whole action in this Court merely most of the defendants reside here while the 5th defendant does not, the bearing interpretation of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent on this point is a matter of some and I consider that it would be better not to say more on a point which is not necessary the decision of the case, since I hold that, even if the court has the power, we should this case exercise it or give leave to the plaintiff to sue." In the Division Bench thus learned Judges found that this question had not been directly arisen for decision although one of the learned Judges entered into the question and gave some a newer, other learned Judges clearly said that interpretation of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent point was a matter of some difficulty and it would be better not to say more on a point was not necessary for the decision of the case. The observations as above have rendered said judgment on this point on obiter dicta and is thus not a binding authority. The observations as above have rendered said judgment on this point on obiter dicta and is thus not a binding authority. A single Judge of the Calcutta High Court, however, has in a case reported in Bengal Corporation v. Corporation of Calcutta, A.I.R. 1960 Cal 123, one into this question noticed the argument for and against the two possible view, one in favour of the jurisdiction and the other against it. Incidentally Clause 12 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta Court is similarly worded as Clause 12 of this Court, and the contentions raises before the question as to what meaning we should give to the word ‘defendant’ are similar contentions before the learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court, Mallick., has noted contentions and started as follows: "It is contended by Mr.Das that even if the instant suit cannot be treated for the purpose jurisdiction as a suit for land and must be treated as ‘other suit’, this Court jurisdiction entertain it, because, out of two defendants, one is within and one is jurisdiction. It has been conceded by Mr.Roy that so far as the State of West concerned, according to the present state of authorities, it must be held by this Court the Government does not carry on business within jurisdiction and on that footing submitted to the dismissal of the suit as against the State. Mr.Das’s argument is jurisdiction is to be invoked on the ground that the defendant resides or carries on within jurisdiction and there are more defendant within jurisdiction. Of the defendants, there is one who resides or carries on business or personally works for gain jurisdiction, then the Court under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent is not competent entertains the suit and the suit is liable to be dismissed, not merely against the defendant but also against the defendant who resides or carries on business jurisdiction..... In Mr.Das’ submission ‘defendant’ in this clause means all the defendants where there more than one defendant. It is not sufficient that one of the defendants dwells or carries business within jurisdiction. In Mr.Das’ submission ‘defendant’ in this clause means all the defendants where there more than one defendant. It is not sufficient that one of the defendants dwells or carries business within jurisdiction. It is submitted that the language used in Clause 12 is significant, namely ‘at the time of the commencement of the suit’ and also ‘receive, try and determine suits’ so that if there are more defendants than one when the suit is filed and one of them is outside jurisdiction, the Court is not empowered only to try and determine it but also to receive it. It follows that if at the date presentation of the plaint the court had no jurisdiction to receive, try and determine because of one of the defendants not residing or carrying on business or personally for gain within jurisdiction, then this initial defect cannot be cured by abandoning against such outside defendant. Mr.Das relies on the case of Hajee Ismail Mohammed, 13 Beg.L.R. 91, in support of his argument that the defendant in Clause means all the defendants if there are more than one. Mr.Das emphasised that decision of this Court is held as authoritative even now and has been invariably followed all Courts and has never been dissented from. Mr.Das has also relied on the decision J. in the case of A.I.R 1942 Cal. 496, and noticed before in support of his argument important question to consider as to whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain is-was the suit as framed entertainable when the suit was filed? On the strength authority, Mr.Das argued that if the court was not competent to entertain the suit by of the fact that one of the defendants was outside jurisdiction at the time when the suit filed or that there are paragraphs in the plaint or reliefs claimed in the plaint when originally filed which make it a suit for land and the land is outside jurisdiction, then the court be clothed with jurisdiction by removing the offending defendant or the offending paragraph and prayers in the plaint. This is not permissible, because in determining whether the has jurisdiction, the point of time to be taken into consideration is the time of the institution of the suit and not the time when the suit is being heard. This is not permissible, because in determining whether the has jurisdiction, the point of time to be taken into consideration is the time of the institution of the suit and not the time when the suit is being heard. The language used in Clause that the Court is empowered ‘to receive, try and determine the suit’ and the word used in Clause 12 of the Letters Patent cannot be ignored. So also the words are that date of the commencement of the suit the defendants reside or carry on business jurisdiction’. It seems to me that the proposition submitted by Mr.Das for acceptance broadly stated. On a correct construction of Clause 12 of the Letter Patent, not all which there are more than one defendant, not all of them being within jurisdiction, are to be dismissed as against all including those who reside or carry on business jurisdiction. Again it is not correct to say that in a case in which the plaintiff abandons claim either wholly or in part against some of the defendants, for determining the nature the suit and the jurisdiction of the court, the court is to look at the plaint as originally and not as it stands after the claim has been abandoned as against some of the defendants wholly or in part. Neither reason nor authority warrants such a proposition. If the suit single cause of action and there are more defendants than one, then all the defendants necessary parties, having regard to the nature of the claim and th reliefs sought, then defendants must be within jurisdiction in order that the court can entertain such a suit the court can entertain such a suit. In such a suit the court cannot pass against one and dismiss the suit as against the other. The liability being joint, decree must be against both or against none. This is Hajee’s case, 13 Beng.L.R. 91, by Mr.Das There was a single cause of action and joint liability and all the defendants necessary parties. The court held that all the defendants must be within jurisdiction that the court may ‘receive, try and determine’ the suit. It does not follow that if the action is joint and several or if there are different causes of action against defendants, the same rule would apply as in Haji’s case, 13 Beng.L.R. 91. The court held that all the defendants must be within jurisdiction that the court may ‘receive, try and determine’ the suit. It does not follow that if the action is joint and several or if there are different causes of action against defendants, the same rule would apply as in Haji’s case, 13 Beng.L.R. 91. In such liabilities against different defendants being different, the suit must be treated as suits rolled into one an if the suit fails as against one for lack of jurisdiction, there reason why the suit against the others should also fall, even though the court is fully with jurisdiction to try the suit as against the other defendants. Mr.Subimal Roy strongly relied on the case of Gokuldas v. Chaganlal decided by the Appeal reported in A.I.R. 1928 CaL 887. In this suit the plaintiff instituted a suit against defendant for damages for wrongful conversion of a house at Punjab in which the had a share. All the defendants except one were outside jurisdiction. The suit was dis-missed in the trial court on the ground jurisdiction. The plaintiff in the Appeal Court abandoned his case against all defendants and wanted to proceed against the only defendant who resided or carried business within jurisdiction. It was submitted on the authority of Hajee’s case, 13 Beng.L.R. 91, that all the defendants not being within the jurisdiction of the court, the Court jurisdiction and the suit must be dismissed against all including the defendants who within jurisdiction. This submission was overruled. Buckland, J. pointed out in the paragraph of his judgment the difference between Haji’s score and the case consideration in the following terms. [p.889]: “suit against several defendants all of whom are necessary for the determination questions which have to be decided in the suit must be distinguished from suit several defendants in which all the defendant are not necessary for the purpose of giving plaintiff the relief which he prays and against any one or more of whom it is open plaintiff at his option to proceed. The case of Hajee’s case, 13 Beng. L.R. 91, was a the former description.” Overruling the decision of Page, J. who dismissed the suit on the ground of jurisdiction. The case of Hajee’s case, 13 Beng. L.R. 91, was a the former description.” Overruling the decision of Page, J. who dismissed the suit on the ground of jurisdiction. Lordship observed at p.890, “But, on the question of law, treating this suit as a suit for damages for conversion the plaintiffs have proceeded eventually exclusively against one of the tort-feasors, opinion that the judgment of the learned Judge cannot be sustained and the appeal allowed and the suit sent back for trial, as my learned brother has directed. This decision negatives both the propositions contended by Mr.Das, namely, (i) that jurisdiction of the court is invoked on the ground of residence or place of business, defendants must have residence of place of business within the jurisdiction of this Court (2) that by abandoning the claim against some efendants, the initial defect of the suit jurisdiction cannot be cured.” 6. Before appreciating the reason of Mallick, J.’s observations as above, we may note the contentions noted by him had arisen in a suit in which certain defendants were joint tort-feasors having done wrong to the plaintiffs right to property. It was stated their liability was joint as well as several. The court had permitted abandonment against other defendants, but allowed the suit to proceed against the Corporation of one of the defendants. Thus, going by the judgment in the case of Hadjee Ismail v. Mohamed, 13 Beng.L.R. 91, if there are more than one defendant and not all of them or carry on business within jurisdiction, the court will have to see whether the cause of is only joint or is also several and if it is only joint then to refuse to entertain the suit. perhaps bearing this in mind that in the case of Parameswara Pattar, 1922 M.W.N. view was expressed that this Court may not have the right to bring before it defendants are not within jurisdiction, and allow the suit against such a defendant to proceed. 7. Srinivasan, J. has taken notice on the commentary on the C.P.C. (Act X of 1877) Broughton in which it is stated: “The word ‘defendant’ includes the plural. 7. Srinivasan, J. has taken notice on the commentary on the C.P.C. (Act X of 1877) Broughton in which it is stated: “The word ‘defendant’ includes the plural. So that if one defendant dwells within jurisdiction and another does not, the suit cannot be maintained under that jurisdiction without an order of Court.” After referring Hadjee Ismail Hadjee Hubseeb’s case, 13 Beng.L.R. 91, the commentary proceeds: “This order may now be made either under this clause or under Sec.17 of the Code; defendant who wells within the jurisdiction consents, no order is necessary.” The Judge has commented: “No doubt, the applicability of Sec.17 of the Code has now excluded by Sec.120 of the present Code. The reference to the case in Hadjee Ismail Hubseeb’s case, 13 Beng.L.R. 91 is certainly erroneous. It was now decided in that case if one of the defendants resides or carries on business within the jurisdiction, then suit not be instituted with the leave of the Court. In fact, a contrary view was taken Division Bench of the Bengal High Court. ”As laid down in Secretary of State v. Colarai Pali-ram, A.I.R. 1932 Cal. 146, questions difficulty and importance should not be dealt with by an application to revoke the leave Clause 12 Letters Patent and to take the plaint off the file and the proper course cases is to dismiss the application and to direct that the case do proceed on all points in the usual way hence I am leaving open that question to be decided, if raised by the parties. In the itself." 8. We would have preferred this course and accordingly opined that since this question free from difficulty, the parties may raise it in the trial and if necessary invite a judgment this question besides other questions on merits. We shall fail however in meeting challenge to the jurisdiction of this Court on this account, if we do not at this stage examine how residence and or carrying on business etc. of a defendant or defendants if there more than one, within the jurisdiction of this Court, should be viewed for the purposes cause of action. In what sense the words ‘case of action’ are used in clause of the Letters Patent? of a defendant or defendants if there more than one, within the jurisdiction of this Court, should be viewed for the purposes cause of action. In what sense the words ‘case of action’ are used in clause of the Letters Patent? Learned counsel for the appellant has brought to our notice various definitions term ‘case of action’ and contended that it is used in different senses depending upon subject to which it is applied or the object which it is to sub-serve. According to him, it technical and primary definition, although in practice it has also acquired a much secondary and colloquial meaning. Generally accepted meaning however in a factual sense, the fact or facts which give raise to or entitle a party to sustain an action or as referring the pleading and proof, the facts alleged, or necessary to be alleged and proved to sustain the action. It is however always the whole or bundle of the facts and not the one or two the exclusion of other facts which go and stand together. In this behalf, he has drawn attention to a judgment of the Bombay High Court in Naroda Oil Cakes Traders Purshottam, A.I.R. 1954 Bom. 491. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has referred to the observations of the Courts in England to point out that case of action been held from the earliest time to mean every fact which is material to be proved to the plaintiff to succeed and every fact which the defendant has a right to traverse and state the law as follows: "It is however, important to bear in mind that the bunch of facts which constitute the or actions in a civil suit does not and is not intended to comprise every fact which may proved to evidence. It is only material facts which must be proved by the plaintiff before debtor a decree that constitute the cause of action. Facts which the plaintiff may incidentally and facts which may be brought in evidence as res gestae would not necessarily constitute a part of the cause of action. It is only material facts which must be proved by the plaintiff before debtor a decree that constitute the cause of action. Facts which the plaintiff may incidentally and facts which may be brought in evidence as res gestae would not necessarily constitute a part of the cause of action. The distinction between facts which are relevant material and those that are incidental and immaterial is sometimes not easy to be drawn, the said distinction is nevertheless important for the purpose of deciding which constitute the cause of action and which are not included in it." A Full Bench of this Court in In re. Lakshmi-narayana Chettiar, (1954)1 M.L.J. 403 , defined cause of action as a fact which if traversed would be necessary for the plaintiff prove in order to entitle him to the judgment of the Court. The Supreme Court in India case of State of Rajasthan v. M/s. Swaika Properties, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 12S9, has defined cause of action to mean every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court, and added in other it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right relief against the defendant. 9. There can be hardly any dispute to such a wise approach to understand the expression ‘cause of action’ and we see no reason to deviate. The facts relevant to decide as to what the instant case constituted the cause of action have already been stated by us. According the plaintiff, the first defendant who resided in Madras had been insisting for payment certain amount of money allegedly advanced by him to her husband. The third defendant transacted some business in the city of Madras with her husband and had entered into agreement on 8.12.1987 at Madras with him under which agreement the latter had granted to him some right in the movie ‘Kalaiyum Neeye Malayum Neeye’ which he has produced partnership with one R.Sundararajan and R.Ponnuran. This agreement had given rise certain claims and counter claims between the 3rd defendant and the plaintiffs husband. plaintiffs husband has issued a cash cheque in October, 1988, in favour of the 3rd defendant at Madras for some transaction. The 3rd defendant presented the said cheque to Indian Bank Ltd., Mylapore Branch, Madras, on 28.1.1989. This agreement had given rise certain claims and counter claims between the 3rd defendant and the plaintiffs husband. plaintiffs husband has issued a cash cheque in October, 1988, in favour of the 3rd defendant at Madras for some transaction. The 3rd defendant presented the said cheque to Indian Bank Ltd., Mylapore Branch, Madras, on 28.1.1989. The same however was returned. He then lodged a complaint before the police against the husband of the plaintiff. Then followed the acts of putting pressure upto the plaintiff ’ s husband, the plaintiff, her law and her son in which certain policemen also got involved. Since the initial contract been at Madras, cash cheque had been issued at Madras and presented at Mylapore of the South Indian Bank at Madras, one can think that all subsequent action have place in the city of Madras. It was however not so. The scene shifted to Coimbatore State of Tamil Nadu and to Chittlancheri in the state of Kerala. After this, the last performed at Coimbatore in which, according to the plaintiff at the office of a Superintendent of Police, the first, second and third defendants along with some persons threatened and warned her, her husband, her son and her sister-in-law Dy.S.P. stated that unless the plaintiff, and her husband agreed to sell the house and Rs.4.25 lakhs to the 3rd defendant and Rs.3.25 lakhs to the first defendant they be let free. Stamp papers wee brought by the first defendant ’ s servant and a sale was got typed on them as if the plaintiff agreed to sell her house for Rs.9 lakhs to and 2nd defendants and had received on that day Rs.7.50 lakhs as advance in cash them and had handed over possession of the property to them. What followed however gives credence to the case of the plaintiff, if it is true and is established in trial, that it was with respect to the transaction in Madras in which her husband and defendant were involved and that in the sale agreement an amount of Rs.4.25 lakhs introduced besides Rs.3.25 lakhs which was the claim of the first defendant, to make advance amount of money to Rs.7.5 lakhs which was the amount shown to have in advance to the plaintiff in the impugned document. No cash money, according plaintiff, was paid to her by the 1st and 2nd defendants towards any advance transfer of the house property. On that very day, the 1st and 3rd defendants gave receipts to the plaintiff’s husband for Rs.3.25 lakhs and Rs.4.25 lakhs respectively, discharge of their claims against him. The name of the 2nd defendant although mention in the agreement, he thus stood as a nominee or in place of the 3rd Both the 1st and 2nd defendants joined as intending purchasers who obtained delivery possession of the suit property because they had their separate claim to be realised plaintiff’s husband. What is then the cause of action? The alleged impugned dated 21.2.1989 or the alleged demand of defendants 1 and 3 for which they intended proceed against the plaintiff’s husband. But when they found that he had already adjudicated as an insolvent and it was not legal to proceed against the plaintiff ’ s they resorted to all sort of creative activities finally obtaining a document of agreement sale in the names of 1st and 2nd defendants at Coimbatore. This is what the plaintiff alleged. Thus the plaintiff without traversing these facts will not be able to get any on the validity of the agreement of sale. This undoubtedly is a matter in issue in the one of the material facts to be decided, because for any order declaring that agreement void it will be difficult to ignore this part of the case for deciding the main contention plaintiff. 10. Viewed in this perspective the cause of action for the present suit can easily be the demands of the 3rd defendant which have to be traced to the agreement 8.12.1987 between him and the husband of the plaintiff at Madras and subsequent transactions between the plaintiffs husband and the 3rd defendant at Madras leading having been adjudicated insolvent. 11. Defendant No.1 who has been residing and carrying on business in the city of cannot say that there is no cause of action to the plaintiff to sue him in this Court. So he is concerned, his residence and carrying on business in Madras is conclusive. 11. Defendant No.1 who has been residing and carrying on business in the city of cannot say that there is no cause of action to the plaintiff to sue him in this Court. So he is concerned, his residence and carrying on business in Madras is conclusive. residence and cause of action are inseparable in this case, since the cause of action the 1st and 3rd defendants as well as the 2nd defendants, who, it appears, did not anywhere until he suddenly found a place in the impugned agreement, together stand For such inseparable cause of action, it is fair, as the learned single Judge has held, that institution of a suit against the 2nd defendant also in this Court with the leave Court is not vitiated. 12. We find ourself thus of the view that it shall always be in relation to the subject of the dispute that the court will decide whether to nonsuit the plaintiff for the reason one or some of the defendants are residing or carrying on business within the jurisdiction this Court, but some are not and if cause of action is found common to all of them by residence of one or some of the defendants or otherwise, it would be enough to hold that since cause of action if not wholly but in part has arisen within the jurisdiction the court the suit is maintainable. 13. Independent of this aspect of the residence and or dwelling or doing business within the jurisdiction of the court of one or some of the defendants, this is a case, in our view, which the learned single Judge has committed no error, for, even if we forget about the residence or business of the 1st defendant in the city of Madras, there are compelling substantial materials on record to conclude that if not whole, part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. We have already found that without traversing the facts leading to the transactions in the city of Madras between the plaintiffs husband and the 3rd defendant, it will not be possible to find the real nature of the transaction at the time of the execution of the impugned agreement. 14. The other finding recorded by the learned single Judge that this is not a suit for land has not been challenged before us. 14. The other finding recorded by the learned single Judge that this is not a suit for land has not been challenged before us. We find no merit in these appeals. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. No costs. Appeals dismissed.