JUDGMENT S. B. Sinha, J. This application is directed against the order dated 31.10.1990 issued by respondent no.4 and as contained in Annexure-3 to the writ application whereby and where under the petitioner has been Bihar State Elect. Board directed to deposit additional security amount of Rs. 2,09,550/-. 2. The basic facts of the case are not in dispute. 3. The petitioner is a consumer of electrical energy. It for the purpose of consumption of electrical energy in its factory exccuted an agreement in 1974 for supply of 373.2 KVA. It appears that the petitioner deposited the initial security money amounting to Rs. 28000/-while entering into the aforementioned agreement. Later on, the petitioner applied for reduction of the load, which was agreed upon by the Board and it was reduced to 286 KVA. 4. Admittedly high tension electrical energy is supplied to the petitioner - factory directly from a Transformer. For the purpose of recording the consumption of electrical energy, a meter as well as a Maximum Demand Indicator has been installed in the premises of the petitioner. In the month of November, 1989 the Maximum Demand Indicator had shown the consumption of energy by the petitioner to the extent of 369 KVA. Respondent- Board therefore issued a bill to the petitioner on the basis of 369 KVA as recorded in the Maximum Demand Indicator. The petitioner objected to the correctness of the said reading. 5. It is now accepted in the counter affidavit that the Maximum Demand Indicator was found to he wrong being fast by 9.9%. However, as noticed hereinbefore, the petitioner was served with a bill on the basis of 369 KVA. 6. By a letter dated 30th of March, 1990 as contained in Annexure-2 to the writ application, the petitioner was directed to deposit further security amount of Rs. 70,400/-. The petitioner was also directed to execute a supplementary agreement for the additional load of 83 KVA raising the contract demand from 286 KVA to 369 KVA. 6. By a letter dated 30th of March, 1990 as contained in Annexure-2 to the writ application, the petitioner was directed to deposit further security amount of Rs. 70,400/-. The petitioner was also directed to execute a supplementary agreement for the additional load of 83 KVA raising the contract demand from 286 KVA to 369 KVA. By reason of the impugned order dated 31.10.1990, the petitioner was reminded by Bihar State Electricity Board about thcir earlier letters dated 10.2.1990 and 31.3.90 and it was contended that as the actual load was 369 KVA which being more than 10% of the contract demand, the petitioner was again requested to execute a supplementary agreement upon depositing necessary security amount,' details whereof has been given herein which reads as follows : 7. Mr. R. K. Marathia, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has principally raised two contentions in support of this application. Learned counsel firstly submitted that the matter relating to the validity of the imposition of additional security is pending consideration before the Supreme Court of India and the order of the Supreme Court of India dated 13th August, 1987 has been annexed to the writ application and marked as Annexure-6. 8. Learned counsel further submitted that additional security could only be demanded in terms of clause 15.3(c) of the Tariff framed by the Board in exercise of its power conferred upon it under section 46 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. According to the learned counsel, in terms of clause 15 of the aforementioned Tariff, an additional security should be demanded only when one or the other conditions mentioned in clause 15.3(c) of the Tariff is fulfilled. 9. Mr. B.S. Lal learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Board, on the other hand submitted that there is nothing to show as to on what basis the additional security was demanded in the case which is pending before the Supreme Court of India and an interim order has been passed which is contained In Annexure-6 to the writ application. 10. 9. Mr. B.S. Lal learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Board, on the other hand submitted that there is nothing to show as to on what basis the additional security was demanded in the case which is pending before the Supreme Court of India and an interim order has been passed which is contained In Annexure-6 to the writ application. 10. Learned counsel submitted that in this case in view of clause 16.5 of the Tariff, the petitioner is bound to enter il1to a fresh agreement for supply of electrical energy to the extent of 369 KVA and in that view of the matter further security demanded from the petitioner is not by way of additional security, but, in fact, by way of initial security which is covered under Tariff no. 15.3 (b) (iii) thereof. 11. According to the learned counsel, from the Tariff itself it would appear that in the matter of high tension electrical energy, the electricity is supplied directly from the Transformer and for the purpose of calculation of the security amount to be deposited by a consumer, base charges of 1752 units per KVA per year is calculated for the purpose of annual minimum guarantee charges and 25% of such annual minimum guarantee charges is to be deposited 'by a consumer by way of security. 12. Learned counsel further submitted that from a perusal of clause 15.3 (b) (iii), it would be evident that minimum base charges is considered for the purpose of calculation of the amount of security. 13. Mr. R. K. Marathia learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in reply submitted that clause 16.5 of the Tariff has no application in the facts and circumstances of this case, inasmuch as the same provides for payment of a surcharge in the event the consumer exceeds the consumption of electrical energy more than 110% of the contract demand as recorded by the Maximum Demand Indicator. Learned counsel submitted that from a perusal of Tariff it would appear that the bill has to be raised either on the basis of 75% of the contract demand or the drawal of power as indicated by the Maximum Demand Indicator. Learned counsel submitted that from a perusal of Tariff it would appear that the bill has to be raised either on the basis of 75% of the contract demand or the drawal of power as indicated by the Maximum Demand Indicator. Learned counsel submitted that in view of the fact that clause 16.5 refers to a contract demand for a particular year, the same cannot be extended for the purpose of considering the amount of security which is required to be deposited by a consumer. 14. In the agreement entered into by a consumer and the respondent - Board, the provision for security has been made so as to enable the supplier to take resort to the security amount in the event a default in the payment of electrical charges is made by the consumer. 15. Thus depending upon various factors including the change in tariff, change in contract demand and several such factors, extra security may be demanded. 16. Clause 15.3 and. clause 16.5 of the Tariff read as follows : Security deposits. (a) This is a deposit due from the consumer In the Board in respect of supply of energy on credit to be supplied towards the payment or satisfactiol1 of any money payable by him. (b) The amount of initial security deposit to be paid before commencement of supply shall cover three months estimated consumption subject to the following minimum : i. For domestic, commercial and street light service - Rs. 50/- per connection. ii. For irrigation and agricultural service- Rs. 50/- per HP per connection. III. For service for which minimum basic charge has been specified in Clause 15.3 the initial security deposit shall be equal to 1/4th of annual minimum base charge. (c) The amount of security deposit is liable to be enhanced on review from time to time. Such review shall take place twice every year namely in October-November for the period of April to September and in April-May for the period October to March. If half of the agreed amount of all the bills relating to the aforesaid half yearly period exceeds by 20 per cent the existing security deposit, then the security deposit shall be enhanced to that amount rounded off to ten rupees. Fuel surcharge, if applicable shall be taken into consideration but delayed payment surcharge levied during the year, if any, shall be excluded. Fuel surcharge, if applicable shall be taken into consideration but delayed payment surcharge levied during the year, if any, shall be excluded. (d) The entire amount of security deposit in ease of L.T consumers will be deposited in cash. In B.T.S.L.T.S. Consumers, the security deposit upto an amount of rupees one lakh will be deposited in cash and 50% in the shape of bank guarantee. If the additional deposit payable is not paid on demand by a date to be fixed by the Board in the manner specified in clause 15.4 (a), the service may be disconnected on serving seven days notice and connection thereafter can only be restored if the deposit is made in full along with the prescribed disconnection and reconnect ion charges. (e) In case of deposit having exhausted on adjustment or becoming insufficient on account of enhancement or adjustment, the full amount or the differences, as the case may be, shall be payable in the manner, and subject to the conditions mentioned in sub-clause (d) above. 16.5 : Surcharge for exceeding the Contract Demand : If during any month in a financial year (April to March next year) the actual Maximum Demand of a consumer exceeds 110 per cent of the Contract Demand then the higher demand so recorded shall be treated as the Contract demand for the financial year and the minimum base charges, both in respect of Maximum Demand and energy charge shall be payable on that basis." 17. From a perusal of 15(3)(b)(iii), it would appear that initial security is to be deposited in terms thereof on the basis of 1/4th of annual minimum base charge; whereas clause (c) thereof postulates review of the matter relating to payment of security twice a year so that the consumer may be called upon to pay additional security. 18. It is true as has been contended by Mr. Marathia that clause 15.3 as such docs not provide for payment of any extra security either by way of an initial deposit or: by way of an additional deposit. 19. Further from a perusal of clause 16.5 of the Tariff, it will appear that in the event the Maximum Demand Indicator indicates increase of drawal of electrical energy by a consumer which exceeds 110% of the Contract Demand, then the higher demand so recorded shall be treated as the Contract Demand. 20. 19. Further from a perusal of clause 16.5 of the Tariff, it will appear that in the event the Maximum Demand Indicator indicates increase of drawal of electrical energy by a consumer which exceeds 110% of the Contract Demand, then the higher demand so recorded shall be treated as the Contract Demand. 20. Thus, by reason of clause 16.5, a legal fiction has been created that for the purpose of a particular year, although the agreement may remain unaffected for all intent and purpose, recording of a rate higher than 110% in the Maximum Demand Indicator would be taken to be the Contract Demand. 21. In East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. Vs. Finsbury Borough Council reported in 1951(2) All. ER 587, Lord Asquith stated the law thus: "If you arc bidden to treat an imaginary slate of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the, Putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it....The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corrollaries of that stale of affairs." The aforementioned observation of Lord Asquith has been taken into consideration by the Supreme Court in various decisions. See State of Bombay Vs. Pandurang Vinayak and others reported in AIR 1953 S.C. 244 ; Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. S. Teja Singh reported in AIR 1959 SC 352 and Additional Income Tax Officer Vs. E. Alfred reported in AIR 1962 SC 663 . 22. It is, therefore, clear that if for the purpose of payment minimum base charges as also annual minimum guarantee, drawal of electrical energy by a consumer at a rate higher than 110% of the contract load will be treated to be the contract demand, even for the purpose of payment of annual mininum guarantee charges as also base charges, in my opinion, the said provision shall also be applicable for the purpose of demand of security within the meaning of clause 15.3 (b) (iii) of t he Tariff. 23. 23. Such a contract demand within the meaning of clause 16.5 of the Tariff being in effect and substance a new agreement, the extra security which is demanded from a consumer will not be an additional security within the meaning clause 15.3(c) of the Tariff nor that would amount to a biennial review of the amount of security deposit. Such security, for all intent and purport, having regard to the provisions of the Tariff, should be treated as the initial security. 24. It is not in dispute that Tariff framed under sections 46 and 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 has the force of a Statute. The terms and conditions for supply of electrical energy are not only governed by the agreement entered into by and between the parties, but also the same is governed by the provisions of Tariff and whenever there occurs a conflict between the terms and conditions of the agreement and the tariff, the latter shall prevail. It is also well known that for interpreting a Statute or statutory instruments the entire statute has to be read and that interpretation should be adopted which advances the object thereof. 25. As noticed hereinbefore, the object of deposit of security having direct relation with the payment of electricity dues which in a case of contract demand will have nexus there with and in view of the fact that in terms of clause 16.5 of the Tariff, the enhanced contract demand would amount to a fresh agreement for supply of electrical energy, it is permissible for the Bihar Slate Electricity Board to demand additional security deposit in view of the fact that such an agreement by legal fiction would be deemed to be a fresh agreement. 26. However, as both Mr. 26. However, as both Mr. Marathia and B.S. Lal could not inform as to what are the grounds or the bone of contention in S. L. P. No. (c) 8282 of 1987 as contained in Annexure-6 to the writ application, it goes without saying that in the event it is held by the Supreme Court that demand of additional amount of security is prohibited even in a case of this nature, the petitioner shall be entitled to obtain refund of the said amount together with interest from the date of deposit till the actual refund at such a rate as may be determined by the Supreme Court in the Petition filed before it. 27. This application is disposed of with the aforementioned observation. But in the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to pay and bear their own costs.