JUDGMENT - DESAI A.A., J.:---Section 2 of the Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Principal Act') empowered the Provincial Government, by general of special order to regular letting and sub-letting of any accommodation or class or accommodation, whether residential or non-residential, whether furnished or unfurnished, and whether with or without board and further provided amongst others for preventing the eviction of tenants of sub-tenants from such accommodation in the specified urban area. The Provincial Government in pursuance thereof, on 26-7-1949 issued Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Order'). Amendment notified on 27-6-1989 to the order deletes the term 'house' wherever it appeared and substitutes the term 'premises' therefor. Clause 4-A as incorporated by the amendment, defines the term 'premises' which amongst other includes open land not capable of being used for agricultural purposes. Thereby it has necessitated the landlord of such open plot to seek prior permission under Clause 13(1) of the Order for terminating the tenancy. (Emphasis supplied). In these proceedings, the amendment has been impugned on the ground that inclusion of open plot for the purposes of regulating the letting and sub-letting under the order and it being retrospective in operation since affects the pre-existing right accrued owing to terminating of tenancy, to evict the tenant, is beyond the competence and scope of the delegated authority of the Provincial Government. 2. Mr. Chandurkar and Mr. Bobde, the learned Counsel appearing for the landlord, strenuously urged that the authority as conferred by section 2 of the Principal Act on the Provincial Government pertains to regulating the tenancy of the accommodation. They pointed out that sub-section 8 of section 5 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 defines the term 'premises' which amongst others includes an open plot. According to them, the term 'premises' is capable to take within its sweep any accommodation, whereas the term 'accommodation' as engaged in the Principal Act does not embrace within its fold any premises. The term 'accommodation', according to them, is comparatively having a very narrow and definite import. The principal Act though used the term 'accommodation', has not defined it. As such, ordinary meaning as commonly understood needs to be assigned to the term 'accommodation'. The term 'accommodation', according to them, is comparatively having a very narrow and definite import. The principal Act though used the term 'accommodation', has not defined it. As such, ordinary meaning as commonly understood needs to be assigned to the term 'accommodation'. According to them, the term definitely signifies something furnished with wall and roof where the people can be accommodated. It would be ridiculous to consider that the open plot is meant for accommodation. The impugned amendment which includes open plot for the purposes of regulating under the order is, therefore, beyond the scope of delegated power of the Provincial Government. 3. Mr. Bobde further made a submission that term 'accommodation' is of definite significance. It unequivocally conveys something covered by wall and roof. The placed reliance on a decision in (Dr. R.N. Gupta v. Smt. Sarla Khandelwal and others)1, A.I.R. 1974 All. 376(F. B.) and (Smt. Parbati v. Babu Lal)2, A.I.R. 1967 All. 40. According to me, no assistance can be derived from these Authorities since Their Lordships were considering the term 'accommodation' having regard to the definition as provided under section 2(a) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. 4. Mr. Bobde then invited my attention to the dictionary meaning of the term 'accommodation' as provided in Chamber Dictionary (20th Century). The dictionary meaning conveys amongst others:- supplying of wants (especially housing or refreshment), a help towards satisfaction of a want, space for what is required. However, the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case cited supra, gave a note of caution in para 8 of its report, which reads as thus : "If we look at the dictionary meaning of the word 'accommodation', different meanings have been given to this word. One which can be considered to be material is "the accommodation that is, lodging and food at a hotel". The words 'lodging and food' have reference to the accommodation generally provided at a hotel, which is a boarding and lodging place. The hotel may also provide for garaging motors. It may also afford other kinds of accommodation or facilities. It cannot, therefore, be inferred from this Dictionary meaning of 'accommodation' that it has specific reference to the user by a human being for his own personal purpose". (Emphasis supplied by me). The hotel may also provide for garaging motors. It may also afford other kinds of accommodation or facilities. It cannot, therefore, be inferred from this Dictionary meaning of 'accommodation' that it has specific reference to the user by a human being for his own personal purpose". (Emphasis supplied by me). According to me, therefore, whether accommodation is capable of being used for a particular purpose, could not be a decisive test to ascertain the width and import of the term. 5. The question, therefore, is whether the open plot is capable of being used for accommodation of a human being in an ordinary affairs of life? Mr. Dhote, the learned Counsel appearing for the tenant, canvassed before me that the human need has a multi facet. The activities of the human being are also multi dimensional. The Government in a Welfare State is cast with an obligation to take care of such needs and activities. As such, need for accommodation cannot rationally be confined to residence, namely, housing and commercial activity, namely, shopping or marketing complex. Submission, according to me, is well merited. The rent control measure as adopted by the Principal Act, according to me, has no doubt a predominant purpose to provide for a residence to the inhabitants of a prescribed urban area. However, it could not be a solitary purpose. People do not come to the urban area merely to reside. They need accommodation for their various activities such as commercial, social, cultural, religious, so on and so forth. Accommodation for such activities, needless to say, is essential for the human development. Open plot is certainly capable of being used for accommodating people for carrying such activities. To keep tenancy of such open plot outside the purview of the regulation would defeat the purpose and object of the Principal Act. 6. Having regard to the debate as canvassed, it would be more appropriate to ascertain as to what was in contemplation of the legislature while employing the term 'accommodation' in the Principal Act. According to me, it could be done by tracing the background which necessitated to introduce the Enactment and the object of legislature. War condition, as then realised, accelerated the influx of population in urban area. To meet the situation, Rule 31 of the Defence of India Rules. According to me, it could be done by tracing the background which necessitated to introduce the Enactment and the object of legislature. War condition, as then realised, accelerated the influx of population in urban area. To meet the situation, Rule 31 of the Defence of India Rules. 1942 empowered the Provincial Government, by order to provide services essential to the life of the community and amongst others, vide Clause (bb) for regulating letting and sub-letting of a residential accommodation, whether furnished or unfurnished, with or without board. (Emphasis supplied). The Provincial Government pursuant thereof, promulgated Central Provinces and Berar House Rent Control Order, 1942. By amendment of 1944 to Rule 81(bb) of the Defence of India Rules, the term 'non-residential' has been inserted. The Rent Control Order, 1942 being a temporary measure came to an end on 30-9-1946. The Principal Act of 1946 has thereupon been enacted. Phraseology, as enumerated, engaged in section 2 of the Principal Act has been borrowed from sub-clause (bb) of sub-section (1) of Rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules. To deal with the situation of the acute scarcity of accommodation in urban area, the Principal Act has thus come into being. Keeping in view this historical background, legislative intention and beneficial character of the Enactment, the term 'accommodation' commands generous and liberal interpretation so as to extend the benefit to the community at large. The legislature though not defined the term 'accommodation', have sufficiently indicated as to what was in their contemplation. By using the phraseology "any accomodation or class of accommodation, whether residential or non-residential, whether furnished or unfurnished and whether with or without board", the term has been made very comprehensive. Width of the term in contemplation of the legislature is sufficiently broad based. According to me, the open plot which is not capable of being used for a particular use of cultivation can accommodate the community for any of their multifarious activity. Such open plot need not be furnished with wall and roof so as to make it capable for being used particularly for residence or shop. The open plot as envisaged by impugned amendment is within the purview of the term "accommodation" as provided by the Principal Act. Such plot could certainly render services essential to the life of community. To take such plot outside the purview would make the term to suffer artificially from shrinkage. The open plot as envisaged by impugned amendment is within the purview of the term "accommodation" as provided by the Principal Act. Such plot could certainly render services essential to the life of community. To take such plot outside the purview would make the term to suffer artificially from shrinkage. It would reduce its natural and normal scope and width. Moreover, the Principal Act and the Order thereunder are the rent control measures for the protection of community of tenant. To eliminate such open plot from the purview of the term 'accommodation' would tend to disregard the object of the beneficial legislation. I, therefore, hold that the impugned amendment which includes open plot not capable of being used for agricultural purpose is well within the delegated authority of the State Government and is intra vires. 7. In the next challenge, the learned Counsel for the landlord, made a submission that since impugned amendment in effect, affects the right already accrued owing to termination of tenancy under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, its operation is retrospective and hence, beyond the competence of the delegated power. In support, they placed reliance on a decision in (The Income-tax Officer, Alleppey v. I.M.C. Ponnoose and others)3, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 385 and (Hukam Chand etc. v. Union of India and others)4, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2427. The submission is not well merited. The delegated authority either expressly or by necessary implication does not make the operation of the impugned amendment retrospective. The impugned amendment in its design or with its own force does not aim to achieve the results complained of. That might be owing to mandate of judicial dictum and not due to a vice in the amendment. The consequence of any amendment to the law is that the rights which are vested or accrued, while enforcing they are to be adjusted according to law as prevailing at the relevant time. That might be owing to mandate of judicial dictum and not due to a vice in the amendment. The consequence of any amendment to the law is that the rights which are vested or accrued, while enforcing they are to be adjusted according to law as prevailing at the relevant time. The Supreme Court in a decision in (Trimbak Damodhar Raipurkar v. Assaram Hiraman Patil and others)5, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1758 while examining the effect of amendment of 1952 to the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, held - "(a) before the right accrued to the landlord to eject the tenants, the amending Act of 1952 stepped in and deprived the landlord of that right by requiring him to comply with the statutory requirement as to a valid notice which has to be given for ejecting tenants; (b) that this construction as regards the operation of section 5(1) as amended by the Act of 1952 did not make the Act retrospective in operation; it merely affected in future existing rights." Similarly, the Supreme Court in a decision in (H. Shiva Rao and another v. Cecilia Pereira and others)6, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 248, has laid down- "While ordinarily substantive rights should not be held to be taken away except by express provision, or clear implication in the case of Rent Control Act, it being a beneficial legislation the provision which confers immunity to the tenant against eviction by the landlord though prospective in form operates to take away the right vested in the landlord by a decree of a Court which has become final, unless there is express provision or clear implication to the contrary." 8. The learned Counsel for the landlord placed reliance on a decision in (Durgaji v. Manji Dana)7, 1958 N.L.J. Note 28. It was held that the applicability of Rent Control Order subsequent to service of quit notice does not affect the notice as well as suit for eviction. However, in view of decision of the Supreme Court cited supra, according to me, this decision would no longer be a good law. 9. The learned Counsel for the landlord then made a submission that decree of eviction once passed after adjudication as per the law then prevailing needs no interference at the subsequent stage of appeal merely because there has subsequently been a change in the position of law. 9. The learned Counsel for the landlord then made a submission that decree of eviction once passed after adjudication as per the law then prevailing needs no interference at the subsequent stage of appeal merely because there has subsequently been a change in the position of law. In support, reliance is placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in (Dewaji v. Ganpatlal)8, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 560. This Authority considered the effect of the amended provision in sections 16, 16-A and 16-B of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951. It was held that the amended provision did not apply to the appeals pending in the Civil Court when the amendment came into force for want of necessary indication or implication in the amended provision. This authority would not render desired support to the plea as canvassed. Amendment ousting the jurisdiction of a specified forum, has no applicability to the pending appeals which are under the seisin of such forum. However, according to me, there could not be an analogous effect of the amendment which regulates the legal right involved in such appeal pending for adjudication. The question as raised is that the law, as introduced by the impugned amendment, can regulate the rights which have been adjudicated according to then prevailing law and sub judice in appeal. The Supreme Court has considered this question and answered in affirmative in the following decisions : (i) (Raja Shatrunjit v. Mohammad Azmat Azim Khan and others)9, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1474- The Court has to apply the law as it stood at the time of decision; (ii) (Amarjit Kaur v. Pritam Singh and others)10, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2068- Appeal being re-hearing of a suit, since bar came during the pendency, High Court has to set aside the decree; (iii) (Lakshmi Narayan Guin and others v. Niranjan Modak)11, A.I.R. 1985 S.C.111- Appeal being continuation of a suit, change in law has to be taken into account. 10. Mr. Chandurkar tried to urge that the Supreme Court in the cases cited supra, took into consideration the effect of the Act of Legislature which carries a non obstante clause. As such, in the submission of the learned Counsel, the impugned amendment being a delegated legislation cannot have a similar effect. The submission, according to me, is untenable. 10. Mr. Chandurkar tried to urge that the Supreme Court in the cases cited supra, took into consideration the effect of the Act of Legislature which carries a non obstante clause. As such, in the submission of the learned Counsel, the impugned amendment being a delegated legislation cannot have a similar effect. The submission, according to me, is untenable. The impugned amendment if intra vires and remains on a statute, for all practical purposes is law as envisaged by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act which regulates the right between landlord and tenant. In view of my discussion, the impugned amendment since not made retrospective by the authority, is within the competence of the delegated powers. It has application to the rights between the landlord an tenant which are sub judice in pending proceedings. Similar is the view taken by Chavan, J., in a decision dated 7th February, 1991 in Second Appeal Nos. 148/77 (Mohammad Rafique s/o Sheikh Munnumiyan Patel v. Taherabegum wd/o Abdul Aziz and others)12, and 149/77 Mohammad Rafique s/o Shaikh Munnumiyan Patel v. Taherabegum wd/o Abdul Aziz and others. 11. M.C.A. No. 187/89. The trial Court decreed the suit claim of eviction against the applicant-tenant in respect of tenanted premises consisting of an open plot. The first appellate Court set aside the decree. In second appeal, by the impugned judgment dated 26-7-1989, this Court reversed the judgment of the first Appellate Court and confirmed the decree of the trial Court for eviction. 12. Mr. Chandurkar, the learned Counsel appearing for the non-applicant landlord, submitted that Clause 13-A to the order came to be incorporated by second amendment notified on 26-10-1989, i.e. subsequent to the decision in Second Appeal dated 26-7-1989. As such, the impugned amendment has no application. The submission is factually erroneous. The impugned amendment had been notified as discussed, on 27-6-1989, i.e. during the pendency of appeal. As such, the impugned amendment is applicable with full force to the right involved in the second appeal. 13. Mr. Chandurkar then made a submission that by express or necessary implication Clause 13-A made the impugned amendment retrospective in its operation. This submission is equally erroneous. As such, the impugned amendment is applicable with full force to the right involved in the second appeal. 13. Mr. Chandurkar then made a submission that by express or necessary implication Clause 13-A made the impugned amendment retrospective in its operation. This submission is equally erroneous. Clause 13-A as incorporated by second amendment notified on 27-10-1989 reads as thus : "No decree for eviction shall be passed in a suit or proceeding filed or pending in any Court or before any authority, unless landlord produces a written permission of the Controller as required by sub-clause (1) of Clause 13." This Court in a decision dated 8-8-1991 in Civil Revision Application No. 633/90 in great detail considered the scope and effect of Clause 13-A. It is observed that the legislature has declared its intention under Clause 13-A contrary to the principle as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of H. Shiva Rao, cited supra. As a consequence of the first amendment, the licensed premises and the open plot not being used for agricultural purposes have now been brought under the control of the Order. Now for the landlord of such premises, it has become obligatory to obtain prior permission from the Rent Controller to terminate the tenancy or to require the tenant to vacate the premises under Clause 13(1) of the Order. As a result of the first amendment, decree if passed or suit is pending in respect of such premises without there being any necessary prior permission may suffer from legal infirmity and would entail a civil consequence. To deal with this situation, Clause 13-A came to be incorporated in the Order. This clause renders protection to decrees of eviction which have already been passed from being suffered from legal consequences of the first amendment. The legislative intention in incorporating Clause 13-A is not to render decrees of eviction, as passed earlier, into nullity so as to make them unenforceable. 14. Mr. Chandurkar then made a submission that the ground as raised by the applicant is beyond the scope of review under Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure. As such, the decree impugned in review is not liable to be set aside. Mr. Dhote, the learned Counsel for the applicant, placed reliance on a decision in Raja Shatrunjit v. Mohammad Azmat Azim Khan and others, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1474. As such, the decree impugned in review is not liable to be set aside. Mr. Dhote, the learned Counsel for the applicant, placed reliance on a decision in Raja Shatrunjit v. Mohammad Azmat Azim Khan and others, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1474. The learned Counsel rightly contended that any error on the face of record is a sufficient ground to entertain the review. He pointed out that the impugned amendment to the order came into being during the pendency of the appeal and it has application to the right of eviction as asserted by the landlord. In absence of prior permission as envisaged under Clause 13(1) of the Order, no decree of eviction could be passed against a tenant. As such, confirming a decree of eviction in second appeal as passed by the trial Court is patently illegal and liable to be set aside. He submitted that the possession of the suit plot was delivered to the plaintiff-non-applicant in view of the undertaking furnished to this Court and this Court accordingly passed an order dated 6-8-1991. It is asserted that the possession of the suit plot as delivered is now liable to be restored. 15. Second Appeals Nos. 24/85, 25/85, 26/85 and 203/86. The trial Court dismissed the entire suit claim of recovery of open plot leased out and area abutting thereto encroached upon by the tenant. In first appeals by reversing the judgment of the trial Court, entire suit claim has been decreed. Hence, these second appeals at the instance of the tenants. Decree for eviction to the extent of area actually leased out by the respondent landlord now cannot be maintained in view of the amendment. The same is, therefore, liable to be set aside. As regards decree of eviction for the area on which encroachment has been made. Mr. Mehadia and Mr. Ghare, the learned Counsel for the appellant-tenant, tried to support the judgment of the trial Court. They made an attempt to assail the judgment of the Appellate Court. The trial Court held that the entire area in occupation of the defendant-tenant was leased out by the landlord and the defendant-tenant has not made any further encroachment over the abutting lands. The Lower Appellate Court re-examined the issue in para 20 of the impugned judgment. It is observed that as regards encroachment, the evidence of parties is merely word against word. The Lower Appellate Court re-examined the issue in para 20 of the impugned judgment. It is observed that as regards encroachment, the evidence of parties is merely word against word. However, it is held that the plaintiff-landlord has made out a definite case of a lease of a specified area. He has also shown the area so leased out in the rent receipt. The actual area leased out was mentioned in the quit notice dated 10-9-1977. The tenants have not refuted the averment in notice or in rent receipt by giving any reply. In written statement, tenants have not disputed that they have been in possession of the area in question. However, they claim that the entire area, in their possession was leased out to them. They have omitted to specify the actual measurement of area leased out in their favour. The appellate Court was, therefore, justified in accepting the claim of the plaintiff that besides the specified area leased out, rest of the area abutting to the leased plot has been encroached upon by the tenants. 16. The learned Counsel for the defendants-tenants tried to urge that the defendants-tenants are illiterate. The plaintiff took advantage of their illiteracy by making reference of definite area in rent receipt. This plea of disputed question of fact cannot be entertained in second appeal. The judgment of the Appellate Court so far as eviction from area encroachment upon by the tenants does not suffer from any material illegality. The appeals do not raise any substantial question of law. As such, decree to the extent of encroached area deserves to be maintained. 17. Second Appeal No. 99/89. The trial Court decreed the suit for recovery of possession of open plot leased out for a cattle shed. In first appeal, the decree has been confirmed. Hence, this second appeal at the instance of tenant. The impugned decree of the trial Court as well of Appellate Court for eviction against tenant is liable to be set aside in view of the impugned amendment. 18. Second Appeal No. 152/90. The trial Court decreed the suit claim of the respondent for eviction of the Appellate from open plot admeasuring 25' x 40'. The first appellate Court maintained the decree. Hence, this second appeal. The defendant-tenant denied the title of the plaintiff-landlord. He averred that one Karishma was recovered as an owner of the suit plot. 18. Second Appeal No. 152/90. The trial Court decreed the suit claim of the respondent for eviction of the Appellate from open plot admeasuring 25' x 40'. The first appellate Court maintained the decree. Hence, this second appeal. The defendant-tenant denied the title of the plaintiff-landlord. He averred that one Karishma was recovered as an owner of the suit plot. He also denied the relationship of landlord and tenant. He further denied termination of tenancy. He asserted that he paid the Municipal taxes for the period from 1965 to 1980. In view of this, Shri Lambat, the learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff-landlord, relying on a decision in (Ashwinikumar Govardhandas Gandhi and another v. Gangadhar Dattatraya Gadgil)13, 1990 Mh.L.J. 18 rightly contended that the defendant-tenant being a disclaimer of the relationship, is not entitled to the benefit of protection of the order. He asserted that the plaintiff has established his title in respect of the suit plot. The impugned decree as passed deserves to be maintained. Heard Mr. Bapat, the learned Counsel for the appellant. He could not repel the submission as advanced. Even otherwise, the appeal does not raise any substantial question of law to warrant interference in the concurrent findings as recorded. Hence, appeal must fail. ORDER (i) M.C.A. No. 187/89 Review application is allowed. The judgment and decree dated 26-7-1989 passed in Second Appeal No. 97/89 is hereby set aside. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court for eviction of applicant-tenant is hereby set aside. The suit for eviction is dismissed. The non-applicant-landlord is directed to restore the possession to the applicant-tenant within a period of 15 days. No order as to costs. (ii) Second Appeals Nos. 24/85, 25/85, 26/85 and 203/86. These appeals are partly allowed. The judgments and decrees of eviction passed by the first Appellate Court to the extent of open plot leased out to the tenants are hereby set aside. The judgments and decrees of eviction against appellants for eviction from the area encroached upon by them are, however, confirmed. No order as to costs. (iii) Second Appeal No. 99/89. The judgments and decrees passed by the courts below are hereby set aside. No order as to costs. (iv) Second Appeal No. 152/90. The appeal is dismissed. The judgments and decrees of the Courts below are confirmed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. -----