JUDGMENT M. W. Deo, J. -- 1. This is plaintiffs' second appeal against dismissal of their claim for possession of a plot of land by both Courts below. 2. Briefly stated, the case of plaintiff Moolchand (Father of the present appellants) was that his father Narsingh had purchased the suit plot of land by sale-deed Ex. P-1 for a price of Rs. 31.00 on 22.4.1913. The plaintiff Mookhand continued to be in possession of the property. Over the years a shed standing on the suit plot of land fell down leaving the suit property an open plot of land. It was alleged that the defendants encroached upon this plot of land on 11.12.1964 and refused to deliver its possession despite notice. The plaintiff, therefore, claimed possession of the suit plot land as described in map attached with the plaint. 3. Defendant No.3 Ratansingh did not file any written statement. Defendants No.1 and 2 i.e. Ramnath and Dayaram, by a joint written statement, denied title of the plaintiff and pleaded in para 4 of the written-statement that even if the plaintiff proved title to the premises, the defendants have used the premises for throwing their Gudha (garbage) and thus are in adverse possession of the property for more than 12 years and have acquired title by adverse possession. The defendants also pleaded that they had purchased the suit plot of land in 1935 from one Natthu s/o Mallu Gujar and are in possession thereof as owners. 4. The learned first appellate Court concurred with the trial Court and held that the plaintiff did not prove his title to the suit property. The first appellate Court further held that even if the plaintiff had acquired title, the defendants have extinguished title of the plaintiff by adverse possession. Consequently the suit was dismissed. 5. Despite service of notice and then issuance of S.P.C. for 14.8.1991 and 16.9.1991, the respondents did not appear. The appeal was, therefore, heard in their absence. 6. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the learned first appellate Court arrived at a wrong finding of for want of title of the appellants as the Court misdirected itself by over-looking the sale-deed Ex. P-1 and by jumping at once into the question of possession. The correct approach to the case ought to have been whether the plaintiff proved his title to the suit property. P-1 and by jumping at once into the question of possession. The correct approach to the case ought to have been whether the plaintiff proved his title to the suit property. If the answer was in the affirmative, then the question of extinguishment of plaintiff's title by adverse possession would fall for consideration. 7. Now Ex. P-1 is a properly stamped sale-deed of the suit property of the date 22.4.1913. The sale price of the property is 31-00 rupees and, therefore, the document was not compulsorily registrable. The document is albeit scribed on proper stamp of the erstwhile Holker State. There is no dispute about the fact that the document is coming from the custody of a proper person namely son of the purchaser. Thus, Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act at once comes into play. In fact it is to be seen that the memo of appeal in the first appellate Court specifically raised this question in para 5 of the memo. But the learned lower appellate Court missed it and, therefore, followed a wrong course of approach. The document EX.P-1 being of 1913 was undisputedly more then 30 years old. It was executed in favour of Narsingh, the father of Moolchand, the plaintiff. Consequently the plaintiff was justified to have a finding in his favour that the document was coming from proper custody and as such the Court would presume that the document was duly executed by person by whom it purports to be executed i.e. by Buddha. As against this documentary evidence, the story of the respondents about purchase of the property from Nathu s/o Mallu Gujar in 1935 is not supported by any documentary evidence. Consequently Ex. P-1 ought to have been accepted by both the Courts below as good proof of the title of the plaintiff to the suit plot of land. Both the Courts below totally mis-directed themselves in ignoring this line of approach and considering the evidentiary value of Ex. P-1 vis-a-vis Section 90 of the Evidence Act. There is, therefore, no hesitation to reverse that finding of both Courts below and to hold that the plaintiff was owner of the suit plot of land under Ex.P-1. 8. The next question is whether the respondents proved that they had acquired title by adverse possession to the suit property for more than 12 years. There is, therefore, no hesitation to reverse that finding of both Courts below and to hold that the plaintiff was owner of the suit plot of land under Ex.P-1. 8. The next question is whether the respondents proved that they had acquired title by adverse possession to the suit property for more than 12 years. It is now well-settled that jurisprudential concept of possession is made up of two ingredients; (i) the corpus; and (ii) the animus. Corpus means actual exclusive physical CONTROL over the property denoting physical possession. The animus denotes the intention and exercise of right to possess the property as owner to the exclusion of others. These, two ingredients put together go to constitute legal possession. 9. Applying the aforesaid test, it is to be examined whether the respondent proved their exclusive physical possession as owners over the suit plot of land. What is the nature of evidence regarding possession'? The total evidence led by the respondents is that they used to throw garbage (Gudha) on the suit land for all these years. Now it is well-settled that this kind of user does not constitute possession on open land. Long line of cases can be relied up starting from ILR 16 Bombay 338 followed by AI.R. 1951 M.B. 80; 1955 M.B.L.J. 193 as also AI.R. 1916 Nagpur 19. Reference may also be made to AIR 1939 Allahabad 161. The case of Raghubar Prasad AI.R. 1941 Nagpur 311) turns on special fact of that case. The sum total of all the aforesaid cases is that throwing of Gudha over an open plot of land for a very long period much more than even 12 years will not constitute legal possession of the persons throwing Gudha and muchless can such user ripen into adverse possession so as to extinguish the title of the rightful owner. Applying the principle of the facts in hand and assuming for the sake of argument that the respondents were throwing Gudha over the suit open land for 20- 25 years, such acts cannot in law constitute legal exclusive possession of the defendants/respondents and muchless can such acts ripen into their adverse possession vis-a-vis the plaintiff. The learned first appellate Court took a totally erroneous approach on legal principles about adverse possession and, therefore, arrived at an illegal finding of adverse possession which cannot be allowed to stand. 10. The learned first appellate Court took a totally erroneous approach on legal principles about adverse possession and, therefore, arrived at an illegal finding of adverse possession which cannot be allowed to stand. 10. It must, therefore, be held that the adverse possession of the respondents over the suit land so as to extinguish the title of the appellants was not proved in law and, therefore, the defendants did not prescribe title to the suit property by adverse possession. The plaintiff proved his title to the suit property by sale-deed Ex. P-1. 11. Consequently the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of both Courts below are set-aside. The claim of the appellants for possession of the suit land as described in plaint shown in the map attached to the plaint succeeds. Respondents shall deliver possession of the suit land to appellants and also pay mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 2.00 per month for the period as claimed in the plaint. A decree be drawn up accordingly. The appellants will have costs throughout from the respondents. Counsel's fee as per schedule, if certified.