Tea Board v. P. D. Vasistha — 1991 DIGILAW 417 (CAL)

Judgment : Kabir, J. :- This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 17th May, 1989 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Matter No. 1121 of 1987, allowing the writ application filed by the respondent No.1 herein and quashing the order of compulsory retirement passed against him under Rule 56(j) of the fundamental Rules. 2. The case of the writ petitioner/respondent No.1 is that he was initially appointed as Inspector of Tea Estates for Kangra and Mandi Tea Estates on 16th December, 1955, with Head Quarters at Dharamsala in the State of Himachal Pradesh. On 4th February, 1963, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Field Advisory Officer and in 1968 he was transferred to the Regional Office of the Tea Board at Jorhat in the same capacity. The respondent No.1 held the said post till November, 1971, and, thereafter, he was promoted and transferred to the Head Quarters of the Tea Board at Calcutta as Assistant Plantation Officer. He was confirmed in the said post on and from 19th April, 1980. Because of his satisfactory service, the respondent No.1 was, thereafter, selected and promoted to the post of Deputy Director, Tea Development, and was posted at Guwahati in the month of April, 1985. 3. It appears that pursuant to certain guidelines given by the Central Government relating to compulsory retirement under Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules, a Review Committee was constituted by the Tea Board on 18th December, 1985, to consider the cases of 22 officers and to ascertain as to whether they should be compulwrily retired in the Public interest under Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules. The respondent No.1 was one of the said 22 officers whose cases were taken up by the Review Committee. It appears that the Review Committee at its meeting held on 16th January, 1987, recommended that the respondent No.1 be compulsorily retired and such recommendation was accepted by the Tea Board at its meeting held on 17th January, 1987. Thereafter, on 17th January, 1987, the Tea Board issued an order in exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (j) of Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules, retiring the respondent No. l with immediate effect. 4. The said order of the Tea Board was challenged by the respondent No.1 by way of the writ application, out of which the present appeal arises. 4. The said order of the Tea Board was challenged by the respondent No.1 by way of the writ application, out of which the present appeal arises. When the writ application came up for final hearing before the learned Single Judge, it was contended on behalf of the respondent No.1 that Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules could not be made applicable in his case, since under the said rules only the case of officers in Group 'A' or Group 'B' service or post who had entered government service before attaining the age of 35 years and had attained the age of 50 years could be taken up for review by the Review Committee. According to the guidelines given by the Central Government, such review has to be made 5 months before the person concerned was to attain the age of 50 years and could not be made thereafter. According to the respondent No.1, the Review Committee ought to have started reviewing his case 6 months before 14th December, 1980, when he had attained the age of 50 years, but, in fact, the Review Committee was constituted only on 18th December, 1985. It was, therefore, contended on behalf of the respondent No.1, that the Review Committee had exceeded its authority in recommending his compulsory retirement, when he had already attained the age of 56 years. The order passed by the Tea Board on the basis of such recommendation was, therefore, also bad and was not capable of being sustained. 5. On behalf of the respondent No. 1 it was also contended that there were no materials before the Review Committee, whereby it could arrive at the satisfaction necessary for making a recommendation for compulsory retirement of an officer under Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules. On the other hand, it was pointed out that even in 1985, i.e., two years before the order of compulsory retirement was passed, the respondent No.1 had been selected and promoted to the post of Deputy Director. According to the respondent No. 1 if his integrity or work performance was in doubt then he would not have been promoted to the post of Deputy Director just about 2 years before the impugned order of compulsory retirement was passed. 6. According to the respondent No. 1 if his integrity or work performance was in doubt then he would not have been promoted to the post of Deputy Director just about 2 years before the impugned order of compulsory retirement was passed. 6. Furthermore, the guidelines made it clear that once the proper authority had decided to retain a Government servant in service beyond the age of 50 years or beyond the date of completion of 30 years of service, he would ordinarily be allowed to continue in service till he attained the age of retirement. Since the respondent No. 1 was, in any event, due to the retire on 31st December, 1988, on attaining the age of 58 years, the order of compulsory retirement passed on 17th January, 1987 was in itself bad as per the guidelines given by the Central Government. It was also contended on behalf of the respondent No.1 that the Review Committee had been illegally constituted as the chairman of the Tea Board had no power to constitute a Review Committee in view of the provisions of sub-Sections (3), (4) and (5) of Section B of the Tea Act, 1953. It was lastly submitted on behalf of the respondent No.1 that the provisions of Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules could not be invoked as a substitute and/or short cut method to victimise a Government servant, without taking recourse to proper disciplinary proceedings. 7. On behalf of the Tea Board and the other respondents, it wall contended that the order of compulsory retirement was passed on the basis of adverse remarks against the respondent No.1 in his Annual Confidential Reports for the years 1968, 1971 and 1972, which resulted in the transfer of the respondent No.1 from dharamsala to Jorhat. Apart from the said adverse remarks in the Annual Confidential Reports, it was also contented on behalf of the respondents in the writ petition that the Review Committee had also taken into consideration a news item in the issue of the "Business Standard" of 11th January, 1983, which was directed against the respondent No. 1. The said news item disclosed that serious charges of corruption had been levelled against a high official in the Tea Board Directorate of Tea Development. Some of the complaints received against the said high official were also set out in the said news item. The said news item disclosed that serious charges of corruption had been levelled against a high official in the Tea Board Directorate of Tea Development. Some of the complaints received against the said high official were also set out in the said news item. It was contended on behalf of the respondents in the writ application, that the Review Committee had rightly recommended compulsory retirement of the respondent No. 1 herein on the basis of the said adverse remarks in the Annual Confidential Reports, as also the serious charges mentioned in the news item of the "Business Standard". 8. After considering the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, the learned Single Judge was of the view that there were no materials before the Review Committee which justified the recommendation of an order of compulsory retirement against the respondent No.1. The learned single Judge further held that the respondents in the writ petition had failed to either consider or follow the guidelines given by the Central Government for invoking the provisions of Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules. The learned Single Judge also held that the Review Committee had not been properly constituted, since under the provisions of the Tea Act, 1953, only the Tea Board had the Authority to constitute such committee, while in the instant case the Review Committee had been constituted by the Chairman of the Board. The learned Single Judge, therefore, allowed the writ application and quashed the order of compulsory retirement and subsequent order rejecting the representation made by the respondent No. 1, and directed the respondents in the writ petition .to treat the writ petitioner/respondent No.1 as on duty from the date when the impugned order was passed under Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules, till his superannuation on 31st December, 1988. The learned Single Judge further directed that the petitioner would be entitled to all service benefits, including monetary benefits. The respondents in the writ application were directed to pay to the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 all arrear salaries and other retirement benefits, as admissible to him, taking his dale of retirement on 31st December, 1988. Such payment was directed to be made within a period of two weeks from the date of the order. 9. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order, the Tea Board and the Secretary of the Tea Board have preferred the instant appeal. 10. Such payment was directed to be made within a period of two weeks from the date of the order. 9. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order, the Tea Board and the Secretary of the Tea Board have preferred the instant appeal. 10. After filing the appeal, the appellants filed an application for stay of the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge and it appears that the same came up for consideration before the Division Bench on 2nd June, 1989. During the hearing of the said application, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 herein, filed a statement of the claims of the respondent No.1 for a total sum of Rs. 2.97,005.04p., calculated on the basis that the date of retirement of the respondent No.1 was 20th January, 1987, in terms of the order passed under Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules. The cheque for the said amount, drawn in the name of the respondent No. 1, was directed to be handed over to his learned Advocate on record within a fortnight from the date of the order passed by the Division Bench. It was, however, clarified that such payment was to be made without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties and would be subject to the orders to be passed in the appeal. The Division Bench also directed stay of the operation of the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. 11. Appearing on behalf of the appellants, Mr. Hirak Mitra, learned Advocate, submitted that in view of the materials available in respect of the respondent No.1, casting serious doubts about his integrity, the Review Committee was fully justified in recommending that the respondent No. 1 be compulsorily retired from service under the provisions of Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules. 12. Mr. Mitra submitted that since Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules did not give the concerned Government servant a right of representation, it was not necessary for the authorities to follow the principles of natural justice before taking a decision to retire a Government servant under the said Rule. Mr. Mitra further submitted that the authorities were not also required to take into consideration the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution while taking such a decision. 13. In this connection, Mr. Mr. Mitra further submitted that the authorities were not also required to take into consideration the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution while taking such a decision. 13. In this connection, Mr. Mitra drew our attention to paragraph 5 of the affidavit-in-opposition which had been used before the learned Single Judge on behalf of the respondents No.1, 2 and 3 in the writ application, namely, the Tea Board and its Chairman and Secretary. In the said paragraph, the facts leading to the passing of the impugned order of compulsory retirement have been generally stated. It has been mentioned that the Annual Confidential Reports of the respondent No.1 herein for the years 1968. 1971 and 1972 and the newspaper report in the issue of the "Business Standard" of 11th January, 1983, had been duly taken into account by the Review Committee while recommending that the respondent No.1 herein be compulsorily retired. Mr. Mitra placed particular emphasis on sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 5 in which various instances are given of how the respondent No.1 was alleged to have mis-used his position for personal gain. 14. Mr. Mitra submitted that from the allegation set out in subparagraph (d), it was quite reasonable for the Review Committee and the Tea Board to entertain doubts about the integrity of the respondent No. 1 and the propriety of his continuing in service against the public interest. 15. Mr. Mitra submitted that after the order of compulsory retirement was passed, the respondent No.1 herein made a representation to the Chairman of the Tea Beard and the same was placed before the Representation Committee. After considering the said representation, the Representation Committee was of the view that there were no extenuating circumstances in favour of the respondent No. 1 and felt that there was no necessity for interfering with the decision of the Board. The report and recommendation of the Representation Committee was placed before the Tea Board on 4th March, 1987, along with the representation of the respondent No. 1. Upon considering the recommendation made by the Representation Committee and after considering the representation made by the respondent No.1, the Board accepted the recommendation made by the Representation Committee and upheld its earlier decision to retire the petitioner compulsorily. 16. Mr. Upon considering the recommendation made by the Representation Committee and after considering the representation made by the respondent No.1, the Board accepted the recommendation made by the Representation Committee and upheld its earlier decision to retire the petitioner compulsorily. 16. Mr. Mitra also submitted that, although, the materials against the respondent No. 1 were sufficient for initiating disciplinary proceedings, such fact did not preclude the authorities from taking recourse to the provisions of Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules in the public interest, merely because disciplinary proceeding had not actually been started against the respondent No. 1 Mr. Mitra submitted that when the Board was satisfied from the materials on record that the integrity of the respondent No.1 was in serious doubt, the Board was free to apply the provisions of the said Rule. 17. Mr. Mitra then submitted that the guidelines given by the Central Government for applying the Provisions of Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules to a Government servant were not mandatory in nature, and were in the nature of suggestions as to the manner in which the concerned authority should proceed while applying the aforesaid Provisions to a Government servant. Mr. Mitra submitted that the respondent No. 1 could not take advantage of the fact that Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules provides for review of cases of certain officers who has attained the age of 50 years, and in other cases 55 years. According to Mr. Mitra, such an argument was not available to the respondent No.1, since the guidelines were not mandatory in nature. 18. Mr. Mitra also submitted that the guidelines given by the Central Government were received by the Tea Board only on 7th October, 1985, and immediately, thereafter, the Board took steps to constitute a Review Committee for going into the cases of the various officers of the Board under the said Provisions. Mr. Mitra submitted that the respondent No. 1 had not been picked up as an isolated case, but the cases of 22 officers were reviewed by the Review Committee. Mr. Mitra pointed out that after considering the cases of the said 22 officers, the Review Committee had informed the Board that in the case of 18 officers, no adverse comments had been found in the assessment reports on their performance. Mr. Mitra pointed out that after considering the cases of the said 22 officers, the Review Committee had informed the Board that in the case of 18 officers, no adverse comments had been found in the assessment reports on their performance. After further scrutiny of the cases of the 4 remaining officers, the Review Committee thought it fit to recommend premature retirement only in respect of the writ petitioner/respondent No.1, Mr. Mitra submitted that it could not be contended that the authorities concerned harboured any prejudice or malice against the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1, and that the decision to retire the writ petitioner/respondent No.1 prematurely was taken purely on the basis of the available records. 19. Mr. Mitra lastly submitted that the contention of the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 that the Review Committee had not been properly constituted and the acceptance of such contention by the learned Single Judge, had no legal basis, in view of the provisions of the Tea Act, 1953. Mr. Mitra drew our attention to Sections 8 and 10 of the said Act. Section 8 provides for the constitution of an Executive Committee of the Board and other Standing Committees or Ad-hoc committees for exercising any power or discharging any duty of the Board or for enquiring into or reporting and advising on any matter which the Board may refer to them. Section 10 sets out the functions of the Board. Mr. Mitra submitted that Section 8 and Section 10 have to be read together for a meaningful construction and that the action taken by the Chairman of the Board could always be subsequently ratified by the Board. Mr. Mitra submitted that if the Court was satisfied that there were sufficient materials before the Review Committee and the Board, which prompted the Board to pass an order of compulsory retirement in respect of the writ petitioner/respondent No.1, then technicalities ought not to be allowed to stand in the way, and the Court should not interfere with the decision taken by the Board. 20. Mr. Mitra cited several decisions in support of his contentions. Mr. Mitra first referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (1) Union of India v. J. N. Sinha and Anr. reported in AIR 1971 SC at page 40. 20. Mr. Mitra cited several decisions in support of his contentions. Mr. Mitra first referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (1) Union of India v. J. N. Sinha and Anr. reported in AIR 1971 SC at page 40. In the said case the Supreme Court was of the view that where an appropriate authority bona fide forms an opinion that a Government servant should be retired in public interest, such authority can pass an order of compulsory retirement and such opinion could not be challenged before the Courts. The Supreme Court observed that Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules do not require an opportunity of showing cause against compulsory retirement to be given. The order of compulsory retirement was capable of being challenged only on the ground that either the requisite opinion was not formed or the order was passed arbitrarily or on collateral grounds. Fundamental Rule 56(j) holds the balance between the rights of, the individual Government servant and the public. While minimum service is guaranteed to the Government servant, the Government is given the power to make its machinery more efficient by compulsorily retiring such persons who in its opinion should not be allowed to continue in public interest. Compulsory retirement did not involve any civil consequence and was not intended as a penal measure against Government servants. Mr. Mitra also referred to the case of (2) J. D. Srivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. reported in AIR 1984 SC at page 634, wherein the Supreme Court made similar observations to the effect that the power to retire a Government servant compulsorily in public interest in terms of a service rule is absolute, provided the authority concerned forms an opinion bona fide that it is necessary to pass such an order in public interest. If such decision is passed on collateral grounds, or if the decision is arbitrary, it is liable to be interferred with by the courts. The next case referred to by Mr. Mitra is the case of (3) Ved Prokash v. Union of India, reported in. If such decision is passed on collateral grounds, or if the decision is arbitrary, it is liable to be interferred with by the courts. The next case referred to by Mr. Mitra is the case of (3) Ved Prokash v. Union of India, reported in. AIR 1988 SC at page 77, where in a very short judgment, the Supreme Court observed that the jurisdiction of the Courts in matters of this kind is limited and unless there was an allegation of mala fide against the authorities taking the decision to compulsorily retire a Government servant, no interference was called for from the Courts. Mr. Mitra also referred to the case of (4) Brij Mohan Singh Chopra v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1987 SC at page 948 where, while reiterating its earlier decisions relating to the Government's power to pass orders of compulsory retirement, the Supreme Court further observed that the power to compulsorily retire a Government servant was an absolute power vested in the Government and that there were no criteria or guidelines prescribed except public interest. The Supreme Court further explained that in relation to compulsory retirement, public interest means retention of honest and efficient employees and weeding out of in-efficient and dishonest employees who has become dead-weed and whose removal would subserve the public interest. Mr. Mitra lastly referred to the case of (5) A. L. Goel v. Punjab National Bank and Ors, reported in 1983(2) Calcutta Law times at page 210, where a learned Single Judge or this Court followed the various decisions of the Supreme Court on this point. 21. In support of his contention that while taking a decision to compulsorily retire a Government servant the principles of natural justice need not be followed, Mr. Mitra referred to the case of (6) The State of Sikkim and Ors. v. Sonam Lama and Ors., reported in AIR 1991 SC at page 534. In the said case, the Supreme Court held that it was not necessary to follow the principles of natural justice before an order of compulsory retirement was passed, nor was it necessary to observe the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution in such a case. 22. Mr. In the said case, the Supreme Court held that it was not necessary to follow the principles of natural justice before an order of compulsory retirement was passed, nor was it necessary to observe the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution in such a case. 22. Mr. Mitra concluded his submissions by submitting that since the materials before the Board were sufficient for the Board to satisfy itself about the doubtful integrity of the writ petitioner/respondent No. 1, the Court should not interfere with such subjective satisfaction which was based on objective tests in the shape of the materials before the Board. 23. Appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent No.1, Mr. Arun Prokash Sircar, Mr. Malay Chakrabortty appearing with him, submitted that the learned Single Judge had correctly analysed both the facts and the law in arriving at a decision in the matter culminating in the judgment impugned in the appeal. 24. Mr. Sircar submitted that the materials which had been sought to be placed before the Court, were not before the Review Committee and/or before the Board when a decision was taken to compulsorily retire the respondent No.1. The same was subsequently introduced in the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed on behalf of the Tea Board and its Chairman and Secretary in the writ proceedings. Mr. Sircar submitted that except for the Annual Confidential Reports for the year 1968, 1971 and 1972 and the newspaper report appearing in the "Business Standard", no other materials were considered either by the Review Committee and/or the Tea Board in taking a decision to retire the respondent No.1 compulsorily under Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules. 25. Mr. Sircar further submitted that throughout the entire career of the respondent No. 1, his work had been satisfactory to the authorities and that he had been given promotion in 1963, 1971, 1980 and also in 1985, the last promotion having been given just about one and half years before the order of compulsory retirement was passed. Mr. Sircar pointed out that it has been admitted by the appellants themselves that on 9th April, 1985, the writ petitioner/respondent No.1 had been selected for promotion to the post of Deputy Director. Mr. Mr. Sircar pointed out that it has been admitted by the appellants themselves that on 9th April, 1985, the writ petitioner/respondent No.1 had been selected for promotion to the post of Deputy Director. Mr. Sircar submitted that the very fact that the respondent No.1 had been promoted to the post of Deputy Director in 1985, which post carried with it a good deal of responsibility, and such selection having been made on competition out of 13 departmental candidates, it went to show that if any adverse remarks existed against the respondent No.1 prior to the grant or such promotion, the same were not of a serious nature and were condoned by the authorities concerned. Mr. Sircar pointed out that the news item in the "Business Standard" had been published on 11th January, 1983, while the respondent No.1 was promoted to the post of Deputy Director, thereafter, on 9th April, 1985. Mr. Sircar submitted that, in any event, the allegations contained in the news item were entirely vague and no reliance could be placed thereon without any proper enquiry in respect thereof. 26. Mr. Sircar submitted that the respondent No.1 was due to retire on 31st December, 1988, on attaining the age of 58 years and, in fact, the decision taken to compulsorily retire the respondent No.1 on 17th January, 1987, just about 2 years prior to his attaining the age of superannuation, was contrary to the Government's own policies. Mr. Sircar also pointed out that the respondent No.1 had attained the age of 50 years on 14th December, 1980, and that if Rule 56(j) of the fundamental Rules were to be made applicable in his case, it should have been done 6 months prior to 14th December, 1980, in terms of the Government's own guidelines. 27. Expanding his submissions, Mr. Sircar invited us to go through the remarks contained in the Annual Confidential Reports of the respondent No.1 for the years 1968, 1971 and 1972 on which the order of compulsory retirement was partly based. Mr. Sircar submitted that the Annual Confidential Reports of the respondent No.1 had been produced before the learned Single Judge, who had looked into the same right from the year 1963 up to the year 1985. The remarks made in the said Annual Confidential Reports have been set out by the learned Single Judge in his judgment, which is under appeal. Sircar submitted that the Annual Confidential Reports of the respondent No.1 had been produced before the learned Single Judge, who had looked into the same right from the year 1963 up to the year 1985. The remarks made in the said Annual Confidential Reports have been set out by the learned Single Judge in his judgment, which is under appeal. On a perusal of the extracts of the Annual Confidential Reports of the respondent No.1 set out in the judgment of the learned Single Judge, it appears that right from the year 1963 up to the year 1985, nothing adverse was found regarding the work and integrity of the respondent No.1. On the other hand, the consistent remarks in the said reports show that the respondent No.1 enjoyed the confidence of the authorities and his grading was consistently good. The learned Single Judge has pointed out that in 1963 certain adverse remarks had been made by the Reviewing Officer and his grading was recorded as average for the said year. However, the Annual Confidential Reports for the year 1971 and 1972, on which the Review Committee also based its decision to recommend that the respondent No. 1 be compulsorily retired, show that his grading was good for the year 1971, but was average for the year 1972. There are no adverse remarks, however, regarding the integrity of the respondent No.1. From the year 1980 till the year 1985 it has all along been recorded that nothing adverse as regards integrity was found against the respondent No.1. Even in the year 1983, when the news item appeared in the "Business Standard" the Reporting Officer observed that the respondent No. 1 was a very good officer and nothing adverse had been found as regards his integrity. In the Annual Confidential Report for the year 1985 it was again recorded that nothing adverse had been found regarding the integrity of the respondent No.1. 28. Mr. Sircar submitted that in view of the above, it could safely be said that there was no material whatsoever against the respondent No.1 on the basis of which the Review Committee could have recommended the premature retirement of the respondent No.1. On the other hand, nothing adverse had ever been recorded in the Annual Confidential Reports of the respondent No.1 throughout his career and his grading was consistently good. Mr. On the other hand, nothing adverse had ever been recorded in the Annual Confidential Reports of the respondent No.1 throughout his career and his grading was consistently good. Mr. Sircar submitted that merely because the respondent No.1 was graded as average for the years 1968 arid 1972, the same could not be held against the respondent No.1 since, thereafter, the same Reporting Officer consistently found that the respondent No.1 was intelligent, keen and had discharged his duties well. Mr. Sircar submitted that basing their decision on a vague news item published in the "Business Standard", the Review Committee had recommended the compulsory retirement of the respondent No. 1. Mr. Sircar submitted that the learned Trial Judge had taken all these materials into consideration in holding that the impugned order of compulsory retirement was not capable of being sustained. 29. Mr. Sircar them referred to the guidelines regarding premature retirement of a Government servant, given by the Central Government. Mr. Sircar pointed out that in the said guidelines it has been stated that the criteria to be followed by the Review Committee in making its recommendations is that Government employees whose integrity is doubtful will be retired. Government employees who are found to be ineffective will also be retired. The criteria to be followed also provides that while the entire service record of an Officer should be considered at the time of review, no employee should ordinarily be retired on grounds of ineffectiveness if his service during the preceding 5 years, or where he has been promoted to a higher post during that 5 years period, his service in the highest post, has been found satisfactory. The said guidelines further provide that the rules relating to pre-mature retirement should not be used to retire a Government servant on grounds of specific acts of misconduct, as a short cut to initiating formal disciplinary proceeding. The said guidelines further provide that the rules relating to pre-mature retirement should not be used to retire a Government servant on grounds of specific acts of misconduct, as a short cut to initiating formal disciplinary proceeding. The said guidelines also provide that once a decision has been taken by the appropriate authority to retain a Government employee beyond the age of 50 years in the case of employees referred to in Fundamental Rules 56(j) (i), or beyond the age of 55 years in the case of others, or beyond the date of completion of 30 years' service under Fundamental Rule 56(1) or 30 years of qualifying service for pension under Rule 48 of the C.C.S. (Pension) Rules, be would ordinarily continue in service till he attained the age of retirement. Mr. Sircar also referred to the time schedule contemplated in the said guidelines wherein the quarter in which the review is to be made has been specified. Mr. Sircar pointed out that in the case of the respondent No.1, such review should have been made during the period from January to March and the order on the basis of such review ought to have been made during the months of July to September of the same year. 30. Mr. Sircar then referred to the minutes of the meeting of the Review Committee held on 16th January, 1987, and submitted that it would be evident from the said minutes that except for the Annual Confidential Reports of the respondent No. 1 for the years 1968, 1971 and 1972 and the vague news item published in the "Business Standard" on 11th January, 1983, there were no other materials before the Review Committee on the basis of which the said Committee recommended premature retirement of the respondent No.1. 31. Mr. Sircar next contended that the very formation of the Review Committee was illegal, since it had not been constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Tea Act, 1963. Mr. Sircar pointed out that sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the said Act empowers the Tea Board to form Committees, while in the instant case the Review Committee had been constituted by the Chairman of the Board. Mr. Sircar submitted that its constitution being illegal from the very inception, any recommendation made by the Review Committee was illegal ineffective and void ab initio. 32. Mr. Mr. Sircar submitted that its constitution being illegal from the very inception, any recommendation made by the Review Committee was illegal ineffective and void ab initio. 32. Mr. Sircar them pointed out that there had been no specific item in the agenda of the meeting of the Board held on 17th January, 1987 regarding the respondent No. 1's case. Mr. Sircar submitted that the decision taken at the meeting to retire the respondent No.1 prematurely was illegal and void, such decision having been taken under the heading "Any other business". Mr. Sircar submitted that a matter of such grave consequence to the respondent No.1 could not have been decided at the meeting without a specific agenda to that effect. In this connection, Mr. Sircar referred to and relied on Chapter 6 of the 7th Edition of Shackleton on "The law and Practice of Meeting". The said chapter deals with convening of meetings, and part 2 of the said Chapter deals with the agenda of meetings. In the discussion on the agenda of a meeting, the learned author observed as follows :- "It is usual to include in the agenda the item 'Any other business' and matters of on informal or unimportant nature could be transacted under this heading. The Chairman should not however permit a matter of major importance to be raised under this item unless it is urgent, i.e. that action needs to be taken before the next meeting. He should be vigilant to ensure that those whose main interest lies in the passing of resolutions do not use 'other business' to bounce a resolution through a meeting, most of whose members may by then be ready to go home." Mr. Sircar submitted that under the item "Any other business", only matters of an informal or unimportant nature could be transacted at a meeting. 33. Mr. Sircar submitted that from the timing of the recommendation made by the Review Committee and the decision taken by the Tea , Board to retire the respondent No. 1 pre-maturely, it would be evident that the said decision had been taken hurriedly and without proper consideration of the facts. In this connection, Mr. Sircar referred to the case of (7) Dolgobinda Kayal v. The West Bengal Board of Secondary Education and Ors., reported in 1991(1) CLJ at page 222. In this connection, Mr. Sircar referred to the case of (7) Dolgobinda Kayal v. The West Bengal Board of Secondary Education and Ors., reported in 1991(1) CLJ at page 222. In the said case a learned Single Judge of this Court was considering the case of a Headmaster against whom a decision had been taken at an emergency meeting of the school committee to place him under suspension and to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him, despite the fact that there was no agenda to the said effect in the notice of the meeting. The learned Single Judge quashed the order of suspension and the chargesheet issued against the Headmaster on the ground that there was no specific item in the agenda in the notice of the meeting regarding initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the said teacher. 34. Mr. Sircar then submitted that there was no indication in the impugned order dated 17th January, 1987 that the Board had formed a proper opinion before passing the said order under Clause (j) of Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules. Mr. Sircar pointed out that the order simply stated that the Board was of the opinion that it was in the public interest to prematurely retire the respondent No.1 from service. In support of his said contention, Mr. Sircar also referred to the case of Union of India v. J. N. Sinha (supra). Mr. Sircar submitted that in the said case, the Supreme Court had observed that when an appropriate authority bona fide forms opinion that a Government servant be retired in public interest, he can pass an order of compulsory retirement and such opinion was not open to challenge before the Courts. The order of compulsory retirement was, however, open to challenge only on the ground that either the requisite opinion was not formed or that the order was passed arbitrarily or on collateral grounds. Mr. Sircar submitted with emphasis that in the instant case there was no formation of opinion and the order of compulsory retirement had been passed either mala fide or mechanically. Mr. Sircar then referred to the case of J. D. Srivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) on which Mr. Mitra had also placed reliance. Mr. Sircar submitted with emphasis that in the instant case there was no formation of opinion and the order of compulsory retirement had been passed either mala fide or mechanically. Mr. Sircar then referred to the case of J. D. Srivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) on which Mr. Mitra had also placed reliance. In the said case also, the Supreme Court was pleased to observe that, although, the power to retire a Government servant compulsorily in public interest in terms of a service Rule was absolute, it was necessary for the concerned authority to form a bona fide opinion that it was necessary in the public interest to pass such an order. If such decision was based on collateral grounds or the decision was arbitrary, it was liable to be interfered with by the Courts. Mr. Sircar also relied on the case of (8) Baldev Raj Chadra v. Union of India and Ors, reported in AIR 1981 SC at page 70, in which the Supreme Court observed that in order to pass an order of compulsory retirement, the authority must form the requisite opinion-non subjective satisfaction but objective and bona fide and based on relevant material. The Supreme Court further observed that the requisite opinion is that the retirement of the victim is "in public interest"-not personal, political or other interest, but solely governed by the interest of the public service. The last case referred to by Mr. Sircar on this point is the case of (9) N. C. Gargi v. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 1987 SC at page 65. Relying on its earlier decision in the case of Union of India v. J N. Sinha (supra) the Supreme Court held that the power of compulsory retirement under Rule 3.25(d) of the Punjab Civil Service Rules Vol. I, Part I (similar to Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules) can be exercised subject to the conditions mentioned in the rule, one of which is that the concerned authority must be of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so. Mr. Sircar submitted that the impugned order of the Tea Board dated 17th January, 1987, had been rightly struck down by the learned Single Judge in the absence of any formation of opinion by the concerned authority before it passed the order of compulsory retirement. 35. It was then submitted by Mr. Mr. Sircar submitted that the impugned order of the Tea Board dated 17th January, 1987, had been rightly struck down by the learned Single Judge in the absence of any formation of opinion by the concerned authority before it passed the order of compulsory retirement. 35. It was then submitted by Mr. Sircar that the respondent No.1 had not been paid 3 months' salary simultaneously with the passing of the impugned order under Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules, which payment was contemplated in the said Rule itself. Mr. Sircar submitted that even on that score the impugned order of compulsory retirement could not be sustained. In support of his contention, Mr. Sircar referred to the case of (10) M/s. National Iron and Steel Company Ltd. and Ors. v. The State of West Bengal and Anr, reported in AIR 1967 SC at page 1206. In the said case, among other questions, the Supreme Court was considering payment of retrenchment compensation under the provisions of Section 25F(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Supreme Court held that Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act contemplated payment to the worker at the time when he was retrenched from service. Although, the worker's services has been terminated with effect from 17th November, 1968, the workman was asked to collect his dues from the Cash Office on 20th November, 1958. The Supreme Court was of the view that the provisions of Section 25F had not been complied with since the payment of compensation was not made simultaneously with the order seeking to terminate the worker's services. Mr. Sircar also relied on a Division Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of (11) Y. Ganga Raju and Ors. v. Railway Board and Ors., reported in 1983(1) Services Law Reporter at page 686. In the, said case the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was considering Rule 2046(h) of the Railway Establishment Code, which also provides for compulsory retirement and the payment of 3 months' salary in lieu of notice. Their Lordships held that payment of pay and allowances in lieu of the notice period had to be made simultaneously at the time of retirement. Their Lordships further held that an order of compulsory retirement without simultaneous payment of 3 months' salary for the notice period, was illegal. Mr. Their Lordships held that payment of pay and allowances in lieu of the notice period had to be made simultaneously at the time of retirement. Their Lordships further held that an order of compulsory retirement without simultaneous payment of 3 months' salary for the notice period, was illegal. Mr. Sircar submitted that since simultaneous payment of 2 months salary had not been made to the respondent No. 1, the order of compulsory retirement could not be sustained, as there was non-compliance with the provisions of Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules. 36. Mr. Sircar lastly submitted, that, as has been provided in the guidelines given by the Government itself, the rules relating to pre-mature retirement should not be used to retire a Government servant on ground of specific acts of mis-conduct as a short cut to initiate formal disciplinary Proceedings. Mr. Sircar submitted that the Courts had also repeatedly deprecated reliance upon state records for the purpose of passing an order of compulsory retirement. In this context Mr. Sircar referred to the case of (12) Ram Ekbal Sharma and Anr. v. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1990 SC at page 1368. In the said case, the Supreme Court observed that in cases of compulsory retirement, the Court was competent to lift the veil in order to find out whether the order is based on any mis-conduct of the Government servant concerned or whether the order had been made bona fide without any oblique or extreneous purposes. In the said case, the order of compulsory retirement was passed on the ground that the Government servant had been found to have committed grave financial irregularities leading to financial loss to the State. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the impugned order cannot but be said to have been made by way of punishment and, accordingly, quashed the same. Mr. Sircar pointed out that in the case of J.D. Srivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) the Supreme Court had cautioned against reliance on state records in passing an order of compulsory retirement. Mr. Sircar pointed out that in the case of J.D. Srivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) the Supreme Court had cautioned against reliance on state records in passing an order of compulsory retirement. In the said case, the authorities chose to rely on entries that had been made 20 years before the decision was taken to retire the Government servant compulsorily, Deprocating such practice, the Supreme Court observed that dependence on such dead entries cannot be placed for retiring a person compulsorily, particularly when the officer concerned had been promoted subsequent to such entries having been made Similar sentiments have been expressed in the case of Brij Mohan Singh Chopra v. State of Punjab (supra). In the said case, the Supreme Court went further to observe that though the entire service record of an employee may be considered while considering the question of his premature retirement, if the service record of the last 10 years of his service do not indicate any deficiency in his work and conduct, it would be unjust and unreasonable to retire his prematurely on the basis of entries which may have been awarded to him prior to that period Mr. Sircar pointed out that in the case of Baldev Raj Chadha v. Union of India (supra), the Supreme Court had held that if an officer had earned no adverse entries at least for 5 years immediately before the order of compulsory retirement, it would not be desirable to order premature retirement, if during the last 5 years of his service the work and conduct of the employee was good. 37. Mr. Sircar concluded his submissions by submitting that in the instant case also, apart from the Annual Confidential Reports for the years 1968, 1971 and 1972, there were no other materials, except for the vague news item in the Business Standard of 11th January, 1983, before the Review Committee, for taking a decision to retire the respondent No. 1 compulsorily. Moreover, there were no adverse remarks in the said reports regarding the integrity of the respondent No.1. On the other hand, after 1972, the grading of the work of the respondent No.1 was consistently good and no adverse remarks had been made against the respondent No. 1 during such period. Mr. Moreover, there were no adverse remarks in the said reports regarding the integrity of the respondent No.1. On the other hand, after 1972, the grading of the work of the respondent No.1 was consistently good and no adverse remarks had been made against the respondent No. 1 during such period. Mr. Sircar submitted that in the light or the observations made by the Supreme Court in the various cases cited above, no interference was called for by the Appeal Court with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 38. We have carefully considered the various submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and we do not find any merit in the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants. 39. From the minutes of the meeting of the Review Committee held on 16th January, 1987, it is quite obvious that a except for the Annual Confidential Reports of the respondent No.1 for the years 1968, 1971 & 1972 and the news item in the "Business Standard", which in our view is entirely vague, there was no other material which was taken into consideration by the said Committee in making the recommendation that the respondent No.1 be compulsorily retired. In our view there is nothing in the Annual Confidential Reports for the said three years, on the basis or which the Review Committee could have made such recommendation. Except for the grading "average'" for the years 1968 and 1972, there is no adverse remark against the performance and/or integrity of the respondent no. 1 during his entire service career. On the other hand, as has been very correctly pointed out by Mr. Sircar, the grading of the respondent No.1 for the subsequent years right up to the year 1985, was consistently good. Apart from the above, the respondent No.1 was given promotion at different stages, and the last of such promotions was to the post of Deputy Director as late as in the month of April, 1985. As was observed by the Supreme Court in the case of J. D. Srivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) and also in the case of (13) D. Ramaswami v. State of Tamilnadu, reported in AIR 1982 SC at page 793, no dependence could be placed on stale entries for retiring a person prematurely, particularly when the officer concerned had been given promotion subsequent to such entries. 40. 40. Nothing has been shown on behalf of the appellants to indicate that there were any adverse remarks as to the integrity of the respondent No.1 and/or his efficiency, which led to the passing of the impugned order' of compulsory retirement. The specific instances relating to alleged misuse of his official position, as set out in paragraph 5(d) of the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed on behalf of the Tea Board and its Chairman and Secretary, were not before the Review Committee and no reliance can be placed thereon for justifying the order of compulsory retirement passed against the respondent No.1 by referring to the said allegations. As has been observed by the Supreme Court in the case of (14) Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors., reported in AIR 1978 SC at page 851, an order passed by the authority cannot be validated by the introduction of new materials by way of affidavits. In any event, we are to consider whether there were any materials before the Review Committee which justified the recommendation that the respondent No.1 be prematurely retired. Alas, we do not find such material, and even the Tea Board appears to have acted either mechanically or in a mala fide manner in relying on such recommendation and passing the order of compulsory retirement against the respondent No.1. 41. We are also in agreement with the submissions of Mr. A. P. Sircar that there was no formation of opinion by the Tea Board while making the impugned order of compulsory retirement. The order merely stated that the Board was of the opinion that in the public interest it was necessary to retire the respondent No. 1 prematurely. Except for such bland statement, nothing has been stated in the impugned order as to what led the Tea Board to form such opinion. Obviously, it was the recommendation of the Review Committee which was the basis for the formation of the opinion of the Tea Board, and, as we have held earlier, there were no materials before the Review Committee which justified such recommendation. Obviously, it was the recommendation of the Review Committee which was the basis for the formation of the opinion of the Tea Board, and, as we have held earlier, there were no materials before the Review Committee which justified such recommendation. The opinion of the Tea Board must, therefore, also be held to have been formed mechanically or motivatedly without any material and/or factual basis The Supreme Court in the various cases cited above have categorically observed that, although, the Government's power to pass an order of compulsory retirement is absolute, the pre-condition for passing such an order was the formation of an opinion that it was necessary in the public interest to do so. In our view, there was no such formation of opinion and only mechanically it was recorded that in the opinion of the Board such order was required to be made. 42. We cannot also accept the submission of Mr. Mitra that if there was no specific item in the agenda, it was not for the respondent No.1 to raise such objection, but that only the persons for whom the notice of the meeting was intended, was entitled to raise such objection. A matter which would have serious consequences for the respondent No. 1, could not, in our view, have been considered by the Board under the item "Any other business". The fact that such decision was taken under the said item the very next day after the Review Committee made its recommendation, clearly shows that the decision was hurriedly taken by the Board without considering as to whether there were really any materials against the respondent No. 1 which could have led to the entertainment of serious doubts regarding his work performance and integrity. 43. In fact, such decision is also contrary to the guidelines given by the Central Government in this regard in its Memo dated 5th January, 1978. In the said guidelines, the Central Government had mentioned that while the entire service record of an officer should be considered at the time of review, no employee should ordinarily be retired on the ground of ineffectiveness if his services during the preceding 5 years or where he has been promoted to a higher post during that 5 years period, his service in the highest post, has been found satisfactory. As has been found by the learned Single Judge, with whom we agree, the grading of the respondent No. 1's abilities had been consistently good after 1972, including the 5 years preceding the date on which the order of compulsory retirement was passed. Furthermore, there were no adverse remarks against the respondent No.1 during the said period. On the other hand, just one and a half years prior to the passing of the order of compulsory retirement, the respondent No.1 had been promoted to the post of Deputy Director, which carried with it a good deal of responsibility and there was nothing on record to show that his service in such prom,ted post had not been satisfactory. The decision to retire the respondent No.1 prematurely was based on stale entries in his Annual Confidential Reports, which were also not of such nature as to warrant an order of premature retirement. Although, it has been observed that an order of compulsory retirement is not a penal measure and does not carry any stigma with it, it cannot also be denied that when such an order is passed, a person's abilities and integrity are under scrutiny. 44. We are of the view that the specific instances got out in paragraph 6(d) of the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed on behalf of the Tea Board, could have been the basis for initiating disciplinary proceedings against the respondent No.1, as such of the said instances were specific acts of misconduct. Instead of initiating such disciplinary proceedings, the Tea Board chose to take a short cut method of getting rid of the respondent No.1 by passing an order of compulsory retirement, which again is contrary to the guidelines given by the Central Government. We accept the submissions of Mr. Sircar that in the said guidelines, it has been specifically provided that the rules relating to premature retirement should not be used to retire a Government servant on specific grounds of misconduct, as a short cut to initiate disciplinary proceedings. If the appellants have chosen to rely on the specific acts of misconduct, mentioned in paragraph 6(d) of the affidavit-in-opposition to justify the order of compulsory retirement, the inevitable and inescapable conclusion is that the appellants had acted illegally and in colourable exercise of power in not initiating disciplinary proceedings against the respondent No.1. 45. If the appellants have chosen to rely on the specific acts of misconduct, mentioned in paragraph 6(d) of the affidavit-in-opposition to justify the order of compulsory retirement, the inevitable and inescapable conclusion is that the appellants had acted illegally and in colourable exercise of power in not initiating disciplinary proceedings against the respondent No.1. 45. In view of our aforesaid findings and also in view of the fact that the respondent No.1 would have ordinarily retired on 31st December, 1988, we do not think it necessary to decide the other submissions relating to the competence of the Chairman of the Tea Board to appoint the Review-Committee under Section 8 of the Tea Act, 1953. 46. We also need not go into the other questions as to whether the appellants were justified in reviewing the case of the respondent No.1 after he had attained the age of 58 years or whether the order of compulsory retirement was bad since the respondent No.1 had not been paid three months salary simultaneously with the passing of the said order by the Tea Board. 47. We are of the view that there were no materials before the Review Committee for making a recommendation that the respondent No. 1 be compulsorily retired and the order of the Tea Board passed on the basis of such recommendation must be held to be illegal. We are in complete agreement with the findings of the learned Trial Judge on the various points raised in the writ petition and canvassed before us also and we do not think that any interferance is called for in this appeal. 48. The appeal is accordingly dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. 49. The appellants are directed to give immediate effect to the orders passed by the learned Single Judge and to pay to the respondent No.1 all his arrear salaries and other monetary benefits, including retirement benefits, as would be admissible to him taking his date of retirement as 31st December, 1988. Such payments are to be made within a period of one month from the date of communication of this order. 50. Prayer for stay of operation of the judgment and order made on behalf of the appellant is considered and refused. All parties to act on a signed copy of the operative portion of the judgment on the usual undertaking. Mukherjee, J. : I agree.