S. Padmanabhan, J. 1. The petitioner is a public limited company in the private sector. One of the conditions in the long-term settlements entered into by the company with the workers represented by trade unions is that whenever an employee retires from service or is dead, a dependent-relative will have to be provided employment in the unskilled category. 2. One Ayyappan, an unskilled worker, retired on 31st March, 1985. The second respondent, one of the recognized unions, representing some of the employees, claimed that Venugopal, son of Ayyappan, should be appointed on the basis of the said clause in the settlement. The petitioner refused, on the ground that one Viswanathan, brother of Ayyappan, was already appointed. 3. Government referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, Alappuzha, by Exhibit P-3 award, the Industrial Tribunal held that Venugopal is entitled to get employment as unskilled worker. Direction was given to appoint him in the earliest vacancy. This original petition is for quashing the award. 4. Main grounds of attack against Exhibit P-3 are: (1) there was no industrial dispute in the sense of a dispute or difference between employer and employees; (ii) issue related only to an individual, who is not an employee and the cause was not espoused by a substantial portion of the workmen; and (iii) even going by the settlement, the brother of Ayyappan was given employment and hence the question of again giving employment to his son does not arise. Incidentally, Mr. Pathros Mathai also said that the condition in the settlement is not enforceable as it is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution concerning equality and equal opportunity in public employment. 5. Last two contentions cannot, at any rate stand scrutiny. The petitioner is an undertaking in the private sector and it is not a "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Equality of opportunity relating to employment or appointment is applicable only to any office under the State. Under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workmen, even otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings, shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. Admittedly, the petitioner was a consenting party to the settlement, which contains the impugned condition. That condition was in vogue in the company from 1957 onwards, as found by the Industrial Tribunal. Admittedly, the petitioner was a consenting party to the settlement, which contains the impugned condition. That condition was in vogue in the company from 1957 onwards, as found by the Industrial Tribunal. So also, it was found by the Industrial Tribunal on facts that appointment of Viswanathan, brother of Ayyappan, was in 1970, long before the retirement of Ayyappan in 1985, and the appointment was not a relative of any serving employee. Ayyappan repeatedly wanted his son to be appointed in obedience to the clause in the settlement. For detailed factual and legal reasons, the Tribunal found that Venugopal, son of Ayyappan, is entitled to appointment under Clause 40 of the impugned settlement within the limited powers of interference with the conclusions of statutory tribunals in a proceeding under Article 226 or 227. I do not feel I will be justified in interfering on those aspects. 6. That takes us to the first two grounds. "Industrial dispute", under Section 2(k), mean, any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person. In Workmen of Sagar Talkies v. Odeon Cinema, 1957 (12) FJR 153, the High Court of Madras held that there should be a "industrial dispute" before such dispute is referred for adjudication as an "industrial' dispute" and before a dispute could be said to be a dispute between employers and workmen, relationship of employers and workman should be established between the parties. Counsel said that Venugopal was not an employee or worker and hence, dispute regarding his employment cannot be one relating to employment, non-employment or terms of employment or conditions of labour. I do not think the contention is sound. 7. There was a long term settlement, which is admittedly a conciliation settlement, and as such, a statutory settlement under Section 18 binding on the petitioner, who is bound to accept and fulfill the same. Dispute was raised by one of the recognized unions when the petitioner refused to give effect to that term regarding agreed condition of employment It is an Industrial dispute under Section 2(k) though it relates only to one person as it relates to non-employment. Dispute was raised by one of the recognized unions when the petitioner refused to give effect to that term regarding agreed condition of employment It is an Industrial dispute under Section 2(k) though it relates only to one person as it relates to non-employment. In Management of Indian Bank v. Industrial Tribunal, 1977 (51) FJR 76, the words "any person", occurring in Section 2(k), were held to include a person who is not a workman. It is enough if he is a person in whose conditions of employment, etc., the workers are directly or substantially interested or with whom they have a community of interest. Whether a person satisfies this test or not is a question of fact in each case. Though the words "any person", occuring in Section 2(k), may not apply to any and everybody in the wide world, it can take in a person in the employment or non-employment or with the conditions of labour, of whom the workmen themselves are directly and substantially interested. Demand was in terms of a condition of settlement. It definitely falls within the definition of Section 2(k) as it relates to the terms of employment of workmen (Management of United Textiles v. United Textiles Labour Association, 1983 I LLJ 435. I am in agreement with that proposition of law. Therefore, the first objection has to be rejected. 8. In the decision in Chittadi Estate v. Industrial Tribunal 1959 (2) LLJ 184, a Division Bench of this Court said that the dispute was relating to the cause of a single individual and there was no evidence to show that the cause of the individual was ever espoused by the fellow workmen in the establishment and hence the reference must be held to be invalid in law. On facts, this case stands on a different footing. It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that there are more than 900 workmen under it and the cause of Venugopal was espoused only by the second respondent union having membership of only twenty and hence the dispute, not espoused by a substantial section, cannot stand. 9. But, it has to be remembered, the dispute is one coming under Section 2(k) for the reasons already stated and it was raised by a union of workers recognized by the petitioner, whatever be its membership. 9. But, it has to be remembered, the dispute is one coming under Section 2(k) for the reasons already stated and it was raised by a union of workers recognized by the petitioner, whatever be its membership. The second respondent is admittedly a signatory to the long-term settlement, from which the right flows. Section 18(3) provides that a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding, which has become enforceable, is binding on all parties specified in Clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Sub-section (3). Section 18(3)(d) makes it clear that, when a party referred to in Clause (a) or (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who are employed in the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute, and all persons, who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part, would be bound by the settlement. In order to bind the workmen, it is not necessary to show that the said workmen belong to the union which was a party to the dispute before the conciliation. Whole policy of Section 18 appears to be to give an extended operation to the settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings, and that is the object with which the four categories of persons bound by such settlement are specified in Section 18(3). A minority union can validly raise an industrial dispute, as Section 2(k) does not restrict the ambit of the definition of the "industrial dispute" to a dispute between an employer and a recognised majority union, but takes within its wide sweep any dispute or difference between employer and workmen, including a minority union, Tata Chemicals Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 1978 (2) LLJ 22 10. It, therefore, follows that on factual and legal questions, the Industrial Tribunal was justified in holding that there was an industrial dispute and that the workman was entitled to be given appointment on the basis of the terms of long-term settlement agreed to by the petitioner. Exhibit P-3 requires no interference. Original Petition is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.