G. B. PATNAIK, J. ( 1 ) THE appellate order of the Additional District Magistrate, Mayurbhanj, in Regulation-2, Appeal Case No. 15 of 1975, annexed as Annexure-1, has been assailed in this writ application. By the said order, the appellate authority set aside the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer and held the transfer to be a valid one. ( 2 ) THE petitioner's case is that he is the sole legal heir of the recorded owner of the property, Bisha Ho belonging to a member of the Scheduled Tribes. The predecessor-in-interest of opposite parties 1 to 6 got a fraudulent deed of transfer purported to be one executed by said Bisha Ho without any prior permission of the competent authority and took possession of the land in question. The petitioner was serving in Army and he sent an application to the Sub-Divisional Officer invoking his jurisdiction under Regulation 2 of 1956 alleging therein that the transfer in question is in contravention of the provisions of the said Regulation and, therefore, possession of the land should be given to him. On the basis of the said application filed by the petitioner in the year 1972, a proceeding under the Regulation was initiated. The Sub-Divisional Officer in the said proceeding came to the conclusion that there was no permission of the competent authority to sell the land by the Scheduled Tribe transferor in favour of the non-Scheduled Tribe transferee. It was further held that Bisha Ho was dead since 1-5-1940 and, therefore, the alleged transfer dated 5-8-1963 was the outcome of forgery and consequently the transfer was invalid. With these findings, the Sub-Divisional Officer directed the transferee to give possession of the land to the present petitioner. This order of the Sub-Divisional Officer though has not been filed, but the same has been quoted in extenso in the writ application itself. Being aggrieved by the said order, the father of present opposite parties 1 to 6, Barju Mahanta, filed an appeal. Before the appellate authority, the appellant produced the document of permission permitting the transfer of the land in question. The appellate authority came to the conclusion that there was a permission for transfer of the land by a Scheduled Tribe person in favour of a non-Scheduled Tribe person and, therefore, the same could not be said to be hit by the provisions of Regulation 2 of 1956. The appellate authority came to the conclusion that there was a permission for transfer of the land by a Scheduled Tribe person in favour of a non-Scheduled Tribe person and, therefore, the same could not be said to be hit by the provisions of Regulation 2 of 1956. On the question of fraud alleged to have been committed by the transferee and the finding that Bisha Ho was dead since 1949, the appellate authority came to the conclusion that those matters would not be within the jurisdiction of the authority under Regulation 2 of 1956 and would be a matter for the Civil Court to decide the same. On those findings, by the impugned order, the appellate authority set aside the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer and, therefore, the petitioner has approached this Court. ( 3 ) MR. Jena appearing for the petitioner raises two contentions in assailing the order of the Additional District Magistrate :- (I) The finding that there was permission for sale by the competent authority cannot be held to be a finding in accordance with law and the said permission cannot be said to be a permission under the Regulation and, therefore, there has been violation of the provisions of the Regulation; and (II) In view of the categorical finding of the Revenue Officer that Bisha Ho was dead since 1949, the alleged sale by Bisha Ho on 17-8-l963 is the outcome of forgery and, therefore, the same is invalid and inoperative, the appellate authority was not justified in ignoring the said finding on the ground that it would be a matter for the Civil Court and it would not be within the competence of the authority under Regulation 2 of 1956 to go into the said question. ( 4 ) ON perusal of the provisions contained in the Regulation as well as the order of the appellate authority, we do not find any substance in either of the submissions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. So far as the first submission of Mr. Jena is concerned, reliance has been placed on Rule 3 of the Orissa Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable Property (By Scheduled Tribes) Rules, 1959, and according to Mr. So far as the first submission of Mr. Jena is concerned, reliance has been placed on Rule 3 of the Orissa Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable Property (By Scheduled Tribes) Rules, 1959, and according to Mr. Jena since Rule 3 lays down the procedure for applying for transfer and the Additional District Magistrate has found that the application for transfer had been made by the transferee and not the transferor, permission, if any, must be held to be not in accordance with the Rules and, therefore, the said permission is vitiated thereby attracting the provisions of S. 3 (1) of the Regulation 2 of 1956. We are unable to accept this submission of the learned counsel. Undoubtedly Rule 3 prescribes that a member of a Scheduled Tribe who intends to transfer any of his immovable property situated within a Scheduled Area to a member of non-Scheduled Tribe shall submit an application for the purpose and obtain the prior consent in writing of the competent authority under S. 3 (1) of the Regulation. But if an application is made by the transferee and the competent authority on that application accords permission, the permission none the less will be a permission by the competent authority. S. 3 (1) of the Regulation stipulates that any transfer of immovable property by a member of Scheduled Tribe shall be null and void and of no force unless made in favour of another member of a Scheduled Tribe or with the previous consent in writing of the competent authority. Therefore, previous consent in writing of the competent authority is an essential pre-requisite in case of a transfer by a Scheduled Tribe in favour of a non-Scheduled Tribe person. If that previous consent in writing is available on record, but the same was accorded on the application of the transferee, the consent in writing none the less remains as a permission and, therefore, it cannot be said that it was not the consent in writing by the competent authority. In our considered opinion, therefore, the so-called permission accorded by the competent authority on the basis of an application filed by the transferee cannot be held to be vitiated. ( 5 ) THAT apart, in course of hearing of this writ application before us, the certified copy of the order-sheet was produced by Mr. In our considered opinion, therefore, the so-called permission accorded by the competent authority on the basis of an application filed by the transferee cannot be held to be vitiated. ( 5 ) THAT apart, in course of hearing of this writ application before us, the certified copy of the order-sheet was produced by Mr. Misra appearing for opposite parties 1 to 6 and the said order-sheet indicates that the application had been filed by Pradhan Bisha Ho praying for permission to sell the land in village Badabaliposi. This being the position, there is no justification for the grievance that permission was accorded on the application of the transferee and not the transferor. In any view of the matter, the finding of the Additional District Magistrate that there was consent in writing of the competent authority for the sale in question, cannot be held to be vitiated in any manner whatsoever so as to be interfered with by this Court. The first submission of Mr. Jena accordingly stands rejected. ( 6 ) COMING to the second question, Mr. Jena argues with vehemence that it would be open for the authority under the Regulation to enquire into all sorts of invalidity of a transfer and, therefore, when the Sub-Divisional Officer came to the conclusion that Bisha Ho was dead since 1949 and the transfer was the outcome of forgery, it was well within his jurisdiction and the Additional District Magistrate committed an error in holding that it would be only within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to go into the question and it was not competent for the Authority under the Regulation to enquire into the same. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on two decisions of this Court reported in (1970) 36 CLT 11 (Himarika Ramuda v. Rondagorri Bhuchhanna) and (1972) 38 CLT 1213 (Makunda Nayako v. Suna Omanatya ). A bare perusal of the provisions contained in S. 3 (1) of the Regulation makes it explicitly clear that an authority under the Regulation is required to enquire into the question whether the transfer in question is vitiated for absence of previous consent in writing of the competent authority so as to hold the sale to be void and pass appropriate orders with regard to the property covered by the sale. In the two decisions relied upon by Mr. In the two decisions relied upon by Mr. Jena what has been indicated by this Court is that it is open for the authority to find out who is the real transferee. For that purpose, the authority under the Regulation can lift the veil and if he comes to the conclusion that the real transferee is a non-scheduled Tribe and though the document of transfer indicates that the transferee is a Scheduled Tribe man, then the authority can exercise his power under the Regulation. In none of these two cases, it has been stated that an authority under the Regulation can examine and enquire into all types of invalidity of a deed of transfer. In our considered opinion, the Additional District Magistrate was fully justified in coming to the conclusion that the allegations of forgery and fraud could be appropriately dealt with by the Civil Court and it could not have been enquired into by an authority under the Regulation. We do not find any error to have been committed by the said appellate authority in coming to the aforesaid conclusion. Accordingly, the second submission of Mr. Jena is rejected. ( 7 ) BOTH the contentions having failed, the writ application is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. ( 8 ) D. M. PATNAIK, J. :- I agree. Petition dismissed.