JUDGMENT - DESAI A.A., J.:—The petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition against the proceeding initiated by Civil Suit to declare notice of Election as null and void and perpetual injunction from holding election in pursuant thereof, of the Co-operative Society. 2. The petitioner is a specified society as envisaged under section 73-G of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It has an affiliation with the respondent No. 5 Society. As per sub-clause (xv of Clause 24 of the bye-laws of the petitioner Society, the Board of Directors has to elect one amongst them to be nominated on the respondent No. 5 society. Respondent No. 4 is a nominee of the Collector, who has on 18 -6-1991 issued a notice convening meeting on 29-6-1991 of the Board of Directors of the petitioner society to elect such nominee. 3. Respondent No. 2, Narhari Barde is a member of the petitioner as well the respondent society. According to him, as per Clause 29 of the Bye-laws of the respondent No. 5 society such nominee is to be elected from the general body of the petitioner society. He, therefore, filed a civil Suit bearing No. 1484/1991. Therein he claimed a declaration that the notice dated 18-6-1991 issued by respondent No. 4 is illegal and void ab initio and the election of the nominee is to be held from amongst the members of general body. He further claimed perpetual injunction against holding of an election of the nominee from the members of the Board of Directors. The respondent No. 2 also applied for grant of temporary injunction against holding of election on 29-6-1991. The respondent No. 1 Civil Court on 28 -6-1991 granted the injunction as prayed. 4. Mr. Bobde, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner made a submission that the Civil Court entertained a suit and granted temporary injunction particularly when there is a patent lack of jurisdiction. The dispute as involved in the proceedings on the face of it pertains to the non-compliance of the bye-law which is covered by Rule 81 of the Maharashtra Specified Co-operative Societies Elections to Committees Rules, 1971 (for brevity the rule of 1971). Such dispute can be referred to under section 144-T of the Act to the Commissioner of Division. The dispute as involved in the proceedings on the face of it pertains to the non-compliance of the bye-law which is covered by Rule 81 of the Maharashtra Specified Co-operative Societies Elections to Committees Rules, 1971 (for brevity the rule of 1971). Such dispute can be referred to under section 144-T of the Act to the Commissioner of Division. The Commissioner who is a specified authority under the said provision comes within the definition of Co-operative Court as laid down under sub-section (10)(aii) of section 2 of the Act. Section 163 of the Act completely ousts the jurisdiction of the Civil Court as regards the matter enumerated thereunder. The proceeding through civil suit as initiated is, therefore, liable to be quashed by issuing a writ of prohibition. Mr. Bobde relying on the decision reported in 1977 Mh.L.J. 587, (Shantilal v. N.A. Rangaswami)1 (Full Bench) made a submission that when the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction that by itself causes substantial injury and creates a serious prejudice. Such person need not wait till the completion of such proceedings, and is not liable to be forced to avail ordinary remedy as provided under the Code. This Court in extra ordinary jurisdiction would be justified in issuing a prerogative writ of prohibition. 5. Mr. Aney, the learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 plaintiff relied on the decisions reported in :— I) A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 213—(Narayana Chetty v. Income-tax Officer)2. II) A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 142—(Sales Tax Officer v. Shiv Ratan)3. III) A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1274—(Govinda v. Union of India)4. He made a submission that the writ of prohibition has a primary purpose of supervision over the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court. The lack of jurisdiction must be apparent on the face of record. Issuance of writ of prohibition would be justified if there is complete absence of jurisdiction in the Court. If it requires any further investigation either on the question of facts or law, the writ of prohibition, needs to be refused. According to him, a question regarding interpretation of the provisions or its applicability is such further investigation. 6. No doubt question of absence or presence of jurisdiction is to be ascertained from the prima facie averment as made in the plaint, without there being a further probing. According to him, a question regarding interpretation of the provisions or its applicability is such further investigation. 6. No doubt question of absence or presence of jurisdiction is to be ascertained from the prima facie averment as made in the plaint, without there being a further probing. However, any amount of argument advanced to debate on the question of applicability of law by itself does not deter the Court from issuing a writ of prohibition. To entertain such debate is not a part of the investigation. After the debate if the High Court reaches to a definite conclusion on taking the averment in the plaint as they are that the Civil Court completely lacks of jurisdiction, writ of prohibition could justifiably be issued. 7. Mr. Aney invited my attention to section 164 of the Act, which reads thus:— “No suit shall be instituted against a society, or any of its officers, in respect of any act touching the business of the society, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to the Registrar or left at his office, stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims, and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left.” The submission is, the Civil Court possesses the power to try the suit in respect of the matter touching the business of a society. As such, there is no complete lack of jurisdiction. The only requirement is the compliance of the issuance of a notice to the Registrar. The submission is wholly erroneous. The question as posed and under adjudication is, whether the Civil Court possesses even limited jurisdiction in respect of the election dispute as involved in the suit. Nature of civil suit as envisaged by section 164 of the Act is confined to the matters touching to the business of the society. Holding the election or deputing the representative or nominee cannot be said to be a business of any society. Business of the society is as provided under the byelaws. Election of Committee or nominees are the modulates to carry the business. However, such process of election could not by itself be a business of the society. The suit as filed is not covered by the provision. Business of the society is as provided under the byelaws. Election of Committee or nominees are the modulates to carry the business. However, such process of election could not by itself be a business of the society. The suit as filed is not covered by the provision. Even otherwise section 164 issues a mandate of prohibition against the institution of suit itself, unless the requirement of notice is complied with. The learned Counsel tried to urge that section 164 is analogous to section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sub-section (2) of section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code empowers, in a case of emergency with the leave of Court to dispense with the compliance of issuing notice. Accordingly the plaintiff has also made an application to the Civil Court to dispense with the condition as laid down under section 164 of the Act. This submission is equally erroneous. Provisions of section 164 may be analogous with section 80 of the Code. However, there is no provision analogous to sub-section (2) of section 80, Civil Procedure Code, under section 164 of the Act. Section 164 does not empower the Court to dispense with issuing of such notice as envisaged. The mandate of section 164 of the Act unlike section 80 of the Code is absolute. Since the institution of the suit in absence of requisite itself is prohibited, the Civil Court acted wholly without jurisdiction in entertaining it. Lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of record. 8. Mr. Aney then invited my attention to section 163 of the Act. According to him, this section ousts the jurisdiction of the Civil Court as regards the matter enumerated therein. Section 163(1)(b) which is relevant, reads thus:— “163(1) Save as expressly provided in this Act, no Civil or Revenue Court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of— (a) * * * (b) any dispute required to be referred to the Co-operative Court for decision.” According to the learned Counsel the dispute as raised is not within the ambit of section 91 of the Act, since the petitioner is a specified society. Section 144-T provides for making a reference of election dispute of such specified society to the Commissioner of the division. The Commissioner is, however, competent to try the election dispute only on the grounds enumerated under Rule 81 of the Rules, 1971. Section 144-T provides for making a reference of election dispute of such specified society to the Commissioner of the division. The Commissioner is, however, competent to try the election dispute only on the grounds enumerated under Rule 81 of the Rules, 1971. Sub-clause (iv) of Clause (d) of Rule 81 merely provides for the ground as non-compliance of the provisions of the Act or any Rules made thereunder. The ground in the plaint relates to non-compliance of the byelaws. The byelaws of the society are not rules framed under the Act as envisaged. In view of this the election dispute is also not covered by section 144-T. As such there is no bar or ouster to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court by section 163, for a trial of the election dispute as involved in the suit. 9. The submission as made is wholly misconceived. The Rules of 1971 as framed for holding election of the specified societies command adherence of the provisions of byelaws as regards constituency, election, candidature and other matters connected thereto. Breach of the relevant provision would ultimately tend to commit breach of the Rule of 1971. So any breach of byelaws would amount to non-compliance of the Rules itself, and as such any complaint regarding non-compliance of bye-laws as an election dispute is squarely covered by Clause (d) of Rule 81. Clause (b) of Rule 2 of the Rules of 1971 defines the term “Constituency” which means an electoral division as specified in the bye-laws of the society (emphasis is supplied by me). The substance of dispute as raised by the plaintiff definitely pertains to the constituency as the question raised is whether the nominee to be sent on the respondent society is to be elected from the constituency of the Board of Directors or from the constituency of the members of the general body. Rule 4 provides for preparation of provisional list of voters in accordance with different constituencies and names of voters to be arranged accordingly, as laid down in the byelaws. Rule 11 lays down the duties of the returning officer to do all such acts and things as may be necessary for effectually conducting the election in a manner provided under the Act and the rules and byelaws made thereunder. Rule 18 which provides for nomination of candidates amongst others, must be according to byelaws. Rule 11 lays down the duties of the returning officer to do all such acts and things as may be necessary for effectually conducting the election in a manner provided under the Act and the rules and byelaws made thereunder. Rule 18 which provides for nomination of candidates amongst others, must be according to byelaws. Sub-rule (2) of rule 19 provides for a disqualification amongst others as per byelaws for being proposer or seconder. It is thus crystal clear that the Rules of 1971 aim to implement the provisions of byelaws as framed in this behalf. Holding election of a nominee for being deputed on the respondent No. 5 society from the constituency of the Board of Directors if it is alleged, in breach of the byelaws would ultimately be a non-compliance of the Rules of 1971. The submission as advanced is totally unfounded. 10. Mr. Aney then made a submission that under section 144-T the dispute can be referred only after the result of election. However, the election dispute as involved touches the act of the election officer earlier to the result of election. As such it is not covered under section 144-T of the Act. This submission is equally misconceived. The scheme of the Act and Rules provide a specific ground and forum. The law which does not provide for a particular ground or excludes a particular stage in the process of election, prohibits any person from agitating on that aspect. Permitting any person to take resort to a forum other than the prescribed on a ground or item which is not prescribed under law would be bypassing the provision and it would defeat the scheme of the Act and Rule. The law as per the scheme has clearly prohibited from interfering the stages earlier to the result of election. It equally ousts the jurisdiction of the Civil Court by formulating a dispute in the nature of pre-result of election. 11. Sub-section (4) of section 144-T it is significant to note, attaches finality to the order made by the Commissioner (Specified Officer) in such election dispute and makes it conclusive. It further prevents from being questioned in any Court. It equally ousts the jurisdiction of the Civil Court by formulating a dispute in the nature of pre-result of election. 11. Sub-section (4) of section 144-T it is significant to note, attaches finality to the order made by the Commissioner (Specified Officer) in such election dispute and makes it conclusive. It further prevents from being questioned in any Court. Sub-section (3) of section 163 of the Act provides that all orders, decisions or awards passed in accordance with this Act or the Rules shall, subject to the provisions for appeal or revision in this Act be final and no such order, decision or award shall be liable to be challenged, set aside, modified, revised or declared void in any Court upon the merits or upon any other ground whatsoever. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is thus ousted from entertaining any suit involving the particular subject matter as well to examine legality of the order passed by the authority under this Act. As such even subsequent order of the Commissioner in reference under section 144-T of the Act even could not be gone into by a Civil Court in a suit proceeding. As such the bar is absolute. Hence the Civil Court namely respondent No. 1 badly suffers from complete lack of jurisdiction to try the suit as presented by the respondent No. 2. It is always expedient for a Civil Court to be extremely cautious while assuming jurisdiction as regards the matters covered by the special Statute and particularly when it pertains to the election. Exercise of jurisdiction which is completely absent jeopardizes democratic processes and has far reaching consequentialities. Wrong done cannot be undone under the normal remedy. 12. Mr. Aney lastly made a submission that the order passed in the suit proceeding or the ultimate decree could be questioned by approaching to a forum prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. There is efficacious and expeditious remedy available to the petitioner. Issuing of a writ of prohibition is wholly without justification. The submission is untenable in view of the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Shantilal cited supra. Entertaining such suit when there is a complete, and patent lack of jurisdiction, is totally an unauthorised proceeding. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be directed to file the normal remedy under the Code. The submission is untenable in view of the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Shantilal cited supra. Entertaining such suit when there is a complete, and patent lack of jurisdiction, is totally an unauthorised proceeding. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be directed to file the normal remedy under the Code. The petitioner is fully justified in seeking a writ of prohibition in the instant proceeding. Presenting suit by the respondent No. 2 is complete abuse of the process of law. In the result the Rule made absolute, respondent No. 1, by a writ of prohibition is directed not to entertain the suit No. 1484 of 1991 and the proceedings thereunder and they are hereby quashed. The order dated 28-8-1991 is hereby set aside. Respondent-plaintiff shall pay exemplary costs of Rs. 2500/- within a period of one month to the petitioner-society. In case of failure, it shall be treated as dues towards society constituting a default and the respondent No. 2 shall incur disqualification as prescribed under the relevant provisions. Order accordingly. -----