Judgment : 1. This appeal by the State is against acquittal. 2. The respondent/accused was stated to be vending milk by standing in front of Muthusamy Chettiar Grocery Shop situate at Alwarthirunagari Road at about 4.30 P.M. on 29.5.1984. The Food Inspector, P.W.1, was stated to have taken sample of milk after observing all the formalities for the purpose of analysis. One such sample of milk sent to the Public Analyst was found to be deficient in solids-not-fat to the extent of at least 38% besides being deficient in fat to the extent of at least 14%. The Food Inspector, after observing the other formalities required to the done under the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short ‘the Act’), launched prosecution against the respondent/accused, which was taken on file in C.C.No.846 of 1984 by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Tirunelveli for the alleged offences under Secs.7(1) and 16(1)(a)(i) read with Sec.2(ia)(a) and (m) of the Act. 3. Learned Magistrate, on consideration of the material placed before him, found the respondent/accused not guilty of the offences with which he stood charged and acquitted him thereof, giving rise to the present appeal. 4. The verdict of acquittal is based on the following reasonings: (1) No intimation had been sent to the Local Health Authority on the date of sending of one such sample to the Public Analyst for the purpose of analysis as required under Sec. 11(1)(C)(i) of the Act; (2) The evidence available on record did not at all establish that the accused is a milk vendor by profession; but on the contrary, he was a tailor by profession; and (3) As regards the sampling, there remains the ipse dixit of P.W.1 without being corroborated by any evidence whatever, although two such persons were cited for the purpose of proving the sampling. 5. Learned Government Advocate would contend that the aforesaid reasonings of learned Magistrate appear on their own face to the perverse calling for interference and setting aside the verdict of acquittal, to which course, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/accused would express his strong disapproval. 6. No doubt true it is that the Food Inspector, P.W.1 did not at all send any intimation to the Local Health Authority as respects his sending of a sample to the Public Analyst, on the date when the sample was so sent. 6. No doubt true it is that the Food Inspector, P.W.1 did not at all send any intimation to the Local Health Authority as respects his sending of a sample to the Public Analyst, on the date when the sample was so sent. No doubt, Sec.11(1)(c)(i) of the Act prescribes that an intimation has to be sent to the Local Health Authority. Though no such intimation has been send to the Local Health Authority, yet the materials available on record do indicate that the Food Inspector, P.W.1 did sent the other two samples to the Local Health Authority on the same date on which he sent the sample to the Public Analyst. Such sending of two such samples to the Local Health Authority, I feel, is a sufficient indication of an intimation to the Local Health Authority as required under Sec.11(1)(c)(i)s of the Act. Even otherwise, noncompliance of such a provision cannot have the effect of throwing the case of the prosecution lock, stock and barrel, inasmuch as by non-observance of such a provision, no prejudice had been caused to the accused. As such, this reasoning of learned Magistrate does not hold water for rendering the verdict of acquittal. 7. The other reasoning that the materials on record did not at all establish that the respondent/ accused was a milk vendor by profession does not appear to be sound, on the facts and circumstances of the case. The person vending milk may or may not possess a licence for such vending. The fact that a person is not possessed of such a licence will not by itself show that he is not at all a vendor of milk. On the day in question, the respondent/ accused was found in possession of five litres of milk standing in front of the grocery shop of one Muthusamy Chettiar, Alwarthirunagari Road. Possession of such huge quantity of milk is sufficient indication to show that such possession was for purpose of sale. The other signal factor is that the Food Inspector, P.W.1 took sample, after giving the accused due intimation that the sample was taken for the purpose of analysis. The evidence of P.W.1 coupled with Ex.P-1 intimation does point out that the respondent/accused did effect sale of milk to him. Such sale is for all practical purposes is ‘sale’ under the provisions of the Act. The evidence of P.W.1 coupled with Ex.P-1 intimation does point out that the respondent/accused did effect sale of milk to him. Such sale is for all practical purposes is ‘sale’ under the provisions of the Act. In this view of the matter, the reasoning of learned Magistrate that there was no evidence worth the name available on record to point out that he was vending milk for sale on the date in question cannot at all be countenanced. 8. Yet another reasoning given by him for acquitting the respondent/accused was that there was no corroboration to the testimony of P.W.1. This reasoning also is not sound. The evidence of P.W.1 Food Inspector, in the absence of other evidence available on record has to be analysed like any other evidence and a finding has to be recorded on analysis of such evidence, in the sense of whether his evidence is commending acceptance or not. That sort of a ritualistic exercise, learned Magistrate had not done, for rejecting his testimony. As such, the reasoning given on this aspect of the matter is of no consequence. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/ accused would however contend that even if the reasoning, as given by learned Magistrate for rendering the verdict of acquittal, are perverse, even then there are other materials on record to uphold the verdict of acquittal, on the facts and circumstances of the case. What he would contend is that an obligation is cast upon the Food Inspector under Sec.10(7) of the Act to call for independent witnesses for sampling operation. If he did call for such witnesses from the locality and the witnesses refused to comply with his request, then it cannot be stated that the obligation cast on the Food Inspector had not at all been discharged. In the case on hand, the position is the other way about. The Food Inspector, P.W.1 did call the independent witness, who also complied with his request, in the sense of there being witnesses for the sampling operations. The name of those two witnesses had been mentioned in the mahazar for sampling. But their addresses were not at all given. In the case on hand, the position is the other way about. The Food Inspector, P.W.1 did call the independent witness, who also complied with his request, in the sense of there being witnesses for the sampling operations. The name of those two witnesses had been mentioned in the mahazar for sampling. But their addresses were not at all given. It is in this context, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, would submit that in order to ensure fairness of the sampling operation, it is but necessary for the Food Inspector to have furnished the addresses of the other two witnesses, who may be called as witnesses either for the Court or for the defence. By the fact that their addresses were not given it has to be construed that the defence had been prejudiced in their defence, in the sense of their inability to summon such witnesses to ensure fairness of the sampling operation, when especially the sampling operation itself is challenged, in the sense of there being no sampling operation done as stated to have been done by the Food Inspector. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the respondent/ accused relied upon the decision of David Annoussamy, J., in Manickam v. Food Inspector Manickam v. Food Inspector , 1988 F.A.J. 60 and the observations made by learned Judge are worth reproduction and they are as follows: “But when the whole process of taking of sample is challenged, it should be open for the court or to the accused to summon the persons, who have affixed their signatures, for examination. For that purpose, whenever signatures of witnesses have been obtained, it is obvious that the names and addresses of the persons, who have attested, should also find a place. Otherwise, the whole purpose of Sec.10(7), which is to ensure the fairness of sample taking is destroyed. In fact, when names and addresses are missing, it will not be possible for the Court to test the veracity and fairness of the operation. Of course, it is only when the operation of sample taking is challenged, and when there are reasons to doubt its fairness, that the absence of name and address would make the operation invalid. Otherwise, it will not.” The view taken by David Annoussamy, J., with which I respectfully agree, will apply to the facts of the present case. Of course, it is only when the operation of sample taking is challenged, and when there are reasons to doubt its fairness, that the absence of name and address would make the operation invalid. Otherwise, it will not.” The view taken by David Annoussamy, J., with which I respectfully agree, will apply to the facts of the present case. On this ground, I am not inclined to disturb the acquittal of the respondent. 10. This appeal, therefore, shall stand dismissed.