JUDGMENT:- S. N. Jha, J. This revision under Section 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') by the defendant is directed against an order for this eviction from the suit premises on the ground of personal necessity of the plaintiff-opposite party. 2. The plaintiff's case, shortly stated, is that the suit premises had been let out on rent for a period twenty years commencing from 18. 4. 1966. After the expiry of the aforesaid period of lease, the tenancy was to continue on monthly basis terminable by giving notice. After superannuation from service on 30. 11. 1985, the petitioner was in need of the suit premises for his own use to do business and as such, the defendant was liable for eviction on the ground of personal necessity under Section 11(1) (c) of the Act. According to the plaintiff, the suit premises was situated in the heart of Katihar town which was the best business centre of the town. An alternative plea of eviction on the ground of expiry of the aforesaid fixed term-lease on 17. 4. 1986 under Section 11(1) (e) was also taken. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant by keeping the eastern part of the suit premises continuously locked and allowing stray animals to occupy the outer space had caused damage to the portion, consequent whereof the municipal authorities had issued notice to reconstruct the building or to make thorough repairs which could not be carried out without the premises being vacated. 3. The case of the defendant-petitioner, as set out in the written statement in its material particulars, is that the plaintiff had no bona fide and reasonable requirement of the premises for doing business and the aforesaid plea had been taken with some ulterior motive of making wrongful gain by enhancing the rent and obtaining Salami by letting out the same to other person. The defendant also asserted that the plaintiff had got several houses at Katihar located at important business centers and if he had any desire to start any business, he could have done so immediately after his retirement from service in any of those buildings. It was also alleged that the plaintiff was getting pension and receiving rent from other houses to the tune of about Rs. 10,000/- per month. It was also alleged that the plaintiff was getting pension and receiving rent from other houses to the tune of about Rs. 10,000/- per month. An alternative plea, however was also taken to the effect that the defendant was ready and willing to vacate the eastern part of the suit premises, the area of which was larger than the western part, which could serve the alleged need of the plaintiff for doing his own business. 4. The trial court, on consideration of the evidence adduced on behalf of the parties, held that the plaintiff was not entitled to get a decree for eviction on the ground of expiry of the period of lease under Clause (e) of Section 11(1). It also held that the plaintiff does not require the whole suit premises in order to carry out any building work at the instance of the Municipality and as such the plaintiff was Dot entitled to get any decree for eviction on this ground as well. However, the court has accepted the plea of personal necessity and directed eviction of the defendant on the aforesaid ground giving rise to the present revision. 5. Mr. K. D. Chatterjee learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has made three fold submission. He has submitted that in order to succeed in a suit for eviction on the ground of personal necessity, a definite need must be stated. He pointed out that the filed stated in the plaint was for opening a cafeteria in the premises but in the evidence the plaintiff mentioned about starting a transport business therein. According to the learned counsel, there is difference between wish and actual need and that need can be established only if sufficient evidence is led to show that necessary funds etc were available for doing the particular business. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in the case of Ramesh Chandra Agrawal & ors. Vs. Bhushan Ram (1989 PLJR 1188). It was next submitted that the plaintiff admittedly had other buildings in Kalihar town and, therefore, it was necessary for the Court to hold, before granting decree on the ground of personal necessity, that the other buildings are not suitable to serve the plaintiff's need. Vs. Bhushan Ram (1989 PLJR 1188). It was next submitted that the plaintiff admittedly had other buildings in Kalihar town and, therefore, it was necessary for the Court to hold, before granting decree on the ground of personal necessity, that the other buildings are not suitable to serve the plaintiff's need. It was submitted that the landlord has no unfettered choice in the matter of selection of building and the finding of the Court is in the teeth of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M. M. Quasum vs. Manohar Lal ( AIR 1981 SC 1113 ). It was lastly submitted that the court has not considered the question as to whether tile need of the plaintiff can be met by directing partial eviction from the suit premises in terms of the proviso to Clause (c) of Section 11(1) of the Act. 6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party has submitted that the finding recorded by the court as to the personal necessity of the plaintiff is a finding of fact which cannot be disturbed in revision. Relying on a Bench decision of the court in the case of M/s Tip Top & others Vs. Smt. Indramani Devi ( AIR 1982 Pat 190 ), it was submitted that once the plaintiff proves his case of personal necessity he is free to select the building for his own use and mere existence of alternative accommodation is not sufficient to disentitle the plaintiff from getting the decree for eviction. Regarding the plea of partial eviction, it was pointed out that the court has already considered the matter and held that the eastern part of the building was not suitable for doing business. It was also submitted that the defendant having already agreed to vacate part of the premises, could not be permitted to deny the plaintiff's claim of personal necessity. 7. The discussion on the question of personal necessity is contained in Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the judgment A perusal thereof shows that the discussion is quite perfunctory and the issues which are necessary to be sorted out for giving a finding as to existence of personal necessity in terms of Section 11 (1) (c) have not at all been framed or considered and a bald finding bas been recorded. It would appear that most of the discussion in the aforesaid two paragraphs centers around the plea taken by the defendant indicating its willingness to part with the eastern portion of the premises and in that connection, the court bas found that, for the reasons mentioned in the order, the same was not Suitable. Possibly the court is right there and no infirmity can be pointed out so far that finding is concerned. However, for the purpose of passing a decree of eviction it was not enough. The Law, on the subject, has now crystalised by several judicial pronouncements. While examining a similar question under the corresponding provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, in the case of Smt. Sushila Devi and others vs. Avinash Chandra Jain and others ( AIR 1987 SC 1150 ), it was said that, "While the landlord is entitled to the beneficial enjoyment of his property, the law still insists as a measure of social necessity that the Court should be satisfied as to the genuineness of the requirement of the landlord under Section 14 (1) (e) ......... The provision contained in S. 14 (1) (e) is meant to sub-serve a public interest and to strike a just balance between the competing needs of the landlord and the tenant. It is axiomatic that when a landlord applies for eviction of a tenant under Section 14 (1) (e), there is a duty cast on the Court to consider the question on merits on the basis of the evidence adduced by the Parties. Again, there has to be in such cases an objective determination of the claim of the landlord." 8. It has to be kepi in mind that in terms of the provisions contained in Clause (c), what is necessary to find is not only that the building is reasonably required by the land lord for his own occupation but also that the requirement is in good faith Therefore, the mere assertion of the plaintiff cannot he said to be conclusive. The distinction between 'desire' and 'need' of the plaintiff to himself occupy the premises bas to be kept in mind and that can be done only when sufficient evidence is led on behalf of the parties showing, inter alia that he was in a position on the basis of availability of fund and other facilities and expertise, to start a particular business. It is also not clear from the order as to whether the other buildings which are admittedly owned by the plaintiff in the town of Katihar were not vacant or were unsuitable for occupation. The finding of the court that the landlord has a free-choice of selecting the accommodation is contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M. M. Qasum (supra), wherein it was said: "This approach betrays a woeful lack of consciousness relatable to circumstances leading to enactment of Rent Acts in almost all States in the, country. The time honoured notion that the right of re-entry is unfettered and that the owner landlord is the sole Judge of his requirement has been made to yield to the needs of the society which had to enact the Rent Acts specifically devised to curb and fetter the unrestricted right of re-entry and to provide that only on proving some enabling grounds set out in the Rent Act, the landlord can reenter. The such ground is of personal requirement of landlord. When examining a case of personal requirement, if it is pointed out that there is some vacant premises with the landlord which he can conveniently occupy the element of need in his requirement would be absent. To reject this appeal by saying that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose the premises is to 'negative the very raison deter of the Rent Act. Undoubtedly, if it is shown by the tenant that the landlord has some other vacant promises in his possession, that by itself may not be sufficient to negative the landlord's claim but in such a situation the Court would expect the landlord to establish that the premises which is vacant is not suitable for the purpose of his occupation or for the purpose for which he requires the premises in respect of which the action is commenced in the Court. It would, however, be a bald statement Unsupported by the Rent Act, to say that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose whatever premises he wants and that too irrespective of the fact that he has some vacant premises in possession of which he would not occupy and try to seek to remove the tenant. It would, however, be a bald statement Unsupported by the Rent Act, to say that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose whatever premises he wants and that too irrespective of the fact that he has some vacant premises in possession of which he would not occupy and try to seek to remove the tenant. This approach would put a premium on the landlords greed to throw out tenants paying lower rent in the name of personal occupation and rent out the premises in his possession at the, market rate. To curb this very tendency the Rent Act, was enacted and, therefore, it becomes the duty of the Court administering the Rene Act, to bear in mind the object and intendment of the legislature in enacting the same." Since the court bas not considered the aforesaid allied issues, the finding recorded by it in regard to personal necessity cannot be sustained in law and the matter requires reconsideration by the trial court. The argument of the learned counsel for the Opposite party that merely because the defendant had agreed to vacate part of the suit premises, he cannot question the existence of personal need of the plaintiff cannot be accepted for the reason that it was only an alternative plea and cannot be interpreted as an admission of the plaintiff's claim. 9. Besides the aforesaid infirmities, the impugned order of eviction is also bad since the court has not considered the question of partial eviction. It is well established that proviso to Clause (c) of section 11 (1) is mandatory in nature and in terms thereof, the court is bound to consider as to whether the need of the plaintiff can be reasonably satisfied by directing partial eviction from the suit premises or not. In this connection, reference may be made to the case of Rahman Jeo wangnoo vs. Ram Chand and others (A.I.R. 1978 SC 413), wherein the following observations were made: "We are satisfied that the proviso aforesaid mandates the Court to consider whether partial eviction as contemplated therein should be ordered or the entire holding should be directed to be evicted. This aspect therefore, requires judicial exploration after giving opportunity to both sides to lead evidence in this behalf." I do not agree with to the contention made on behalf of the opposite party that the question of partial eviction ha s already been considered. This aspect therefore, requires judicial exploration after giving opportunity to both sides to lead evidence in this behalf." I do not agree with to the contention made on behalf of the opposite party that the question of partial eviction ha s already been considered. It would appear from Paragraph Nos. 10 and 11 of the judgment that what was considered by the court was only an offer made by the defendant to part with a definite portion, namely, the eastern portion of the premises. What the court has to do in terms of the proviso is to consider independently on the basis of evidence as to whether partial eviction in any other manner could have substantially satisfied the need of the landlord. In other words, even if the eastern portion of the suit premises was held to be unsuitable, and rightly so as it has no direct access to the main road, the court could have examined the question as to whether the suit Premises can be divided in such a manner that two portions are carved out and each of them has access to the main road. During the course of hearing of the case, a sketch map of the building was produced and, prima facie, it appeared to me that such a course was possible. As a matter of fact, the hearing of the case was adjourned at one stage to enable the parties to agree to an out of court settlement. Since, I am going to remand the matter to the court below for fresh consideration, in the event the court finds that the plaintiff has made out a case of personal necessity in accordance with law, it should there after consider as to whether the need aforesaid can be reasonably satisfied by directing partial eviction or not? while doing so the court will bear in mind the following observations of the Supreme Court ill the case of Nasirual Haque vs. Jeetendra Nath Dey (AIR 1984 SC 799); .. In doing so the High Court failed to take into account the proviso to Section 12 (1)(c) of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, of 1977, which in terms enjoins that what is necessary to be considered is the 'reasoeable' requirement of the landlord and whether it would be 'Substantially' satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the premises. The Court has, therefore, in toe first instance, to determine the extent of the premises which the landlord "reasonably" requires. Determine it objectively and not on the basis of his ipse dixit or his mere desire to occupy as much as he wants. But the Court has to furthermore apply a test as to whether such requirement, as the Court considers reasonable, will be 'substantially' satisfied (not fully s1tisfied) by ordering partial eviction. " 10. for the reasons stated above, it has to be held that the impugned judgment and order is not in accordance with law and the matter requires reconsideration by the trial court. 11. In the result, the judgment and order dated 30.7.1988 is set aside and the case is remanded back to the trial court for fresh consideration and decision in accordance with law. The application is, accordingly, allowed. 12. Since the suit is for eviction on the ground of personal necessity which was tried as per the summary procedure prescribed under Section 14, the court below is directed to pass final order within four months from the, date of receipt of the order. It is made clear that it will be open to the parties to lead such further evidence as may be necessary for the purpose of the case. AS. Application allowed.