JUDGMENT 1. THE petitioners have challenged an amendment of the Assessment Book as a result of which the annual value was increased "from Rs. 12,420/- to Rs. 2,56,360/- in one case and Rs. 3,54. 840/- in another. The petitioner Trust contends that the enhancement is meet unusual and shockingly disproportionate to the original value. It is contended by Mr. Pradip Ghosh, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner Trust that the violation of the principle of natural justice warranted an interference by the writ Court even though an alternative remedy was provided by the statute by way of filing an appeal before the Assessment tribunal. Mr. Ghosh further contends that the notices as served on the petitioner Trust were vague, lacking in material particulars and no speaking, order was at all issued and in reality no order was ever communicated to the petitioners. 2. THE petitioners contend further that the decision is on the face of it arbitrary since by one sweeping amendment the original value has been raised from Rs. 12,420/- to Rs. 2. 56,360/- in one case and to Rs. 3,54,640/- in another. The enhancement of annual value was made under Section 192 of the calcutta Municipal Corporation Act 1980 hereinafter referred to for the sake of brevity as the Act. The notice refers to Clauses (iv) and (vii) of Sub-section (1) of Section 192 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 as a ground for amendment. It is contended that the amendment of the Assessment Book under Section 192 of the Act is made under exceptional circumstances only when a real ground exists for such amendment, such as the discovery of fraud, misrepresentation or mistake which made it necessary to take recourse to the provisions for amendment in this, context. The reported judgment in Municipal council, Khurai vs. Kamal Kumar and Another reported in AIR 1965 SC 1321 is referred to. m one of the recent judgments of our Court to Sm. Shakuntala gupta vs. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 1991 Calcutta 104, a learned single Judge of our Court held inter alia that "if the Municipal authority/ did not have any valid ground far making amendment to the Assessment Book, any person aggrieved can invoke the Writ Jurisdiction of this Court against any alleged illegal and ultra vires Act of the Municipal Authority. " it was further observed inter alia that it is not correct to say that the Municipal Authority without any valid reason can take steps for the amendment of the assessment. The section clearly provides under which circumstances the authority can re-open the assessment. If any such grounds were not there, the Municipal Authority could not issue any notice and if without any valid ground such action is taken, such act can be declared illegal or void by any Court of law. " 3. MR. Ghosh contends by citing the decision in Shyam Kishori Devi vs. The patna Municipal Corporation reported in AIR 1966 SC 1678 that the burden is upon the Corporation to establish the fact that there was any fraud, misrepresentation or mistake. The ground for amendment under clause (vii) as disclosed in the notice relates to erection, re-erection, alteration or addition. But there has not been any such erection, re-erection, alteration or addition and hence the ground is non-existent. Clause (iv) is also wholly inacceptable since no particular has been given out and the notice seems to be bad in law since no adequate reason has been disclosed as required under clause (iv) of section 192 (1) of the Act and the Calcutta Municipal Corporation has not filed any affidavit on this regard. The petitioners contend that the notices are defective and since a valid notice is a pre-condition to a statutory action, any defect in the notice goes to the root of the jurisdiction and the decision becomes void. It is contended by the petitioners that one of the basic principles of natural justice is that the authority concerned should give the party likely to be effected by the proposed adjudication, the notice of the case, so that he can meet the case for revision or amendment specifically and defend him adequately and If the notice repeals the language of the statute without giving any particulars, it would not only the considered insufficient but inadequate as well. Mr. Ghosh referred to in this context the decision reported in Nasir Ahmed vs. Assistant Custodian General Evacuee Property, U. P. , reported in AIR 1980 sc 1157 . By citing decision in Charandas Malhotra vs. Assl collector of customs, reported in AIR 1968 Calcutta page 28 para 6 and 8. and Amba Lal vs. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 264 . Mr. By citing decision in Charandas Malhotra vs. Assl collector of customs, reported in AIR 1968 Calcutta page 28 para 6 and 8. and Amba Lal vs. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 264 . Mr. Ghosh contends that the notices were vague, sketchy and not only non specific but ambiguous as well. 4. IT was urged on behalf of the Corporation that the amendment became necessary because of the discovery of payments of rents paid by the different sub-tenants to the tenant of the first degree. The Corporation did not however produce any record which could be said to be a comprehensive one, giving out the details in this regard. The Corporation however, sought to justify the amendment on the ground that the enhanced annual value in both the cases was based on the different items of rent received by the first degree tenant from the sub-tenants. Mr. Ghosh, the learned Advocate for the petitioners contended in this context that neither clause (iv) nor clause (vii) would justify the making of an amendment an the basis of the alleged rents paid by the subtenants to the tenant of the first degree. The actual assessee ought to have been given an opportunity to rebut, the said allegation by the service of a proper notice and the assessee should have been told as to why and on what basis the rents paid by the sub-tenants would form the basis of assessment. Annual value is to be assessed by the Corporation on the basis of rents paid by the tenants to the owner and not on the basis of rents paid by the subtenants to the tenant of the first degree. In the reported decision of Corporation of Calcutta vs. Life Insurance Corporation in AIR 1970 SC 1417 , it was however. decided that the assessing authority was not primarily concerned with the rent the tenant might receive from the Sub-tenants but it is based oh the gross annual rent which the owner would realize from the tenants by letting out the land or building which should be the basis of valuation. Mr. decided that the assessing authority was not primarily concerned with the rent the tenant might receive from the Sub-tenants but it is based oh the gross annual rent which the owner would realize from the tenants by letting out the land or building which should be the basis of valuation. Mr. Ghosh contended that this authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court is still good law since it was specifically so held by the Supreme Court in some of its later decisions as in AIR 1980 SC 541 (Devon Daulat Rai Kapur vs. New Delhi municipal Corporation) and AIR 1985 SC 339 (Dr. Balbir Singh vs. M/s. M. C. D and Ors.). Moreover our court in Corporation of Calcutta vs. East India commercial reported in AIR 1982 Calcutta 479 = 1982 (1) Calcutta High Court notes 360, reiterated the principle that when a premises is actually let out, the corporation may proceed to determine the annual value on the basis of the actual rents received by the owner from the tenants. Mr. Ghosh contended that by this atrtiortiattre pronouncement, Calcutta High Court hade it clear that corporation is not authorized to take into consideration the rents paid by the sub-tenant or sub tenants to the first degree tenant. 5. IN United Investment Corporation Vs, Corporation of Calcutta, reported in air 1982 Calcutta 388, our High Court, however, took a different view when it held that the lessee realizing rents from its subtenants was owner of the building in terms of Section 5 (53) of the Calcutta Municipal Act 1951 and the assessing authority determining annual value of the building was entitled to take into account, such rents realized by lessee from the subtenants. Mr, ghosh, however, sought to distinguish the said decision by pointing out that the owner in the circumstances of the said case, was the owner of the land only and the building was constructed by the lessee and as such the lessee became the owner of the building by necessary implication which he let out to tenants. Mr, ghosh, however, sought to distinguish the said decision by pointing out that the owner in the circumstances of the said case, was the owner of the land only and the building was constructed by the lessee and as such the lessee became the owner of the building by necessary implication which he let out to tenants. Our Court held that the ratio of the Life Insurance Corporation Case reported in AIR 1970 SC 1417 could not apply, because the owner, being the owner of the land was not the owner of the building and therefore the lessee was the owner of the building and any rerat received by the lessee must be regarded as the rent received by the owner of the building, for the purpose of computing the annual valuation and for assessing the tax payable to the Municipal corporation. In this case however the rents paid by the sub-lessees were taken into consideration for determirting the annual yalue. Mr. Ghosh, however, pointed out that this judgment did not authorize the Corporation to make assessment on the basis of the rents paid fey the sub-tenants in such a contingency where the land and the building are both owned by the "owner" and the building had been let out to a lessee and the Lessee in his own turn has further sublet a portion of the building to sub-tenants. According to Mr. Ghosh for such a contingency, the ratio of Life Insurance Corporation case would still be fully applicable. 6. MR. Ghosh, however, pointed out that if for any reason the rent paid by the tenant to the landlord was not acceptable to the Corporation as a reasonable rent, the Corporation was free to adopt the alternative mode of valuation as contained in Sub-section (4a) of Section 174. But the Corporation cannot arbitrarily discard the rent paid by the tenant to the landlord and make the assessment on the basis of the alleged rents paid by the different subtenants to the tenant of the first degree. The Corporation however, asserted that the petitioner being the lessee was closely associated with lessor and the lease was not really a genuine transaction. The lessor was one Deokinandan Jalan and the trust was bansidhar Jalan Seva Trust and there must be a close proximity between the lessor and the lessee. The Corporation however, asserted that the petitioner being the lessee was closely associated with lessor and the lease was not really a genuine transaction. The lessor was one Deokinandan Jalan and the trust was bansidhar Jalan Seva Trust and there must be a close proximity between the lessor and the lessee. There is, however been a strong suspicion which cannot take the place of proof and whether the Trust is really a 'benami' affair of the owner has not been really proved beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt in the facts and circumstances of the present case so as to warrant a conclusion that the owner and the lessor of the first degree i.e. Banshidhar Jalan Seva trust comprise one identical entity in the eye of law. It was contended by Mr. Ghosh that the Trust is a public charitable Trust and not just a private trust set up for the purpose of evading the tax liability through valid legal means. The Trust enjoys exemption under Section 80g of the Income Tax Act and the trust is a distinct legal entity different from the beneficiaries as well as the settlor. In order to enjoy the benefit of an exemption from the Income Tax Act, the Trust has to prove a charitable purpose and it has to fulfil as well the conditions as laid down in Sub-section (5) of 60g of the Income Tax Act. It is not for this Court to question what has been taken for granted by the Revenue authorities in granting tax exemption benefits to the Trust but then this Court cannot also embark upon a fishing expedition by way of lifting the veil, unless the law empowered the Court to do as such. This Court is really helpless in the matter since the statute does not vest the Corporation with amok authority to probe into this delicate question in so far as this particular Trust is concerned. It has been contended that the petitioners Nos. 2 and 5 are specific individuals who have been appointed Trustees to carry out the purpose of the trust and they are themselves not the beneficiaries of the Trust. It has been contended that the petitioners Nos. 2 and 5 are specific individuals who have been appointed Trustees to carry out the purpose of the trust and they are themselves not the beneficiaries of the Trust. The settlor is also not one of the beneficiaries whatever may be the case in respect of other trusts specifically created for taking an advantage as well as the benefits of the taxing statute in so far as the present Trust is concerned, we have no such findings before us even prima facie, that the Trust which claims it to be a public charitable Trust is a sham entity or that the creation of the Trust is itself a make-believe transaction. The owner of the premises being the lessor has let out the premises to the Trust. The owner of the premises receives a monthly rent of Rs. 10,000/ -. But then the tenant has let out the premises to different sub-tenants fetching a substantial amount of rent, which really forms the subject matter of assessment and the consequential amendment of the annual value. 7. THE arguments of Mr. Ghosh are without any substance at all since the assessee is the Trust and not the owner of the building, if the Trust derives financial benefit by way of subletting or creation of sub tenancies, it is the Trust which is the subject matter of assessment and no legal dichotomy has been struck at all in the facts and circumstances of the case. In the reported decision in United Investment Corporation vs. Corporation of Calcutta reported in AIR 1982 Calcutta 388, we find a clear illustration on the point. Even though the total amount of rents realized on subletting is one of the, principal sources of revenue of the Trust and such income derived from the different sub tenants might be spent for the cause of public charity, unless the law clearly exempts such a Trust from the purview of assessment as regards municipal taxes it cannot evade the responsibility. Even though Deokinandan Jalan may be the owner of the premises, it is the petitioner Trust which bears the brunt of the tax which is payable to the Corporation, by mutual agreement between the owner and the petitioner Trust and the: petitioner really steps into shoes of the owner. 8. Even though Deokinandan Jalan may be the owner of the premises, it is the petitioner Trust which bears the brunt of the tax which is payable to the Corporation, by mutual agreement between the owner and the petitioner Trust and the: petitioner really steps into shoes of the owner. 8. THE petitioner has a clear alternative remedy and in that view of the matter this court is of the view that the said alternative should be resorted to by way of preferring appeals before the Assessment Tribunal. Even if it is within the jurisdiction of this Court to interfere in proper cases and jurisdiction has not been taken away merely by providing for an alternative remedy, the matter of interference is a matter of discretion. I do not think that for ends of justice this Court would be called upon to interfere straightway in preference to the petitioner as an assessee being relegated to the appropriate reliefs before the Municipal Assessment Tribunal. As regards the other question of the petitioner not being served with proper orders of assessment on the face of its objection and not being served with a proper speaking order in respect of each amendment, this Court upholds such a contention and directs the Corporation of Calcutta to serve the petitioners the fresh assessment orders, giving out in each case the break-up of different items so that the petitioners can avail of an effective remedy by way of preferring appeals before the Assessment Tribunal within the statutory period of limitation of 45 days from the service of assessment orders impugned. With this direction as aforesaid, both the writ applications stand disposed of. There will be however no order as to costs. 9. THE prayer for stay of the operation of the order is considered and refused. Application disposed of.