JUDGMENT S.N. Jha, J. These two writ applications canvassing divergent view points, one representing private individual interests of certain licensees of retail vend of country spirit and the other espousing, professedly, the cause of public, have one common aspect between them that is the ultimate relief sought therein namely, scrapping of the Government Policy of supply of country spirit in polythene sachets for the retail vend, and that is why these cases have been heard one after another and are being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. Liquor is inherently pernicious, a source of crime, pauperism and misery but all attempts to prohibit its manufacture; sale and consumption having failed to achieve the desired result, it has come to stay as a necessary evil in the society, irrespective of the degree of civilization. Taking judicial notice of these phenomena the Courts have unanimously held that the trade and business in the intoxicants stands on a different footing which can be regulated in a manner different from other articles and the theory of 'exclusive privilege' has been judicially evolved. 3. The Bihar Excise Act (in short 'the Act') and the rules framed thereunder, provide for the manner of grant of licence or exclusive privilege in the manufacture, supply and sale-whether wholesale or retail, of country liquor. Broadly speaking, the system of supply for retail vend that was being followed earlier in the State was that the grantee of exclusive privilege for the manufacture of spirit in the distilleries used to set up warehouses established under section 15 of the Act, where spirit was made potable by reducing its strength and, thereafter, supplied to the licenced retail vendors in drums, casks or vats. The liquor, thus, supplied to the retail vendors used to be bottled at the vendors premises and finally sold loose to the consumers. The system was not found to be conducive to either public health & hygiene or excise revenue, on account of sale of liquor in unhygienic conditions prevailing in the vendors' premises and also on account of the possibility of the sale of illicit liquor endangering not only human lives but also affecting the excise revenue. The State Government accordingly started toying with the idea of supplying country liquor to the retail vendors in sealed bottles sometime in 1983-84. A policy decision to that effect was taken and contracts were granted. The State Government accordingly started toying with the idea of supplying country liquor to the retail vendors in sealed bottles sometime in 1983-84. A policy decision to that effect was taken and contracts were granted. The 'bottling' scheme was challenged in this Court in a number of writ petitions. A Bench of this Court in the case of Sheonarain Jaisawal (C.W.J.C. No. 4145 of 1984, disposed of on 1st October, 1984), upheld the policy of supply of country liquor in sealed bottles. However, on account of the pendency of the writ petitions, the aforesaid policy could not be implemented. In 1987 fresh contracts were granted, which again came under challenge. In the meantime, the State Government decided to introduce an 'improved' system of supply of country liquor from the warehouses to the licenced retail vendors in sachets or pouches of prescribed quality and specifications, which were cheaper than bottles and disposable after use, on the basis of the success achieved in some States. Tenders were invited and finally 17 persons were granted contracts in April 1989 for the period 15th July 1989 to 31st March 1993. This too was challenged in C.W.J.C. 4722 of 1989. A Bench of this Court dismissed the said writ petition on 11th July, 1990. Special-leave petition against the aforesaid judgment was also dismissed by the Supreme Court on 8th September, 1990. It is an admitted position that the supply of country liquor in sachets finally commenced from November, 1990. 4. C.W.J.C. No. 7825 of 1990 claiming to be in the nature of public interest litigation was filed in this Court on 4th December, 1990, while C.W.J.C. No. 250 of 1991 was filed on 11th January, 1991 on behalf of seven retail licensees of country liquor for the period 1990-91. Since the issues raised in the two writ petitions are different and distinct from each other, it would be appropriate to deal with the two cases separately. I would first take up C.W.J.C. No. 250 of 1991 in which both the facts and the questions raised lie in a rather narrow compass. 5. It is an admitted position that the three out of the seven petitioner of C.W.J.C. No. 250 of 1991 have not been granted licence for the retail vend of country liquor for the period 1991-92 and as such, as regards them, the writ petition has become infructuous. 5. It is an admitted position that the three out of the seven petitioner of C.W.J.C. No. 250 of 1991 have not been granted licence for the retail vend of country liquor for the period 1991-92 and as such, as regards them, the writ petition has become infructuous. Even as regards the remaining petitioners, this writ petition can be disposed of on a short point. As noticed above, pursuant to policy of retail supply of country liquor in sachets, contracts had been awarded in April 1989 to be effective from 15th July 1989. The petitioners, who are said to be holding licences during 1989-90 also were old hands in the trade, When they took settlement for the year 1990-91 they knew too welt about the system of supply in sachets. Having known the implications of the proposed settlement, the terms and conditions thereof, for the year 1990-91, and then taken the settlement, they will be deemed to have accepted the terms and conditions and entered into the contract as such, 'with eyes open', whether they can be permitted to turn about and resile from its terms taking an inconsistent stand? Not only that, although feeling aggrieved by the policy and its actual implementation, which admittedly commenced from November 1990, they again opted to take the settlement on the same terms and conditions for the next year i.e. 1991-92, and, as stated above, four of them also got licences. Mr. M.L. Verma, learned counsel for respondent no. 7, rightly submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable not only on the ground of delay but also because it is not a bona fide petition having been inspired and motivated by oblique considerations and that ultimate prayer made therein, if granted, would amount to allowing the petitioners to go behind the contract and get rid of their contractual obligations. In my opinion, this aspect alone is sufficient to warrant dismissal of the writ application. It is a settled principle of law that the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be resorted to in order to wriggle out of the contractual obligations. Reliance placed by Mr. In my opinion, this aspect alone is sufficient to warrant dismissal of the writ application. It is a settled principle of law that the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be resorted to in order to wriggle out of the contractual obligations. Reliance placed by Mr. M.L. Verma on the decision of the Supreme Court in the cases of State of Haryana vs. Jage Ram (AIR 1980 Supreme Court, 2018); State of Punjab vs. M/s Diyal Chand Gian Chand and Company (AIR 1983 Supreme Court, 743), following Harshanker's case (AIR 1975 Supreme Court, 1121) is quite appropriate. It is now too well settled that the right of manufacture, storage and sale of intoxicants in all its manifestations vests absolutely in the State and the State is competent to part with those rights in the manner it thinks appropriate reserving to itself the right to regulate the process of manufacture, storage and sale in public interest. This aspect apart, the writ petition is further fit to be dismissed on the ground of delay since the writ petition had been filed almost towards the end of the licensing period 1991, by which time the persons in whose favour the contract had been granted for supply of liquor in sachets, had already made substantial investments in setting up the plants, machineries etc. I will deal with this aspect later while discussing the merits of the other writ petition since the question is common to the writ petitions. 6. In all fairness to the learned counsel for the petitioners, it would be appropriate at this stage to notice the grounds of challenge. Learned counsel submitted that the supply of liquor in sachets affects the consumption and sale thereof and makes the business less profitable; that the said policy has not been implemented in the whole of the State, as a result of which consumers may buy liquor from other neighbouring areas where the supply of liquor continues to be loose in drums or vats, such liquor being stronger in strength; that no mechanism has been provided for the implementation of the policy. Learned counsel also pointed out a number of loopholes such as that no facility has been made available for the weighment of the contents of the liquor in pouches (sachets) as a result of which there may be possibility of supply of liquor weighing less than prescribed quantity. Learned counsel also pointed out a number of loopholes such as that no facility has been made available for the weighment of the contents of the liquor in pouches (sachets) as a result of which there may be possibility of supply of liquor weighing less than prescribed quantity. Since no date is mentioned on the pouch indicating the date on which the liquor was filled in it, there may be possibility of supply of stale and 'under-strong' liquor on account of lapse of time. Learned counsel suggested that the provisions should have been made for the return of bad quality, leaking under-weighing sachets. He also suggested that the licensees of retail vend should be allowed certain percentage of wastage allowance and further that a body of experts should be created to decide the complaints received from the consumers or the retail licensees in this regard. 7. The later part of the submissions of the learned counsel, as has been briefly indicated hereinabove, no doubt, are in the nature of nature of suggestions, which deserve consideration by the excise authorities and it is expected that they will take due notice of the same and improve the system of supply so as to plug any loophole in the system. These loopholes, however, are not such as to discredit or discard the system itself or to abandon the policy. No system involving storage, distribution sale of articles, particularly intoxicants can be said to be fool proof, thanks to the human ingenuity, which is difficult to comprehend. Apart from this, in my opinion, any such grievance may constitute individual case of complaint, which can be property and effectively dealt with by the Excise officers. The entire process of manufacture storage and sale of liquor at all stages in the distillery, warehouses as also in the sacheting plants where liquor is sacheted under the impugned policy is done and carried out under the direct" supervision and control of the Excise officials. Besides, there are officials posted in the field, who are supposed to oversee that the supply and sale of country liquor is in accordance with the prescribed conditions and if there is any occasion for any grievance or complaint, that can be effectively redressed by those officials. Besides, there are officials posted in the field, who are supposed to oversee that the supply and sale of country liquor is in accordance with the prescribed conditions and if there is any occasion for any grievance or complaint, that can be effectively redressed by those officials. The argument that the policy has not yet been implemented in the whole of the State and therefore, is discriminatory in nature has no merit in view of the stand of the State that the policy had been introduced in ten major districts of the State in the first phase and the same will be extended and made applicable to other areas no sooner the necessary infrastructure is built up and becomes available. Similarly, the argument that the consumption and sale of country liquor has fallen down is also without any substance in view of the stock position of liquor, as found by the officers. However, one thing that I have not been able to appreciate is the cost aspect of sachets. In this connection, learned counsel preferred to the pleadings, according to which the price of sachet of 100 ML in the State of U.P. is 45 Paise for liquors of both 40 and 60 strength respectively. The petitioners have alleged that higher price has been fixed arbitrarily and in order to give undue benefit to respondent no. 7. This aspect of the matter also deserves due consideration by the competent authority in the State Government. 8. Assuming that these loopholes are there or the price of the sachet has been fixed on a higher side, the question for consideration is whether they are enough to render the scheme or the policy itself arbitrary. It would be apt at this stage to notice the following observations of Justice Bhagwati in R.K. Gary v. Union of India (AIR 1981 Supreme Court 2138) in order to appreciate, the impact of possibilities of distortions and abuse of any policy involving revenue of the State so as to warrant any interference by Court :- "There may even be possibilities of abuse, but that too cannot of itself be a ground for invalidating the legislation, because it is not possible for any legislature to anticipate as if by some divine prescience distortions and abuses of its legislation which may be made by those subject to its provisions and to provide against such distortions and abuses. Indeed, howsoever great may be the care bestowed on its framing, it is difficult to conceive of a legislation which is not capable of being abused by perverted human ingenuity, The Court must therefore adjudge the constitutionality of such legislation by the generality of its provisions and not by its crudities or inequities or by the possibilities of abuse of any of its provisions. If any crudities, inequities or possibilities of abuse come to light, the legislature can always step in and enact suitable amendatory legislation. That is the essence of pragmatic approach which must guide and inspire the legislature in dealing with complex economic issues," (emphasis supplied) It would appear that although these observations were made in the context of challenge to a legislation, namely, the Special Bearer Bonds (Immunities and Exemptions) Act, 1981 later, while dealing with similar question relating to executive action in the field of economic activities under the Madhya Pradesh Excise law in Nand Lal's case (infra), the learned Judge held that the yardstick or the principle governing court's power of interference would be the same. I shall refer to those observations soon hereinafter. 9. I have held above that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief in this writ petition since they cannot be permitted to wriggle out of their contractual obligations and the writ petition is fit to be dismissed on this score alone. I have also spelt out the nature of the grievance in regard to the implementation of the policy, briefly indicating the constraints of the Court to interfere on the basis of the aforesaid grievances. Before I take the final stock of the legal position as to the nature, extent and scope of the court's power to interfere with policies of the Government in the field of economic activities it would be appropriate to notice the contentions raised by Mr. Jitendra Singh in the other writ petition, namely, C.W.J.C. No. 7825 of 1990. 10. Mr. Jitendra Singh made a long painstaking argument on the chemico-sociological aspects of the use of low density polyethylene (LDPE) as container for supply of alcohol in small pouches or sachets. Jitendra Singh in the other writ petition, namely, C.W.J.C. No. 7825 of 1990. 10. Mr. Jitendra Singh made a long painstaking argument on the chemico-sociological aspects of the use of low density polyethylene (LDPE) as container for supply of alcohol in small pouches or sachets. His main thrust of argument was that as a result of direct contact with alcohol, various components of LPDE migrate into the contents i.e., liquor making it toxic and, therefore long sustained consumption of liquor will have deleterious effect on the public health & hygiene of the hapless masses of low income group, who cannot afford to buy foreign liquor. In the course of his argument, learned counsel took us through various documents which are in the nature of reports and articles containing the opinion of experts, pointing out, where necessary, that these opinions are not those of self-styled experts of self appointed bodies, but are of those, who have the seal of recognition. In the course of this elaborate exercise we kept reminding learned counsel, as indeed ourselves, of our limitations to critically evaluate or appraise the veracity of those opinions. Perhaps, we may only have to accept that what they purport to convey is correct, but where do we reach? Use of plastics is bad but it is bad not only for being used as container of alcohol but for other food-stuffs also. Is it possible for us, proceeding on that premise, to strike down the policy of supply of country liquor in sachets, the resultant situation of which will be the revival of the old system of supply in drums or vats to be sold loose to the consumers? That situation has been judicially disapproved by this Court as being not only opposed to public health & hygiene but also as source of drain on the revenue. Therefore, the court has necessarily to think of an alternative. We asked learned counsel to suggest the alternatives but no alternative mode was suggested. But the main question is whether the Court while exercising its power of judicial review can give any such direction at all in a case of this nature. 11. This question is not res integra. The Supreme Court has considered the question on a number of occasions. In R.K. Garg's case (supra), Mr. But the main question is whether the Court while exercising its power of judicial review can give any such direction at all in a case of this nature. 11. This question is not res integra. The Supreme Court has considered the question on a number of occasions. In R.K. Garg's case (supra), Mr. Justice Bhagwati speaking on behalf of the majority of a constitution Bench of the Supreme Court noticed with approval the following observations of the Supreme Court of the united States in Metropolis Theatre Company v. State of Chicago (I912) 57 L. Ed. 730 :- "The problems of Government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations, illogical, it may be and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is best is not discernible, the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned, Mere errors of Government are not subject to our judicial review." and stated the law in the following words :- “Another rule of equal importance is that laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion etc. It has been said by no less a person than Holmes, J., that the legislature should be allowed some play in the joints, because it has to deal with complex problems which do not admit of solution through any doctrinaire or straight jacket formula and this is particularly true in case of legislation dealing with economic matters, where, having regard to the nature of the problems required to be dealt with, greater play in the joints has to be allowed to the legislature. The Court should feel more inclined to give judicial deference to legislative judgment in the field of economic regulation than in other areas where fundamental human rights are involved. Nowhere has this admonition been more felicitously expressed than in Morey v. Doud, (1957) 354 U.S. 457 where Frankfurter, J. said in his inimitable style: "In the utilities, tax: and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial self-restraint if not judicial deference to legislative judgment. The legislature after all has the affirmative responsibility. The Courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct. The legislature after all has the affirmative responsibility. The Courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct. When these are added to the complexity of economic regulation, the ul1certainty, the liability to error, the bewildering conflict of the experts, and the number of times the judges have been overruled by events, self-limitation can be seen to be the path to judicial wisdom and institutional prestige and stability." The Court must always remember that- "legislation is directed to practical problems, that the economic mechanism is highly sensitive and complex, that many problems are singular and contingent, that laws are not abstract propositions and do not relate to abstract units and are not to be measured by abstract symmetry" that exact wisdom and nice adoption of remedy are not always possible and that "judgment is largely a prophecy based on meagre and un-interpreted experience". Every legislation particularly in economic matters is essentially empiric and it is based on experimentation of what one may call trial and error method and therefore it cannot provide for all possible situations or anticipate all possible abuses," Again in the case of State of M.P. vs. Nandlal Jaiswal (AIR 1987 Supreme Court 251) the same learned Judge, after referring to the law laid down delineating the extent of the Courts' power to interfere with the economic policies of the Government in R.K. Garg's case (supra), held that the same principle would be applicable in regard to the jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with the 'executive' action in the field of economic activities. It was said :- "What we said in that case in regard to legislation relating to economic matters must apply equally in regard to executive action in the field of economic activities, though the executive decision may not be placed on as high a pedestal as legislative judgment in so far as judicial deference is concerned. We must not forget that in complex economic matters every decision is necessarily empiric and it is based on experimentation or what one may call 'trial and error method' and therefore its validity cannot be tested on any rigid 'a priori', considerations or on the application of any strait jacket formula. We must not forget that in complex economic matters every decision is necessarily empiric and it is based on experimentation or what one may call 'trial and error method' and therefore its validity cannot be tested on any rigid 'a priori', considerations or on the application of any strait jacket formula. The court must while adjudging the constitutional validity of an executive decision relating to economic matters grant a certain measure of freedom or 'play' in the" joints" to the executive…… The Court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by the State Government merely because it feels that another policy decision would have been fairer or wiser or more scientific or logical. The Court can interfere only if the policy decision is patently arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide. It is against the background of these observations and keeping them in mind that we must now proceed to deal with the contention of the petitioners based on Article 14 of the Constitution." Although, as noticed above, the extent of interference by the Court was confined to the test of Article 14 of the Constitution and it was said in paragraph 32 of the judgment that while deciding to grant licence or part with its privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14 and act arbitrarily or at its sweet-will, it was observed that such an interference should not be made having regard to the nature of the trade or business unless the economic policy appears to be plainly arbitrary, irrational or mala fide. The following observations in paragraph 33 may usefully be quoted :- "But, while considering the applicability of Article 14 in such a case we must bear in mind that having regard to the nature of the trade or business the Court would be slow to interfere with the policy laid down by the State Government for grant of licences for manufacture and sale of liquor. The Court would, in view of the inherently pernicious nature of the commodity allow a large measure of latitude to the State Government in determining its policy of regulating, manufacture and trade in liquor. The Court would, in view of the inherently pernicious nature of the commodity allow a large measure of latitude to the State Government in determining its policy of regulating, manufacture and trade in liquor. Moreover, the grant of licences for manufacture and sale of liquor would essentially be a matter of economic policy where the court would hesitate to intervene and strike down what the State Government has done unless it appears to be plainly arbitrary, irrational or mala fide." While dealing with the same question, but in a different context, in the case of Shri Sachidanand Pandey vs. The State of West Bengal (AIR 1987 Supreme Court, 1109) the Supreme Court opined as follows :- “The least that the Court may do is to examine whether appropriate considerations are borne in mind and irrelevancies excluded. In appropriate cases, the Court may go further, but how much further must depend on the circumstances of the case. The Court may always give necessary directions. However, the Court will not attempt to nicely balance relevant considerations. When the question involves the nice balancing of relevant considerations, the Court may feel justified in resigning itself to acceptance of the decision of the concerned authority." Recently in the case of M/s Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. and another vs. Union of India and others (AIR 1990 Supreme Court, 1277) another Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had again the occasion to consider more or less the same question. After referring to the various authorities of Indian and Foreign Courts, the law was summarised in the following words :- "The true position, therefore, is that any act of the repository of power, whether legislative or administrative or quasi-judicial, is open to challenge if it is in conflict with the Constitution or the governing Act or the general principles of the law of the land or it is so arbitrary or unreasonable that no fair minded authority could ever have made it." xx xx xx "The Court has neither the means nor the knowledge to re-evaluate the factual basis of the impugned orders. The Court in exercise of judicial review, is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence." xx xx xx "Judicial review is not concerned with matters of economic policy. The Court in exercise of judicial review, is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence." xx xx xx "Judicial review is not concerned with matters of economic policy. The Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or its agents as to matters within the province of either. The Court does not supplant the "feel of the expert" by its own view. When the legislature acts within the sphere of its authority and delegates power to an agent, it may empower the agent to make findings of fact which are conclusive provided such findings satisfy the test of reasonableness. In all such cases, judicial inquiry is confined to the question whether the findings of fact are reasonably based on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. As stated by Jagannatha Shetty, J. in Gupta Sugar Works ( AIR 1987 SC 2351 at p. 2352 (supra) : “the court does not act like a chartered accountant nor acts like an Income tax Officer. The court is not concerned with any individual case or any particular problem. The court only examines whether the price determined was with due regard to considerations provided by the statute. And whether extraneous matters have been excluded from determination.” The legal position that would, thus, emerge in view of the aforementioned binding authorities of the apex court, is that while dealing with the challenge to the policy of supply of country liquor in polythene sachets, the only thing that has to be seen by this Court is whether there were materials available before the State Government on the basis of which such a decision could be taken and whether the materials on the basis of which the Government claims to have taken the decision are relevant or germane. In the event it is found that there were such materials available with the State Government this Court cannot go into the question of adequacy or sufficiency of the materials. It is also not possible for this Court to examine the merits of the expert opinion or to prefer one expert opinion to the other, or to substitute its own opinion in place of an expert's opinion on the subject. It is also not possible for this Court to examine the merits of the expert opinion or to prefer one expert opinion to the other, or to substitute its own opinion in place of an expert's opinion on the subject. While deciding the aforesaid question, not only due regard has to be given to the fact that the policy in question deals with the supply of liquor, which in the very nature of things stands on a footing different from other articles but also that a strict test cannot be adopted to judge the rationality or reasonableness of the policy and that it is difficult to evolve a fool proof system to achieve a perfect or near perfect state of affairs and, therefore, as Justice Holmes has said scope for some 'play in the joints' has to be given. We have also to keep in mind the fact that human ingenuity knows no bounds and. therefore, in such matters, even if there be some loopholes or shortcomings they can be set aright by some experimentation by 'trial and error' method. 12. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State stating that a high power committee had submitted its recommendations for the betterment of excise revenue in the State after studying the tax structure, the licensing system and administrative set up in other States. The committee, inter alia recommended to adopt the system of supply of country liquor in sachets which had been found to be successful in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The Government considered the said recommendation and after taking into account the various reports from other sources decided to adopt the said scheme, according to which sacheting of liquor is done under the direct control and supervision of excise officers and the sachets/pouches are sold wholesale to the retailers to be sold to the consumers. Thus, the consumers are now getting liquor in poly-packs which are tamper proof, pilfer proof, handy, cheap and trustworthy. It has also been stated that after the introduction of the said scheme sales have gone up surfacing the real consumption, which had hitherto been suppressed through sale of sub-standard, diluted, short measured liquor by the retailers. It has been asserted that the State Government is in possession of reports obtained from the Government of Tamil Nadu, which approve of the use of LDPE for packing of country liquor. It has been asserted that the State Government is in possession of reports obtained from the Government of Tamil Nadu, which approve of the use of LDPE for packing of country liquor. Copies of these reports have been brought on record as Annexures A to A/2 to the counter affidavit. In the counter affidavit, heavy reliance has been placed on a judgment of Madras High Court in which the same very question, namely, the likelihood of ad verse, deleterious effect of supply of country liquor in LDPE sachets had come up for consideration. I shall immediately refer to the findings recorded in the said judgment, a copy whereof has been marked as Annexure-B to the counter affidavit, later. Before that, it may only be stated, that according to the State, same system is in vogue in the States of Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Jammu & Kashmir, besides Andhra Pradesh. In a nutshell it has been asserted that the scheme has been introduced as a progressive measure not only in Bihar but in other States with a view to safeguarding the interest of consumers and protecting excise revenue. 13. The Madras High Court in the aforesaid judgment in the case of Aditya Mahapatra v. Government of Tamil Nadu and others (Writ Petition No. 3692 of 1990, disposed of on 24.4.90) considered the arguments pointing out the so called hazards of supply of liquor in LDPE sachets and concluded that the apprehension expressed in that regard is more imaginary than real. It also took the view that the question as to whether the use of sachets for supply of liquor would be injurious to health is a question of fact, which cannot be decided in a proceeding under Article 226 and that the only question to be considered is whether the decision to use LDPE sachets for packing liquor for the purpose of sale to the consumers is arbitrary and illegal. The learned Judge discussed the findings recorded by the Kerala High Court in a similar writ petition in the case reported in AIR 1985 Kerala, 24 and took the view that the judgment in that case had been rendered as the Government decision was found to be based on irrelevant matters and hence arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The learned Judge proceeded to consider the various materials, and concluded "that State Government had in its custody sufficient technological information and other relevant facts on which it was possible for the State to conclude that use of Polyethylene sachets will not affect the health of the persons, who consume country liquors or arrack supplied in such sachets. At any rate it is not possible for this Court to hold that the decision of the State Government is arbitrary and that it is based on irrelevant materials". Mr. Jitendra Singh submitted that reliance on the judgment of the Madras High Court, in order to sustain the policy which had been taken in 1989 itself, is misplaced because at the relevant time there was no such judgment. Learned counsel to that extent may be right. However, the question whether the said policy should be struck down on the ground of absence of relevant materials having arisen for consideration, if such a decision can be sustained as being in conformity with the findings recorded on the basis of similar materials, reliance on the judgment cannot be said to be inappropriate. It may be that when the scheme was framed, there was no such judgment but now when the validity of the scheme is to be decided the State can certainly take aid of the findings recorded in the judgment for holding that the policy or the scheme cannot be said to be arbitrary or without any material. 14. Once we come to this conclusion that there are reports which do not suggest the possibility of any adverse effect of use of LDPE sachets, it would be difficult for this Court to reject the same as being unreliable and to prefer those reports which suggest otherwise. In other words, if there are two conflicting views or reports it would be difficult for the Court to weigh their inter se veracity, authenticity or correctness and to prefer one to the other. This is the message of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above. In has, accordingly, to be held that the impugned Government decision cannot be said to be arbitrary as being based on no relevant material. I may, however, observe that we are living in an age where science and technology has made tremendous strides. New concepts are being developed every day. In has, accordingly, to be held that the impugned Government decision cannot be said to be arbitrary as being based on no relevant material. I may, however, observe that we are living in an age where science and technology has made tremendous strides. New concepts are being developed every day. Use of LDPE sachets is an improved mode of packaging and one can expect and hope that with the scientific experiments taking place, by some experimentation, trial and error, still better and more improved mode of packaging would be available which could be said to be less health hazardous than the use of plastics or LDPE sachets. However, as I have said in this judgment earlier, no system or mode can be said to be fool-proof and there are always certain chances of manipulation because of human ingenuity as a result of which certain distortions and incongruities at the stage of implementation may arise or occur, which the science and technology will take care of. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 cannot be resorted to for the redressal of these distortions and incongruities. 15. Before I conclude, I would like to mention another important aspect. I have stated above that the decision to supply liquor in sachets had been taken and contracts had been awarded in April 1989 effective from 15th July, 1989. The same could not be implemented until November, 1990, only on account of certain litigation referred to above. It may only be a coincidence, as the learned counsel for the petitioners tried to justify, that this writ petition was filed on 4th December, 1990, soon after the aforesaid litigation had finally ended unsuccessfully in September, 1990. A doubt certainly arises in one's mind as to why, if the petitioner really wanted to challenge the policy on the ground as set out in the writ petition, should he have waited till the end of the earlier round of litigation. Learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State, highlighted this aspect and submitted that the petitioner has been set up by those very disgruntled persons who had filed the previous writ petition having failed to get the contract, and are now trying to stall the implementation of the policy on different grounds. Mr. Learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State, highlighted this aspect and submitted that the petitioner has been set up by those very disgruntled persons who had filed the previous writ petition having failed to get the contract, and are now trying to stall the implementation of the policy on different grounds. Mr. Jitendra Singh in order to establish the bonafides of the petitioners pointed out the background of the petitioner about whom it has been said that he is a public spirited man hiving a brilliant academic record and has joined legal profession after giving up a lucrative job in a public undertaking. It is difficult and also unnecessary to go into this aspect of the matter, but certainly one aspect, which cannot be lost sight of, is that the writ petition has been filed after inordinate delay. In Nandlal Jaiswal's case (supra) the impugned policy decision had been taken on 30th December, 1984. The writ petition challenging the same was filed in the High Court on 20th November, 1985 i.e. after about 11 months. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were guilty of gross delay in filing the writ petitions since on account of lapse of time the respondents of those cases, who had been granted contract, had altered their position by incurring huge expenses towards setting up distilleries. It was also said that if interference by the High Court after lapse of considerable time affects the right of third party, the Court should not entertain and grant reliefs in such writ petitions. The following observations in the said case may be usefully noticed : "The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties." It has to be borne in mind that the persons in whose favour contracts have been granted, have not even been made parties in this writ petition. Certainly, therefore, it can be said that any positive order or direction in this writ petition is bound to affect their rights. Mr. Jitendra Singh submitted that the writ petition is not in the nature of adversary litigation and the whole object in filing the same is to point out that the implementation of the decision will be a health hazard to the poor hapless citizens of the State. The object apparently sounds laudable. But I could have appreciated the object more if the petitioners had filed the writ petition for an appropriate direction against the sale of liquor itself. However, as learned counsel conceded a number of times during hearing, this writ petition is not against the sale of liquor, it is only against sale of liquor in LDPE sachets. If the consumption of liquor itself is inherently injurious to health & hygiene, it is difficult for me to appreciate the logic that the sale of liquor should continue but only the mode of packaging should be changed. 16. Mr. Jitendra Singh has also made submissions that consideration of protection of human lives under Article 21 of the Constitution should outweigh all other considerations, including revenue. Learned counsel to that extent may be right. This submission, however, is based on the premise that use of LDPE sachets is a health hazard regarding which, as noticed above, there is no unanimity of opinion. Besides it overlooks the fact that under the old system of supply, on account of sale and consumption of spurious liquor, many human lives had been lost. The 'liquor tragedies' of the past bear testimony to this fact. No such instance of loss of human lives under the new system during the last about a year was brought to our notice. 17. Having given my most anxious considerations raised in both the writ petitions, in my opinion, there is no scope for any interference by this Court. I may, however, observe that the State Government will be well advised to take into consideration the suggestions, which have been referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the judgment and also consider further improvement in the system depending on the development in the technology. 18. These two writ petitions are, accordingly, dismissed, but without any order as to costs. Dharmpal Sinha, J. - I agree.