ORDER R.C. Lahoti, J. -- 1. Judges must be beware of hard constructions and strained inferences; for there is no worse torture than torture of laws -- said Francis Bacon. Should the law be so interpreted and implemented as to let the litigation go into a circuitous and torturous path of journey or should it be so interpreted as to cut-short litigation keeping in view the purpose and object behind its enactment, is the question staring at the Court hearing this reference. 2. The Code of Civil Procedure (M.P. Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act No. 29 of 1984) introduced Rule 3-B in Order 1 and Rule 4-A in Order 6 in the body of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as applied to the State Of Madhya Pradesh. Of late, it has come to the notice of this Court that the provision is being utilized by the appellate Courts as a tool for earning easy disposal of appeals by making orders of remand unmindful of the fact that a convenient resort to that provision has the result of setting at naught the concluded decrees of competent Courts, well merited otherwise, and thereby throwing down the litigants to retread the arduous path of tiresome litigation. 3. The facts in brief: The plaintiff/respondent No. 1 instituted a suit for declaration of title and partition relating to an agricultural holding. The suit was instituted on 20.10.76 and came to be decided on 28.8.80. The suit was decreed on 2.9.80. The defendants preferred an appeal before the lower appellate Court which was heard on merits and dismissed by the lower appellate Court vide its judgment and decree dated 17.4.90. In between, on 14.8.84, had come into force the Amending Act of 1984. The provisions of Order 1 Rule 3-B and Order 6 Rule 4-A C.P.C. were not complied with by the defendant as appellant before the lower appellate Court nor did that Court advert its attention at securing compliance therewith. In between, on 14.8.84, had come into force the Amending Act of 1984. The provisions of Order 1 Rule 3-B and Order 6 Rule 4-A C.P.C. were not complied with by the defendant as appellant before the lower appellate Court nor did that Court advert its attention at securing compliance therewith. The losers in litigation, i.e. the defendants, have come up to this Court now seriously complaining of jurisdictional incompetence in the lower appellate Court for failure of compliance thereat with the provisions contained in Order 1 Rule 3-B and Order 6 Rule 4-A suggesting that the decree passed in appeal was vitiated and forcefully pressing for a remand so as to secure a rehearing of the appeal at the hands of the lower appellate Court after compliance with the said provisions of law. This Court admitted the appeal for hearing parties on the following question. "Whether the judgment and decree of the Court below are vitiated for non-compliance with the provisions contained in Order 1 Rule 3-B and Order 6 Rule 4-A C.P.C." 4. It is clear that if the contention raised on behalf of the appellant canvassing mandatory character of the two provisions and jurisdictional incompetence in the Court below in hearing and disposing of the appeal without securing compliance with the two provisions were to be accepted the appeal has to be simply allowed with consequent order of remand setting aside the impugned decree and directing a rehearing .of the appeal at the hands of the lower appellate Court. Forceful reliance was placed on Mohanlal v. Ramlal (1989-11 MPWN 22); Shakoor Khan v. Yogi Dulichand ( 1989 MPLJ 134 ) and three unreported decisions of this Court in Shankarlal v. Shankarlal (S.A. No. 113/88, decided on 22.3.90); Smt. Dhanakju v. Smt. Sukhrani (S.A. 30/89, decided on 16.10.90) and Alfoo Khan v. Lateef Khan (M.A. No. 90/88, decided on 20.2.91). 5. 5. The effort of the defendant/appellants at securing the remand was seriously opposed by plaintiff/respondent submitting that though the lower appellate Court should have secured compliance with the provisions contained in Order 1 Rule 3-B and Order 6 Rule 4-A C.P.C. yet the primary responsibility of imp-leading the State as party-respondent in the appeal before the lower appellate Court laid with the appellant thereat who having failed in discharging own obligation, cannot now be heard to complain of non-compliance with the provisions to their own advantage securing thereby reversal of well merited decree in favour of the plaintiff/respondent. . 6. Order 1 Rule 3-B and Order 6 Rule4-A C.P.C. brought on the statute book by M.P. Act No. 29 of 1984 read as under:-- "3-B. Conditions for entertainment of suits.- (1) No suit or proceeding for – (a) declaration of title or any right over any agricultural land, with or without any other relief; or (b) specific performance of any contract for transfer of any agricultural land with or without any other relief, . shall be" entertained by any Court, unless the plaintiff or applicant, as the case may be, knowing or having reason to believe that a return under section 9 of the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960 (No. 20 of 1960) in 'relation to land aforesaid has been or is required to be filed by him or by any other person before competent authority appointed under that Act, has imp-leaded the State of Madhya Pradesh as one of the defendants or non-applicants, as the case may be, to such suit or proceeding. (2) No Court shall proceed with pending suit or proceeding referred to in sub-rule (1) unless, as soon as may be, the State Government is so imp-leaded as a defendant or non-applicant. Explanation. (2) No Court shall proceed with pending suit or proceeding referred to in sub-rule (1) unless, as soon as may be, the State Government is so imp-leaded as a defendant or non-applicant. Explanation. -- The expression "suit or proceeding" used in this sub-rule shall include appeal, reference or revision, but shall not include any proceeding for or connected with execution of any decree or final order passed in such suit or proceeding." ORDER 6:- "4-A. Particulars of pleadings for agricultural land.-- In any suit or proceedings contemplated under Rule 3-B of Order 1 the parties other than the State Government shall plead the particulars of total agricultural land which is owned, claimed or held by them in any right and shall further declare whether the subject matter of suit or proceeding is or is not covered by Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960 (No. 20 of 1960) and whether any proceedings in relation to such subject matter are to the knowledge of the party pending before the competent authority." 7. Mahila Bashiran Bai v. Fatima Bai (1'986 JLJ 777) is the first decision (at least out of the reported ones) of this Court which took notice of newly introduced provisions and stated the object behind. The referring Judge has formed an opinion that there was a conflict in the view taken in Mahila Bashiran Bai's case and the subsequent decisions noticed in para 4 above. He has also observed that the questions arising for consideration were of general importance affecting large number of cases, arising frequently and hence deemed it proper to have the questions answered by a Division Bench. This is how the following three questions have come pp for consideration before this Bench constituted by Hon'ble the Chief Justice:-- . (i) Whether non-compliance with the provisions contained in Order 1 Rule 3-B C.P.C. creates jurisdictional incompetence in the Court hearing the suit or appeal? (ii) Whether the defect as to non-compliance with the provisions contained in Order 1 Rule 3-B C.P.C. can be rectified by compliance at the stage at which it is detected or pointed out? (i) Whether non-compliance with the provisions contained in Order 1 Rule 3-B C.P.C. creates jurisdictional incompetence in the Court hearing the suit or appeal? (ii) Whether the defect as to non-compliance with the provisions contained in Order 1 Rule 3-B C.P.C. can be rectified by compliance at the stage at which it is detected or pointed out? (iii) Whether a party on whom lay the primary duty of imp-leading the State as a party to the case, and having defaulted in doing so, can be permitted to raise the plea to its own advantage so as to get rid of the decree against it, otherwise well merited? 8. Ceiling on agricultural holdings was introduced in the State of Madhya Pradesh by M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960 and was brought" into force on 15th November 1961. Though the Act empowered Competent Authority there under to examine the transactions entered into with the object of defeating the provisions of the Act and anull and avoid such transaction, yet it came to the notice of the Legislature that unscrupulous persons were utilising the forum of civil Courts as a means for setting at naught the provisions of the Ceiling Act. They would file declaratory suits or suits seeking specific performance of contracts for sale, secure a decree, collusively sometimes, and then set up' the civil Court's decree before the Competent Authority under the Ceiling law seeking protection thereat pleading immunity to civil Court's decree from scrutiny under the Ceiling Act. To guard against such efforts, the State Legislature came out with amendment in the Code of Civil Procedure in the year 1984. 9. To quote from the Statement of Objects and Reasons [see, M.P. Government Gazette Extraordinary case 13.12.83, P. 2753]:- "7. It is again a malady that collusive civil litigation for circumventing the provisions of Ceiling Act and devised prolongation of litigation in the Civil Courts for making its provisions ineffective, are rampant and many times not being a party, the Government is neither aware of civil proceedings nor can do anything to abate the mischief and misuse of the process of the Court, hence it is proposed that in such case State Government should necessarily be made a party so that by such collusive litigation the public interest do not suffer. With that end in view amendments in section 80, Order 1 Rule 3, Order 6 Rule 4 and Order IX Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure have been proposed." 10. The two provisions, haVil1g been introduced in the body of the Code, they are to be read not in• isolation but along with other provisions of the Code. The following provisions pre-existing in the body of the Code, deserve to be noticed: "S. 99. No decree to be reversed or modified for error or irregularity not affecting merits or jurisdiction. -- No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any care be remanded, in appeal on account of any misjoinder or non- joinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to non-joinder of a necessary party. . Order 1 :- "Rule 9. Misjoinder and non-joinder. -- No suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, and the Court may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it : Provided that nothing in this rule shall apply to non-joinder of a necessary party." "Rule 13. Objections as to non-joinder or misjoinder. -- All objections on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties shall be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, unless the ground of objection has subsequently arisen, and any such objection not so taken shall be deemed to have been waived." 11. In Mahila Bashiran Bai's case (supra), several appeals came to be decided by this Court by• a common order. In all the cases, the trial Courts had decreed the suit without securing compliance with the provisions of Order 1 Rule 3-B and Order 6 Rule 4-A C.P.C. The lower appellate Court had set aside the decrees and remanded the case to respective trial Courts for re- trial and disposal afresh after compliance with the provisions aforesaid. Dr. In all the cases, the trial Courts had decreed the suit without securing compliance with the provisions of Order 1 Rule 3-B and Order 6 Rule 4-A C.P.C. The lower appellate Court had set aside the decrees and remanded the case to respective trial Courts for re- trial and disposal afresh after compliance with the provisions aforesaid. Dr. T.N. Singh, J. held such an approach patently erroneous and wholly impermissible, de novo trial being not at all contemplated, which would have the effect of prolonging the life of litigation unnecessarily and causing undue harassment to the parties at all stages. It was observed:- "The sole object of the State Amendment is to protect interest of the State in a particular class of cases. Whether the State has any interest in any case at any stage of the lis has to be decided by any Court before which any proceeding is pending when the State Amendment Act came into force and this duty is placed, by the State Amendment Act, to be discharged by not only the trial Court but also by the appellate Court, of course, excluding the executing Court, as is made very clear by the Explanation appended to the new provision. Without discharging this duty it did not behave the appellate Court to pass any barren and omnibus order, shifting its responsibility to the trial Court. What is contemplated is that the appellate Court shall issue a notice to the State of Madhya Pradesh to show cause why the State should not be imp-leaded as a party in the appeal. After the State appears, it will be open to the State to state its case and plead whether it would like to contest the suit on merits and to be added as defendant-respondent in the suit. Should the State plead that, it has to be heard on merits and evidence• may have to be adduced. That may be done even at the appellate stage as the Court has the power to receive additional evidence. The appellate Court in these matters is entitled to hear both sides and to give opportunity to both sides in the matter of adducing evidence. There is no necessity for remand, for de novo trial. That may be done even at the appellate stage as the Court has the power to receive additional evidence. The appellate Court in these matters is entitled to hear both sides and to give opportunity to both sides in the matter of adducing evidence. There is no necessity for remand, for de novo trial. Indeed in some of the cases it may so happen that the State should be satisfied merely being imp-leaded as proforma respondent and evidence ~ay not be necessary to be recorded. Therefore, without hearing the State the appellate Court had no jurisdiction to set aside the decree and remand the suit for retrial, after making State as a party defendant in the Court below. " In subsequent decisions noted in para 4 hereinabove, Mahila Bashiran Bai's case was noticed in some of the cases, yet it was not fully followed and there the error was committed. 12. In Fort Gloster Jute Manufacturing Co. v. Chandra Kumar Das and another (AIR 1920 Calcutta 597) the Division Bench made the following observations, which in our opinion, must be read time and again whenever occasion arises for d~aling with such situations:-. "Non-compliance with every rule of procedure does not necessarily destroy the validity of the whole proceeding. The purpose of the rule violated must be examined. If the act of the "Court is without jurisdiction or infringes a rule prescribed on ground of public policy, the proceeding becomes a nullity, if it is, on the other hand, only an irregular exercise of jurisdiction, a contravention of-rules framed by the legislature with a view to afford protection to the individual litigant, the latter might waive the benefit thereof and is not entitled to obtain a reversal of the decree except on proof that the merits have been affected. The mere fact that the Court has acted in a manner contrary to that prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure does not necessarily show that what has been done is a nullity; the effect depends upon the nature, scope and object of the particular provision which has been violated." 13. The mere fact that the Court has acted in a manner contrary to that prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure does not necessarily show that what has been done is a nullity; the effect depends upon the nature, scope and object of the particular provision which has been violated." 13. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Muhammad Hussain Khan v. Babu Kishva Babdab Sahai (AIR 1937 PC 233) stated with reference to section 99 C.P.C. that the rule embodied therein proceeds upon a sound principle and is calculated to promote justice and their Lordships were not prepared to adopt a course which would merely prolong litigation. Their Lordships refused to render concluded trial abortive unless the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court were affected. 14. In a latter case of Kiransingh and others v. Chaman Paswan and others ( AIR 1954 SC 340 ) their Lordships of the Apex Court while dealing with sections 21 and 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act have stated the law in the following terms:- "The policy underlying S. 21 and S. 99, Civil P .C. and S. 11 of the Suit . Valuation Act, is the same, namely, that when a case "had been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical. and not open to consideration by an appellate Court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits." 15. The object behind a legislative provision has a role to play in its interpretative process. In Mrs. Vinifred Ross and another v. Mrs. Ivy Fonsca and others ( AIR 1984 SC 458 ; vide para 5) and M/s Sanghvi Jeevraj Ghewar Chand & others v. Secretary, Madras Chillies, Grains and Kirana Merchants Workers Union and another ( AIR 1969 SC 530 ; vide para 18) their Lordships read the object of the enactment to utilise the same for determining the scope and ambit of the relevant statutory provisions. In Narain Khamman v. Praduman Kumar Jain ( AIR 1985 SC 4 ; vide para 12), their Lordships observed:-"It is now well settled that though the Statement of Objects and Reasons' accompanying a legislative Bill cannot be used to determine the true meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of a statute, it is permissible to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a Bill for the purpose of understanding the background, the antecedent, state of affairs, the surrounding circumstances in relation to the statute, and the evil which the statute sought to remedy. " [Emphasis supplied.] 16. Order 1 Rule 3-B and Order 6 Rule 4-A C.P.C. have been brought on the statute book to protect tile interest of the State. These provisions were never intended to provide a tool in the hands of private litigants (i.e. other than State) for securing orders of remand and de novo trials consequent to directions for compliance with these provisions. 17. The party on whom did lay primarily the responsibility of joining the State as a party to the case, having failed in disc baring its duty, the Court too having overlooked the omission, the opponent too having shared the blame for the omission, wittingly or unwittingly by failing in promptly pointing out to the omission, the ends of justice and the spit it of law would be satisfied by directing the Sate to be joined as a party to the case at that very stage and before that very Court when and where the defect is detected or pointed out. The State would then be noticed and afforded an opportunity of participation at the proceedings. The State may then avail the opportunity to point out that merits of the case have been adversely affected on account of non-compliance with the provisions at an earlier stage. The State would then be noticed and afforded an opportunity of participation at the proceedings. The State may then avail the opportunity to point out that merits of the case have been adversely affected on account of non-compliance with the provisions at an earlier stage. In that event if the matter be before the trial Court, it may exercise its jurisdiction to reopen the trial to the extent warranted so as to protect the interest of the State; if the Court be an appellate Court, it may exercise its jurisdiction conferred by Rules 23, 23-A and 25 or 27 of Order 41 C.P.C. and may either proceed to frame an issue and try itself or may remit the case to the trial Court retaining seisin of appeal to itself or may if necessary make a remand of the case if satisfied that prejudice bas resulted to the State affecting the merits . of the case or jurisdiction of the Court on account of failure to join the State as party to the case at an earlier and appropriate stage of the proceedings. If the State having been noticed, fails to appear or having appeared refuses to participate at the proceedings or to claim a trial or retrial qua itself, it will serve no purpose to dislodge the otherwise well merited decree of the" Court below solely because the said provisions were not complied with before the Court/s below. 18. It is basic to civil jurisprudence that no one should be allowed to take advantage of its own wrong. No party (i.e. other than the State) should be permitted to challenge the concluded decree of Courts below solely by complaining non-compliance with the provisions contained in Order 1 Rule 3-B and Order 6 Rule 4-A C.P.C. because if it be a plaintiff or appellant it is to be blamed primarily for failure to imp-lead the State as party to the proceedings at an appropriate stage and if it be a defendant or respondent it is to be blamed for its failure to raise an objection to such omission at the earliest. Section 99 and Rules 9 and 13 of Order 1, C.P.C., would water down the force of Order 1 Rule 3-B and Order 6 Rule 4-A, C.P.C. 19. Section 99 and Rules 9 and 13 of Order 1, C.P.C., would water down the force of Order 1 Rule 3-B and Order 6 Rule 4-A, C.P.C. 19. The State which is joined as a party to proceedings under Order 1 Rule .3- B C.P .C. is not a necessary party in the sense in which the term is understood in the Civil law. A Full Bench of this Court in Panna Jeewanlal ( 1976 JLJ 84 ) held:- "The tests for determining whether a party is a necessary party are:-. (i) There must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the matter involved in the proceeding in question. (ii) It should not be possible to pass an effective decree in the absence of such a part. AIR 1963 SC 521, AIR 1947 All. 18 (FB) and AIR 1958 SC 886 relied on." . It is clear that the State is joined as a party for the purpose of Order 1 Rule 3-B, C.P.C., there is no right to relief against such party in respect of the matter involved in the proceeding in question nor can it be said that it would be impossible to pass an effective decree in the absence of the State. Even if a decree is passed without joining the State as a party to the proceeding to which Order 1 Rule 3-B C.P.C. is attracted, the only result would be that the State would not be bound by the decree and 'in the event of an occasion arising for the purpose, it would be free to contend that the decree was secured for the purpose of defeating the provisions of the Ceiling law. The efficacy of the decree between the parties would not be affected. It cannot be said that the decree passed would be a nullity or a decree without jurisdiction. Proviso to S. 99 and proviso to O. 1 R. 9 C.P.C. do not have any applicability to the case of non-joinder of State under Order 1 Rule 3-B C.P.C. 20. We may mention that since the day on which 1984 Amendment Act was brought into force and till this day we have not come across a single case where the State might have really put in a contest on being joined as a party to the case and taken benefit of these provisions. We may mention that since the day on which 1984 Amendment Act was brought into force and till this day we have not come across a single case where the State might have really put in a contest on being joined as a party to the case and taken benefit of these provisions. On the contrary we find that on account of the State being joined as a party to the case, the decree becomes binding on it while it has in fact not put in any contest. The provision far from serving its purpose is rather boomeranging its laudable object and public purpose behind. 21. We may now refer to the decisions on which reliance is placed by the' learned counsel for the appellant. 21. 1. In Mohanlal's case (supra), the High Court set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court and sent the matter back to the lower appellate Court where the State ought to have been joined as a party to the case, but was not so joined. 21.2. In Shakoor Khan's case (supra), the question of vaildity of the decree passed in contravention of the provisions of Order 1 Rule 3-B and Order 6 Rule 4-A C.P.C. was not considered. 21.3. In Smt. Dhanakju's case (supra), although the State was joined as a party in the Second Appeal, but without examining the effect of failure to joint it before the lower appellate Court, a learned Single Judge of this Court set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court and sent the matter back. 21.4. In Alfoo Khan's case (supra) the State was not joined as a party to the case before the trial Court. The objection was raised by the appellant for the first time in Second Appeal and the learned Single Judge set aside the judgment and decree of the Courts below solely for this reason and sent the matter back to the trial Court for disposal afresh. 21.5. In Shankarlal's case (supra) also a similar course was followed and decree of the lower appellate Court was set aside without examining the effect on merits and though the State was not even heard in this Court. 22. In our opinion the law has been correctly laid down in Mahila Bashiran Bai's case (supra). We do not approve of the view taken by the learned Single. 22. In our opinion the law has been correctly laid down in Mahila Bashiran Bai's case (supra). We do not approve of the view taken by the learned Single. Judges of this Court in the cases of Mohanlal, Shankarlal, Smt. Dhanakju and Alfoo Khan's cases (supra). In our opinion there was no occasion to make a remand solely on account of non-compliance with Order 1 Rule 3-B C.P.C. before the Court/s below and when the State had neither prayed for a remand nor had demonstrated the necessity for adopting that course. 23. For the foregoing reasons we answer the questions referred as under:-(1) the non-compliance with the provisions containing in Order 1 Rule 3-B C.P.C. does not create jurisdictional incompetence in the Court hearing the suit or appeal solely on account of non-compliance therewith; (2) the defect as to non-compliance with the provisions contained in Order 1 Rule 3-B C.P.C. can be rectified by joining the State as party to the proceedings and noticing it at that very stage at which the defect is detected or pointed out to the Court; (3) the party on whom lay the primary duty of imp-leading the State as party to the case having defaulted in doing so, cannot plead the defect at subsequent stage of the proceedings to its own advantage so as to get rid of a decree against it, otherwise well merited. No such decree shall be set aside unless the State ,be in a position to point out that merits of the case or jurisdiction of the Court has been affected on account of non- compliance with the provisions contained in Order 1 Rule 3-B and Order 6 Rule 4-B C.P.C. 24. Let the matter be placed before the Single Bench as per Roster for disposal of Second Appeal in accordance with law.