Judgment S. B. Sinha, J. 1. This appeal under Sec.55 of the Indian Divorce act, 1869 is at the instance of the petitioner/husband who filed a suit for divorce under Sec.10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 as against defendent/respondent No.1 on the ground of adultery. 2. The basic facts of. this case are not disputed. 3. The appellant filed the aforementioned suit alleging inter alia therein that he married respondent No.1 according to Christian rites on 28-12-1981. It is also admitted that respondent No.1 gave birth to a female child in the year 1982. However, there is a dispute with regard to the date of birth of the said child, that is, according to the appellant, the famale child was born in August, 1982 ; whereas according to respondent No.1 she was born on 23-9-1982. The appellant inter aha had contended that he had no access to the defendant so as to live as husband and wife prior to third week of March, 1982. It is admitted that since April 1982, they have not been living together. Admittedly, the parties last lived together at Ranchi. 4. The appellant has contended that in April, 1982 pregnency of respondent No. J was detected but she denied the same and as she was to be taken to a doctor for a medical check-up at Ranchi, she filed away therefrom to Gumla and since then had not come back. In August, 1982, appellant along with some of his relatives went to Gumla to bring back his wife when it was found that she was in a very advanced stage of preg-nency. Despite requests made to her allegedly she did not come to Ranchi at that time. 5. Thereafter, in September, 1982, respondent was again visited by the appellant along with some of her relatives when he came to learn that she had already given birth to a female child. Allegedly at that point of time, respondent No.1 admitted that the father of the said child was respondent No.2. 6. 5. Thereafter, in September, 1982, respondent was again visited by the appellant along with some of her relatives when he came to learn that she had already given birth to a female child. Allegedly at that point of time, respondent No.1 admitted that the father of the said child was respondent No.2. 6. Separate written statements were filed by defendant Nos.1 and 2 wherein it was assented that the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 started living together as husband and wife from the very beginning Defendant no.1 was working as a teacher in Gumla and she used to visit her husbands residence at Ranchi on every Sundays and holidays and similarly the plaintiff also used to visit her house at Gumla and on such occasion they used to cohabit. Defendant No.1 contended that a female child was born to her in the third week of September, 1982 and not in August, 1982. Defendant No.1 further denied that she had any illicit connection or had committed any adultery at any time with defendant No.2. 7. The only issue, therefore, which arose for consideration before the court below was as to whether the respondent No.1 had been living in adultery with respondent No.2 ? 8. The learned trial court in his impugned judgment inter alia held that in view of the provisions contained in Sec.112 of the Evidence act, as sufficient evidences have been brought on records to show that the parties had access to each other immediately after marriage, the appellant was the father of the said female child. The learned court below further held that as the wife of respondent No.2 had testified that the respondent no.1 did not have any illicit connection with her husband, her evidence should be relied upon. Learned court below further relied upon an admission made by the appellant who examined himself as P. W.3 that he visited the respondent no.1 one month prior to the birth of the child. 9. Mr. Learned court below further relied upon an admission made by the appellant who examined himself as P. W.3 that he visited the respondent no.1 one month prior to the birth of the child. 9. Mr. P. K. Banerjee, learned counsel appearing for the appellant raised the following contentions :-It was firstly submitted that the learned court below should not have invoked Sec.112 of the Evidence Act as in this case, the exception thereto, namely (a) Commencement of co-habitation between the appellant and the respondent No.1 started in march, 1982 and (b) admission of respondent No.1 regarding the parantage of the child having been pleaded and proved, and then Sec.112 of the Evidence Act had no application. It was next contended that admittedly respondent No.2 was the brother-in-law of the respondent No.1 (sisters husband) and both respondent Nos.1 and 2 lived together in the same house. It was further submitted that respondent No. I was a teacher at Gumla and, thus, she was living with the family of respondent No.2. Learned counsel submitted that in a suit for divorce instituted under Sec.10 of the Indian Divorce Act, it is not necessary for the parties to prove the case of adultery beyond all reasonable doubts ; what is required to be proved is merely preponderance of probabilities. In this connection, learned counsel relied upon Binod Anand V/s. Belulah Lakra, reported in AIR 1982 Patna page 213 and two decisions of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Shrichand V/s. Tejirder Singh, reported in AIR 1979 M P page 76 and Jernail singh V/s. Kanhaiyalal, reported in AIR 1986 MP 56. Learned counsel next submitted that in this case, the appellant has proved that a female child was born to respondent No.1 in august, 1982 by proving Exhibits 1 and 2. Ext.1 was a letter written by a cousin brother of respondent No.1 and who examined himself as P. W.1 wherein he clearly stated that respondent No.1 had given birth to a female child in August 1982. It was also contended that genuineness of the said letter (Ext.1) and the envelope (Ext.2) has not been disputed. 10. According to Mr. Banerjee, on the other hand, respondents sought to prove the date of birth of the female child on the basis of a certificate granted by the Church which was marked as Ext. It was also contended that genuineness of the said letter (Ext.1) and the envelope (Ext.2) has not been disputed. 10. According to Mr. Banerjee, on the other hand, respondents sought to prove the date of birth of the female child on the basis of a certificate granted by the Church which was marked as Ext. A. The said document was not admissible in evidence inasmuch as the entries in the call Register (Pukar Wahi) which is said to be basis of the said certificate was neither called for by the respondent No.1 nor proved. The medical certified granted in this connection, namely, Ext. B was also not legally proved as neither the Doctor nor the mid wife who were present at the time of giving birth to the female child by respondent No.1 had been examined. 11. Learned counsel further submitted that the Medical Certificate (Ext.8) being a report, the same could not have been proved except by examining the maker of the said report. 12. Learned counsel further submitted that in this case, the conduct of the parties played a vital role inasmuch as if the plaintiff was the father of the child, when the pregnency was detected in April, 1982 there was no occasion for respondent No.1 to flee away from her marital home to Gumla. Learned counsel further submitted that the very fact that respondent no.1 did not come back to Ranchi despite the fact that the appellant went to Gumla once in August, 1982 and thereafter in September, 1982 also proves that she was guilty of commission of adultery with the Respondent No.2. Learned counsel submitted that thus in the facts and circumstances of this case, the appellant must be held to have rebutted the presumption arising under Sec.112 of the Indian Divorce Act. 13. Learned counsel further drew my attention to Paragraph 9 of the judgment and submitted that the learned court below committed an illegality in reading evidence of P. W.3 as an admission that he visited his house one month before the child birth. 13. Learned counsel further drew my attention to Paragraph 9 of the judgment and submitted that the learned court below committed an illegality in reading evidence of P. W.3 as an admission that he visited his house one month before the child birth. Learned counsel submitted that in order to construe the admission of a witness, his entire evidence should be read as a whole and as in the instant case, the appellant had visited the respondent No.1 at Gumla twice, namely one in August, 1982 and another in September, 1982 and thus he cannot be said to have admitted that he visited Gumla one month prior to the birth of the female child. 14. Mr. T. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that in this case, it is admitted that immediately after the marriage which took place on 28-12-1981, the appellant as also respondent No.1 had several opportunities to have access with each other. Learned counsel submitted that the statements made by respondent no.1 to the effect that at every week end as also on the holidays either she used to visit Ranchi or the appellant used to come to Gumla, cannot be disbelieved. It was further submitted that P. W.3 did not state that the defendant denied her pregnancy in April, 1982. 15. In this view, of the matter, according to the learned couasel, the ingredients of Sec.112 of the Indian Evidence Act had been existing and, thus, the court below has rightly drawn a presumption that the appellant is the father of the female child born in September, 1982. Learned counsel submitted that as the fact of paternity becomes a conclusive proof in terms of Sec.112 of the Indian Evidence Act, such a presumption can be rebutted only if the appellant can bring his case within the exceptions mentioned therein and not otherwise. 16. Learned counsel submitted that in this case, the appellant has not been able to bring his case within the purview of the exception to Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act. 17. Learned counsel next contended that it is true that in Gumla, respondent No.1 used to reside with respondent No.2, but it is impossible to comprehend that any adultery- would be permitted to be committed by the wife of respondent who happened to be her elder-sister. 18. 17. Learned counsel next contended that it is true that in Gumla, respondent No.1 used to reside with respondent No.2, but it is impossible to comprehend that any adultery- would be permitted to be committed by the wife of respondent who happened to be her elder-sister. 18. Sections 10 and 22 of the Indian Divorce Act read as follows :- "10. When husband may petition for dissolution ; Any husband may present a petition to the District Court or to the High court praying that his marriage may be dissolved on the ground that his wife has, since the solemnization thereof, been guilty of adultery. When wife may petition for dissolution ; Any wife may present a petition to a District Court or to the High Court, praying that her marriage may be dissolved on the ground that, since the solemnization thereof her husband has exchanged his profession of Christinaity for the profession of some other religion, and gone through a form of marriage with another woman ; or has been guilty of incestuous adultery or of bigamy with adultery, or of marriage with another woman with adultery. or of rape, sodomy or bestiality, or of adultery coupled with such cruelty as without adultery would have entitled her to a divorce a mensa ettoro. or of adultery coupled with desertion, without reasonable excuse, for two years or upwards. Contents of petition : Every such petition shall state as distinctly as the nature of the case permits, the facts on which the claim to have such marriage dissolved is founded.22. Bar to decree for divorce a mensa et toro ; but judicial sepation obtainable by husband or wife-No decree shall hereafter be made for a divorce a mensa et toro, but the husband or wife may obtain a decree of judicial separation, on the ground of adultery, of cruelty or desertion without reasonable excuse for two years or upwards, and such decree shall have the effect of a divorce a mensa at toro under the existing law, and such other legal effect as hereinafter mentioned. " 16. An adultery is a voluntary sexual intercourse after the solemnization of marriage with another persons other than his or her spouse. " 16. An adultery is a voluntary sexual intercourse after the solemnization of marriage with another persons other than his or her spouse. In Oxford V/s. Oxford (1971 (47 OLR) page 15 (Canada), it has been held that essence of adultery consists in the voluntary surrender to another person of the reproductive power or facilities to the guilty person and any submission of this power to the service or enjoyment of any person than the husband or the wife comes within the definition of adultery.17. There has been a divergence of opinion with regard to the standerd of proof. In some of the case, it has been held that the charge of adultery should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In Miller V/s. Minister of Pension 1947 Vol.2 All. E. R 372, Lord Dening held :- "it need not reach certainty. But it must carry a high degree of probability. Prof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. . . If the evidence is so strong against man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence of course it is possible, but not in the least probable, the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice. " In Bastable V/s. Bastable and Sanders reported in 1968 (3) All. ER 701 at 704, Willmer L. J. held as follows :- "true it is not a criminal offence ; it is a matrimonial offence. It is for the petitioner to satisfy the court that the offence has been committed. Whatever the popular view may be, it remains true to say that in the eyes of the law the commission of adultery is a serious matrimonial offence. It follows, in my view, that a high standard of proof is required in order to satisfy the court that the offence has been committed. " 18. It is, therefore, clear that a mere possibility that respondent no.1 has been in adultery with another is not enough and certainly suspicion cannot take the place of proof. However, it is not possible to obtain nor is it necessary to prove the case of an adultery by a direct evidence. 19. " 18. It is, therefore, clear that a mere possibility that respondent no.1 has been in adultery with another is not enough and certainly suspicion cannot take the place of proof. However, it is not possible to obtain nor is it necessary to prove the case of an adultery by a direct evidence. 19. In England V/s. England reported in 1952 (2) All E. R.784 it was held that conjunction of strong inclination with opportunity raises an irrebuttable presumption that adultery has been committed. 20. In Preston, Jones V/s. Preston Jones reported in 1951 (1) All. E. R.124 the House of Lords held that it a wife gave birth to a child and it was proved that the husband could not be the father, it was sufficient proof of adultery. 21. Reference in this connection may also be made to Blyth V/s. Blyth reported in 1966 (1) All, ER 524. 22. However in Binod Anand Lakra V/s. Smt. Belulah Lakra and another reported in AIR 1982 Patna 213, this Court following a decision of the m. P. High Court in Bulikkottial V/s. Mery reported in AIR M. P. Page 112, held that: "a proceeding for obtaining a decree for divorce being a Civil proceeding, the standard of proof need not be as high as that of a criminal case". It was further held that: "it is enough if preponderence of probability is proved". Similar view has been taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in lalit Lazarus Chhindwara V/s. Smt. Lavina Lazarus reported in AIR 1979 madhya Pradesh 70 and in Hargovind Soni V/s. Ramdulari reported in 1986 madhya Pradesh 57. The Madhaya Pradesh High Court while considering a case of adultery in a suit for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, also held that preponderence of probability should be the criteria for the purpose of proving a charge of adultery. Reference in this connection may also be made to Dastane V/s. Dastana reported in AIR 1975 s. C.1534. 23. However, there cannot be any doubt that a charge of adultery should be proved clearly and convincingly. A mere possibility is not enough, and certainly suspicion cannot take the place of proof. 24. Under Sec.10 of the Indian Divorce Act, the husband has to prove that his wife has, since the solemnization of marriage, been guilty of adultery. 25. 23. However, there cannot be any doubt that a charge of adultery should be proved clearly and convincingly. A mere possibility is not enough, and certainly suspicion cannot take the place of proof. 24. Under Sec.10 of the Indian Divorce Act, the husband has to prove that his wife has, since the solemnization of marriage, been guilty of adultery. 25. In this case, certain salient facts which are admitted may be noticed first. Admittedly the marriage took place on 28.12.1981. P. W.1 admitted that plaintiff used to go to Gumla and used to stay at his in-laws place for a day or two. He admitted that at the beginning on two or three occasions, he stayed at his in-laws place, but later on he used to stay at his place or at the place of Principal whose name he did not know. 26. P. W.3 is the sister in-law of the plaintiff. According to her, after the marriage, defendant came to Ranchi five times for a day or two. Immediately after the marriage, she came to his house on 29.12.1981 along with a friend of hers arid two children and she went back on 2.1.1982. According to P. W.3 on that occasion the couple did not have any occasion to live together as the house was full. She further stated that after about one week in January, she came to Ranchi on a Saturday and went back on Sunday and similarly she came in the kst week of January on a saturday with a child and went back to Gumla on Monday morning. She further alleged that the plaintiff went to Gumla along with his friend John (P. W.2) in February in the morning and came back in the evening. This witness further stated that he did not have any occasion to stay with her nor did he have any such occasion at Ranchi She further stated that the plaintiff went to bring the defendant in the third week of March and came back with her. At that point of time, the defendant (respondent herein stayed with the appellant for a period of three days. She again came along with her mother, younger brother and sister in April,. She stated that when she went to Gumla in April, it was told by defendants mother that she was pregnent. 27. At that point of time, the defendant (respondent herein stayed with the appellant for a period of three days. She again came along with her mother, younger brother and sister in April,. She stated that when she went to Gumla in April, it was told by defendants mother that she was pregnent. 27. Allegedly when she was asked to go to a doctor, she went back to Gumla, although her mother, brother and sister remained there. She stated that when she went to Gumla again in August, 1982, she was in advance stage of pregnency. Allegedly she came to learn in the last week of August that the defendant has given birth to a child. She again went to Gumla in the second week of September. According to her, she presumed that the defendant has become mother by only seeing her. In her cross-examination she stated that she is the patient of blood pressure and her mind does not work properly. She also admitted that she hah not been physically well for the last three-four years. She also admitted that she cannot remember various matters when she becomes unwell. She admitted that Robert has a separate house. She could not tell as to how many times Robert had been to his in-laws place. She admitted that she had gone to Gumla thrice and on all the occasions she had stayed in the house of the defendant. She admitted that Subhasini used to tell from the very begining that she would not stay wjth Robert. This was allegedly disclosed to Robert by her. Allegedly this was told to her by the defendant No.1 when she had gone to Ranchi for the second time after her marriage. At that point of time, allegedly P. W.2 was also present. 28. Her evidence does not inspite confidence inasmuch as she admitted in her deposition that in her society with regard to the relationship of husband and wife is not discussed openly. If her statement is correct that the respondant No.1 did not want to live with the plaintiff from the very begining, there was no occasion for the plaintiff who examined himself as P. W.4 to state that she co-habited with his wife for the first time in March, 1982. 29. If her statement is correct that the respondant No.1 did not want to live with the plaintiff from the very begining, there was no occasion for the plaintiff who examined himself as P. W.4 to state that she co-habited with his wife for the first time in March, 1982. 29. The plaintiff who examined himself as P. W.4 stated that she did not have any occasion to co-habit with his wife only because he did not have any occasion therefor, but it was not stated that the respondent used to avoid him. He admitted that the respondent No.1 visited him twice on the week-ends. If the respondent No.1 did not want to live with the appellant and further did not intend to live a natural conjugal life, it is unbelievable that she would come to Ranchi on her own in the week-ends. P. W.4 further alleged that when he came to learn in April, 1982 that his wife was pregnent and when he asked her as to who is the father of the child, she fled away to Gumla. This has not been corroborated by P. W.3 as she did not make any statement. It is also unbelievable that if the defendant had gone back to Gumla, her mother, brother and sister would stay back at Ranchi. 30. In Paragraph 12 of his deposition, the plaintiff/appellant admitted that the respondent stayed with him at Ranchi immediately after the marriage ; P. W.3 merely stated that she stayed only for three days P. W.4 further admitted that he accompenied his wife to Gumla and came back on the second day. He further admitted that she came to Ranchi in january, 1982 twice on herown accord. He admitted that he did not file any criminal case against respondent No.2 nor did he ask him or the parents of th e respondent No.1 in this regard. 31. In Paragraph 16 of his deposition, he states that respondent No.1 admitted that respondent No.2 is the father of the child in presence of p. W.3 but no such statement was made by P. W.3. He could not give any reason as to why he filed the suit in July, 1983, that is, after a period of 10 months of the birth of his child. 32. He could not give any reason as to why he filed the suit in July, 1983, that is, after a period of 10 months of the birth of his child. 32. On the other hand, defendant who examined herself as D. W.2 categorically stated that immediately after the marriage, she used to visit her husband regularly on week-ends and holidays. Asnoticed here-in-before to some extent this has been admitted by P. W.4 also P. W.4 further in her evidence stated that when she went to Ranchi in January, 1982, she came there along with her brother and stated that she had come alone. She also denied that on the next Saturday in January, 1982 she went to Ranchi along with the son of defendant No.2. She categorically stated that she had marital relationship with the appellant on all those occasions. As indicated here-in-before, the appellant categorically admitted that the respondent stayed at his place for a period of five days after the marriage was selemnised. 33. If the statement of the appellant to the effect that the respondent No.1 had been making attempts to avoid sexual connection with him, it does not stand to any reason as to how in March, 1982, he had such relation with her; 34. P. W.4 obviously made incorrect statements when he tried to improve his case that on all occasions when the defendant came to Ranchi she did so for the purpose of taking away her personal belongings. If this was the reason she would not have stayed in Ranchi for two nights, that is, from Saturday to Monday morning. It has also been admitted by p. W.4 that even prior to March, 1982, he had also been visiting his in-laws place at Gumla. 35. P. W.1 has also admitted that at the begining P. W.4 used to stay at his in laws place Gumla. 36. The appellant did not state in his evidence that when he visited gumla and stayed at his in-laws place, he did not have any access to his wife. This was only alleged by and P. W.3 and is a hear-say evidence and thus the same is not admissible because in this regard, P. W.3 was not corroborated by the appellant. 37. P. W.3 admittedly had been residing in a separate house. This was only alleged by and P. W.3 and is a hear-say evidence and thus the same is not admissible because in this regard, P. W.3 was not corroborated by the appellant. 37. P. W.3 admittedly had been residing in a separate house. She, therefore, was not in a position to state as to whether the appellant and respondent No.1 had any access to each other at any time when the child could have been begotten. 38. As noticed here-in-before, Mr. Banerjee submitted that respondent no.1 herself admitted before the plaintiff and other relations that respondent no.2 was the father of the child. Respondent No.1 denied that she. made any such admission. The appellant alleged that the said admission was made in the 2nd week of September, 1982 when he had visited her house at Gumla along with P. W.2 and P. W.3. 39. P. W.3 in her evidence, however, did not say that any such admission was made by respondent No.1 in her presence. Similarly, p. W.2 in his deposition had also not disclosed that any such admission was made by respondent No.1 in his presence. 40. Respondent No.2 also examined himself as D. W.1. He categorically denied that he had any illicit connection with respondent No.1. Apart from respondent No.2, his wife Hilaria Kujur also examined herself as D. W.3. She also categorically denied that although her husband as also respondent No.1 had been staying at their mothers place respondent no.2 had any illicit connection with respondent No.1. 41. Learned court below has come to the conclusion that the evidence of the witnesses examined on behalf of the respondent is trustworthy. 42. It is now well known in view of various decisions of the Supreme court as also other High Courts that when a case is to be decided on the basis of oral evidence adduced by the parties, the findings of fact arrived at by the trial court should not ordinarily be disturbed as he had the occasion to look to the demenour of the witnesses. 43. In H. M. Doyal Co. 43. In H. M. Doyal Co. V/s. Ram Nath Chitkara and others, reported in 28 (1985) Delhi Law Times 212, it was held :- "in Sarju Per shad Ramdeo Sahu V/s. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh and others, AIR 1951 SC 120 , it has been observed as under : when there is conflict of oral evidence of the partks on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of the witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escape the trial Judges notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on question of fact. In T. D. Gopalan V/s. The Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable endowments, Madras, AIR 1972 SC 1716 , it has been observed as under : "we apprehended that the uniform practice in the matter of appreciation of evidence has been that if the trial court has given cogent and detailed reasons for not accepting the testimony of a witness the appellate court in all fairness to it ought to deal with those reasons before proceeding to form a contrary opinion about accepting the testimony which has been rejected by the trial court". I may also mention that the evidence in this case was recorded by the same judicial officer who has given the judgment as Additional rent Controller. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the Rent Control Tribunal by disregarding the law laid down by the Supreme Court has wrongly held that the cheque dated 27th May, 1977 was sent by the appellants to respondent no.1". 44. On the aforementioned background, the provisions of Sec.112 of the Evidence Act may be considered, section 112 of the Evidence Act reads as follows :- "birth during marriage, conclusive proof of legitimacy : the fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten". 45. 45. The basis of the rule in Sec.112 of the Evidence Act that it is undesirable to enquire into the paternity of the child whose parents had access to each other. The provision refers to the point of time of the birth of the child as the deciding factor and not to the time of his conception ; the latter point of time has to be considered only to see whether the husband had or had no access to the mother. Evidence that a child is born during wedlock is sufficient to establish its legitimacy and shift the burden of proof to the party seeking to establish to the contrary. 46. It is true that reading this provision along with Sec.120 of the Evidence Act,, any husband or any wife may adduce evidence to show that they had at any time when the child would have been begotten namely during 280 days prior to the birth of the child had no access to one another. The evidence to establish that the husband did not have access to wife must be a satisfactory one. 47. In this case, the acceptance of a valid marriage between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 is not in dispute. The birth of a child to the defendant No.1 was otherwise inconsequential except for the purpose of proving adultery. Legitimacy of the child thus is not a question which has a direct relationship with the case but the said question has to be answered only for the purpose of finding out as to whether the plaintiff had been able to prove his plea that defendant No.1 had been living in adultery with defendant No.2. 48. As noticed here-in-hefore that there is no cogent evidence of non-access of the plaintiff to the defendant within a period of 280 days from the date of birth of the child. 49. In this case, another factor may be noticed. If the plaintiff was assured that he was not the father of the child, there was absolutely no reason as to why he did not volunteer to carry out his own blood test as also that of the child. The report of such a blood test would have been a relevant factor. 50. In this case, there is no proof whatsoever, whether direct or circumstantial, to show that respondent No.1 had been guilty of adultery after the solemnization of marriage. The report of such a blood test would have been a relevant factor. 50. In this case, there is no proof whatsoever, whether direct or circumstantial, to show that respondent No.1 had been guilty of adultery after the solemnization of marriage. It is true that for the purpose of proving the guilt of adultery on the part of a spouse, by another spouse, direct evidence may not be necessary. But in this case, except the plea put forward by the plaintiff to the effect that he did not have any access with respondent No.1 prior to March, 1982, no other evidence has been brought on records. 51. As would be evident, from the discussions made here-in-before, the learned court below, in my opinion, has rightly come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to prove the said plea. So as the date of birth of the child is concerned, Exts. A and B were inadmissible in evidence to prove the same. The plaintiff, however, sought to prove the fact that the child was born in August, 1982, only by reason of Ext.1. 52. From a perusal of Ext.1, it does not appear that thereby P. W.2 laid any emphasis so far as giving birth of a child by Subhasini in August, 1982 is concerned. 53. The plaintiff sought to prove the said fact by examining P. W.1 and by proving the letter allegedly written by him to the plaintiff namely ext.1. 54. P. W.2 his evidence stated that he went to the house of respondent No.1 along with the plaintiff on two occasions. P. W.1 admitted that from Ext.1, it would not appear as to whom the said letter was addressed to. Although he admitted that he had regular correspondence with the plaintiff, no other letter has been filed. In this connection, the evidence of P. W.2 is also worth considering. 55. Allegedly P. W.2 visited the parents house of respondent No.1 at Gumla once in February, 1982 and on the second occasion in August, 1982. They were accompanied by P. W.3 and one Amruias who had not been examined. In this connection, the evidence of P. W.2 is also worth considering. 55. Allegedly P. W.2 visited the parents house of respondent No.1 at Gumla once in February, 1982 and on the second occasion in August, 1982. They were accompanied by P. W.3 and one Amruias who had not been examined. He first stated that his second visit in the month of august, 1982 took place after the birth of the child, but later on he corrected himself that he went there a month prior to the birth of the child which shows that the child was born in September, 1982. He further stated that they went there to bring Subhasini back to Ranchi. Plaintiff as also respondent No.1 in their respective evidences categorically stated that they had their differences from April, 1982. If in April, 1982 respondent no.1 denied that she was pregnant and fled away from Ranchi thereafter and there was no occasion for the plaintiff to visit respondent no.1 at Gumla regularly thereafter and making attempt to bring her back at Ranchi. 56. As indicated hereinbefore, the appellant has also no explained that if he had as such proved that respondent No.1 was guilty of adultery which included a categorical admission by her that respondent No.2 was the father of the child, it does not stand to any reason as to why he waited for such a long time in filing the application under Sec.10 of the Indian divorce Act, and tried to bring her back in the months of August and september, 1982. 57. From the conduct of the appellant, as mentioned here-in-before, it is, therefore, evident that the story of the purported admission made by respondent No.1 and/or other evidences adduced in this regard appears to be by way of an after-thought and are not convincing at all. 58. The learned court below, in my opinion, has rightly drawn an inference that the probability of the appellants making out a story of adultery as against respondent No.1 was made out only because she refused to resign from her job as a teacher. 59. The evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant to prove the guilt of adultery on the part of respondent No.1 centres around giving-birth to a child by her in August, 1982, Evidences have been brought on record to show that respondent No.1 gave birth to her child after the full gestation period. 59. The evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant to prove the guilt of adultery on the part of respondent No.1 centres around giving-birth to a child by her in August, 1982, Evidences have been brought on record to show that respondent No.1 gave birth to her child after the full gestation period. 60. It, thus, appears highly improbable that the appellant would note-detect the pregnancy of respondent No.1 in March, 1982 when allegedly he first cohabited with her. The story set up by the appellant appears to be improbable on the face of it. In such an event, the appellant was expected to raise hue and cry then and there and refused to have any further relation with respondent No.1. In such a situation it was also expected that the appellant would have accosted respondent No.1 and/or her other family members including respondent No.2 to the effect that respondent No.1 guilty of adultery. 61. In terms of Sec.10 of the Indian Divorce Act the appellant was bound to prove adultery on the part of respondent No.1 after solemnization of the marriage. As indicated here-in-before, no direct or circumstantial evidence was brought on records to prove the said fact. 62. Taking these aspects of the matter into consideration and weighing the balance of probabilities so far as the respective cases of the parties are concerned, it appears to me that the case respondent No.1 appears to be more probable then that of the appellant. In such a situation, the question as to whether the child was born in August, 1982 or in september, 1982 is not of much importance. However, the only proof in this that was adduced on behalf of the appellant was Ext.1. 63. As noticed here-in-before, P. W.1 categorically stated that there is nothing to show that Ext.1 was addressed to the appellant. Further from the tenor of the letter itself, it appsars that P. W.1 was intimately connected with the appellant. In view of the evidence of P. W.2, the contents of the letter to the effect that respondent No.1 has given birth to a female child in August, 1982 does not appear to be very convincing. 64. From Ext.1 it also appears that P. W.1 was also not sure of the day on which respondent No.1 had allegedly given birth to a child. 64. From Ext.1 it also appears that P. W.1 was also not sure of the day on which respondent No.1 had allegedly given birth to a child. The said letter also suggests that P. W. I did not have any direct knowledge about the child but he came to learn thereof from the female inmates of his house. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, not much reliance can be placed upon Ext.1. 65. Taking thus all aspects of the matter into consideration, I am of the view that there is no merit in this appeal which is, accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to pay and bear their own costs of this appeal. Appeal dismissed.