Judgment :- Anand, C.J.: This writ appeal is directed against the judgment of a learned single dismissing W.P.No.2928 of 1981 vide judgment dated 143.1988. 2. The facts are short and not in dispute. An area measuring 3.39 acres in Survey No.249 Karahathahalli village, Palacode Taluk, Dharmapuri District, which was Government land, assigned to one Akkumaran by the Government vide order of assignment dated 31.12.1955. The assignment was subject to certain conditions which have been enumerated in Special Form D of Board Standing Order 15, para 9. The assignment of the land was made out land which was reserved for Harijans to Akkumaran who was an Adi Dravida. The land sold by the assignee, Akkumaran, in favour of one Muthu vide sale deed dated 26.11.1979. Muthu also like the assignee was also a Harijan. Subsequently on 4.6.1977 the appellant purchased the land from Muthu. 3. On account of the violation of the terms of the assignment, a show cause notice issued by the third respondent on 31.10.1980 calling upon Muthu as well as the appellant show cause as to why the original assignment made in favour of Akkumaran on 31.12.1955 be not cancelled as the alienation had been made in violation of the conditions assignment. An explanation was submitted by the appellant on 11.12.1980 after considering which the third respondent cancelled the assignment originally made in favour of Akkumaran principally on the ground that sale had been made of the assigned land in favour of a Hindu, not a Harijan, in violation of the conditions of assignment contained in Clause Special Form D, Board Standing Order 15, para 9. The order of cancellation was questioned in appeal, but to no avail. The appellant thereafter came to this Court through W.P.No.2928 of 1981 which, as already stated, was dismissed by the learned single Judge. Hence appeal. 4. Appearing for the appellant, the learned counsel submitted that the condition imposed clause (9) of the Special Form D. Board Standing Order 15, para 9 was unreasonable would be violative of the rights available to a bona fide purchaser under the Transfer Property Act. The other ground of attack by the learned Counsel for the appellant was the restriction contained in Clause (9) prohibiting the alienation in favour of a non a Harijan was unconstitutional and therefore liable to be struck down. 5. The other ground of attack by the learned Counsel for the appellant was the restriction contained in Clause (9) prohibiting the alienation in favour of a non a Harijan was unconstitutional and therefore liable to be struck down. 5. Both the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellant need not detain us, as the questions are no longer res integra. far as the submission that the condition of restriction on alienation is violative of provisions of the Transfer of Property Act is concerned, a Division Bench of this Court in Ammal v. Sundararaja Nairdu, A.I.R. 1946 Mad. 52, while dealing with a condition, similar the one contained in Clause (9) in this case, in the Crown Grants Act, 1895 held that though such a condition would be invalid if the grant was made by a private individual, the condition was perfectly valid in the case of a Crown grant. It was held by the Bench that prohibition against alienation was not violative of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The Supreme Court of India also in State of U.P. v. Zahoor Ahmad, A.I.R. 1973 2520, considered a similar argument and repelled the contention identical to the one raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. The apex court observed as follows: “Sec.3 of the Government Grants Act declares the unfettered discretion of the Government impose such conditions and limitations as it thinks fit, no matter what the general law of land be. The meaning of Secs.2 and 3 of the Government Grants Act is that the scope of Act is not limited to affecting the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act only. Government has unfettered discretion to impose any conditions, limitations, or restrictions its grants, and the right, privileges and obligations of the grantee would be regulated according to the terms of the grant, notwithstanding any provisions of any statutory common law.” Both the aforesaid judgments are the complete answer to the first submission made by learned counsel for the appellant. 6. Coming not to the second contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, suffice it to say that the classification is both rational and has a clear nexus with the object sought to be achieved, that is to prevent alienation by exploitation of the Harijans persons, other than Harijans. 6. Coming not to the second contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, suffice it to say that the classification is both rational and has a clear nexus with the object sought to be achieved, that is to prevent alienation by exploitation of the Harijans persons, other than Harijans. In Sri Manche Gowda v. State of Karnataka, A.1.R. 1984 1151, the apex Court was considering the vires of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978, which provided cancellation of alienation in contravention of the conditions relating to the transfer of such assigned land. Before the Supreme Court, the appellants were the purchasers of land had been originally granted by the State of Karnataka to persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes under the provisions of law or on the basis of regulations governing such grant. After the coming into force of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (Karnataka Act 2 of 1979), notices were issued by the appropriate authority to the transferees lands to show cause as to why the lands transferred to them in violation of the assignment should not be resumed for being restored to the original grantees or their heirs or for distribution otherwise to the members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The question about the vires of such a condition was raised before the Court and it was repelled. The apex Court held that the object of the Act was to protect preserve the economic interests of persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and to prevent their exploitation. The Supreme Court found that for the purpose that Act, the classification has a clear nexus to the object sought to be achieved. The expressed the view that special provisions made for the resumption of “granted originally granted to the members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and restoration of the same to the original grantees or their heirs and legal representatives and failing to other members of these communities do not infringe Art.14 of the Constitution. The expressed the view that special provisions made for the resumption of “granted originally granted to the members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and restoration of the same to the original grantees or their heirs and legal representatives and failing to other members of these communities do not infringe Art.14 of the Constitution. In the settlement of law by the Supreme Court which has again been reiterated in Pochanna v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1985S.C. 389, the second ground of attack the unconstitutionality of the restrictions contained in Clause (9) of Special Form D, Standing Orders 15, paragraph 9 must also fail and holding that Clause (9) is constitutionally valid, we reject the argument raised to the contrary by Mr.Doraiswamy. 7. For what we have discussed above, we find no reason to interfere with the judgment the learned single Judge. The writ appeal consequently fails and is dismissed. No costs. B.S. Appeal dismissed.