K. A. SWAMI, J. ( 1 ) THESE three revision petitions are preferred under Section 115 of the Code of civil Procedure against the order dated 24-7-1985 passed by the learned District judge, Bijapur, in Rent Revision No. 35/1985, 36/1985 and 42/1985 by the petitioners therein respectively. the aforesaid rent revision petitions were preferred against the order dated 24th July, 1985 passed by the learned Principal Munsiff, jamkhandi inh. R. C. No. 6/1981. ( 2 ) C. R. P. No. 1395/1987 is filed by the tenant Jivaji @ Balasaheb Venkatesh Anikhindi; C. R. P. No. 1354/1982 is filed by the subtenant Basappa Ramappa Mali and C. R. P. No. 2993/1990 is filed by the landlords. In this order, the petitioners in c. R. P. No. 2993/1990 will be referred to as the landlords' and the petitioner in c. R. P. No. 1395/1987 will be referred to as the tenant' and the petitioner in C. R. P. No. 1354/1987 will be referred to as the 'subtenant'. ( 3 ) THE schedule premises are Extension Plot Nos. 9 and 10 of Jamkhandi inbijapur District. they are vacant lands now numbered as C. t. S. No. 5326. ( 4 ) THE schedule premises were leased to the tenant under a registered sale deed (which is marked as Ex. P. 40 in the case) by the landlords. landlords-2 and 3 are none other than the brothers of landlord-1. It is submitted during the course of the arguments by Sri S. K. Joshi, learned counsel for the petitioners in C. R. P. No. 2993/1990 (landlords) that the schedule premises had fallen to the share of jandlord-1 in a partition evidenced by a registered deed of partition. the landlords filed h. R. C. No. 6/1981 against the tenant and subtenant respectively for eviction on the grounds that the tenant has sublet the schedule premises to the subtenant and that the landlords require the schedule premises for putting up construction to run a lodging house; that originally the lease was granted under Ex. P. 40, dated 23-4-1962 for a period often years with effect from 1-1-1960 to 31-12-1969. thereafter the said lease was not renewed by the tenant by exercising option. After the expiry of the period of ten years, the tenant has sublet the schedule premises to the subtenant under a deed dated 16-9-1971 marked as Ex. D. 27. P. 40, dated 23-4-1962 for a period often years with effect from 1-1-1960 to 31-12-1969. thereafter the said lease was not renewed by the tenant by exercising option. After the expiry of the period of ten years, the tenant has sublet the schedule premises to the subtenant under a deed dated 16-9-1971 marked as Ex. D. 27. As such he has become liable for eviction under Section 21 (1) (f) of the Kamataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ). Under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act, it was pleaded by the landlords that they want to augment their income by putting up a building over the schedule premises for running a lodging house. therefore, they required the scheduled premises for their bona fide use and occupation. ( 5 ) THE tenant and the subtenant have resisted the petition. Each one of them has filed separate objections. ( 6 ) THE tenant contended that originally the lease for a period from 1-1-1960 to 31-12-1970 but subsequently the landlords continued the lease on the same terms and conditions; that one of the terms of the lease was to enable the tenant to sublet the premises. therefore, the tenant was entitled to sublet the schedule premises to anybody. Hence the tenant sublet the premises to the subtenant under the deed dated 16-8-1971 - Ex. D. 27. As such it was the defence of the tenant that as there was a contract between the landlords and the tenant to enable the tenant to sublet the scheduled premises, there was no unlawful subletting. Hence the ground pleaded under Section 21 (1) (f) of the Act was not tenable. Regarding the ground pleaded under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act, it was contended that the landlords are agriculturists; that they do not require the schedule premises for putting up a lodging house; that they are also not entitled to seek possession of the vacant premises under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act. the subtenant put up his defence more or less on the same lines. ( 7 ) ON the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Judge raised the following points: 1) Do petitioners prove that respondent-1 has unlawfully sublet the petition premises to respondent No. 2? the subtenant put up his defence more or less on the same lines. ( 7 ) ON the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Judge raised the following points: 1) Do petitioners prove that respondent-1 has unlawfully sublet the petition premises to respondent No. 2? 2) Do petitioners further prove that they require the petition premises reasonably and bona fide for running a lodging? 3) Does opponent-respsondent No. 1 prove that he was allowed respondent-2 to run a petrol bunk temporarily on his behalf of only? 4) Does he further prove that the lease deed is of a permanent character and he is authorised to sublet the petition premises as per the terms of the lease deed? 5) Does respondenl-2 prove that he has purchased the right, title and interest in the structures of the petition premises for Rs. 20,000/-? 6) Who will be put to greater hardship? 7) Do petitioners entitle for eviction of opponents-respondents-1 and 2? 8) What order? in support of the case of the landlords, landlords-1 and 3 were examined asp. Ws. 1 and 3 and one Rajasekhar, Engineer, was examined as P. W. 2 and got marked 65 documents. In support of the defence, the tenant and subtenant examined themselves as r. Ws. 1 and 2 respectively and produced 27 documents. ( 8 ) ON the basis of the evidence on record, the trial Court answered Point Nos. 1, 2 and 7 in the affirmative, Points 3 to 5 in the negative. Point No. 6 was answered in favour of the landlords. Consequently, the trial Court allowed the petition, directed eviction of the tenant and the subtenant within a period of three months from the date of the order, i. e. , 24-7-1985. It also further directed the landlords to pay a sum of Rs. 20,000/- towards levelling the ground and also for superstructure on the petition premises to the tenant before eviction of the tenant and subtenant. ( 9 ) BEING aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the landlords as well as the tenant and subtenant preferred Rent Revision Petitions Nos. 35/1985; 36/1985 and 42/1985 respectively. the landlords were aggrieved by the order of the trial Court because the learned trial Judge directed them to pay a sum of Rs. 20,000/- to the tenant. ( 9 ) BEING aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the landlords as well as the tenant and subtenant preferred Rent Revision Petitions Nos. 35/1985; 36/1985 and 42/1985 respectively. the landlords were aggrieved by the order of the trial Court because the learned trial Judge directed them to pay a sum of Rs. 20,000/- to the tenant. the tenant and subtenant were aggrieved because of the fact that the subtenancy was held to be unlawful and they were directed to be evicted. In the revision petitions, the learned District Judge called for a finding on the question of comparative hardship. Pursuant to that order, the trial Court submitted its finding on 10-11-1986 holding that the tenant would be put to greater hardship if he were to be evicted from the schedule premises. ( 10 ) ON considering the findings received from the trial Court and also the evidence on record and on hearing both sides, the learned District Judge has held that the sublease created in favour of the subtenant (petitioner in C. R. P. 1354/1987) is unlawful; that the trial Court is right in ordering eviction under Section 21 (1) (f) of the Act. However, on the ground falling under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act, the learned District Judge has held that the landlords have failed to make out a case that they reasonably and bona fide required the premises for their own use and occupation. Accordingly, the learned District Judge has confirmed the order of eviction passed by the trial Court under Section 21 (1) (f) of the Act and has set aside that portion of the order which directed eviction of the tenant and subtenant under section 21 (1) (h) of the Act the learned District Judge has also set aside the direction of the trial Court that the landlords shall pay a sum of Rs. 20,000/- to the tenant. thus the learned District Judge has partly allowed the Rent Revision Petition nos. 35/1985; and 36/1986 and has completely allowed Rent Revision Petition No. 42/1985. Hence the landlords as well as the tenant and subtenant have come up before this Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 20,000/- to the tenant. thus the learned District Judge has partly allowed the Rent Revision Petition nos. 35/1985; and 36/1986 and has completely allowed Rent Revision Petition No. 42/1985. Hence the landlords as well as the tenant and subtenant have come up before this Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 11 ) IN the light of the contentions urged by the learned counsel appearing on both sides, the following points arise for my consideration: 1) Whether the learned District Judge, Bijapur is right in law holding that subletting of the schedule premises by the petitioner in C. R. P. No. 1395/1987 in favour of the petitioner in C. R. P. No. 1354/1987 is not justified and it is unlawful? 1-A) Whether the provisions of the limitation Act, 1963, are applicable to the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act. If so, whether Article 137 or Article 67 applies to a petition filed for eviction of a tenant under Section 21 (1) (f) of the Act? 2) Whether the rejection of the relief prayed for by the landlords under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act calls for interference? 3) If the finding of the learned District Judge on Point No. 2 is reversed and the order of eviction under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act has to be passed, who would be put to greater hardship? 4) If the order of eviction as passed by the learned District Judge is con- finned, whether the tenant or subtenant or both, as the case may be, is/are entitled to a sum of Rs. 20,000/- as directed by the trial Court? point Nos. 1 and 1-A. ( 12 ) THE finding on Point No. 1-A will have a bearing on Point No. 1 because in the event it is held that the provisions of the limitation Act, 1963 are attracted to a petition or an application filed for eviction of a tenant unde the Act on the ground of subletting, such an application or petition will have to be filed within the period prescribed under the limitation Act, 1963. In the event, it will have to be further considered whether the petition in the instant case has been filed within the period of limitation, therefore it will have a bearing on Point 1 also. Hence, both the points are considered together. In the event, it will have to be further considered whether the petition in the instant case has been filed within the period of limitation, therefore it will have a bearing on Point 1 also. Hence, both the points are considered together. the facts necessary for the purpose of deciding Point Nos. 1 and 1-A and several other contentions urged under these points are no more in dispute. the schedule premises were leased to the tenant under a registered lease deed dated 23-3-1962 for a period from 1-1-1960 to 31-12-1970. the lease deed has been marked as ex. P. 40. the relevant terms of the lease deed are as follows: 1) the said described plots have been leased out by party No. 1 to party No. 2 from 1-1-1960 to 31-12-1970 on fixed payment (rental) basis. 2) As the lease rent for the said plots Party No. 2 shall pay to party No. 1 Rs. 150/- (Rupees one hundred fifty only) every year. this payment has to be made before the January of every year. the party No. 2 must obtain receipt therefor. the payment made by party No. 2 to party No. 1 shall not be considered valid if it is not supported by written receipt to be obtained by party No. 1. If party No. 2 defaults in the payment of the said agreed rent for a period of two continuous years, Party No. 1 has a right to terminate the lease and take back possession of the said plots. 3) Municipal assessments and other dues from time to time have to be paid by Party No. 2 and receipts therefor should be handed over to party No. 1 by party No. 2 the said amount of Municipal assessment etc. ; shall not be deducted from the agreed amount of lease rent. Party No. 1 shall not be bothered in any way in regard to the payment of the said Municipal assessment. In case such Municipal dues are recovered from party No. 1, the same shall be reimbursed by party No. 2. Party No. 1 shall have legal rights to recover the same from party No. 2. 4) the said plot Nos. Party No. 1 shall not be bothered in any way in regard to the payment of the said Municipal assessment. In case such Municipal dues are recovered from party No. 1, the same shall be reimbursed by party No. 2. Party No. 1 shall have legal rights to recover the same from party No. 2. 4) the said plot Nos. 9 and 10 are lease out to party No. 2 for the purpose of petrol pump business and as such party No. 2 is allowed to fill in and level the area of the said plots at his expense, party No. 2 is also allowed to construct the required structure elc. for the petrol pump business at his own cost such superstructure constructed by party No. 2 shall have no right whatsoever therein. In pursuance of this agreement, party No. 2 has already invested a big amount in getting the plot area levelled and constructing the required super-structure. 5) As agreed above, party No. 2 shall enjoy the plots for ten years i. e. , 1-1-1960 to 31-12-1970 or 1-1-1971. the party No. 2 shall hand over and return the possession of the said plots to party No. 1. After the said period, party No. 2 requires the said plots for further use, party No. 2 shall give six months advance notice to party No. 1 of the intention to continue on the same terms and conditions. In the event of party No. 2 exercising the option, Party No. 2 shall bound to allow party No. 2 the use and enjoyment of the said plots for a further period of 10 years on the same terms and conditions. 6) During the period of subsisting lease, the party No. 2 is entitled to further sublease full or part area of the said plots and is also entitled to transfer the lease hold rights; such transaction of sublease or transfer made by Party no. 2 shall be binding on party No. 1. After the expiry of the lease period at the time of banding over possession back to party No. 1, Party No. 1 shall have obtain lo purchase the sub-structure at reasonably settled price or reject the same in which case party No. 2 shall take away the material forming Ihe super-structure. Party No. 2 is bound to lake away the superstructure and restore the possession back to party No. 1. Party No. 2 is bound to lake away the superstructure and restore the possession back to party No. 1. " ( 13 ) THUS, as per conditions Nos. 5 and 6, a right was given to the tenant to have the lease renewed for a further period of 10 years by giving six months advance notice intimating his intention to the landlords to continue in occupation of the premises as tenant for a further period of 10 years on the same terms and conditions. As per condition No. 6, during the subsistence of the lease, the lessee-tenant was entitled lo sublet the schedule premises according to his own convenience to anyone. It is not in dispute that the tenant did not exercise this option before the expiry of the original period of lease nor thereafter. However, he continued in possession of the premises in question and the landlords also went on collecting the same rent. In the cross-examination of landlord No. 1, who is examined as P. W. 1 the following admission has been obtained: thus it has been stated by landlord No. 1 that after the expiry of the first period often years, the lessee has been continued in possession of the premises on the same terms and conditions. It is this statement of landlord No. 1 which is the basis for Ihe contention of the parlies. It is on the basis of this statement of landlord No. 1, the tenant and subtenant contend that even though the tenant did not exercise his option by giving six months advance notice to the landlords to continue the lease for a further period of 10 years on the same terms and conditions, the lease was continued for a further period on the same terms and conditions. ( 14 ) IT may be pointed out that subletting of the lease has taken place as per ex. D. 27 on 16th September, 1972 after the expiry of the period of the lease. Request for renewal of the lease was not made in writing by the lessee nor the lease was renewed in writing, much less there was neither a registered deed renewing the lease for a wither period of 10 years. D. 27 on 16th September, 1972 after the expiry of the period of the lease. Request for renewal of the lease was not made in writing by the lessee nor the lease was renewed in writing, much less there was neither a registered deed renewing the lease for a wither period of 10 years. ( 15 ) IT is contended by the tenant and subtenant that the renewal of the lease must be deemed to have taken place in the same terms and conditions for a further period of 10 years, therefore, the lessee had the right to sublet the schedule premises. ( 16 ) THE two Courts below have not accepted this contention. . If it were to be a pure question of fact, it would not have been open to the tenant and the sub- tenant to contend to the contrary in a revision petition under Section 115, C. P. C. ; but it involves not only a question of law, but also affects the jurisdiction of the Court to poss a decree or order for eviction. therefore, it is considered. ( 17 ) THE lease deed specifically stated that renewal should be by issuing six monthe advance notice by the tenant expressing his desire to continue the same for a further period of ten years on the same terms and conditions. thus the lease deed specifically provided for exercise of the option by the lessee to have the lease renewed giving a notice in writing. therefore, it was not a matter for mere coninuation of the tenancy unilaterally by the landlord alone; but the lease was to be continued only on exercise of option by the lessee by giving specific notice in this regard in writing. It may be relevant to notice that after the expiry of the lease period, , 1-1-60 to 31-12-1970, as stated in the lease deed ex. P. 40, the lease would come to an end if the lessee failed to exercise the option to continue the lease for a further period of ten years by giving specific notice in writing six months before the expiry of the original period of the lease. It is not in dispute that the lessee failed to exercise the option. thus the lease came to an end on the expiry of the period of lease on 31-12-1970. It is not in dispute that the lessee failed to exercise the option. thus the lease came to an end on the expiry of the period of lease on 31-12-1970. the premises were open site used for and let out for non-residential purpose. the lessee in occupation of the premises was protected by the Act. therefore, even after the expiry of the lease period, the landlords could not have evicted the tenant or the subtenant by taking recourse to a regular suit as the premises were governed by Part V of the Act. therefore, the tenant and subtenant could not have been evicted without taking recourse to the proceedings under the Act Hence, the fact that the landlords did not initiate eviction proceeding under the provisions of the Act, it did not clothe the lessee with thexsame rights which he enjoyed under the lease deed for the period ending on 31-12-1970. On the expiry of the lease period, in other words from 1-1-1971, the lessee could exercise only such rights which were available to him under the Act as a tenant. therefore, he was not entitled to sublet on and from 1-1-1971. ( 18 ) THE admission of the landlord-1 that the tenant was continued on the same terms and conditions could not be taken as, or did not have the effect of, renewing the lease for a further period of 10 years with the right of subletting; because renewing of the lease for a further period of 10 years could not have been done unilaterally by the landlords without the lessee willing to have the lease renewed on the same terms and conditions. Further, in the absence of exercise of option of renewal of the lease by the lessee as per the terms of the lease deed, it could not have been renewed for a period of ten years by the landlord unilaterally and without a written document registered as per the provisions contained in the Registration Act. In the absence of any written deed renewing the lease registered as per law, the continuation of the lessee in occupation of the premises after the expiry of the lease, could be only as month to month tenant under the Act, and as such he was liable to be evicted as per the provisions of the Act. In the absence of any written deed renewing the lease registered as per law, the continuation of the lessee in occupation of the premises after the expiry of the lease, could be only as month to month tenant under the Act, and as such he was liable to be evicted as per the provisions of the Act. therefore, the contention of the tenant and the subtenant that the lease has been renewed on the same terms and conditions for a further period of 10 years and this fact is proved by the admission of landlord No. 1 cannot be accepted. It is accordingly rejected. ( 19 ) IT is the contention of the tenant and subtenant that a mere continuation of the tenant by the landlord amounts to acquiescence in renewing the lease for a further period of 10 years enabling the tenant to sublet. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krishnapasuba v Dattatraya, AIR 1966 SC 1024 . that was a case in which the land was let out. thereafter the tenant at his own cost put up a shed of corrugated iron sheets on a portion of the land leased to him. the question arose as to whether Section 13 (1) (i) of the Bombay Rent Act was applicable. Section 13 (1) (i) of the Bombay Rent Act was as follows: "13. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of Section 15, a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied.- (i) that where the premises are land, such land is reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the erection of a new building. " it was held that as the subject-matter of the lease was in respect of open land only, section 13 (1) (i) of the Bombay Rent Act was applicable. The relevant portion of the judgment reads thus: "clause 2 of the rent note dated August 28, 1948 covered the entire City survey No. 1577/17, but we are now concerned only with the letting of the portion of the property excluding the shop on the northern comer. the rent note stated that the subject-matter of this letting for which the rent was payable by the tenant was open land with a "khatta". the rent note stated that the subject-matter of this letting for which the rent was payable by the tenant was open land with a "khatta". It is common case before us that "khatta" is not a building. Clause 1 stated that on a portion of the land, the tenant had built a shed of corrugated iron sheets at bis own cost. Clause 5 stated that on the termination of the tenancy, the tenant would remove the structures raised by him including the timber the pillars, the iron materials and the stores used for paving the floor. On a plain reading of the lease, it is clear that the subject-matter of the letting was open land and the rent was payable in respect of the open land and the rent was payable in respect of the structures raised by defendant No. 1. We were referred to decisions in respect of building leases. It is a question of construction of a building lease whether the lease is a demise of the land only or whether it is a demise of the land together with the building to be constructed by the tenant. See Bhatia Co-operative Housing Society ltd. vd. C. Patel, 1958 SCR 185, atpp 104-106, AIR 1958 SC 10 at pp 20-21; Dr. K. A. Dhairawan v J. B. thakur, 1959 scr 799 at pp 806-808, AIR 1958 SC 789 at pp 791-794. In this case, we are not concerned with a building lease. the building on the land was constructed by the tenant at his own cost before the execution of the rent note. the building belonged to the tenant and was not the subject-matter of the letting. the land only was the subject- matter of the letting. Consequently, the premises are land within the meaning of Section 13 (1) (i ). " therefore, it is clear that the said decision turned upon the tenns contained in the lease deed. therefore, it has no bearing either on the point involved in the case on hand or on the contention that a mere continuation of the tenant by the landlord amounts to acquiescence in renewing the lease for a further period of 10 years of the premises governed by the Act. ( 20 ) RELIANCE was also placed on the decision in M/s. Dossibai v Khemch and, AIR 1966 SC 1939 . ( 20 ) RELIANCE was also placed on the decision in M/s. Dossibai v Khemch and, AIR 1966 SC 1939 . In that case, the question considered was as to whether Section 15 of the Bombay Rents Hotel and lodging House Rates Control Act (57 of 1947) really stood in the way of subletting the building constructed by the lessee on the open land taken on tease for the purpose of constructing on it buildings intended to be used for residence or for business, it was held thus: "9. In our opinion, the words "let for residence, education, business, trade or storage" are wide enough to include a letting for the achievement of these purposes with construction of buildings as also without construction of buildings. " it was also pointed out that in such a case, the lessee would be careful enough to have a further clause included in the lease to enable him to sublet. the relevant portion of the Judgment is as follows: "this argument as regards the difficulty in the matter of letting out the building constructed on the land on which lease has been taken was more plausible when the saving phrase "but subject to any contract to the contrary" did not form part of the section. Now, however, the cases in which such difficulty will arise, if at all, would be few and far between; for, it is reasonable to expect that when taking lease of land for the construction of building intended to be let out to others for residence, the lessee of the land would take care to include in contract of lease a term permitting him to let out the building. Assuming that there may be cases where the contract of lease does not contain any such terms and assuming further that it will not be lawful for the lessee of the land to let out the building constructed by him, the probability of such difficulty in some cases can be no reason to cut down the ordinary and reasonable connotation of the words "let for residence" in Section 6. " therefore, it is clear that the aforesaid decision has no bearing on the question involved in this case. ( 21 ) SRI Anant Mandgi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in CRP No. 1395/1987 placed reliance on the following decisions: 1. " therefore, it is clear that the aforesaid decision has no bearing on the question involved in this case. ( 21 ) SRI Anant Mandgi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in CRP No. 1395/1987 placed reliance on the following decisions: 1. AIR 1977 SC 2262 , Chander Kali v Jagdish Singh; 2. AIR 1978 SC 15l8 , Sardari lal Vishwanath v Pritam Singh; 3. AIR 1979 SC 1745 , V Dhanapal Chettiar v Yesodai Ammal; 4. AIR 1982 SC 1043 , Mahabir Prasad v Surinder Kaur. I will now consider each one of them. ( 22 ) IN the case of Chander Kali, the questions considered were whether a person continuing in possession of the accommodation even after the termination of his contractual tenancy would be a tenant within the meaning of the Madhya Pradesh accommodation Control Act and whether on such termination, his possession would not become wrongful until and unless a decree for eviction was made, and in case he continued to be in possession even after the passing of the decree for eviction, whether he did so as wrongful occupant of the accommodation. In the light of the provisions contained in Sections 2 (1), 12 (1) and 13 (1) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act and the definition of the word 'tenant', it was held that even after the termination of the contractual tenancy, the continuation of the tenant in possession of the leased premises would not be unlawful having regard to the provisions contained in Sections 2 (1), 12 (1) and 13 (1) of the aforesaid Act until and unless a decree for eviction was made. In case he continued to be in possession even after the passing of the decree for eviction, he did so as a wrongful occupant of the accommodation. thus, it is clear that the said decision does not deal with the point with which we are concerned in this case. 21. 2. In the case of Sardari lal iswanath, the question as to whether a statutory tenant is entitled to notice of termination as required by Section 106 of the transfer of Property Act has been considered. It is therefore, clear that the said decision is not on the point, because no such question arises in the instant case. 21. 2. In the case of Sardari lal iswanath, the question as to whether a statutory tenant is entitled to notice of termination as required by Section 106 of the transfer of Property Act has been considered. It is therefore, clear that the said decision is not on the point, because no such question arises in the instant case. the same question is considered by a larger Bench of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanpal Chettiar v yesodai Ammal, AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1745. therefore both these decisions are not on the point in question. In Mahabir Prasad's case, during the subsistence of the lease there was a written consent given by the landlord which enabled the tenant to sublet. Accordingly, the subtenancy was created. the said subtenancy continued even after the expiry of the lease. It was held that such subletting did not enable the landlord to seek eviction of the subtenant because there was a written permission of the landlord for creating subtenancy. thus, it is clear that this decision also has no application to the case on hand. 22. Sri Jigjinni, learned counsel appearing for the subtenant very strenuously contended that long continuation of the subtenant is the schedule premises itself was sufficient to hold that the parties to the lease treated that no notice for renewing the lease was required and a mere continuation of the tenant on the expiry of the period of lease, was sufficient to renew the lease for a further period of ten years on the same terms and conditions. the learned counsel placed reliance on a decision of the court of appeal in 1989 Vol. II Chancery Division at page 261. that was a case in which the Court held thus: "upon that correspondence the Court was now satisfied that the contracting parties had been negotiating on the assumption, which was in substance true, that the new company, the plaintiffs, were entitled to purchase the beerhouse for 4501, and that the defendant was bould to sell. When the abstract was sent setting out the covenant giving the right of pre-emption or option of purchase, nothing was said about notice. " thus it is clear it was a case in which, when the contract was entered into the landlord did not insist for giving notice for renewal. therefore, such right must be deemed to have been waived. When the abstract was sent setting out the covenant giving the right of pre-emption or option of purchase, nothing was said about notice. " thus it is clear it was a case in which, when the contract was entered into the landlord did not insist for giving notice for renewal. therefore, such right must be deemed to have been waived. Such a situation does not arise in the instant case. If at all the tenant wanted to exercise the option for renewal of the lease for a further period of 10 years he was bound to give notice intimating the landlord that he intended to continue the lease for a further period of 10 years on the same terms and conditions. Without such notice being given no agreement to renew the lease could come into existence. ( 23 ) LEARNED counsel also placed reliance on the decision in Garoner v Blaxill and another, 1960 Volume 2 - All england law Reports 457. that was a case in which while interpreting the tenns of the lease their lordship of the Queen's Bench division came to the conclusion that the lease deed did not provide for issuing notice of renewal. It merely gave option or choice to the tenant to continue which could be either by way of payment of rent or by giving notice of continuing the tenancy after the expiry of the original period. the tenant immediately on the expiry of the original lease period sent the rent. It was held that the lease deed did not provide for issuing notice. the relevant portion of the Judgment is as follows: "reading the main clause in this way, I have to decide whether that option is exercised merely by the tenant staying on and paying rent after the first seven years have elapsed or whether the effect of his so doing is to constitute him a tenant holding over from year to year. Counsel for the plaintiff contends for the former; counsel for the defendants contends for the latter, he adding that in any event the act of staying on and paying rent is at least at equivocal act as between two results and, therefore, the effect must be construed against the tenant. Counsel for the plaintiff contends for the former; counsel for the defendants contends for the latter, he adding that in any event the act of staying on and paying rent is at least at equivocal act as between two results and, therefore, the effect must be construed against the tenant. One starts, of course, from the fact that the effect of staying on and paying rent normally is undoubtedly to constitute the tenant a tenant holding over from year to year. As against that, one has to look carefully at the precise words of the option, and primarily it is difficult to see how an option to continue can be exercised except by continuing. the usual term in a lease with regard to an option for an extension of time contains some such word as "renew", which imports "making afresh". there is no such word in this lease. Further, an option to extend the time usually has some provision with regard to the giving of a notice by the tenant stating that he desires to take advantage of the option. there' is no such provision in this lease. the plain meaning of the word "option" is "choice". Reading "choice" for "option", the clause means that the tenant has the choice of continuing his tenancy. the plain meaning of "continuing" is "carrying on" for "continuing", the clause reads "the tenant has the choice of carrying on for an extension of fourteen years with a break at seven years"; or reading "not ceasing to be", the clause reads, "the tenant has the choice of not ceasing to be the tenant for ah extension of fourteen years with a break at seven years". the precise wording of the clause is, I think, important and it is to be noticed that the word after "continuing" is "for" and not "by". It may well be that if the parties has used the word "by" the use of that word would have imported that something had to be done by the tenant in order to extend the tenancy. the lease must be construed according to the exact words which the parties chose to use, and at least one of the parties had the idea that the landlord could not terminate the lease in 1958. In my Judgment, no notice was necessary before the option can be said to have been exercised. the lease must be construed according to the exact words which the parties chose to use, and at least one of the parties had the idea that the landlord could not terminate the lease in 1958. In my Judgment, no notice was necessary before the option can be said to have been exercised. the next question is when precisely is the option exercised. Is it exercised if the tenant says on for a day over the seven years, or is it exercised only when the tenant pays to the landlord the rent due in respect of the quarter following the seven years and the landlord accepts that rent? In my Judgment it is the latter. It does not follow if a tenant stays on for a day over his period that he has any intention of doing other than making a final clearing upbefore he actually leaves. It is true that the phrase "tenant on sufferance" is used in such circumstances, but i do not think that his action is sufficient to show an intention of exercising a. choice or option. So soon, however, as he send the rent for the following quarter, whether it be in advance or in arrears, he is definitely indicating to the landlord that he desires to remain a tenant after the seven years is over, and, reading the words of the lease in the way in which I have read them. I think he definitely indicates that he is exercising his option unless he expressly aware of the contrary. If the landlord accepts that payment, then in my Judgment, be must be deemed to have accepted it on the terms that the tenant has exercised his option, unless indeed there are facts proving the contrary. I have turn to the other part of the clause of the proviso. If I am right in my interpretation of the main part of the clause that I am considering, I do not think that any question under the proviso arises. I have turn to the other part of the clause of the proviso. If I am right in my interpretation of the main part of the clause that I am considering, I do not think that any question under the proviso arises. If a tenant indicates to his landlord that he is exercising an option to continue his tenancy and the landlord takes no objection with regard to the condition of the premises and the tenant thereafter remains on as a tenant, it seems to me plain that the landlord cannot thereafter raise the question whether the tenant was entitled to exercise his option by reason of the condition of the premises. He has waived that right the statement of claim in this action did not arise waiver, although counsel for the plaintiff contended that it was raised by implication. Counsel ex abundanii cautela applied to me to deliver a reply in order to plead waiver and counsel for the defendants did not object to this course being taken. A reply was therefore delivered. the result is that, in my Judgment, if I am right in my interpretation of the main clause, the defendants are precluded from raising any question of lack of repair in 1954. " the learned counsel placed stress on the following observations made in the aforesaid Judgment. "if the landlord accepts that payment, then in my Judgment, he must be deemed to have accepted it on the tcnns that the tenant has exercised his option, unless indeed there are facts proving the contrary. " It is contended that the landlord has accepted the rent, therefore he must deemed to have waived the notice of renewal of the lease by the tenant. It may be relevant to notice that as per the interpretation placed on the lease deed concerned in the aforesaid case, their lordships were of the view that no notice was required to be given. that being so, the aforesaid observation should be read in the light of the interpretation placed on the lease deed that no notice for renewal was necessary. Hence, I am of the view that the aforesaid decision cannot be of any assistance to the tenant and the subtenant. that being so, the aforesaid observation should be read in the light of the interpretation placed on the lease deed that no notice for renewal was necessary. Hence, I am of the view that the aforesaid decision cannot be of any assistance to the tenant and the subtenant. ( 24 ) SRI Jigjinni also relied upon the decision reported in AIR 1982 Calcutta 225, m/s. Dotta and Associates and Another v State of West Bengal and Others and AIR 1967 Calcutta 390, Binani Properties Private ltd. v M. Gulamali Abdul Hussain and co, and Others. Based on these decisions, it was contended by him that there was acquiescence on the part of the landlords in renewal of the lease as they went on receiving the rent from the tenant and as they were also aware of the fact that the tenant had sublet the schedule premises to the petitioner in CRP No. 1354/1987. In the case ot M/s. Dotta and Associates and Another v State of West Bengal and others, AIR 1982 Calcutta 225, it was observed that: "when a tenant under a 20 years lease with a renewal clause, continues bis possession after expiry of the said lease his continuance of possession will be deemed to be under the renewal clause though there will not be any express exercise of the said renewal. His rights in the leasehold land would be deemed to have flowed from the registered lease for 20 years and such cases will be outside the mischief of clause of Section 2 (5) of the Calcutta thika tenancy Act. In the instant case the lease expired on 3lst March, 1978 but the Agarwallas that is transported petitioners remained in possession of the property on the basis of the renewal clause though the option was not expressly exercised. therefore, the possession of the lessors that is the Agarwallas after the expiry of the term of the lease is on the basis of the renewal clause that is on the terms and conditions as mentioned in the registered lease for 30 years, it cannot be said that they were holding over the said tea Garden under the provisions of Section 116 of the t. P. Act," first of all the aforesaid decision did not relate to a case of the premises governed by the rent control statute. It related to a tea Garden, outside the purview of the rent control statute. In a case where the premises is governed by the rent control statute and the original lease provides for the renewal of the lease by issuing notice by the tenant and no such notice is given by exercising option of renewal, continuation of the tenant cannot be held to be under the original lease, and such continuation is because of the protection provided under the Rent Act. therefore, the proposition laid down in paragraph 14 of the aforesaid Judgment cannot be made applicable to the case on hand. Similar is the decision in Binani Properties Private ltd. v M. Gulamali Abdul hussain and Co, and Others, AIR 1967 Calcutta 360. No doubt in this case, it has been held that continuation of the tenant on the expiry of the lease which enabled the tenant to sublet and as such subletting of the premises by the tenant even after the coining into force of the tenancy Act, did not become unlawful because the tenant was continued under the original lease, therefore he was entitled to sublet. It is not possible to hold that such a proposition can be made applicable to a lease which specifically provides that if the tenant intends to continue the lease for a further period of 10 years on the expiry of the first period of lease, he should issue notice in writing intimating his desire to continue. In such a case, it is issuance of such notice in writing alone would result in renewal of lease, which alone would bind both the parties. therefore, it is not possible to agree with, and apply the proposition laid down in Para IV of the said decision. ( 25 ) LASTLY, the learned counsel placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme court in M/s. Shalimar tar Products limited v H. C. Sharma and Others, AIR 1988 sc 145 . It is not possible to appreciate how the aforesaid decision can support the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the subtenant. In that case, it has been held that the consent in writing of the landlord required for subletting cannot be held to be directory, but it is mandatory, as otherwise it would defeat the public purpose the provision is intended to advance. In that case, it has been held that the consent in writing of the landlord required for subletting cannot be held to be directory, but it is mandatory, as otherwise it would defeat the public purpose the provision is intended to advance. It has also been held that such requirement cannot at all be waived. Hence, the order of eviction of the lessee has been held to be proper. therefore, it is not possible to apply the said decision to the facts of the case on hand. ( 26 ) I may also refer to the relevant provisions of the Kamataka Rent Control Act, 1961. Section 21 (f)of the Act, provides that the Court may on an application made to it, make an order for the recovery of possession of a premises if it is found that the tenant has unlawfully sublet the whole or part of the premises or assigned or transferred in any other manner his interest therein and where the subletting, assignment or transfer has been made before the coming into operation of Part V of the Act (except in respect of subletting, assignment or transfer to which the provisions of Section 61 are applicable) such subletting, assignment or transfer has been made contrary to any provision of law then in force. In the instant case, subletting has taken place on 16-9-1972 after the coming into force of Part V of the act. Sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the Act, further provides as to when the Court may presume that the premises have been sublet by a tenant. In the instant case, subletting has taken place on 16-9-1972 after the coming into force of Part V of the act. Sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the Act, further provides as to when the Court may presume that the premises have been sublet by a tenant. Clauses (a) and (b) of section 21 (3) of the Act provide in respect of the premises let out for residential and non residential purposes respectively which are as follows: " (3) For the purposes of clause (f) of the proviso to sub-section (1) the Court may presume that the premises have been sublet by a tenant- (a) in any case where such premises have been let for use as residence if the court is satisfied that any other person not being a servant or a member of the family of such servant has been residing in the premises or any part thereof for a period exceeding one month otherwise than in commensality with the tenant; or; (b) in any case where such premises have been let for non-residential purposes if the Court is satisfied that the tenant without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord has allowed any person to occupy the whole or any part of the premises ostensibly on the ground that such person is a partner of the tenant in the business or profession but really for the purpose of subletting such premises to that person. Section 23 of the Act is as follows: "tenant not to sublet or transfer after commencement of this Part (1) notwithstanding anything contained in any law, but subject to any contract to the contrary, it shall not be lawful after the coming into operation of this Part, for any tenant to sublet whole or any part of the premises let to him or to assign or transfer in any other manner his interest therein; provided that the State Government may by notification permit in any area the transfer of interest in premises held under such leases or class of leases and to such extent as may be specified in the notification: provided further that nothing in this section shall apply to a tenant having a right to enjoy any premises in perpetuity; (2) Any person who contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) shall, on conviction, be punished with fine which may extend to one hundred rupees. All these provisions deal with the topic of subletting. they are to be read and interpreted harmoniously. A reading of all these provisions together make it clear that subletting of the premises by the tenant after the coming into force of the Act and on the application of Part V of the Act to the premises is permissible only if the contract between the tenant and the landlord enables the tenant to sublet the same. In the absence of any such contract between the landlord and tenant enabling the tenant to sublet the premises, subletting of the premises by the tenant is unlawful and enables the Court to pass a decree for eviction on that ground. Section 21 (3) of the Act, lays down certain norms under which subletting can be presumed. Clause (b) of Section 21 (3) of the Act further provides in the case of a premises let out for non-residential purpose consent of the landlord in writing is necessary and if the tenant has allowed any person to occupy the whole or any part of the premises ostensibly on the ground that such person is a partner of the tenant in the business or profession but really for the purpose of subletting, the Court may presume that the premises have been sublet by a tenant. the date when the subtenancy was created the original lease was not renewed. the continuation of the tenant was from the month under the Act. In the light of the provisions contained in the Act, no tenant could sublet without the specific contract with the landlord to enable him to sublet. that being so, the ultimate conclusion reached by the learned District Judge that subletting of the premises in question by the tenant to the petitioner in CRP No. 1354/1987 was unlawful, cannot be held to be erroneous. ( 27 ) IT is contended by Sri Ana nth Mandagi, learned counsel for the tenant that what is prohibited under the Act is subletting of the premises let out to the tenant. In the instant case what is let out to the tenant is the open site, but what is let out is sublet is the structure put up by the tenant over the open site. therefore, there is no subletting of the schedule premises. In the instant case what is let out to the tenant is the open site, but what is let out is sublet is the structure put up by the tenant over the open site. therefore, there is no subletting of the schedule premises. It is not necessary to consider the legal aspect of this contention because factually the contention is contrary to the very agreement entered into between the tenant and the subtenant which is marked as ex. D. 27. In para 4 of ex. D. 27, it is specifically stated thus:- "party No. 2 and party No. 1 have both agreed to execute a lease deed regarding the ground rent of Rs. 250/- per month payable by party No. 2 to party no. 1, in respect of the site itself. " party No. 2 referred to herein is the subtenant and party No. 1 is the tenant. the site referred to is the schedule premises. the other clauses in the document relate to the structure and the running business. therefore, it is clear that the tenant has specifically sublet the schedule premises i. e. , the open site leased to him. Hence, the contention is rejected. ( 28 ) RE: Applicability of the limitation Act, 1963:- During the course of argument, Sri Jigjinni, leamed counsel for the subtenant has filed a memo which reads thus: "in this proceeding the case of the landlord (respondent No. 1) is that respondent No. 4, who was his tenant has subleased the premises to the present petitioner. In his deposition as P. W. 1, the landlord has admitted that ever since 1971 petitioner is in possession of the premises, to his knowledge 2nd that since that time respondent No. 4 has not been in possession. the petition is filed on the cause of action of illegal subletting, in 1981 (HRC No. 6/1981), i. e. , more than 9 years later. Hence, it is barred under Article 137 of the limitation Act, 1961, vide air 1977 Supreme Court 282 : Ilr 1976 Karnataka 1705 (SC), Kerala State electricity Board v t. K. K. Asom and Desom. Our High Court has very recently held that Article 137 of the limitation Act applies to an application under section 21 (1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, Indian express Pvt. ltd. v C. l. Seetharam and Others, CRP Nos. Our High Court has very recently held that Article 137 of the limitation Act applies to an application under section 21 (1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, Indian express Pvt. ltd. v C. l. Seetharam and Others, CRP Nos. 1285 and 1645 of 1986, decided on 19-11-1990, a copy of which is produced herewith. therefore it is humbly submitted that this pure question of law going to the root of the matter based on undisputed material and on the case of the landlord (petitioner in HRC) may be taken into consideration at the lime of disposal of this petition. " the contention relating to limitation has not been raised before the Courts-below nor it has been pleased. However, in the light of the provisions contained in Section 3 of the limitation Act, I have permitted the learned counsel to argue the same. the learned counsel for the landlord was also given sufficient time to meet the argument: he wanted a short adjournment. It was also granted. the contention of Sri Jigjinni, learned counsel for the subtenant is that the provisions of the limitation Act, 1963, are applicable to the proceedings filed for eviction on the ground of subletting. He contends that Article 137 of the limitation Act is attracted. In support of this plea, the learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the kerala State electricity Board, trivandrum v t. P. Kunhaliumma, AIR1977 SC 282. ( 29 ) HOWEVER, it is contended by Sri Joshi, learned counsel for the landlord that the decision in Kerala electricity Board case is not applicable to the cases arising under Section 21 of the Act in view of the specific provision contained in Section 21 (1) of the Act which excludes the application of the limitation Act by employing a non-obstante clause. the learned counsel has placed reliance on the opening words contained in Section 21 (1) of the Act. Alternatively; it is contended that even if it is held that the provisions of the limitation Act are attracted, it is Article 67 and not article 137 would apply as held by the Supreme Court in Smt. Shakuntala S. tiwari v Hem Chand M. Singhania, AIR 1987 SC 1823 . Alternatively; it is contended that even if it is held that the provisions of the limitation Act are attracted, it is Article 67 and not article 137 would apply as held by the Supreme Court in Smt. Shakuntala S. tiwari v Hem Chand M. Singhania, AIR 1987 SC 1823 . ( 30 ) IT appears to me that having regard to the special provisions contained in the act with which we are concerned, it is not possible to accept the contention of Sri jigjinni, learned counsel for the subtenant and also the alternative contention of Sri joshi, learned counsel appearing for the landlord that Article 67 of the limitation act would be applicable in the event it is held that the limitation Act is attracted. the non-obstante clause contained in Section 21 (1) of the Act specifically excludes the application of any other law. the Act provides for the control of the rents and eviction, leasing of buildings, control of rates of hotel and lodging houses and certain other matters in the State of karnataka. It has received the assent of the President, therefore it is out of the mischief of Article 254 (1) of the Constitution. Part V of the Act which contains sections 21 to 31 provides for control of eviction of tenants and obligation of the landlords. Section 21 of the Act protects the tenant against eviction except on the grounds enumerated in Clauses (a) to (p) in sub-section (1) thereof. Section 21 (1) of the Act opens with the non-obstante clause "notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law or contract". Clauses (a) to (p) of sub-section (1) of section 21 enumerate the grounds on which the tenant can be evicted. the remaining sub-sections of Section 21 are not relevant for our purpose. thus the non-obstante clause contained in Section 21 of the Act gives overriding effect to the provisions contained in Section 21 of the Act over any other law. In other words, Section 21 (1) of the Act prevails over anything contained in any other law. Whenever the legislature intends to give overriding effect to a certain provision enacted by it, over any other law it employs non-obstante clause in order to avoid operation and effect of all the contrary provisions contained in any other law on the provisions which it gives overriding effect. Whenever the legislature intends to give overriding effect to a certain provision enacted by it, over any other law it employs non-obstante clause in order to avoid operation and effect of all the contrary provisions contained in any other law on the provisions which it gives overriding effect. the object of the non-obstante clause contained in Section 21 of the Act is to free the proceedings initiated under Section 21 of the Act from the provisions contained in any other law or contract. It does not require any argument to hold that the words "any other law" are wide enough to take into their fold the law of limitation. If Section 21 (1) had not contained non-obstante clause to free the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act from any other law or contract the right given to the landlord to seek eviction on the grounds stated in Section 21 and certain protections given to the tenant thereunder could have been defeated. the possibility of the landlord loosing his right to secure possession from the tenant could not have been eliminated; thereby the object of the Act would have been defeated as it is also one of the objects of the Act to enable the landlord to secure possession from the tenant on proof of the grounds enumerated in Section 21 (1) of the Act. It is with a view to make the right of the landlord to seek possession as per the provisions of section 21 of the Act truly effective and also at the same time to protect the tenant from arbitrary eviction, the non-obstante clause is employed to give overriding effect to the provisions contained in Section 21 (1) of the Act over any other law or contract. Wherever the legislature intended to give overriding effect to a particular provision of the Act over other provisions of the Act it has employed the words "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act. " (See Section 21-A (1) and (2) which provide for eviction of residential building in certain cases ). Section 21-B which makes a special provision for recovery of possession of premises by members of armed forces of the Union or a member of the family of a deceased member of such force. " (See Section 21-A (1) and (2) which provide for eviction of residential building in certain cases ). Section 21-B which makes a special provision for recovery of possession of premises by members of armed forces of the Union or a member of the family of a deceased member of such force. Section 21-C which makes a provision for recovery of possession of premises by the retired Government servant or a member of the family of the deceased retired Government servant. Section 37 which makes a provision as to when the manager of a hotel or owner of lodging house may recover possession. Similarly, whenever the legislature intends to give overriding effect to a particular provision of the Act over any other law it has employed the words "notwithstanding anything contained in any law" (See Sections 21 (1) and 23 (1) of the Act ). thus, it is clear that the legislature has given widest amplitude to non-obstante clause wherever it is necessary, such as Sections 21 (1) and 23 (1) of the act and it has employed the non-obstante clause confining its operation to the provisions of the Act by employing the words "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act" thus, the intention of the legislature is made clear by employing non-obstante clause in its widest amplitude in Section 21 of the Act to exclude section 21 of the Act from the operation of a contrary or inconsistent provision contained in any other law and thereby to give overriding effect to Section 21 (1) of the Act over any other law. In Sarwan Singh and Another v Kasturi lal, AIR 1977 SC 265 , the Supreme court has considered the effect of non-obstante clause contained in Sections 14-A and 25-A of the Delhi Rent Control Act, and has held thus: "the right conferred by Section 14-A has to be enforced in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Chapter III-A. that is prescription of Section 25-B (1 ). In order expressly to exclude the operation of all provisions inconsistent with Chapter III-A whether such provisions are contained elsewhere in the Delhi Rent Act or in any other law like the Slum Clearance Act; Section 25-A was put on the statute book. In order expressly to exclude the operation of all provisions inconsistent with Chapter III-A whether such provisions are contained elsewhere in the Delhi Rent Act or in any other law like the Slum Clearance Act; Section 25-A was put on the statute book. that section gives an overriding effect to the provisions of Chapter III-A. But the legislature did not rest content by providing merely that the procedural provisions in Chapter III-A would have such overriding effect. It took the precaution of making an additional provision in section 14-A itself that on and from the date of the. order passed by the Central government or any local authority calling upon a person to vacate the residential accommodation allotted to him, there shall accrue to such person a right to recover immediately the possession of any premises let out by him, "notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract (whether express or implied) custom or usage to the contrary. . . . " the provisions of Section 14-A must, therefore, prevail over anything contained elsewhere in the Delhi Rent Act or in the Slum clearance Act. " "the object of the legislature in incorporating the non-obstante clause both in sections 14-A and 25-A of the Delhi Rent Act was to free the proceedings arising out of the right newly conferred by Section 14-A and falling within Chapter iii-A, from the restraint imposed by Section 19 of the Slum Clearance Act and from the operation of Section 39 thereof. the reason for releasing such proceedings from the pre-condition imposed by the Slum Clearance Act is that if the Government or the local authority asks a person to vacate the premises allotted to him by it on the ground that he owns a residential accommodation in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child, a provision ought to be made to enable such a person to obtain immediately the possession of his own house if it be in the occupation of a tenant. to subject this facility to the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act, under which the competent authority can grant the requisite permission only by applying the tests prescribed in Section 19 (4), would be to make illusory the right conferred by Section 14-A on the allottee to obtain "immediate possession" of the premises let out by him to his tenant. It is with a view to making that right truly effective that the legislature gave it precedence over anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Delhi rent Act itself or in any other Act like the Slum Clearance Act. It is noteworthy that whereas Section 25-A gives an overriding effect to the provisions of Chapter iii-A over anything "inconsistent therewith" contained elsewhere in the Delhi rent Act or in any other law for the time being in force, Section 14-A does not qualify the overriding effect of what is contained therein, that is in Section 14-A, in reference to any thing "in consistent" therewith contained either in the Delhi rent Act itself or in any other law. Section 14-A provides that there shall accrue a right to the landlord to recover immediately possession of any premises let out by him notwithstanding "anything" contained elsewhere in the Delhi Rent Act or in any other law for the time being in force. In the context, the word "anything to the contrary", but the point of the matter is that the legislature has expressed its intention clearly and unequivocally in more than one way, that the provisions of section 14-A and Chapter III-A of the Delhi Rent Act would have precedence over anything else contained in that Act itself or in any other law. " it is not possible to appreciate the contention of the tenant and the sub- tenant that the non-obstante clause contained in Section 21 (1) of the Act cannot be interpreted so as to exclude the application of the provisions contained in the limitation Act. When the legislature has used the non-obstante clause in its widest amplitude, it is not possible to hold that it does not give overriding effect to Section 21 of the Act over the provisions contained in the law of limitation. When the legislature has used the non-obstante clause in its widest amplitude, it is not possible to hold that it does not give overriding effect to Section 21 of the Act over the provisions contained in the law of limitation. the words "any other law" contained in the non-obstanle clause take into then' fold not only the provisions contained in the limitation Act, but also any other provisions contained in any other law which are inconsistent with or have the effect of defeating the object and intendment of Section 21 of the Act. ( 31 ) I shall now consider the decisions relied upon on behalf of the tenant, subtenant and the landlord. In Kerala State electricity Board, trivandrum v t. P. Kunhaliumma, air 1977 SC 282 , the Supreme Court considered the applicability of article 137 of the limitation Act, 1963, to a proceeding under Section 16 of the telegraph Act. therefore, before adverting to the relevant portion of the Judgment of the Supreme Court, it is necessary to notice contents of Section 16 of the telegraph Act, which are as follows: "16 (1) If the exercise of the powers mentioned in Section 10 in respect of property referred to in clause (d) of that section is resisted or obstructed, the district Magistrate may, in his discretion, order that the telegraph authority shall be permitted to exercise them. (2) If, after the making of an order under sub-section (1), any person fesists the exercise of those powers, or, having control over the property, does not give ail facilities for tbcir being exercised, he shall be deemed to have committed an offence under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code. (3) If any dispute arises concerning the sufficient of the compensation to be paid under Section 10, clause (d), it shall, on application for that purpose by either of the disputing parties to the District Judge within whose jurisdiction the property is situate, be determined by him. (3) If any dispute arises concerning the sufficient of the compensation to be paid under Section 10, clause (d), it shall, on application for that purpose by either of the disputing parties to the District Judge within whose jurisdiction the property is situate, be determined by him. (4) If any dispute arises as to the persons entitled to receive compensation or as to the proportions in which the persons interested are entitled to share in it, the telegraph authority may pay into the Court of the District Judge such amount as he deems sufficient or, where all the disputing parties have in writing admitted the amount tendered to be sufficient or the amount has been determined under sub-section (3), that amount; and the District Judge, after giving notice to the parties and hearing such of them as desire to be heard, shall determine the persons entitled to receive the compensation or, as the case may be, the proportions in which the persons interested are entitled to share in it. (5) every determination of a dispute by a District Judge under sub-section (3), or sub-section (4) shall be final: provided that nothing i n this sub-section shall affect the right of any person to recover by suit the whole or any part of any compensation paid by the telegraph authority from the person who has received the same. " in the light of the aforesaid provisions contained in Section 16 of the telegraph Act, which did not exclude the application of the provisions of the limitation Act to a proceeding thereunder. the application under Section 16 of the telegraph Act was required to be made before the District Judge, whe presided over the District Court wilhin whose jurisdiction the property concerned was situate. thus the application was required to be made before a Civil Court, therefore it was held by the Supreme court that Article 137 of the limitation Act, 1963, was attracted. We may now notice the relevant portion of the Judgment in the Kerala State electricity Board's case, AIR 1977 SC 282 , which is as follows: "the provisions in the telegraph Act which contemplate determination by the District Judge of payment of compensation payable under Section 10 of the act indicate that the District Judge acts judicially as a Court. We may now notice the relevant portion of the Judgment in the Kerala State electricity Board's case, AIR 1977 SC 282 , which is as follows: "the provisions in the telegraph Act which contemplate determination by the District Judge of payment of compensation payable under Section 10 of the act indicate that the District Judge acts judicially as a Court. Where by statutes, matters are referred for determination by a Court of Record with no further provision the necessary implication is that the Court will determine the matters as a Court. (See National telephone Co. ltd. v the Postmaster-General, 1913 ac 546 ). In the present case the statute makes the reference to the District Judge as the Presiding Judge of the District Court. In many statutes reference is made to the District Judge under this particular title while the intention is to refer to the court of the District Judge. the telegraph Act in Section 16 contains intrinsic evidence mat the District Judge is mentioned there as the Court of the District judge. Section 16 (4} of telegraph Act requires payment into the Court of the district Judge such amount as the telegraph authority deems sufficient if any dispute arises as to the persons entitled to receive compensation. Again in section 34 of the telegraph Act, reference is made to payment of Court-fees and issue of processes both of which suggest that the ordinary machinery of a Court of Civil jurisdiction is being made available for the settlement of these disputes. Section 3 (15) of the General Clauses Act states that the District Judge in any Act of the Central legislature means the Judge of a principle Civil Court of original jurisdiction other than the High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, unless there is anything repugnant in the context. In the telegraph act there is nothing in the context suggest that the reference to the District Judge is not intended as a reference to the District Court which seems to be the meaning implied by the definition applicable thereto. the District Judge under the telegraph Act acts as a Civil Court in dealing with applications under Section 16 of the telegraph Act. the District Judge under the telegraph Act acts as a Civil Court in dealing with applications under Section 16 of the telegraph Act. the changed definition of the words "applicant" and "application" cacntained in Sections 2 (a) and 2 (b) of the 1963 limitation Act indicates the object of the limitation Act to include petitions, original or otherwise, under special laws. the interpretation which was given to Article 181 of the 1908 limitation Act on the principle of ejutsdem generis is not applicable with regard to Article 137 of the 1963 limitation Act. Article 137 stands in isolation from all other Articles in Part I of the third division. this Court in nityananda Joshi's case, AIR 1970 SC 209 (supra) has rightly thrown doubt on the two Judge Bench decision of this Court in Athani Municipal Council case, air 1969 SC 1335 (supra) where this Court construed Article 137 to be referable to applications under the Civil Procedure Code. Article 137 includes petitions within the word "applications". these petitions and applications can be under any special Act as in the present case. the conclusion we reach is that Article 137 of the 1963 limitation Act will apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to a Civil Court. With respect we defer from the view taken by the two Judge Bench of this Court in athani Municipal Council case, AIR 1969 SC 1335 (supra) and hold that Article 137 of the 1963 limitation Act is not confined to applications contemplated by or under the Code of Civil Procedure. the petition in the present case was to the district Judge as a Court. the petition was one contemplated by the telegraph act for judicial decision. the petition is an application falling within the scope of article 137 of the 1963 limitation Act. " thus, Section 16 of the telegraph Act did not contain non-obstante clause excluding the application of the provisions of the limitation Act to the application filed under section 16 before the District Judge. It was also further held by the Supreme Court that the application required to be made under Section 16 (4) of the telegraph Act before the Court of the District Judge which was a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction and as such it was a proceeding before a Court. Hence, the provisions of the limitation Act were attracted. It was also further held by the Supreme Court that the application required to be made under Section 16 (4) of the telegraph Act before the Court of the District Judge which was a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction and as such it was a proceeding before a Court. Hence, the provisions of the limitation Act were attracted. Such a situation does not excise in the case of Section 21 (1) of the Act which employs non-obstante clause in its widest amplitude as pointed out earlier and thereby excludes the application of the provisions of the limitation Act to a proceeding under Section 21 (1) of the Act. therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case ot Kerala electricity Board cannot be applied to the case on hand. In Smt. Shakuntala S. tiwari v Hem Chand Singliania, AIR 1987 SC 1823 , the supreme Court considered the proceeding initiated under Section 13 (1) of the bombay Rents, Hotel and lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Bombay Act') for recovery of possession of the premises let out to a tenant. No doubt the Supreme Court held that the provisions contained in Article 67 of the limitation Act were attracted to a proceeding under Section 13 (1) and 12 (1) of the Bombay Act. the relevant portion of the Judgment is as follows: "haji Suleman Ayub Bhiwnndiwala v Narayan Sadaslnv Ogale, (supra) which is a decision of the Bench of three Judges and as such binding on this court held that Sections 12 and 13, Bombay Rent Act, dealt with different topics and have different objects. It was held that Section 12 (1) clothed a tenant with the cloak of statutory protection against eviction so long as he performs the conditions of tenancy, Section 13 provides that notwithstanding that protection the landlord can sue for eviction provided he established any one of the circumstances set out in that section. this Court further observed that it was impossible to say that it was only when circumstances set out in Section 13 arose that a landlord could evict and that eviction on the ground of the failure to perform the conditions of tenancy would not deprive the tenant of the protection under Section 12 (1) of the Rent Act. Such a reading would be contrary to the whole scheme underlying the objects of the two sections. Such a reading would be contrary to the whole scheme underlying the objects of the two sections. We accept the aforesaid legal position, it is not against the trend of the principle behind rent legislation. It affords protection to the tenant inasmuch as it says that it was only on the fulfilment of the condition stipulated in the two sections and on satisfaction of the contingencies mentioned in Section 12 which would deprive the tenant of the protection that the tenant can be evicted. Much argument was advanced to the contrary but in our opinion to prevent unreasonable eviction, in balancing and harmonising the rights of the landlords and tenant if the sections are so read as done i n Haji Suleman 's case, it would meet the ends of justice and that would be proper construction. If that is so when on the strict grammatical meaning of Article 67, limitation act, would be applicable. this is in dubitably a suit by the landlord against the tenant to recover possession from the tenant. therefore the suit clearly comes within Article 67, limitation Act. the suit was filed because the tenancy was determined by the combined effect of the operation of Sections 12 and 13, bombay Rent Act. In this connection, the terms of Sections 12 and 13 of the bombay Rent Act may be referred to. At the most it would be within Article 66, limitation Act, if we hold that forfeiture has been incurred by the appellant in view of the breach of the conditions mentioned in Section 13, Bombay Rent Act and on lifting of the embargo against eviction of tenant in terms of Section 12 of the said Act. that being so, either of the two Article 66 or Article 67 would be applicable to the facts of this case; there is no scope of the application of Article 133, limitation Act, in any view of the matter. Sections 12 and 13, Bombay Rent act, coexist and must be harmonised to effect the purpose and intent of the legislature for the purpose of eviction of the tenant. In that view of the matter, article 133, limitation Act has no scope of application. large number of authorities were cited. Sections 12 and 13, Bombay Rent act, coexist and must be harmonised to effect the purpose and intent of the legislature for the purpose of eviction of the tenant. In that view of the matter, article 133, limitation Act has no scope of application. large number of authorities were cited. In the view we have taken in the construction of the provisions of Articles 67 and 66, limitation Act, and the nature of the cause of action in this case in the light of Sections 12 and 13, Bombay Rent Act, we are of the opinion that the period of limitation in this case would be 12 years. there is no dispute that if the period of limitation be 12 years, the suit was not barred. " sections 12 and 13 of the "bombay Act" did not contain a non-obstante clause excluding the application of the provisions of the limitation Act to a proceeding under sections 12 and 13 of the "bombay Act". In addition to this, it was held by the supreme Court in the aforesaid decision that a proceeding under Sections 12 and 13 of the Bombay Act was a suit by the landlord against the tenant to recover possession from the tenant. therefore, either Article 66 or Article 67 of the limitation Act was attracted. Hence, the period of limitation was 12 years. thus, it is clear that the aforesaid decision cannot be applied to a proceeding under Section 21 (1) of the Act which contains-the non-obstante clause. even assuming that a proceeding under section 21 (1) of the Act is a proceeding before a Civil Court just as the proceeding under Section 16 of the telegraph Act and Sections 12 and 13 of the "bombay Act", the provisions of the limitation Act, 1963, are not attracted to a proceeding under section 21 (1) of the Act because the Act specifically excludes the application of the limitation Act by employing non-obstante clause in its widest amplitude. therefore, I am of the view that it is not possible to apply both the decisions of the supreme Court to the case on hand. ( 32 ) SRI Jigjinni, learned counsel for the subtenant also placed reliance on a decision dated 16-11-1990, rendered by Shivashankar Bhat, J. , in the Indian express (Madurai) Pvt. ltd, v C. l. Seetharam and Another, CRP Nos. 1285 and 1645 of 1986. ( 32 ) SRI Jigjinni, learned counsel for the subtenant also placed reliance on a decision dated 16-11-1990, rendered by Shivashankar Bhat, J. , in the Indian express (Madurai) Pvt. ltd, v C. l. Seetharam and Another, CRP Nos. 1285 and 1645 of 1986. In that decision it has not been held that the provisions of the limitation Act are attracted to a proceeding under Section 21 (1) of the Act On the contrary, that question has been left upon. this is clear from the following observations: "if provisions of the limitation Act could be attracted, because, Section 21 (1) contemplates an 'application' and the application is made to a Civil Court, then obviously, the landlord would have 3 years time from the date of accrual of the cause of action (Vide: Article 137 of the limitation Act ). But, while construing a provision like Section 21 (1) (p), the competence of the landlord to invoke it, after acquiescing in the conduct of the tenant will have to be examined. these larger questions are unnecessary for a decision in this case, because, here, on the face of it the claim under Section 21 (1) (p) is unreasonable and the Court has been approached 14 years after the accrual of the cause of action. " therefore, it is not possible to hold that the said decision is of any assistance to the learned counsel for the subtenant. Accordingly, the contention of Sri Jigjinni, learned counsel for the subtenant is rejected. It is held that the provisions of the limitation Act are not applicable to the proceedings under Section 21 (1) of the Act. Accordingly, Point No. 1 is answered in the affinnative and Point No. 1-A is answered as follows: "the provisions of the limitation Act, 1963, are not applicable to the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act. As such, the question as to whether article 137 or Article 67 of the limitation Act applies to a petition filed for eviction of a tenant under Section 21 (1) (f) of the Act becomes unnecessary for consideration. " point No. 2: ( 33 ) THE learned District Judge has held that the landlords have not made out a case under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act. that finding is a finding of fact. Moreover, the schedule premises is an open site. " point No. 2: ( 33 ) THE learned District Judge has held that the landlords have not made out a case under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act. that finding is a finding of fact. Moreover, the schedule premises is an open site. It is required by the landlords for the purpose of putting up a construction for running a lodging house. this Court in CRP No. 2218 of 1973 in leelabai Kaslrinathsa Kabadi and Others v Ramappa Fakirappa koppal, decided on 18th July, 1974, has held thus: "addressing arguments in support of the decision of the Courts-below, Mr. K. A. Swamy, learned counsel for the tenant, maintained that since the demised premises are vacant land, the case of the landlords that he required the vacant land for erection of new building, would come within clause (1) of Section 21 (1) of the Act and that the petition for eviction should fail as he (the landlord) has not shown that he had obtained permission or approval of the municipal authorities at Gadag for erection of a new building on that site. On the other hand, Mr. K. I. Bhatta, counsel for the landlord contended that the landlord's case comes within clause (j) and not clause (I) of Section 21 (1) of the Act as the demised premises includes a building also though constructed by the tenant, and that hence it was not necessary for the landlord to have obtained prior to the petition, permission or authority from the municipal authorities to erect a new building on the petition site. Clauses (j) and (1) of Section 21 (1) of the Act read: (j) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for immediate purpose of demolishing them and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building in place of the premises sought to be demolished. XXX XXX XXX (1) that where the premises are land, such land is reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the erection of a new building which a local authority or other competent authority has approved or permitted him to build thereon. though a building is existing on the petition site, such building cannot be regarded as being a part of the demised premises. What was leased to the tenant under ex. though a building is existing on the petition site, such building cannot be regarded as being a part of the demised premises. What was leased to the tenant under ex. P. 3 was only a vacant site and the tenant constructed that building. the lease deed did not provide that at the termination of the lease the tenant should leave the building intact. It is open to him to demolish that building and to take away the building materials leaving only the vacant site. Hence, the demised premises in the present case can only be regarded as a vacant land not as a land with building thereon. It follows that clause (1) and not clause (j) of Section 21 (1) is applicable to the present case. As the landlord has not shown that he had obtained approval or permission of the municipal authorities for erecting a new building on the petition site, he has not fulfilled the condition provided in clause (1) of Section 21 (1) for obtaining a decree. " no doubt that was a case under Section 21 (1) (j) of the Act and the premises let out was an open site. this Court held that Section 21 (1) (j) was not attracted and it was only Section 21 (1) (1) which was attracted. ( 34 ) IN the instant case, the premises involved is an open site. the landlords have also sought for eviction of the tenant under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act. therefore, the following question arises for consideration: "if the landlord seeks possession of an open site let out to a tenant governed by the provisions of the Act on the ground that he reasonably and bona fide requires the schedule premises - Open site - for the purpose of erection of a new building for his own use or occupation or, as in the instant case, for the purpose of running a lodging house to augment his income, whether the provisions of section 21 (1) (1) or 21 (1) (h) of the Act are attracted?" ( 35 ) THE Act makes a specific provision in clause (1) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act for eviction of a tenant from the premises which is a land not used for agricultural puqjoses, by the landlord if he reasonably and bona fide requires it for the erection of a new building. therefore, in such a case, the landlord is required to satisfy the requirement of clause (1) of Section 21 (1) of the Act. Under clause (1) it is not necessary for the landlord to prove that the new building proposed to be erected by him is required for his own use and occupation. What he is required to prove is that he reasonably and bona fide requires the premises, which is an open site, for the erection of a new building which a local authority or other competent authority has approved or permitted him to build thereon. After such construction he may either occupy himself or use it in any manner, or let it out as per law. Whereas if the landlord requires possession of the premises which is an open site not for erecting a new building but for his own use and occupation, he has to make out a ground falling under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act. It may be possible that the landlord may require the open site for his own use and occupation without erecting any building on it. therefore, in such a case, merely because the premises is an open site, he is not required to satisfy clause (1) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act. It is only when the landlord requires possession of the premises which is an open site for the purpose of erecting a new building whether he requires the building erected on the open site for his own use and occupation or for some other purpose. In any case, it is clause (1) of Section 21 (1) that is attracted and not clause (h) of Section 21 (1 ). therefore, he is required to satisfy clause (1) of Section 21 (1) of the Act. ( 36 ) IN the instant case, as already pointed out, the landlords have sought for eviction of the tenant on the ground that they require the schedule premises which is an open site for erecting a new building. therefore, it is not clause (h) but it is clause (1) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act that is attracted. therefore, it is not clause (h) but it is clause (1) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act that is attracted. therefore, the landlords are not entitled to seek eviction under clause (h) of sub-section (1) of section 21 of the Act for the purpose of erection of a new building without satisfying clause (1) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act. No doubt, the Court-below have not gone into this aspect of the matter. However, it has rejected the prayer made by the landlords for eviction of the tenant under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act. therefore, the ultimate conclusion of the learned District Judge rejecting the prayer for eviction under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act is not required to be disturbed. Accordingly Point no. 2 is answered in negative for the reasons given by us above and not for the reasons given by the learned District Judge. Point No. 3 ( 37 ) IN the light of the finding recorded on Point No. 2, Point No. 3 does not arise. Point No. 4 ( 38 ) THE trial Court directed the landlord to pay a sum of Rs. 20,000/- to the tenant before securing possession of the schedule premises along with the building thereon. the learned District Judge set aside this direction. the trial Court did not correctly read the lease deed ex. P. 40. the relevant portion of the same has already been reproduced in the earlier portion of this order. Option was left to the landlords to take or not to take possession of the structure. In the event they exercised the option to take possession of the structure, the value of the building was required to be assessed. the landlords did not choose to take possession of the super-structure put up by the tenant. therefore, it was not at all necessary to value and pay for the super-structure. As such the trial Court was not right in directing the landlord to pay a sum of Rs. 20,000/- to the tenant before securing possession of the schedule premises. As such the learned District Judge was justified in setting aside that finding. Accordingly, Point No. 4 is answered in the negative. ( 39 ) FOR the reasons stated above, the revision petitions preferred by the landlords, tenant and subtenant fail and the same are dismissed. 20,000/- to the tenant before securing possession of the schedule premises. As such the learned District Judge was justified in setting aside that finding. Accordingly, Point No. 4 is answered in the negative. ( 39 ) FOR the reasons stated above, the revision petitions preferred by the landlords, tenant and subtenant fail and the same are dismissed. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. ( 40 ) IN the schedule premises the subtenancy created in favour of the petitioner in crp No. 1354/1987 is unlawful. As such the subtenant cannot be permitted to continue in occupation of the premises when once the order of eviction is confirmed. But the fact is that he is running a Petrol Bunk. He cannot shift the Petrol Bunk to any other place unless the other place is approved by the authorities under the relevant law and the Rules framed thereunder. that procedure takes considerable time. In the meanwhile, if the tenant and the subtenant are directed to vacate, they would be put to irreparable loss. therefore, it is just and necessary to grant reasonable time to the tenant to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the schedule premises. Accordingly, the petitioners in CRP No. 1395/1987 and CRP No. 1354/1987 are granted time till the end of August 1992 to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the petition schedule premises to the landlords on conditions that they file a memo before the trial Court within eight weeks from today with a copy to the landlords or to their counsel giving an undertaking to the trial to the effect that they will voluntarily vacate and deliver vacant possession of the petition schedule premises to the landlords on or before the end of August 1992; that they would not induct third parties into the schedule premises; that they would not cause damage to the schedule premises and that they would go on paying to the landlords or deposit in the trial court the amount equivalent to the rent so far the tenant has been paying to the landlords on the 10th of each month during the period of their occupation. If the petitioners in CRP No. 1395/1987 and 1354/1987 fail to file an undertaking to the aforesaid effect with a copy to the landlords or their counsel in the trial Court within the aforesaid period, it would be open the landlords to proceed to execute the order of eviction as though no time is granted by this Court. --- *** --- .