ORDER K.M. Agarwal, J. -- 1. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, two Bus Operators of Manasa, district Mandsaur, Madhya Pradesh are challenging the constitutional validity of section 80 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, (in short, the "new Act"), on the ground that it over-looks public interest and confers uncanalised and arbitrary powers to Regional Transport Authorities in the matter of grant of stage carriage permits for regional routes. It is further said to be bad, because it does not recognize any right of hearing to the existing operators before making any fresh grant. 2. Referring to sub-sections (1) and (3) of section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (in short, the "old Act") the learned counsel for the petitioners argued that while considering an application for a stage carriage permit, the Regional Transport Authority was bound to consider the various matters enumerated in sub-section (1), as also to "t1ke into consideration any representations made by persons already providing passenger transport facilities by any means along or near the proposed route or area, or by any association representing persons interested in the provision of road transport facilities recognised in this behalf by the State Government, or by any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or area lies", and that he could "limit the number of stage carriages generally or of any specified type for which stage carriage permits may be granted in the region or in any specified area or on any specified route within the region" in exercise of his powers under sub-section (3) and having regard to the matters specified in sub-section (1). Absence of similar safe-guards and restrictions rendered the provisions of section 80 of the new Act invalid. 3. The argument has no substance. As held by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ibrahim v. S.T.A. Tribunal, Madras (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1542), at the stage of limiting the number of permits under section 47 (3) of the old Act, the existing operators had no legal right of making representation, or that of hearing. To reproduce the Supreme Court :- "section 47 (3) of the Act, on the other hand, speaks only of the matters mentioned in sub-section (1) which a Regional Transport Authority may have regard to while limiting the number of stage carriages. To reproduce the Supreme Court :- "section 47 (3) of the Act, on the other hand, speaks only of the matters mentioned in sub-section (1) which a Regional Transport Authority may have regard to while limiting the number of stage carriages. The total absence in section 47 (3) of the Act of any reference to representations mentioned in section 47 (1) of the Act indicates that a Regional Transport Authority under section 47 (3) of the Act is not required to take into consideration any representations of the nature mentioned in Sec. 47 (1) of the Act. Representations mentioned in section 47 (1) of the Act are referable to representations contemplated in section 57(3) of the Act. These representations are those made by operators to the Regional Transport Authority after the publication of an application for a stage carriage permit. In view of the provisions of the Act and, in particular, section 48 of the Act which enacts that a Regional Transport Authority subject to the provisions of section 47 may grant a stage carriage permit, it is manifest that representations contemplated in sections 47 (1) and 57 (3) of the Act are representations subsequent to the application for grant of permit, and, therefore, these representations do not at all enter the field of determination of number of stage carriages under section 47 (3) of the Act. Representations mentioned in section 47 (1) of the Act relate to representations by and between the competitors and contenders for grant of a permit. These individual representations raise rival contentions between operators. When the Regional Transport Authority acts under S. 47 (3) of the Act it does not deal with any dispute between operators. The Regional Transport Authority is required to arrive at its decision under S. 47 (3) of the Act having regard to matters mentioned in S. 47 (1) of the Act independent of any representation by operators or any hearing. The deliberation as well as the decision of the Regional Transport Authority under section 47 (3) of the Act is confined to its own administrative policy and order. The deliberation as well as the decision of the Regional Transport Authority under section 47 (3) of the Act is confined to its own administrative policy and order. The Regional Transport Authority in limiting the number of stage carriage permits under section 47 (3) of the Act may address itsclfto the matters enumerated in sub-section (1) of section 47 of the Act and the said Authority is not required to hear operators at the time of the consideration of the matter of determining the limit of number of permits." "We are of opinion that the Regional Transport Authority is not obliged to hear operators while exercising jurisdiction under section 47 (3) of the Act in fixing the limit of number of stage carriage permits." Accordingly if the new Act makes no restriction to the number of permits that may be granted under section 80, the petitioners can have no say that any of their right is taken away. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners also relied on the provisions of sub-sections (3) & (5) of section 57 of the old Act in support of his contention that in the absence of similar provisions in the new Act, section 80 of the new Act was liable to be struck down as infringing the fundamental right of the petitioners. 5. Sub-sections (3) & (5) of section 57 of the old Act were worded in the following manner :- "Sub-section (3): On receipt of an application for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit, the Regional Transport Authority shall make the application available for inspection at the office of the Authority and shall publish the application or the substance thereof in the prescribed manner together with a notice of the date before which representation in connection therewith may be submitted and the date, not being less than thirty days from such publication, on which, and the time and place at which, the application and any representations received will be considered". provided that........... provided that........... *********** "Sub-section (5) : When any representation such as is referred in sub-section (3) is made, the Regional Transport Authority shall dispose of the application at a public hearing at which the applicant and the person making the representation shall have an opportunity of being heard either in person or by a duly authorised representative." These provisions would show that on receipt of an application for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit, the R.T.A. was hound: (i) to make an application available for inspection. (ii) and to publish the same or the substance thereof together with a notice of the date before which the representation in connection therewith could be submitted and the date on which and the time and place at which the application and any representation received would he considered. The Regional Transport Authority was also bound to dispose of the application at a public hearing after affording the applicant and the existing bus operator an opportunity of being heard. But the question is, whether in the absence of similar provisions in the new Act, section 80 thereof could be struck down as infringing any fundamental right of the petitioners. While considering the question in the light of V.P. Amendment introduced by V.P. Act No. 25/72 removing the limit of the number of stage carriages under section 47 (3) of the old Act, the Supreme Court in HansRaj v. State of U.P. (A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 389.), said that:- "The contention that the impugned notification is violative of the rights of the appellants under Article 19 (1) (f) or (g) of the Constitution is equally devoid of force. There is nothing in the notification which prevents the appellants from acquiring, holding and disposing of their property or prevents them from practising any profession or from carrying on any occupation, trade or business. The fact that some others have also been enabled to obtain permits for running buses cannot constitute a violation of the appellants' rights under the above two clauses of Article 19 of the Constitution. The above provisions are not intended to grant a kind of monopoly to a few bus operators to the exclusion of other eligible persons. No right is guaranteed to any private party by Article 19 of the Constitution of carrying on trade and business without competition from other eligible persons. The above provisions are not intended to grant a kind of monopoly to a few bus operators to the exclusion of other eligible persons. No right is guaranteed to any private party by Article 19 of the Constitution of carrying on trade and business without competition from other eligible persons. Clause (g) of Article 19 (1) gives a right to all citizens subject to Article 19 (6) to practise any profession or to carryon any occupation, trade or business. It is an enabling provision and does not confer a right on those already practising a profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business to exclude and debar fresh eligible entrants from practising that profession or from carrying on that occupation, trade or business. The said provision is not intended to make any profession, business or trade the exclusive preserve of a few persons." In Secretary R.T.A. Guntur v. E. Rama Rao A.I.R. 1991 AP. 11 (FB) a Full, Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court examined the validity of section 80 (2) of the new Act vis- a-vis the provisions of section 47 (1) & (3) of the old Act and after usefully quoting a passage from the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in Hans Raj Kehar v. State of U.P., AI.R. 1975 S.C. 389., came to the following conclusion :- "The aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, therefore, makes it clear that an existing operator has no fundamental right to a monopoly of the trade, business or occupation and after the omission by the U.P. amending Act of 1972 of the right of representation by the existing operators, no such right could be claimed. We may add that viewing the matter from the point of view of the new applicant's fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (g), the said right can be fettered only to the extent specified by law made under Art. 19 (6). Under the old Act, the fetters on this fundamental right of the new applicant included a right conferred on existing operators and others under S. 47 (1), 57 (3), (5) to represent. Under the old Act, the fetters on this fundamental right of the new applicant included a right conferred on existing operators and others under S. 47 (1), 57 (3), (5) to represent. Those fetters have now been removed under S. 71 (1) and S. 80 (2) of the new Act of 1988." We find ourselves in agreement with the said conclusion of the Andhra Pradesh High Court that as the right of representation or that of hearing has been specifically omitted in the new Act by the Parliament, an existing operator has no right of representation or that of hearing before the Regional Transport Authority even at the stage of actual grant of permit to the new operator. 6. One of the interveners, supporting the petitioners, relied on Rameshwar Prasad v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 383, to submit that the provisions of section 80 (2) of the new Act were void and ineffective. 7. In Rameshwar Prasad v. State of U.P. (supra), the Supreme Court considered the two notifications dated 10.1.81 and 23.1.1981 issued by the State of V.P., permitting grant of permits to all eligible applicants without any upper limit in the light of amendments made by U.P. Legislature in the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 by U.P. Act No. 25/72 and U.P. Act No. 15/76. By U.P. Act No. 25/72, section 47 (1) of the old Act was amended by omitting the right of representation to existing operators given in the Central Act and a provision was made allowing an unrestricted number of stage carriage permits to be granted. After U.P. Act No. 25/72, it was found that certain anomalies had arisen in the working thereof, particularly in regard to the provision allowing an unrestricted number of stage carriage permits to be granted. With a view to remedy the situation, the U.P. Legislature amended the Act again by U.P. Act No. 15/76, permitting restriction of the number of permits. There the Central Act was also amended by Parliament in certain respects by Act No. 47/1978. Even so the State Government issued the impugned notifications permitting grant of permits to all eligible applicants without any upper limit. The Supreme Court held that these notifications were inconsistent with the limitations as to number of permits introduced afresh by U.P. Act No. 15176 and were bad. Even so the State Government issued the impugned notifications permitting grant of permits to all eligible applicants without any upper limit. The Supreme Court held that these notifications were inconsistent with the limitations as to number of permits introduced afresh by U.P. Act No. 15176 and were bad. Their Lordships referred to the earlier judgment in Hans Raj Kellar v. State of U.P. (supra) and said that the judgment was good as the law stood before U.P. Amendment Act No. 15176 and that once the U.P. Legislature had itself changed the law in 1976, the State Government could not have issued notifications inconsistent with the Amendment Act No. 15176. To quote: "A reading of these two notifications shows that the State Government ignored, first, the legislative policy underlying the Uttar Pradesh Act 15 of 1976 by which the new sub-section (2) of S. 43-A was enacted in substitution of the former sub-section (2) with retrospective effect. As stated earlier, the State Legislature introduced the new sub-section (2) of S. 43-A after it reansed the mistake committed by the State Government in issuing the notification in the year 1972 directing the issue of bus permits liberally in favour of all eligible applicants which had resulted in investment of unproductive capital expenditure and under utilisation of capital and fuel and in unreasonable competition which eventually eliminated small operators from business. " ********* We may here state that any observations made in Hails Raj Kellar's case (supra) would be inapplicable so far as these cases presently before us are concerned. In that case the Court was concerned with sub-section (2) of S. 43-A of the Act as it stood then which was a provision enacted by the Legislature. That sub-section provided that without prejudice to the generality of the power contained in section 43-A (1) of the Act where the State Government was of opinion that it was in public interest to grant stage carriage permits (except in respect of routes or areas for which schemes have been published under section 68(C) or contract carriage permits or public carrier permits to all eligible applicants it may issue appropriate directions as stated therein. That sub-section contained a clear legislative policy which considered that there could be no public prejudice if all eligible applicants were granted permits. That sub-section contained a clear legislative policy which considered that there could be no public prejudice if all eligible applicants were granted permits. Without saying anything more on the point, it may be stated that whatever this Court may have observed while considering that provision would not apply now as there is a clear departure made by the Legislature from that policy when it enacted the new sub- section (2) of S. 43-A." ********** "Any direction given by the State Government under section 43-A of the Act should, therefore, be in conformity with all matters regarding which the statute has made provision. In this situation to say that any number of permits can be issued to any eligible operator without any upper limit is to overstep the limits of delegation of statutory power and to make a mockery of an important economic activity like the motor transport." *********** "We are of the view that the two notifications are clearly outside the scope of the Act. The first notification which directs that all eligible applicants shall be granted permits and that there shall be no upper limit to the number of permits to be issued for stage carriages and the second notification which says that the Transport Authorities shall have regard only to matters referred to in clauses (a), (b), (d) and (f) of sub-section (1) of S. 47 of the Act and thereby precludes the Transport Authorities to take into consideration matters contained in the proviso to S. 47 (1) and in sub-section (1A) to (1H) of S. 47 of the Act are ultra vires the Act and that they are liable to be struck down. " To sum up, the two notifications before the Supreme Court were found to be inconsistent with U.P. Act No. 15 of 1976 and, therefore, they were struck down. In the present case, independent provision in section 80 of the new Act by legislative enactment has been made and, therefore, it is not liable to be struck down on the ground that it is not in conformity with the old provisions. 8. For the foregoing reasons, the further argument that in the absence of provisions similar to those of sections 71 (3) and 88 (5) of the new Act, the provisions of section 80 (2) of the new Act would be rendered nugatory deserves to be rejected without any discussion at length. 9. 8. For the foregoing reasons, the further argument that in the absence of provisions similar to those of sections 71 (3) and 88 (5) of the new Act, the provisions of section 80 (2) of the new Act would be rendered nugatory deserves to be rejected without any discussion at length. 9. Now coming to the question of public interest, it is better to begin with the object of the new Act, which came into force from 1.7.1989. As its preamble shows, it is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to motor vehicles. The statement of its Objects and Reasons would show that although the old Act was amended several times to keep it up-to-date, the need was felt that among other things, the Act should take into account the changes in the road transport technology, pattern of passengers and "freight movements, development of the road net-work in the country and particularly the improved techniques in the motor vehicles management. Accordingly after taking into account the recommendations of various committees like National Transport Policy Committee, Road Safety Committee etc. for updating, simplification and rationalization of this law; and after considering the suggestions and recommendations of various bodies and institutions like Central Institute of Road Transport Automotive Research Association of India and other transport organisations including the manufacturers and the general public, the Working Group constituted for the purpose of reviewing the old Act and for submitting draft proposal for a comprehensive legislation to replace the existing Act, submitted its recommendations to the Central Government, which in its turn obtained comments of the State Governments on. the recommendations of the Working Group and discussed the subject in a specially convened meeting of the Transport Ministers of all States and Union territories. The greater now of passenger and freight with the least impediments so that islands of isolation are not created leading to regional or local imbalances; and simplification of procedure and policy liberalizations for private sector operations in the road transport field formed part of some of the more important modifications suggested for consideration. The greater now of passenger and freight with the least impediments so that islands of isolation are not created leading to regional or local imbalances; and simplification of procedure and policy liberalizations for private sector operations in the road transport field formed part of some of the more important modifications suggested for consideration. The statement of objects and Reasons further mentions that the "legislation has been prepared in the light of the above background" and among various matters; the legislation makes a provision for "liberalised schemes for grant of stage carriage permits on non-nationalised routes, all-India Tourist permits and also national permits for goods carriages." Under the old Act, section 47 (1) required the Regional Transport Authority to keep in mind the matters enumerated therein while considering an application [or a stage carriage permit, which inter alia included the interest of the public generally; the advantages to the public of the service to be provided, including the saving of time likely to be effected thereby and any convenience arising from journeys not being broken; and the benefit to any particular locality or localities likely to be afforded by the service. These matters do not appear to have any bearing in a situation where the scope of transport service is enlarged by liberalised schemes for grant of stage carriage permits, because it is bound to result in greater now of passengers with least impediments to their convenience and comfort, and in discouraging islands of isolation, regional or local imbalances. Provisions similar to those of section 80 of the new Act were provided by U.P. Amendment Act No. 25/72 by introducing section 43-A in the old Act with an object "to make it easier to secure permits in respect of non-nationalised routes". Provisions similar to those of section 80 of the new Act were provided by U.P. Amendment Act No. 25/72 by introducing section 43-A in the old Act with an object "to make it easier to secure permits in respect of non-nationalised routes". The section sought "to simplify the procedure for this purpose." It was accordingly provided that "in the case of non-nationalised routes if the State Government is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to grant permits to all eligible applicants, it may by notifications in the Gazette issue a direction accordingly." In the context of these provisions, the Supreme Court in Hans Raj Kehar v. State of U.P. (supra) observed and held:- "..........The notification removes the bar created by the limit on the number of permits for buses which could be issued and facilities to issue of such permits to fresh applicants if they satisfy the requirement of eligibility. It hardly needs much argument to show that the larger number of buses operating oh different routes would be for the convenience and benefit of the travelling public and as such would be in the public interest. Any measure which results in larger number of buses operating on various routes would necessarily eliminate or in any case minimise long hours of waiting at the bus stands. It would also relieve congestion and provide for quick and prompt transport service. Good transport service is one of the basic requirement" of a progressive society. Prompt and quick transport service being a great boon for those who travel, any measure which provides for such an amenity is in the very nature of things in the public interest." We accordingly hold that the provisions of section 80 of the new Act are not, in any way, against public interest. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioners had cited R.O. Naidu v. Addl. S.T.A.T., Madras AI.R. 1969 S.C. 1130., Mohd. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioners had cited R.O. Naidu v. Addl. S.T.A.T., Madras AI.R. 1969 S.C. 1130., Mohd. Ibrahim v. S.T. A. Tribunal, Madras, (supra); P.B. Pvt. Ltd. v. S. T.A. Trihunal Punjab, AI.R. 1974 S.C. 1174 and Ajantha Transports v. T.V.K. Transports, AI.R. 1975 S.C. 123, and the General Principles of Constitutional Limits of Legislative Delegation given at page 505 of G.P. Singh's "Principles of Statutory Interpretation", 1988 Edition in support of his various contentions, but we do opt consider it necessary to burden this order with unnecessary discussion of these cases in the light of the fact that the decision of the Supreme Court in Hans Raj Kehar v. State of U.P. (supra) is directly on the point in controversy before us. 11. We may add and conclude that a reference made to section 217 (2) (b) of the new Act and the argument that denial of hearing to the existing operators before making any fresh grants in unlimited numbers would violate the fundamental right of existing bus operators under Article 21 of the Constitution deserves to be rejected, because their right to earn their livelihood by operating on their routes is not taken away. Right to livelihood does not mean enrichment at the cost of others. Similarly public purpose or public interest does not convey any rigid or limited meaning. It has wider meaning and it assumes different shades and different meanings in different situations. Accordingly if the narrow field or public interest under the old Act has been enlarged by the new Act, the petitioners cannot come forward and say that for that reason the new provisions are bad. They can also not he allowed to say that the wider scope in the matter of grant of permits under the old Act was cut short by introducing matters mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 47 of the old Act by Central Amending Act No. 100/76 and further amendments by further subsequent Acts and, therefore, the enlargement of scope in the matter of grant of stage carriage permits by the new Act is bad. 12. For the foregoing reasons, this petition fails and it is hereby dismissed. We hold that the provisions of section 80 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, are not ultra vires but are intra vires. There shall be no order as to costs of this petition. 12. For the foregoing reasons, this petition fails and it is hereby dismissed. We hold that the provisions of section 80 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, are not ultra vires but are intra vires. There shall be no order as to costs of this petition. The outstanding amount of security, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioners.