Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff in Suit No. 151 of 1990 impugns the order of the learned District Judge, Kozhikode, in O.P.No. 241 of 1991 whereby he rejected the application for transfer of the suit from the file of the learned trial judge. The application for transfer was made by the plaintiff under S.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the learned trial judge was biased against the plaintiff. The facts on which this petition is founded are set out in paragraphs 2,3 and 4 below. 2. The suit by the plaintiff is based on a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant whereunder the plaintiff was to supply the formula for film coating and colour coating, and demonstrate the techniques involved. The plaintiff was to receive a royalty of Rs.15,000/-. The defendant is alleged to have committed breach of the contract. In the suit, a mandatory injunction directing the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff one drum containing 25 Kgs. of Chloroquine Phosphate despatched under lorry receipt No.213104 dated 21-3-1990, is claimed. The learned trial judge granted the ad-interim injunction applied for by the plaintiff, thereby accepting that the plaintiff had prima facie case. But at the same time the learned trial judge emphasised the need to have the suit itself disposed off, as, in his opinion the subject matter was chemicals which could deteriorate. On 13-10-1990 written statement was filed. On 16-2-1991 the defendant filed LA. No. 687 of 1991 praying that the suit be listed for disposal in the special list. The defendant opposed the application for listing for early hearing. The suit was listed for hearing in April 1991. Meanwhile the suit came up for framing issues on 11-3-1991. The plaintiff applied for having the suit desisted from the special list. The application was allowed and the suit desisted. 3. The plaintiff made certain applications to the court, the decisions on which are relied upon in support of the application for transfer of the suit to another judge. On 23-2-1991 the plaintiff filed I.A.No. 903 of 1991 for discovery of documents which was dismissed. Similarly I.A.No. 995 of 1991 for issuing interrogatories to the defendant was dismissed on 6-3-1991. However, on 10-4-1991 LA, No. 996 of 1991 filed by the plaintiff for notice of inspection of the defendant's documents was allowed. On 23-2-1991 the plaintiff filed I.A.No. 903 of 1991 for discovery of documents which was dismissed. Similarly I.A.No. 995 of 1991 for issuing interrogatories to the defendant was dismissed on 6-3-1991. However, on 10-4-1991 LA, No. 996 of 1991 filed by the plaintiff for notice of inspection of the defendant's documents was allowed. The plaintiff inspected certain documents at the defendant's premise on 18/19th April, 1991. But on 12-4-1991 the trial court again ordered that the suit be listed in the special list for hearing and posted it on 17-6-1991. The plaintiff made an application, I.A.No. 1561 of 1991 for removal of the suit from the special list. Some other events relied upon by the plaintiff are these. The plaintiff made an application, I.A.No. 1713 of 1991 to summon A.Karim, a former employee of the defendant at the relevant time, as a witness. The application was dismissed on 14-6-1991 on the ground that the defendant did not know the whereabouts of the witness and therefore the issue of summons would be futile. LA. No. 1714 of 1991 for summoning some documents covered by LA. No. 996 of 1991 was made by the plaintiff. It was dismissed in June, 1991, on the ground that (i) the documents which were in the plaintiffs possession were sufficient to prove his case and (ii) the documents sought to be produced were required by the defendant for his daily business. The order in I.A.No. 1714 of 1991 was challenged in C.R.P. No. 1199 of 1991 in this Court. While dismissing the C.R.P.No.1199 of 1991 this Court observed: "If the trial court finds records necessary, the court may give suitable directions to produce the record referred to in I.A.No.1714 of 1991." The plaintiff filed the Transfer Application (O.P. No. 241 of 1991) on 18-6-1991, even before this C.R.P. No. 1199 of 1991 was disposed off. 4. After hearing counsel for the petitioner and the respondent I find that the petitioner alleges bias and entertains apprehension that he will not receive justice from the trial judge. The acts of the trial judge on which the apprehension is based are these: (i) Repeated dismissal of his interlocutory applications such as for discovery RI documents, issue interrogatories and production of documents. (ii) Refusal to summon A. Karim on the ground that his address was not known. The acts of the trial judge on which the apprehension is based are these: (i) Repeated dismissal of his interlocutory applications such as for discovery RI documents, issue interrogatories and production of documents. (ii) Refusal to summon A. Karim on the ground that his address was not known. (iii) Listing the case for hearing with suits of 1985 and 1986 although the suit is a recent one. 5. The word 'bias' is very often used in a loose sense. It is necessary to understand that bias is a state of mind which reveals such pre-possession with some object or point of view that the mind does not respond impartially to anything related to the object or point of view. It conveys a tendency or trend in favour of or against a particular point of view. The word is often used interchangeably with "prejudice". It is the predisposition of the mind in favour or against a particular view that must exist, in order to hold that the learned judge is biased against the petitioner. Counsel have cited a number of judicial authorities. I will divide these authorities into two broad categories. The first category of the authorities lays down general principles in regard to the transfer of cases under S.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure oil the ground that the learned judge is biased. The second category of cases deals with individual sets on facts constituting bias and reasonable apprehension, 6. In Dr. Subramanlam Swamy, (Dr. Subramanlam Swamy v. Ramakrishna Wegrcfe, A.I.R.1990 S.C.113) the Supreme Court laid down these cardinal principles, (a) Assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of dispensation of justice, (b) The central criterion for the court to consider is that the application for transfer has not proceeded from hypersensitivity or relative convenience of a party or easy availability of legal services. There must exist something more than these grounds, something more compelling from the point of view of public justice and not the attitude of a sensitive litigant. (c) The paramount consideration for transfer is the cause of justice. In Eachara Warner (T.V. Eachara Warrier v. State of Kerala & Others, 1984 K.L.T. S.N.44, Case No. 74) this Court emphasised that transfer of suit is not to be made in lighthearted fashion. (c) The paramount consideration for transfer is the cause of justice. In Eachara Warner (T.V. Eachara Warrier v. State of Kerala & Others, 1984 K.L.T. S.N.44, Case No. 74) this Court emphasised that transfer of suit is not to be made in lighthearted fashion. While the existence of a reasonable apprehension on the part of a litigant that he may not receive justice has to be taken into account, a transfer should not be readily granted for any fancied notion of litigant. In Industrial C & D.S.Ltd., (Industrial C & D.S. Ltd. v. Andru 1991 (1) K.L.T.234) this Court deprecated application for transfer based on anticipation of court's decision by litigants. rev. fr.punnen Thomas (rev. fr.punnen Thomas v. MoranMar Bassalios 1963 K.L.J. 781) held that the court should place itself in the complaining litigant's chair and in the light of the facts known to such litigant should decide whether reasonable man would entertain an apprehension that he would be denied justice. Rajkot Cancer Society (Rajkot Cancer Society v. Municipal Corporation, Rajkot, A.I.R.1988 Guj. 63) has a different lesson. The transfer of case from one court to another, casts, indirectly, doubt on the integrity or competence of the judge from whom the matter is transferred. It is, therefore, a serious matter and calls for great circumspection. Mere presumption or possible apprehension cannot be made the basis of transferring a case from one court to another. The need to exercise great care and caution springs from the fact that a lighthearted transfer may impute an improper or unjustifiable stigma or slur against the court. Expression of opinion by the judges during arguments in courts had also been the subject of application for transfer. C.V.Xavier (C.V.Xavier v. J.J.De Chane, 1972 K.L.T. 209) was a classic example of the not uncommon attempt, to have cases transferred, based on unreasonable and fanciful fear of bias proceeding from ignorance of judicial process. The fact that the transfer was sought from one bench of the High Court to another makes no difference to the principle laid down by the case. The expression of opinion on the merits of the case after hearing the case for a day gave rise to the allegation of bias. The fact that the transfer was sought from one bench of the High Court to another makes no difference to the principle laid down by the case. The expression of opinion on the merits of the case after hearing the case for a day gave rise to the allegation of bias. People subjectively attached to the results of their litigation tend to be oblivious to the fact that expression of tentative opinions on the merits of a case which may be adverse to one and favourable to another is a part of the process of debate, and education. Reasoning is an essential component of judicial process. Therefore, arguments have to be tested by questions, answers, expression of ideas and exchange of thoughts. In this process, expression of views on the subject matter is not only inevitable but necessary for a healthy system. Without such exchange dialogue and debate, judicial decision-making will be reduced to a mechanical lifeless exercise. This debate cannot be reduced to the vice of bias. This is the teaching of C.V.Xavier. In Xavier, the division bench of this Court aware of the healthy process of judicial decision - making observed: "To say that the judges are biased if they express some opinion on the merits of the case after hearing the case for a day is certainly male fide if not presumptuous." 7. The foregoing paragraphs contain an account of judicial decisions which lay down general principles relevant to the question of transfer of cases and the concept of bias. I will consider in the paragraphs 8 and 9 below, decisions which set forth the judicial thinking with respect to some specified allegations. 8. Expression of a particular view by a judge in a previous proceeding or in the same proceedings was held not to constitute bias. The reason is that subsequent arguments can persuade the judge to change his views. Secondly, it was also held that an adverse judicial order passed by a judge cannot be made the foundation of an application for transfer under S.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ratanlal v. Suresh Kumar, A.I.R.1987 M.P.178). Similarly, the fact that the judge had earlier issued an ex-parte mandatory injunction against the complaining litigant and that the same complaining litigant had previously withdrawn unconditionally another suit, are not matters which create a predisposition against the litigant who suffered such order. Similarly, the fact that the judge had earlier issued an ex-parte mandatory injunction against the complaining litigant and that the same complaining litigant had previously withdrawn unconditionally another suit, are not matters which create a predisposition against the litigant who suffered such order. The presumption of bias drawn from such facts was deprecated. (Rajkot Cancer Society v. Municipal Corporation Rajkot. A.I.R.1988 Guj. 63). My learned brother Pareed Pillay, J. in Industrial C & D.S. Ltd. (Industrial C & D.S. Ltd. v. Andru,1991 (1) K.L.T. 234) laid down that neither suspicion nor the fact that the judge has taken a particular view in a case, is sufficient to transfer other cases, as it may still be open to a lawyer to argue and convince the judge of the acceptability of the another view. The essence of this judgment is that adverse judicial orders cannot legitimately form the foundation of a transfer; for, making such orders is a part of the normal process of judicial determination. Such orders by themselves cannot form the foundation of an accusation of bias. The Lahore High Court, in Khwaja Ahad Shah, (Khwaja Ahad Shah v. MtAyshan Begum, A.I.R.1923 Lahore 564) went a step ahead. In that case the judge, against whom the application for transfer was made, was related to one of the parties. Since the learned judge himself had expressed that he had no desire to keep the case on his file, the High Court held that it would be better for the judge himself "not to be forced to try" the case. The reluctant High Court (Broadway J.) disapproved the application for transfer and observed "the position taken by the petitioner is perhaps a little unnecessary." 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner, who argued tenaciously, relied upon two decisions. I will deal with them at this stage. In T.N. Indrani Devi (Thounaojam Ningol Indrani Devi & The Municipal Board of Imphal, A.I.R.1958 Manipur 27) the trial judge not only rejected the application for amendment of the plaint, but also rejected the plaint under rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as, according to him, the plaint did not disclose a cause of action. The judicial commissioner of Manipur characterised the action of the trial judge as "rather unusual course" and allowed the application for transfer under S.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The judicial commissioner of Manipur characterised the action of the trial judge as "rather unusual course" and allowed the application for transfer under S.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This judgment should be contrasted with the judgment of the same court in Madanlal, (Madanlal v. Babulalagarwala, A.I.R.1962 Manipur 42) delivered four years later. In Indrani Devi, the "rather unusual course" adopted by the trial judge consisted of making judicial orders which may be erroneous but, as the judicial commissioner himself concedes, were made in the honest belief that they were right. This Court, not so long ago, held that adverse judicial orders cannot form the foundation of an application for transfer. (Industrial C & D.S. Ltd. v. Andru,1991 (1) K.L.T. 234) The judgment in Indrani Devi, (Thounsojam Ningol Indrani Devi v. The Municipal Board of Imphal, A.I.R.1958 Manipur 27) is contrary to this principle. Secondly, the trial judge held that the plaint disclosed no cause of action. According to the learned judicial commissioner,' the trial judge was in error because "the point was not either raised by the defendant board or by the other defendants." Now consider the relevant law of Civil Procedure. Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code demands that "the plaint shall be rejected" in the cases set out therein. The provisions in regard to rejection of plaints is mandatory and the court may reject plaint suo mote. (Code of Civil Procedure -D.F.Mulla, page 1048 Twelfth Edition) The view of the judicial commissioner that a plaint cannot be rejected unless the defendant raises such a plea is not in accordance with law. Since this erroneous view of law entered the conclusion of the judicial commissioner on the question of reasonable apprehension, I am unable to agree with the view of the; learned judicial commissioner. Thirdly, the judicial commissioner held that the apprehension of bias was reasonable because the plaintiffs "are nothing but illiterate women belonging to the class of petty cloth sellers." Different classes of people have different notions of bias. But the question cannot be decided on the basis of what sensitive people think about the matter. The fact that the plaintiffs are poor, or illiterate, cannot decide reasonableness of their apprehension. The apprehension which justifies transfer has to be the apprehension of a reasonable man and not of men and women possessing exceptional sensitivity or susceptibility. But the question cannot be decided on the basis of what sensitive people think about the matter. The fact that the plaintiffs are poor, or illiterate, cannot decide reasonableness of their apprehension. The apprehension which justifies transfer has to be the apprehension of a reasonable man and not of men and women possessing exceptional sensitivity or susceptibility. The judgment proceeds on the assumption that erroneous orders, or strict adherence to procedure or an uncommon view or an idiosyncrasy of a judge means bias. In order to suggest, a prepossession of view, against a litigant, much more than such assumption is necessary. In Madanlal (Madanlal v. Babulal Agarwala, A.I.R.1962 Manipur 42) the same court, held that staying execution of money decree or majcing orders on any application cannot constitute bias. 'Madanlal applied the correct test as to "whether a reasonable man would have found anything in the conduct of the judge which would make him apprehend that there was bias "the judgment of Mandanlal which is later than Indrani Devi (Thounaojam Ningollndrani Devi v. The Municipal Board of Imphal, A.I.R.1958 Manipur 27) rejected the assumption that making adverse judicial orders by itself could be the basis of transfer. The view expressed in Madanlal is consistent with this Court's view in Industrial C & D.S. Ltd. (Industrial C&D.S. Ltd. v. Andru,1991 (1) K.L.T. 234) and C.V.Xavier (C.V.Xavier v. JJ.De Chane, 1972 K.L.T. 209). Another judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioner is Lalita Rajya Lakshmi (Lalita Rajya Lakshmi v. State of Bihar, A.I.R.1957 Patna 198) In that case the wife of the judge was a Member of the Congress Party which was then ruling the State. The Minister in-charge of Land Reforms was directly involved in the success of the litigation. The plaintiff in the suit and the Minister concerned Were on inimical terms. The wife of the judge was associated with the Government as a former candidate for elections, member of the Working Committee of the Ranchi District Congress, President of the Mahila Charkha Sangh, President of the Ranchi Municipal Committee and so on. It is against the background of this relationship and the admitted enmity between one of the litigants and the concerned minister with whom the judge's wife was associated, that the transfer was ordered. The facts of this case are altogether different. It is against the background of this relationship and the admitted enmity between one of the litigants and the concerned minister with whom the judge's wife was associated, that the transfer was ordered. The facts of this case are altogether different. The facts obtaining in this case are totally absent, in the case with which lam concerned. Lalita Rajya Lakshmi (Lalita Rajya Lakshmi v. State of Bihar, A.1.R.1957 Patna 198) is wholly inapplicable to this case. 10. In the application of the principles laid down in the judicial decisions, the first thing that needs to be borne in mind is that at the earliest point of time, the learned trial judge had expressed a desire to dispose off the suit expeditiously, (Paragraph No. 3 - Order of the District Judge Kozhikode in O.P.241 of 1991 dated 23rd July, 1991) for the reason, right or wrong, that the chemicals were perishable objects. This concern for the disposal filled the mind of the trial judge and influenced the subsequent course of events. This explains why the trial judge listed the suit for hearing within six months of the filing of the written statement. When the judge granted in term relief to the plaintiff, he could not have been biased - other wide he would not have granted the interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff. Secondly, in March 1991 he granted the plaintiff s application for delisting the suit. Therefore, the learned trial judge, even in March 1991, did nothing which would suggest a prepossession with a view against the plaintiffs cause. A trend of thought in favour of the defendant or against the plaintiff, was not discernible in March 1991. The trial judge had dismissed plaintiff s I.A.No. 903 of 1991 dated 22-2-1991 for discovery of documents. The plaintiffs LA 995 of 1991 for issuing interrogatories was dismissed on 6-3-1991. These orders, adverse to the plaintiff, were made after delisting the suit from the special list or around that time. While delisting the suit on the plaintiffs application, discloses a disposition "favourable" to the plaintiff, the dismissal of LA. 903 of 1991 and 995 of 1991 appears to be "against" the plaintiff. This treatment of the applications made by the plaintiff, reveals an even-handed approach. There is absence of a trend, predisposition or tendency "in favour of or "against" a particular view of the case. 903 of 1991 and 995 of 1991 appears to be "against" the plaintiff. This treatment of the applications made by the plaintiff, reveals an even-handed approach. There is absence of a trend, predisposition or tendency "in favour of or "against" a particular view of the case. These decisions, right or wrong, have to be understood against the concern of the trial court for speedy disposal of the suit, based on a view, about the perishability of chemicals, which, everyone need not share. But the point is that such "speed" or elimination of interim stages which cause delay, do not spell bias or prejudice. If he were biased, the judge would not have delisted the suit, an order which has pleased the plaintiff. A biased judge who is prepossessed with a view against the plaintiff would not have granted I.A996 of 1991 for inspection of defendant's documents which he did on 10-4-1991 after making the two "prejudicial" orders in LA. 903 of 1991 and 995 of 1991. The plaintiff did inspect the defendant's documents on 18th and 19th April 1991. However, the plaintiff s counsel urged that the judge granted hardly two days for inspection, thereby suggesting that the judge wanted to hustle the plaintiff through the trial. According to counsel this course was chosen only because the trial judge did not want the plaintiffs to lead the best evidence. This argument is too far-fetched to commend acceptance. The learned trial judge by a later order did keep the suit in the special list for hearing on 17-6-1991. The plaintiff s second application for delisting the suit is pending. The order listing the suit for early hearing is consistent with the urge to dispose of the suit expeditiously. Lastly there is the order, on LA 1713 of 1991 refusing to summon A Karim. I will assume that A Karim, if he testifies, may advance the plaintiffs case. The address or whereabouts of the witness are not known to the defendant. It may be that the defendant is deliberately withholding his address. A summons of the court cannot be issued to a witness whose address is not known. In the circumstances, the trial judge made the only order that could have been made by any court. It cannot be suggested that summons should have been issued in the name of a person without stating where it, is to be served. A summons of the court cannot be issued to a witness whose address is not known. In the circumstances, the trial judge made the only order that could have been made by any court. It cannot be suggested that summons should have been issued in the name of a person without stating where it, is to be served. I am unable to read in this order, a mental disposition against the plaintiff. 11. In paragraph 10,1 have referred to the orders of the learned trial judge as "against" or "in favour" of the plaintiff. This has been done with the sole object of testing the plaintiffs argument that orders of the trial court, reveal a bias. I should not be understood to have held that the "in favour" or "against" character of any judicial order, is relevant in cases of this nature. An order against the plaintiff may be as impartial and unbiased as an order in his favour. 12. The listing of the suit for early hearing, proceeded from considerations of speedy disposal of the case. The orders on the application for discovery, and inspection of documents or for issue of summons which the learned judge made, are made every day. On the principles laid down in Ratanlal, (Ratanlal v. Suresh Kumar, A.I.R.1987 M.P.178) Rajkot Cancer Society (Rajkot Cancer Society v. Municipal Corporation Rajkot, A.I.R.1988 Guj. 63) and Industrial C & D.S. Ltd. (Industrial C & D.S. Ltd. v. Andru,1991 (1) K.L.T. 234) such judicial orders cannot form the foundation of an application for transfer under S.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The partout consideration in all applications for transfer under S.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is the interest of justice. There are litigants who by their hypersensitivity, intolerance of every adverse order, or advice of well-wishers, make accusations of bias against judges. But as the Supreme Court (Dr.Subramaniam Swamy v. Ramakrishna Hegde, A.I.R.1990 S.C.113) has laid down, in order to warrant transfer of a case there must be something more compelling, from the point of view of public justice. In the instant case all that the plaintiff complains of is judicial orders which did not please him. The orders may cause temporary inconvenience or upset the plaintiffs expectations about the course of events. But the "apprehension" is fanciful and unrelated to the realities of judicial procedures. In the instant case all that the plaintiff complains of is judicial orders which did not please him. The orders may cause temporary inconvenience or upset the plaintiffs expectations about the course of events. But the "apprehension" is fanciful and unrelated to the realities of judicial procedures. If making of judicial orders, is permitted to be a ground for transfer, no court can function, for fear of such applications for transfer. That is why judicial decisions frown upon allegations of bias, based on past (Rajkot Cancer Society v. Municipal Corporation Rajkot, A.I.R.1988 Guj.63) or present (Ratanlal v. Suresh Kumar, A.I.R.1987 M.P.178) orders, anticipation of orders, (lindustrylal C & D.S. Ltd.) or expression of tentative opinions by judges. (C.V. Xavier v. J.J.De Chane, 1972 K.L.T. 209) The principles emerging from the various judicial decisions do not justify transfer of the suit in this case. On the contrary, the teachings of the decisions referred to in paragraphs 6-9 above, strongly disapprove such transfer. 13. On the facts of this case and having regard to the principles set down by the judicial authorities cited hereinbefore, there is nothing to give rise to any apprehension that the plaintiff may not receive justice from the trial judge. 14. The petition is dismissed with costs.