N. Y. HANUMANTHAPPA, J. ( 1 ) SINCE the facts and the points of law involved in both the appeals are common, both the appeals are clubbed together and disposed of by a common Judgment. The parties are referred to as the 'management' and the 'workman' in this Judgment. ( 2 ) THE order under challenge in both the appeals is the one passed by the learned Single Judge on 19-7-1989 in Writ Petition No. 1480 of 1986. Writ Appeal No. 1961 of 1989 was filed by the Management challenging the correctness of the order passed by the learned Single Judge who had agreed with the order of the Industrial tribunal, Bangalore, rejecting the application filed by the Management under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act for approval of the order of dismissal of the Workman. Whereas, Writ Appeal No. 77 of 1990 filed by the Workman challenging the correctness of the liberty given by the learned Single Judge to the management to take such action against the Workman from the stage at which the illegality has crept into the enquiry proceedings. ( 3 ) A few facts which are necessary to dispose of both the appeals are as follows: The Workman was an employee of the Management. He was working in Design complex which is a part of the Management. The Management was engaged in the manufacture of Aeroplanes and Aero-engines. It was also engaged in overhauling of aircrafts. The Workman was served with a charge-sheet dated 26/29-10-1984 wherein the Management had alleged certain acts of misconduct as per Annexure 'a' which is extracted below:"hindustan Aeronautics Limited post Bag No. 1789, Bangalore-17. D/bdpe/pfr/365/84 October 26/19,1984. On a perusal of your personal records, it is seen that in the 2 Attestation forms dt. 22-4-1984 submitted by you, you had indicated 'no' to the specific question under col. 12 (i) (a), viz. , "have you ever been arrested? and col. 12 (i) (b) "have you ever been prosecuted? Since the 2 copies of the Attestation forms submitted by you were signed by 2 different Gazetted Officers, you were asked on 23-7-84 i. e. the day of your appointment to submit a new set of 2 attestation Forms both signed by the same Gazetted Officer. and col. 12 (i) (b) "have you ever been prosecuted? Since the 2 copies of the Attestation forms submitted by you were signed by 2 different Gazetted Officers, you were asked on 23-7-84 i. e. the day of your appointment to submit a new set of 2 attestation Forms both signed by the same Gazetted Officer. Accordingly, you submitted a set of Attestation Forms on 2-8-1984 wherein you have mentioned 'yes' to the questions specified under columns 12 (i) (a) and 12 (i) (b) as above, giving the particulars of a case which was tried in the Court of law against you and subsequently acquitted. Consequently, you were advised to submit copies of the Judgment of the relevant Courts. Accordingly, you submitted certified copies of the Judgments in the Court of Additional City Civil and Sessions judge, Civil Station, Bangalore, dated 4-8-1981 and the High Court of karnataka, Bangalore, dated 14-7-1983. In the copies of the Judgments submitted by you, it was noticed that during 1980 when you were arrested, you were employed in a factory called Technopack Engineering Co. , situated in the industrial Estate, Rajajinagar, Bangalore. However, in your application for employment dated 23-7-1984, under the column 'details of experience', you had stated that you had not worked anywhere. You had also not mentioned about your employment with the said firm in the Attestation Forms which clearly shows that you have deliberately suppressed the information regarding the court case against you as also your previous employment. Your above acts constitute misconduct under Clause 25 (2) viz. , " breach of trust or dishonesty in connection with the employer's business or property; 25 (8) viz. , "breach of Standing Orders or Rules or any law applicable to the establishment" and 25 (33) viz. , "wilfully making false declaration regarding age, qualification and experience in the application for appointment. . . " of the hal Standing Orders for which you are liable for disciplinary action. You are, therefore, hereby required to submit your written explanation and show cause as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against you for your above mentioned misconduct on or before 2-11-1984 failing which further action in the matter will be taken against you. Sd/- v. F. Angre, '. Chief Engineer, helicopter Design Bureau. You are, therefore, hereby required to submit your written explanation and show cause as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against you for your above mentioned misconduct on or before 2-11-1984 failing which further action in the matter will be taken against you. Sd/- v. F. Angre, '. Chief Engineer, helicopter Design Bureau. "pursuant to Annexure A the Workman submitted his explanation at Annexure B which is extracted herein:"k. Shanmugam, 8554/65729-14, fitter General-B, helicopter Design Bureau, design Complex. To: the Chief Manager, helicopter Design Bureau, h. A. L. , bangalore-17. Sir, through Proper Channel sub: Explanation sought for. Ref: Your Memo No. D/hdpe/per/365/84, dated 26/29-10-1984. I had submitted Attestation Forms dated 24-4-1984 and in the same I had stated 'no' to questions under columns 12 (l) (a) and 12 (1) (b) due to an erroneous impression, as I was acquitted of the charge levelled against me by the hon'ble Sessions Court, Bangalore. However, I myself voluntarily stated 'yes' to the same questions when I submitted another set of Attestation Forms on 23-7-1984. When I submitted the first set of Attestation Forms, I had not consulted anyone and I myself filled up the same and as I had been acquitted, I was under the impression that I need not disclose the arrest etc. The fact that I myself corrected the said mistake voluntarily in the second set of Attestation Forms may kindly taken into account and the matter be treated leniently. As regards column "details of experience" I had stated that I had not worked anywhere as I was working on daily wages as casual worker and after my acquittal the said firm did not take me back to work and also did not give me any experience certificate, hence as I was unable to produce any certificate, I had not mentioned about the same in my Attestation Forms. Wherefore, I most humbly pray that in view of the submission made above, the matter may kindly be viewed leniently and in future I will be careful and not repeat the same. The mistake is due to my ignorance and not deliberate and I may be excused this time and for which act of kindness, I shall remain ever grateful Sir. With respectful regards, bangalore, Yours faithfully, dt. 15-11-1984. K. Shanmugam. "not being satisfied with the explanation submitted by the Workman, the management initiated enquiry proceedings. The mistake is due to my ignorance and not deliberate and I may be excused this time and for which act of kindness, I shall remain ever grateful Sir. With respectful regards, bangalore, Yours faithfully, dt. 15-11-1984. K. Shanmugam. "not being satisfied with the explanation submitted by the Workman, the management initiated enquiry proceedings. In the course of the enquiry proceedings, the Workman stated as follows:"statement of Shri E. Shanmugam, B. No. 8324/65729-14, charge-sheeted workman. I have already brought the circumstances under which I could not mention about my acquittal in the Court and my previous experience with a private firm. I wish to state before the Committee that I had no intention of suppressing facts as is borne by my declaration in the second set of Attestation Forms about my acquittal by the Court and my employment on a daily wage basis. I also wish to submit that I was ignorant of the fact that I should have mentioned about my acquittal in a Court as I did not consider it as an important piece of information. I regret for the same. About my previous employment, I again wish to submit to the Management through this committee that I was being paid Rs. 9/- per day and I was working purely in a temporary capacity and I was liable for sending out without any notice which to my mind was no employment at all. Hence I did not feel the necessity of mentioning this piece of information in the first instance, but later on, I have realised my mistake and beg to be excused. I, therefore, plead guilty of the charges and request the Management through this committee to view my lapses in a sympathetic manner as I had no intention of suppressing any facts. Had I done so, it was purely because of my ignorance. In view of the above statement, Enquiry Officer did not feel the necessity of asking the Prosecution to lead the evidence and declared the enquiry as concluded. Sd/- Enquiry Officer Sd/- Srikantaiah co-employee sd/- K. Shanmugam charge-sheeted Workman copy of the proceedings received: sd/- K. Shanmugam, 19-12-1984 findings: sri. K, Shanmugam, the charge-sheeted Workman has admitted the charges in clear terms bringing out the circumstances under which he comitted the acts of misconduct. Sd/- Enquiry Officer Sd/- Srikantaiah co-employee sd/- K. Shanmugam charge-sheeted Workman copy of the proceedings received: sd/- K. Shanmugam, 19-12-1984 findings: sri. K, Shanmugam, the charge-sheeted Workman has admitted the charges in clear terms bringing out the circumstances under which he comitted the acts of misconduct. I, therefore, hold him guilty of charges attracting Clauses 25 (2), 25 (8) and 25 (34) of the certified Standing Orders of the Company. Sd/- S. G. Rajagopal, enquiry Officer and chief Manager 20-12-1984. Departmental Enquiries. "thereafter a second show-cause notice at Annexure-D was issued to the workman informing that the Departmental Enquiry Committee found that the workman was guilty of the acts of misconduct mentioned in the charge-sheet as per the following clauses of Standing Orders of the Company: "i) Clause 25 (2) ". . . . . . breach of trust or dishonesty in connection with employers business or property"; ii) Clause 25 (8) "breach of Standing Orders or Rules or any law applicable to the establishment"; and iii) Clause 25 (34) "wilfully making false declaration regarding age, qualification and experience in the application for employment. . . " the report of the Enquiry Officer was also enclosed with the second show-cause notice. That was replied by the Workman. However, being not satisfied with the explanation given by the Workman, the Management passed an order dated 13-3-1985 at Annexure-F confirming the proposed punishment of dismissal and thus dismissing the Workman from the services of the Management and also informing that, since the dispute is pending before the Industrial Tribunal, an application is made to the Tribunal to accord approval under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes act and a month's wages amounting to Rs. 1,074-40 was paid to him in cash. The said order is extracted hereunder: "hindustan Aeronautics Limited. D/a/gen/2260/85. March 13, 1985. This has reference to your representation dated 28-1-1985 on the proposed punishment of your dismissal from the service of the company, as per letter No. D/hd- PE/per/09/85, dated 19-1-1985. 2. I have carefully considered your representation. Keeping in view the points raised by you, I have once again gone through the proceedings and the findings of the Enquiry. This has reference to your representation dated 28-1-1985 on the proposed punishment of your dismissal from the service of the company, as per letter No. D/hd- PE/per/09/85, dated 19-1-1985. 2. I have carefully considered your representation. Keeping in view the points raised by you, I have once again gone through the proceedings and the findings of the Enquiry. In my analysis and conclusions on the points raised by you in your representation are as follows: i) You have in para 2 of your representation contended that you had brought out the reasons for not disclosing the Court case and about your employment, prior to your appointment in HAL during the course of the Enquiry and have requested for exonerating you from the punishment. I may inform you that the Enquiry Officer has taken into account all these features, before finding you guilty of the charges. 3. Taking into account the gravity of the misconduct and your past record, I do not find any grounds to alter the punishment of dismissal, as proposed in letter No. D/hd-PE/per/09/85, dated 19-1-1985. ( 4 ) I, therefore, hereby confirm the proposed punishment of dismissal and accordingly you are dismissed from the services of the company with immediate effect in terms of the Standing Order No. 27 (a) (vi) of the Standing Orders of the company. ( 5 ) AS a dispute is pending before the Industrial Tribunal, an application is made to the said authority under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and a month's wages amounting to Rs. 1,074-40 is paid to you in cash. Sd/- S. R. Telang, addl. Chief Designer, helicopter Design Bureau, hal Design Complex. " the prayer made by the Management in the application under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, before the Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore, reads as follows: "9. The application prays that this Hon'ble Industrial Tribunal be pleased: a) try the validity if the domestic enquiry as a preliminary issue; and b) In the event of the findings of the preliminary issue being against the applicant, grant an opportunity to the applicant to adduce evidence before the hon'ble Industrial Tribunal. 11. In conclusion, the applicant prays that this Hon'ble Industrial Tribunal be pleased to approve the action taken, i. e. , dismissal of Shri K. Shanmugam from the services of the Company. 11. In conclusion, the applicant prays that this Hon'ble Industrial Tribunal be pleased to approve the action taken, i. e. , dismissal of Shri K. Shanmugam from the services of the Company. " the said application came to be numbered as Serial Application No. 4/85 in I. D. No. 26 of 1978. As soon as the notice was served on the Workman, he appeared before the Industrial Tribunal and filed his statement of objections contending that i) the request made by the Management cannot be granted as the application was not in accordance with Section 33 (2) (b) and (c) of the Industrial Dispute Act ii) the action taken by the Management is not in accordance with the certificate standing Orders of the Management; iii) the order of dismissal was not preceded by a proper enquiry as sufficient opportunity of being heard was given to the Workman; iv) the so-called allegation of suppression of material facts was incorrect, as the Workman did not suppress any material facts and further there was no necessity to disclose about the previous employment as he was working as a casual labourer on a daily wage of Rs. 97-; v) the enquiry was vitiated as the Workman was not provided with the names of the Management witnesses and the documents sought to rely upon by the management; vi) the Workman was not permitted to cross-examine the witnesses of the management; vii) he never admitted before the Enquiry Officer the charges levelled against him, unconditionally; viii) the admission recorded by the Enquiry Officer was an unqualified admission of misconduct alleged against him; ix) the order of dismissal is not a reasonable one and resultant of non-application of mind to the allegations made and the evidence adduced; x) the order of dismissal was passed by an authority not competent as per the standing Orders; and xi) the order of dismissal is quite unwarranted and the same has been passed solely with ulterior motives and to frighten other workmen. Thus the Workman objected for approving the action taken by the Management. 4. Before the Industrial Tribunal the Chief Manager of the Management was examined and in his examination-in-chief he stated as follows: "the charge sheet was explained and read over to him and he has been asked whether he pleads guilty or to be tried. The O. P. has pleaded guilty of the charges levelled against him. 4. Before the Industrial Tribunal the Chief Manager of the Management was examined and in his examination-in-chief he stated as follows: "the charge sheet was explained and read over to him and he has been asked whether he pleads guilty or to be tried. The O. P. has pleaded guilty of the charges levelled against him. Due to that I find no reason to examine the prosecution witnesses, hence I closed the enquiry. Ex. A-3 is the proceedings which also contains my findings. After my report the 2nd show cause notice issued to O. P. as per Ex. A-4. The O. P. has given his explanation as per Ex. A-5. . . " in his cross-examination, the witness stated as follows: "it is not correct to suggest that after the preliminary question the delinquent did not pleaded guilty. It is not correct to suggest that I have wrongly recorded that he was pleaded guilty. . . " 5. On the basis of the material produced, the Tribunal posed for its determination the following points: "1. Whether the applicant have conducted the domestic enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice? 2. Whether the findings of the enquiry officer is in accordance with the materials on record or in other words the findings of the enquiry officer is legally sustainable?" regarding the 1st point, after going through the entire evidence and taking into consideration the fact that the Workman pleaded guilty of the charges and for that reason the Management did not find any reason to examine its witnesses, the: tribunal held that the enquiry was in accordance with the principles of natural justice, as the Workman was not deprived of availing of any opportunity. Regarding the, 2nd point, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the alleged misconduct has not been proved for the following reasons: a) The nature of charges alleged against the Workman appears to be in accordance with the relevant Standing Orders on which the Management propose to rely; b) Clauses 25 (2) and 25 (8) of the Standing Orders are not applicable to the alleged misconduct and only Clause 25 (34) of the Standing Orders has some relevancy to the alleged misconduct; c) Non-furnishing the information regarding experience, age and qualification for appointment does not amount to an act of misconduct so as to bring the case within Clause 25 (34) of the Standing Orders for the reason that showing of experience is always advantageous for getting an employment and non-mention of the same will be to the disadvantage of the applicant and the same cannot be termed as committing an act of misconduct or suppression of the material facts. As the alleged misconduct cannot be connected to Clause 25 (34), the charges framed on the basis of such allegation is quite vague and defective. Except making use of the provision, the Enquiry Officer has not taken into consideration other material to arrive at such a conclusion; d) The finding of the Enquiry Officer was very short and cryptic and thus caused an economic death to the Workman and also attached a stigma for his future livelihood; e) There is no discussion regarding the applicability of Clause 25 (34) to the charges levelled against the Workman and thus the same is in direct contravention of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of anil Kumar v Presiding Officer and Others, AIR 1985 SC 1121 . The relevant portion is extracted hereunder: "where a disciplinary enquiry affects the livelihood and is likely to cast a stigma and it has to be held in accordance with the principles of natural justice, the minimum expectation is that the report must be a reasoned one. The court then may not enter into the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence. But where the evidence is annexed to an order-sheet and no correlation is established between the two showing application of mind, it is not an enquiry report at all. The court then may not enter into the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence. But where the evidence is annexed to an order-sheet and no correlation is established between the two showing application of mind, it is not an enquiry report at all. Therefore, where the Enquiry Officer save setting out the names of the witnesses, did not discuss the evidence and merely recorded his ipse dixit that the charges were proved and did not assign a single reason why the evidence produced by the delinquent did not appeal to him or was considered not credit-worthy, the order of termination of service based on such proceedings was liable to be set aside. " accordingly, the Tribunal held that the findings given are perverse and the order of dismissal is not in consonance with the Standing Orders. Thus, the Tribunal refused to accord the approval as requested in the application filed under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ( 6 ) AGGRIEVED by the order of the Industrial Tribunal, the Management filed Writ Petition No. 1480 of 1986 in this Court. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition for the following reasons: i) Though the Workman admitted the charges, what he admitted comes only under Clause 25 (34) of the Standing Orders and Clauses 25 (2) and 25 (8) of the standing Orders have no application to the facts of the case; ii) There is no evidence that the Workman had suppressed wilfully the material facts while seeking employment; iii) Whether the so-called admission was made wilfully or out of ignorance was not considered by any of the authorities; iv) The orders made by the authorities are perverse as the authorities applied all the three sub-clauses of Clause 25 of the Standing Orders and made the order without applying their mind independently to each of the charges coming under the standing Orders. For the above reasons, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, however, ordering that it is open to the Management to take such action from the stage at which the illegality has crept into the proceedings. For the above reasons, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, however, ordering that it is open to the Management to take such action from the stage at which the illegality has crept into the proceedings. ( 7 ) AGGRIEVED by the order of the learned Single Judge confirming the order of the Industrial Tribunal refusing to accord approval under Section 33 (2) (b) of the industrial Disputes Act, the Management preferred Writ Appeal No. 1961 of 1989 contending that the learned Single Judge as well as the Tribunal was not right in rejecting the request of the Management for approval, when, in fact, the Workman himself had admitted the guilt alleged against him. Secondly, the admission in respect of one of the charges is sufficient to connect the case, when it is notified by the learned Single Judge and the Tribunal that the Workman had committed an act of misconduct as mentioned under Clause 25 (34) of the Standing Orders and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Industrial Tribunal are not right in rejecting the request of the Management for approval for dismissal from service. Thirdly, when the learned Single Judge held that the findings given by the authorities are perverse, the matter should have been remanded for re-consideration instead of straight away rejecting the application for according approval for dismissal. Fourthly, Clause 25 (34) of the Standing Orders itself is sufficient to warrant the order of dismissal. Since there is no application of mind by the learned Single Judge on the grounds mentioned above, the learned counsel for the Management submits that, if it is felt proper, the matter may be remanded for re-consideration. ( 8 ) WHEREAS Writ Appeal Np. 77 of 1990 filed by the Workman contending that when the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the order of dismissal is the result of non-application of mind to Clause 25 (34) of the Standing Orders, he should have simply confirmed the order of the Industrial Tribunal and should not have reserved liberty to the Management to take action from the stage at which the illegality has crept into the enquiry proceedings. ( 9 ) SRI K. Subba Rao, learned counsel for the Workman in both the writ appeals, submits that the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal rejecting the application for approval under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act is quite correct. According to him, the entire enquiry was vitiated by not giving opportunity of being heard to the Workman. The so-called acceptance of the guilt should not have been made much about. The order of dismissal passed by the authorities concerned is not in consonance with Clause 25 (34) of the Standing Orders. In the charge-sheet what was mentioned was only Clauses 25 (2) and 25 (8) and not 25 (34) of the Standing orders and the Workman being an illiterate and ignorant person was not aware of the consequences of furnishing incorrect information while seeking appointment, the earlier employment and the prosecution of the Workman were not of such an importance, as the case foisted against him ended in acquittal. To connect a workman to the alleged misconduct, such a misconduct shall be defined and enumerated in the Standing Orders. The so-called misconduct referred to relied upon by the Management against the Workman is not applicable to the case of the workman. According to Mm, it is incorrect to inflict the punishment merely because the employer believed that the allegations made amount to misconduct ex post facto. Since the finding of the Enquiry Officer based on no evidence, the disciplinary authority should have rejected the same as perverse, instead of passing an order of dismissal. Lastly, Sri Subba Rao contended that the order of dismissal is quite harsh, unwarranted and resultant of non-application of mind particularly when the charges levelled against the Workman were quite vague and not definite. In support of his contention, he relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in m/s. Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut and others, AIR 1984 SC 505 . The relevant paragraphs read as follows: "12. In the days of laissez-faire when industrial relation was governed by the harsh weighted law of hire and fire the management was the supreme master, the relationship being referable to contract between unequals and the action of the management treated almost sacrosanct. The relevant paragraphs read as follows: "12. In the days of laissez-faire when industrial relation was governed by the harsh weighted law of hire and fire the management was the supreme master, the relationship being referable to contract between unequals and the action of the management treated almost sacrosanct. The developing notions of social justice and the expanding horizon of socio economic justice necessitated statutory protection to the unequal partner in the industry namely, those who invest blood and flesh against those who bring in capital. Moving from the days when whim of the employer was supreme lex, the Act took a modest step to compel by statute the employer to prescribe minimum conditions of service subject to which employment is given. The Act was enacted as its long title shows to require employers in industrial establishments to define with sufficient precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the said conditions known to workmen employed by them. The movement was from status to contract, the contract being not left to be negotiated by two unequal persons but statutorily imposed. If this socially beneficial act was enacted for ameliorating the conditions of the weaker partner, conditions of service prescribed thereunder must receive such interpretation as to advance the intendment underlying the Act and defeat the mischief. 13. After reading Clause 10, Mr. Shanti Bhushan contended that the expression 'committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof can qualify only the expression 'any act subversive of discipline and efficiency and any act involving moral turpitude' but not the earlier portion of the clause. Numerous acts of misconduct have been collocated in Clause 10 such as drunkenness, fighting, indecent or disorderly behaviour, use of abusive language, wrongfully interfering with the work of other employees etc. Says Mr. Shanti Bhushan that these acts of misconduct are per se misconducts that each one of them cannot have any correlation to the time or place where it is committed and each one of them is an act of misconduct irrespective of the time and place where it is committed. Says Mr. Shanti Bhushan that these acts of misconduct are per se misconducts that each one of them cannot have any correlation to the time or place where it is committed and each one of them is an act of misconduct irrespective of the time and place where it is committed. Expanding the submission, it was urged that drunkenness is such a socially reprehensible action that if it is committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof or anywhere else at any point of time it would nonetheless be an act of misconduct comprehended in clause 10 and punishable under Standing Order 23. If this construction were even to be accepted, the employer will have more power than the almighty State because State chooses to punish drunkenness in public place. But on the construction canvassed for if a man consumes liquor in his own house with the doors closed and gets drunk, the employer can still fire him. If a man uses abusive language towards his close relation in his own house with closed door, the employer would be entitled to fire him, and this approach overlooks the purpose of prescribing conditions of service by a statute. To enable an employer to peacefully carry on his industrial activity, the Act confers powers on him to prescribe conditions of service including enumerating acts of misconduct when committed within the premises of the establishment. The employer has hardly any extra-territorial jurisdiction. He is not the custodian of general law and order situation nor the Guru or mentor of his workmen for their well regulated cultural advancement. If the power to regulate the behaviour of the Workmen outside the duty hours and at any place wherever they may be was conferred upon the employer, contract of service may be reduced to contract of slavery. The employer is entitled to prescribe conditions of service more or less specifying the acts of misconduct to be enforced within the premises where the workmen gather together for rendering service. The employer has both power and jurisdiction to regulate the behaviour of workmen within the premises of the establishment, or for peacefully carrying the industrial activity in the vicinity of the establishment. The employer has both power and jurisdiction to regulate the behaviour of workmen within the premises of the establishment, or for peacefully carrying the industrial activity in the vicinity of the establishment. When the broad purpose for conferring power on the employer to prescribe acts of misconduct that may be committed by his workmen is kept in view, it is not difficult to ascertain whether the expression 'committed' within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof would qualify each and every act of misconduct collocated in Clause 10 or the last two only, namely, 'any act subversive of discipline and efficiency and any act involving moral turpitude'. To buttress this conclusion, one illustration would suffice. Drunkenness even from the point of view of prohibitionist can at best be said to be an act involving moral turpitude. If the misconduct alleging drunkenness as an act involving moral turpitude is charged, it would have to be shown that it was committed within the premises of the establishment or vicinity thereof but if the misconduct charged would be drunkenness, the limitation of its being committed within the premises of the establishment can be disregarded. This makes no sense. And it may be remembered that the power to prescribe conditions of service is not unilateral but the workmen have right to object and to be heard and a statutory authority namely, Certifying Officer has to certify the same. Therefore, keeping in view the larger objective sought to be achieved by prescribing conditions of employment in certified Standing Orders, the only construction one can put on Clause 10 is that the various acts of misconduct therein set out would misconduct for the purpose of Standing Order 22 punishable under Standing Order 23, if committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof. XXX XXX XXX 23. It was next contended that while misconduct is enumerated in S. O. 22, the punishment is prescribed in S. O. 23, and the expression 'misconduct' in S. O. 23 would comprehend any misconduct irrespective of the fact whether it is enumerated in S. O. 22 or not. The preamble of S. O. 23 reads as under; " 23 (a) Any Workman who is adjudged by the manager on examination of the Workman, if present, and of the facts to be guilty of misconduct is liable to be. . . . . The preamble of S. O. 23 reads as under; " 23 (a) Any Workman who is adjudged by the manager on examination of the Workman, if present, and of the facts to be guilty of misconduct is liable to be. . . . . ' the submission is that the expression 'misconduct' under S. O. 23 is not qualified as the one set out in S. O. 22 and, therefore, any other act of omission or commission which would perse be misconduct would be punishable under S. O. 23 irrespective of the fact whether it finds its enumeration in S. O. 22. The Act makes it obligatory to frame Standing Orders and get them certified. Section 3 (2) requires the employers in an industrial establishment while preparing draft Standing orders to make provision in such draft for every matter set out in the schedule which may be applicable to the industrial establishment, and where model Standing Orders have been prescribed, shall be, so far as is practicable, in conformity with such model. Item 9 of the Schedule provides 'suspension or dismissal for misconduct, and acts or omissions which constitute misconduct'. It is, therefore, obligatory upon the employer to draw up with precision those acts of omission and commission which in his industrial establishment would constitute misconduct. Penalty is imposed for misconduct. The workmen must, therefore, now in advance which act of omission would constitute misconduct as to be visited with penalty. The statutory obligation is to prescribe with precision in the standing Order all those acts of omission or commission which would constitute misconduct. In the face of the statutory provision it would be difficult to entertain the submission that some other act of omission which may be misconduct though not provided for in the Standing Order would be punishable under standing Order 23, Upon a harmonious construction, the expression 'misconduct' in S. O. 23 must refer to those acts of omission or commission which constitute misconduct as enumerated in Standing Order 22 and none else. However, in this connection, Mr. Shanti Bhushan drew our attention to Mahendra singh Dhantwal v Hindustan Motors Ltd. , AIR 1976 SC 2062 . In that case in a second round of litigation between the parties the Industrial Tribunal set aside the order of dismissal of the workmen and ordered reinstatement with full back wages. However, in this connection, Mr. Shanti Bhushan drew our attention to Mahendra singh Dhantwal v Hindustan Motors Ltd. , AIR 1976 SC 2062 . In that case in a second round of litigation between the parties the Industrial Tribunal set aside the order of dismissal of the workmen and ordered reinstatement with full back wages. In a writ petition filed by the Company under Article 226 of the Constitution, a learned Single Judge of the High Court declined to interfere with the award holding that 'the reason might have been the old reason of dismissal' and that the 'circumstances relied on by the Tribunal cannot be characterised as unreasonable'. The Company carried the matter to the Division Bench of the high Court which accepted the appeal observing that unless contravention of section 23 of the Industrial Disputes Act is established, the Industrial Tribunal would have no jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 33-A. In terms it was held that unless it is established that there has been discharge for misconduct, the Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of termination in an application under Section 33-A. In the appeal by certificate granted by the High Court, the Workman contended that Section 33 may be contravened in varieties of ways and the only question that needs to be examined is whether there was a contravention by the employer in that it did not make any application to the Tribunal for the approval of the order of termination of service of the Workman. It is in this context that while allowing the appeal of the workman this Court observed as under (Part 23):"standing orders of a company only describe certain cases of misconduct and the same cannot be exhaustive of all the species of misconduct which a workman may commit. Eventhough a given conduct may not come within the specific terms of misconduct described in the Standing Orders, it may still be a misconduct, in the special facts of a case, which it may not be possible to condone and for which the employer may take appropriate action. Ordinarily, the Standing Orders may limit the concept but not invariably so. "relying on these observations, Mr. Shanti Bhushan urged that this Court has in terms held that there can be some other misconduct not enumerated in the standing Order and for which the employer may lake appropriate action. Ordinarily, the Standing Orders may limit the concept but not invariably so. "relying on these observations, Mr. Shanti Bhushan urged that this Court has in terms held that there can be some other misconduct not enumerated in the standing Order and for which the employer may lake appropriate action. This observation cannot be viewed divorced from the facts of the case. What stared in the face of the Court in that case was that the employer had raised a technical objection ignoring the past history of litigation between the parties that application under Section 33-A was not maintainable. It is in this context that might have been the outcome of some misorder. But the extracted observation cannot be elevated to a proposition of law that some misconduct neither defined nor enumerated and which may be believed by the employer to be misconduct ex post facto would expose the Workman to a penalty. The law will have to move two centuries backward to accept such a construction. But it is not necessary to go so far because in Salem Erode Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v Their employees Union, (1966)2 SCR 498 : AIR 1966 SC 808 , this Court in terms held that the object underlying the Act was to introduce uniformity of terms and conditions of employment in respect of workmen belonging to the same category and discharging the same or similar work under an industrial establishment, and that these terms and conditions of industrial employment should be well established and should be known to the employees before they accept the employment. If such is the object, no vague undefined notion about any act may be innocuous which from the employer's point of view may be misconduct but not provided for in the Standing Order for which a penalty can be imposed, cannot be incorporated in the Standing Orders. From certainty of conditions of employment, we would have to return to the days of hire and fire which reverse movement is hardly justified. In this connection, we may also refer to Western india Match Company Ltd. v Workmen, (1974)1 SCR 433 : AIR 1973 SC 2650 , in which this Court held that any condition of service if inconsistent with certified standing Orders, the same would not prevail and the certified Standing Orders would have precedence over all such agreements. In this connection, we may also refer to Western india Match Company Ltd. v Workmen, (1974)1 SCR 433 : AIR 1973 SC 2650 , in which this Court held that any condition of service if inconsistent with certified standing Orders, the same would not prevail and the certified Standing Orders would have precedence over all such agreements. There is really one interesting observation in this case which deserves noticing. Says the Court (at p. 2653 of air 1973): 'in the sunny days of the market economy theory people sincerely believed that the economic law of demand and supply in the labour market would settle a mutually beneficial bargain between the employer and the Workman. Such a bargain, they took it for granted, would secure fair terms and conditions of employment to the Workman. This law they venerated as natural law. They had an abiding faith in the verity of this law. But the experience of the working of this law over a long period has belied their faith. ' lastly we may refer to Workmen of Lakheri Cement Works Ltd. v Associated Cement companies Ltd. , (1970)20 Fac. LR 243. This Court repelled the contention that the Act must prescribe the minimum which has to be prescribed in an industrial establishment, but it does not exclude the extension otherwise. Relying upon the earlier decision of this Court in Rohtak and Hissar District Electricity supply Co. Ltd. v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 1471 , the Court held that everything which is required to be prescribed has to be prescribed with precision and no argument can be entertained that something not prescribed can yet be taken into account as varying what is prescribed. In short it cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say ex post facto that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant Standing Order is nonetheless a misconduct not strictly falling within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant Standing Order but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty. Accordingly, the contention of Mr, Shanti Bhushan that some other act of misconduct which would per se be an act of misconduct though not enumerated in S. O. 22 can be punished under S. O. 23 must be rejected. Accordingly, the contention of Mr, Shanti Bhushan that some other act of misconduct which would per se be an act of misconduct though not enumerated in S. O. 22 can be punished under S. O. 23 must be rejected. " apart from the decision referred to by the Industrial Tribunal in Anil Kumar's case, air 1985 SC 1121 , the relevant portion of which is extracted above, Sri. Subba Rao relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajinder Kumar Kindra v Delhi administration through Secretary (Labour) and Others, AIR 1984 SC 1805 . The supreme Court held thus:"16. Mr. Jain contended that once Mr. Kakkar came to the conclusion that the appellant was given full opportunity to participate in the domestic enquiry neither High Court under Article 226 nor this Court under Article 136 can sit in appeal over the findings of the enquiry officer and reappraise the evidence. We have not at all attempted to reappreciate the evidence though in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 both arbitrator and this Court can reappraise the evidence led in the domestic enquiry and satisfy itself whether the evidence let by the employer established misconduct against the Workman. It is too late in the day to contend that the arbitrator has only the power to decide whether the conclusions reached by the enquiry officer were plausible one deducible from the evidence led in the enquiry and not to reappreciate the evidence itself and to reach the conclusion whether the misconduct alleged against the Workman has been established or not. This Court in Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. v Management, (1973)3 SCR 587 : AIR 1973 SC 1227 , held that since the introduction of Section 11-A in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Industrial tribunal is now equipped with the powers to reappraise the evidence in the domestic enquiry and satisfy itself whether the said evidence relied upon by the employer establishes the misconduct alleged against the Workman. It is equally well settled that the arbitrator appointed under Section 10-A is comprehended in Section 11-A. This Court in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v Gujarat Steel Tubes mazdoor Sabha, (1980)2 SCR 146 : AIR 1980 SC 1896 , held that an arbitrator appointed under Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is comprehended in Section 11-A and the arbitratal reference apart from Section 11-A is plenary in scope. Therefore, it would be within the jurisdiction both of the arbitrator as well as this Court to reappreciate the evidence though it is not necessary to do so in this case. . It is thus well settled that where the findings of misconduct are based on no legal evidence and the conclusion is one to which no reasonable man would come, the arbitrator appointed under Section 10-A or this Court in appeal under Article 136 can reject such findings as perverse. Holding that the findings are perverse does not constitute reappraisal of evidence, though we would have been perfectly justified in exercise of powers conferred by Section 11-A to do so. 17, It is equally well Settled that where a quasi judicial Tribunal or arbitrator records findings based on no legal evidence and the findings are either his ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional informity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated. The industrial Tribunal or the arbitrator or a quasi-judicial authority can reject not only such findings but also the conclusion based on no legal evidence or if it is merely based on surmises and conjectures unrelated to evidence on the ground that they disclose total non-application of mind. Viewed from either angle, the conclusion of the enquiry officer as well as of the arbitrator Mr. Kakkar are wholly perverse and hence unsustainable. The High Court, in our opinion, was clearly in error in declining to examine the contention that the findings were perverse on the short, specious and wholly untenable ground that the matter depends on appraisal of evidence. "18. Between appraisal of evidence and total lack of evidence there is an appreciable difference which could never be lost sight of and the High Court ought not to have short circuited the writ petition. 19. "18. Between appraisal of evidence and total lack of evidence there is an appreciable difference which could never be lost sight of and the High Court ought not to have short circuited the writ petition. 19. If there is absolutely no evidence in support of the only allegation of misconduct namely negligence in not keeping one's private cheque book in safe custody, the conclusion is not only not a plausible one but it is wholly perverse and we are in complete agreement with findings recorded by Mr. G. C. Jain that the findings of enquiry officer were perverse and the enquiry was wholly vitiated. 20. Where the order of dismissal is sought to be sustained on a finding in the domestic enquiry which is shown to be perverse and the enquiry is vitiated as suffering from non-application of mind the only course open to us is to set it aside and consequently relief of reinstatement must be granted and nothing was pointed to us why we should not grant the same. "the other decision on which Sri Subba Rao relied upon is Rasik lal Vaghaji bhai Patel v Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and Another, AIR 1985 SC 504 , the relevant paragraph of which read as follows: "1. Petitioner is shown to be guilty of suppression of a material fact which would weigh with any employer in giving him employment and therefore, the case of the petitioner does not merit consideration under Article 136 of the constitution and his petition for special leave to appeal against the decision of a division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Special Application No. 4649 of 1981, dated November 28, 1983 must accordingly fail but this short epistle became a compelling necessity in view of the statement of law appearing in the judgment of the High Court which if permitted to go uncorrected, some innocent person may suffer in future. That is the only justification for this short order. 4. The High Court while dismissing the petition held that even if the allegation of misconduct does not constitute misconduct amongst those enumerated in the relevant service regulations yet the employer can attribute what would otherwise per se be a misconduct though not enumerated and punish him for the same. This proposition appears to us to be startling because eventhough either under the Certified Standing Orders or service regulations. This proposition appears to us to be startling because eventhough either under the Certified Standing Orders or service regulations. It is necessary for the employer to prescribe what would be the misconduct so that the Workman/employee knows the pitfall he should guard against. If after undergoing the elaborate exercise of enumerating misconduct, it is left to the unbridled discretion of the employer to dub any conduct as misconduct, the workman will be on tenterhooks and he will be punished by ex post facto determination by the employer. It is a well-settled cannon of penal jurisprudence that remover or dismissal from service on account of the misconduct constitutes penalty in law that the workmen sought to be charged for misconduct must have adequate advance notice of what action or what conduct would constitute misconduct. The legal proposition as stated by the high Court would have necessitated in depth examination, but for a recent decision of this Court in Glaxo Laboratories v Presiding Officer, Labour Court, meerut, (1984)1 SCR 230 : A]r 1984 SC 505 in which this Court specifically repelled an identical contention advanced by Mr. Shanti Bhushan learned counsel who appeared for the employer in that case observing as under (at pp. 514-515 of AIR 1984 SC): it is thus well-settled that unless either in the Certified Standing Order or in the service regulations an act or omission is prescribed as misconduct, it is not open to the employer to fish out some conduct as misconduct and punish the workman eventhough the alleged misconduct would not be comprehended in any of the enumerated misconduct. " contending so, Sri Subba Rao, learned counsel for the Workman, submits that the appeal filed by the Management be dismissed an the appeal filed by the Workman be allowed on the ground that, when it is observed that the entire enquiry was vitiated for non-compliance with the principles of natural justice, the misconduct and the Standing Orders are vague and undefined and the order of dismissal is the resultant of non-application of mind to the relevant Standing Orders, the learned single Judge should have accepted the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal in toto without reserving liberty to the Management to proceed afresh, if it so desires, from the stage at which the illegality has crept into the enquiry proceedings. ( 10 ) THE arguments of Sri Gururajan, learned counsel for the Management, are to the effect that both the learned Single Judge and the Industrial Tribunal were not justified in refusing to accord approval for dismissal under Section 33 (2) (b) of the industrial Disputes Act for the reasons as made out in the memorandum of Writ appeal No. 1961 of 1989. ( 11 ) AFTER hearing both sides and going through the pleadings and other material made available before us, the point that arises for consideration is: whether the learned Single Judge and the Industrial Tribunal are justified in holding that the punishment imposed on the Workman is in consonance with Clause 25 of the Standing Orders of the Management on the ground that the charges framed are vague and indefinite and the order of dismissal is the resultant of non-application of mind to the relevant factors? ( 12 ) IT is true that, when a request is made to accord approval under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Management shall establish, as held by the Supreme Court in Lord Krishna Textile Mills v Its Workmen, 1961 (1) LLJ 211 and subsequently reiterated by the Supreme Court in State Bank of Bikaner v Balal chander Sen, 1963 (2) LLJ 657 , that before granting approval for dismissal the authority has to satisfy that (i) the Standing Orders justify the order of dismissal, (ii) the enquiry has been held as provided by the Standing Orders and (iii) the other conditions provided in the proviso to Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes act have been complied with. The Supreme Court also observed that, when the management had complied with the above requirements, the authority is bound to accord approval to the action taken by the Management. The authority cannot withhold the approval on some technical grounds, viz. , whether the dismissal cannot be attributed to mala fide and unfair labour practice or the same is too severe. Further, the act of misconduct forming the basis of the punishment of dismissal should fall within the act of misconduct defined in the Standing Orders. The authority cannot withhold the approval on some technical grounds, viz. , whether the dismissal cannot be attributed to mala fide and unfair labour practice or the same is too severe. Further, the act of misconduct forming the basis of the punishment of dismissal should fall within the act of misconduct defined in the Standing Orders. It is the duty of the Tribunal, when an application is filed under Section 33 (2) (b), to see whether there is compliance with the Standing Orders and the Standing Orders have been strictly adhered to and also that there is careful application of mind explaining each of the relevant factors before arriving at a conclusion. Further, application of mind shall be revealed in the order itself that means the order shall be a reasoned one particularly when it relates to dismissal of an employee. The power of the Tribunal regarding its interference with the order passed pursuant to the domestic enquiry is clearly explained by the Supreme Court in The East India Hotels v Their Workmen and Others, AIR 1974 SC 696 , wherein it is held thus: this appeal is by special leave against the award of the Tribunal. It is not denied that the Tribunal was in error in applying Section 11-A of the Act to this case, because the complaint, the enquiry, the report and the reference were all prior to the coming into operation of this section on December 15, 1971. This court held in Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. v the Management, (1973) 1 Lab. L J. 278 : AIR 1973 SC 1227 , that Section 11-A has no retrospective operation as it not only deals with procedural matters, but also has the effect of altering the law laid down by this Court in this respect by abridging the rights of the employer inasmuch as it gives power to the Tribunal for the first time to differ both on a finding of misconduct arrived at by an employer as well as with the punishment imposed by it. In the undoubted exercise of the rights of the employer to take disciplinary action, and to decide upon the quantum of punishment, both of which are part of the managerial functions, what has to be seen is whether the employer before imposing the punishment had conducted a proper enquiry in accordance with the provisions of the Standing Orders, if applicable, and principles of natural justice. When a proper enquiry has been held by an employer and the finding of misconduct has support from the evidence adduced at the said enquiry, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in Judgment over the decision of the employer as an appellate body. The interference with the decision of the employer will be justified when the enquiry is unfair or the findings arrived at in the enquiry are perverse or have no basis in evidence or the management is guilty of victimisation, unfair labour practice or mala fide or the punishment is harsh and oppressive. The Tribunal cannot, therefore, reappraise the evidence and arrive at a conclusion different from that arrived at by the domestic Tribunal. Even if no enquiry has been held by an employer or if the enquiry held by him is found to be defective, the tribunal in order to satisfy itself about the legality and validity of the order, has to give an opportunity to the employer and employee to adduce evidence before it. It is open to the employer to adduce evidence for the first time justifying his action; and it is open to the employee to adduce evidence contra. Once misconduct is proved, either in the enquiry conducted by the employer or by the evidence placed before the Tribunal for the first time, the punishment imposed cannot be interfered with by the Tribunal except in cases where the punishment is harsh and oppressive. This is not a case where no enquiry has been held nor it is a case where either side had not adduced evidence before the Tribunal. What the Tribunal had to see is whether the enquiry is vitiated by any of the grounds referred to by us. Admittedly, no such grounds exist in this case. Nothing was stated as to in what respect the enquiry was defective. What the Tribunal had to see is whether the enquiry is vitiated by any of the grounds referred to by us. Admittedly, no such grounds exist in this case. Nothing was stated as to in what respect the enquiry was defective. On the other hand, the tribunal proceeded on the basis that the enquiry was not vitiated, but it had power under Section 11-A to arrive at a different conclusion and award a different punishment. That apart, even the evidence justified the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer. " ( 13 ) IT is nobody's case that a punishment can be inflicted even the charges arevague and in definite, the material relied upon by the Management were not supplied to the Workman and the misconduct alleged was not enumerated in all the standing Orders. But the authorities relied upon by Sri Subba Rao, learned counsel for the Workman, on facts, are not applicable to the case in question. Those were the cases in which there was no acceptance on the part of the workmen. Those were the clear cases of charges being vague and indefinite, non-supply of required information, inflicting punishment not contemplated in the Standing Orders of the management coupled with non-application of mind by the disciplinary authorities to the relevant factors. But, in the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal was not justified in arriving at a conclusion that the charges levelled against the Workman are vague and indefinite and they do not fall within the ambit of Clause 25 of the Standing orders particularly Clause 25 (34) which speaks of the misconduct of wilfully making false declaration regarding age, qualification and experience in the application for employment. It is not in dispute that the information that was furnished first by the Workman against column 12 (i) (a) viz. "have you ever been prosecuted?" the answer was 'no'. Likewise against the column which relates to the previous employment, etc. the answer was 'no'. These informations were furnished on 23-7-1984. It is not in dispute that the information that was furnished first by the Workman against column 12 (i) (a) viz. "have you ever been prosecuted?" the answer was 'no'. Likewise against the column which relates to the previous employment, etc. the answer was 'no'. These informations were furnished on 23-7-1984. This was followed by the information furnished by the Workman saying 'yes' disclosing that the Workman was prosecuted in S. C. No. 50 of 1981 on the file of the X Additional city Civil and Sessions Judge, Civil Station, Bangalore City, for the offence punishable under Section 302 of I. P. C. which was ended in acquittal and confirmed by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 121 of 1982 on 14-7-1983. Pursuant to the show cause notice issued at Annexure-A, the Workman gave his explanation at Annexure-B admitting the guilt. During the enquiry the Workman not only appeared but also admitted the charges levelled against him. As stated by him, he studied upto s. S. L. C. and had undergone I. T. I, training for 2 years. If that is so, it is very difficult to accept the contention of the Workman that he was not aware of the consequences of non-furnishing correct particulars while seeking employment. When the workman had himself pleaded guilty, there was no necessity for the Enquiry Officer to proceed further with the enquiry. The action of the Management and the conduct of the Workman clearly established the misconduct from, their own pleadings and. statement which are extracted above. Any explanation furnished subsequently in the subsequent application was an improvement to the explanation given first, to the objection taken in the Statement of Objections before the Tribunal and the statement made on oath before the Tribunal which have to be held as an improvement and afterthought. ( 14 ) WHEN the Workman himself admitted the guilt, there was nothing for the Management to enquire further by leading further evidence. When the admission was there, even non-application of the principles of natural justice will not weigh much. ( 14 ) WHEN the Workman himself admitted the guilt, there was nothing for the Management to enquire further by leading further evidence. When the admission was there, even non-application of the principles of natural justice will not weigh much. Under similar circumstances, the views of this Court so also of the Supreme court in some of the decisions are as follows: this Court in Hindustan Aeronautics Limited v B, Gulab Singh and Others, (1986) 68 F. J. R. 132, held as follows: "the position in law is that if a Workman against whom disciplinary proceedings are instituted for acts of misconduct admits his guilt, there is no necessity for the employer to hold any domestic enquiry. Therefore, where the accused Workman, in every one of his statements, namely, those made before the officer holding the domestic enquiry, and the one in reply to the show-cause notice, had admitted his guilt and prayed for mercy and sympathy and he reiterated the same before the Industrial Tribunal, the only order that the industrial Tribunal can pass in an application by the employer under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for dismissal of the Workman, would be to grant the application. Decision of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India Ltd. v Karunamoy banerjee, (1968)32 FJR 481 and Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v Abdul gaffar, (1980) Lab. IC 683, followed. Where a Workman was charged with misconduct under the Standing Order which provided that 'gambling, and money-lending or doing any other private business within the company's premises' would constitute misconduct, it cannot be contended for him: (I) that the Standing Order is intended to make the act of gambling together with money-lending alone a misconduct, and, therefore, no charge of misconduct could be made for the act of money-lending alone; or (II) that money-lending, in order to constitute misconduct, should be a regular business; or (III) that collection of money within the company's premises which had been lent to several workmen outside the premises would not constitute money lending under the Standing Order as money-lending includes both giving the money on loan to a person and receiving repayment of the money so lent from the debtor; or (IV) that a single transaction of money-lending would not amount to misconduct under the Standing Order. Even a single transaction is sufficient to hold that the person was guilty of misconduct. Held, on the facts of the case, where the accused Workman had lent money to as many as 9 persons and according to his statement before the enquiry officer he had charged interest at 10 per cent per month, which amounts to 120 per cent per annum, the view taken by the Tribunal that no misconduct was committed by the Workman within the meaning of the Standing Order was patently untenable and perverse. Decision of the Supreme Court in Digwadih Colliery v Ramji Singh, (1964)2 llj 143 applied. Decision of the Supreme Court in Remington Rand of India v Tahir Ali, (1975) 48 FJR 60, distinguished. His Lordship has pointed out that though the penalty imposed by the employer in this case, which related to a Workman who had put in more than 20 years of loyal service, appeared to be excessive, especially in view of his repentance for his acts, as this was a proceeding under Section 33 (2) (b) of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it was not possible for the Court to modify the penalty by invoking the provisions of Section 11 -A of the Act. His Lordship has suggested that the Government seriously consider the desirability of including a provision in Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act that proceedings thereunder should be treated as a reference under Section 10 of the Act as already suggested in workmen of Mysore Lamp Works v State of Karnataka, (1984) 65 FJR 343. " the Supreme Court under similar circumstances held in Central Bank of India Ltd. v Karunamoy Banerjee, (1967-1968) 32 FJR 481, as follows:" In conducting a domestic enquiry into charges of misconduct against a workman, if the allegations are denied by the Workman, the burden of proving the truth of the allegations will be on the employer and the witnesses called by the employer must be allowed to be cross-examined by the Workman and the workman must also be given an opportunity to examine himself, and adduce any other evidence that he might choose, in support of his plea. If, however, the workman admits his guilt, there will be nothing more for the employer to let in evidence about the allegations. If, however, the workman admits his guilt, there will be nothing more for the employer to let in evidence about the allegations. In such a case, it will be open to the employer to examine the Workman himself even in the first instance so as to enable him to offer any explanation for his conduct or to place before the employer any circumstances which will go to mitigate the gravity of the offence, but the examination of the Workman should not savour of an inquisition and if the employer chooses to examine any witnesses after the examination of the workman, he must be allowed to cross-examine those witnesses and also to adduce any other evidence that he may choose. Therefore, where a Workman, against whom charges of misconduct had been made, categorically admitted that he had committed a mistake and even when the enquiry proceedings began he stated that he had nothing more to add in respect of the charges against him, the Labour Court would not be justified in refusing to grant approval as asked for by the employer for the discharge of the workman on the ground that principles of natural justice had been violated by the employer merely because of the fact that the Workman was examined in the first instance in the domestic enquiry. " ( 15 ) WHEN such being the law regarding according approval as required under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act for dismissal where the Workman pleaded guilty, the finding given by the Industrial Tribunal that the charges were vague and indefinite and did not fall under Clause 25 of the Standing Order is quite untenable in view of Standing Order No. 25 (34) which speaks of wilfully making false declaration regarding qualification, experience, etc. in the application seeking for employment is incorrect and against Standing Orders as the Workman had not disclosed about his past experience, the fact of he being prosecuted for an offence under Section 302, I. P. C. Further, there was no necessity for the Management to examine other witnesses, when the Workman pleaded guilty. The other findings given by the Tribunal that the finding given by the Enquiry Officer is perverse and the order of dismissal by the Disciplinary Authority is the resultant of non-application of mind etc. are quite unsustainable. The other findings given by the Tribunal that the finding given by the Enquiry Officer is perverse and the order of dismissal by the Disciplinary Authority is the resultant of non-application of mind etc. are quite unsustainable. Likewise, the other finding that dismissal of the workman results in his economic death and attaches a stigma to his future employment, etc. is also quite unwarranted. So also, when incorrect approach of the tribunal was canvassed before the learned Single Judge and was made out that the act of the Workman clearly falls under Clause 25 (34) of the Standing Order of the management, the learned Single Judge was not right in accepting the order of the tribunal. When the Workman himself pleaded guilty, the learned Single Judge was not right in arriving at a conclusion that the order of dismissal should not have been based on charges which are not proved under Clauses 25 (2) and 25 (8) of the Standing orders without noticing that the misconduct referred to are not only contemplated under Clauses 25 (2) and 25 (8) but also under Clause 25 (34) of the standing Orders of the Management. Hence, it has to be held that the order of the learned Single Judge as an incorrect one. Since the Tribunal as well as the learned single Judge passed their orders without taking into consideration the principle as laid down by this Court in Gulab Singh's case, (1986)68 FJR 132, regarding holding further enquiry, we have no hesitation to hold that both the orders are incorrect. ( 16 ) SINCE we have held that the order of the learned Single Judge as in correct, itis needless to say that the liberty given to the Management to proceed with the enquiry from the stage at which the illegality crept into the proceedings as unnecessary and unwarranted. ( 17 ) ACCORDINGLY, we allow Writ Appeal No. 1961 of 1989 filed by the Management and set aside the orders of the learned Single Judge and of the Industrial tribunal. Writ Appeal No. 77 of 1990 filed by the Workman is dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .