Judgment :- Defendant in O.S. No. 133 of 1981 on the file of the Sub Court, Tellicherry is the appellant in the second appeal. The plaint if filed the suit for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule building, which consists of a residential building with the land appurtenant thereto having an extent of 61/2 cents. The defendant took the building on rent on 17-8-70 on a monthly rent of Rs.50/-. The lease was for a period of six months and after the expiry of the term of the lease, the defendant was continuing as a tenant holding over on the same terms and conditions. While so, the defendant entered into an agreement with the plaintiff-respondent, wherein the defendant offered to purchase the building and the appurtenant land for a consideration of Rs.12,500/-. A sum of Rs.4,500/- was paid as part of the consideration and as per the agreement, I he sale deed was to be executed on 30-1-75. The plaintiff contended that the defendant committed breach of the agreement and she failed to pay the balance amount and so the sale deed could not be executed. The plaintiff filed rent control O.P. 196/76 for evicting the defendant from the suit building. The defendant contended that she had been in possession of the building as per the terms of the agreement for sale and that the Rent Control Court has no jurisdiction. The original petition was accordingly dismissed on 17-3-77, vide Ext.A20 order. Thereafter the plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of possession of the building on the strength of title. The plaintiff also claimed damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs.80/-. 2. The defendant opposed the suit contending that the suit is not maintainable. The defendant denied the alleged breach of agreement. The defendant maintained that she has been in possession of the house and the surrounding land pursuant to Ext.Bl agreement. It was also alleged that the proper remedy of the plain tiff was to file a suit for specific performance of the agreement by claiming balance consideration. 3. The trial court decreed the suit as prayed for and the defendant filed A.S.41/86. In the appellate court several contentions were raised. It was specifically contended that the civil court has no jurisdiction to order eviction of the defendant from the building. 3. The trial court decreed the suit as prayed for and the defendant filed A.S.41/86. In the appellate court several contentions were raised. It was specifically contended that the civil court has no jurisdiction to order eviction of the defendant from the building. The first appellate court held that the defendant is not entitled to the benefits of the provisions of the Rent Control Act, as she has waived that right and therefore the Rent Control Act, Act 2/65, has no application. It was also held that S.53A of the T.P. Act has no application as she committed breach of the agreement. The lower appellate court was of the view that the defendant has taken an in consistent stand in claiming the benefit of part performance under S.53A of the T.P. Act and also the tenancy right under Act 2 of 1965. On these premises the judgment and decree of the trial court was confirmed. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant Shri. M.Viswanatha Iyer contended that the courts below have erred in holding that the defendant is liable to be evicted from the building. It was urged that the tenancy in favour of the defendant has not come to an end and the defendant continued as a statutory tenant even after the execution of Ext.Bl agreement and therefore the rent control court alone had jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction against the defendant. The respondents' counsel contended that the defendant has already pleaded before the rent control court that she had been in possession of the building by virtue of Ext.Bl agreement and the rent control court has no jurisdiction and based on this contention the rent control court dismissed the petition filed by the plaintiff and the order passed by the rent control court has become res judicata. 5. The short question that arises for consideration is whether the civil court has got jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction against the defendant. Admittedly the building is situated within the area where the Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act is made applicable. The plaintiff filed rent control O.P. 196/76 for evicting the defendant by invoking S.11(2) of the Act. This petition was dismissed by Ext.A20 order, as the defendant contended that she has been in possession of the building by virtue of the agreement. The plaintiff filed rent control O.P. 196/76 for evicting the defendant by invoking S.11(2) of the Act. This petition was dismissed by Ext.A20 order, as the defendant contended that she has been in possession of the building by virtue of the agreement. However, it is important to note that even though Ext.Bl agreement was entered into between the parties, the plaintiff has no case that the tenancy in favour of the defendant had come to an end. The plaintiff issued a notice terminating the tenancy and after the termination of the tenancy the defendant continued as a statutory tenant. A person remaining in occupation of the premises let out to him after the determination or expiry of the period of tenancy is, commonly though in, law not accurately, called a statutory tenant. He cannot be turned out as he in entitled to the protection of the statute. This Court in Vasu v. Kallianikutty Amma (1982 KLT 53 =1982 K.L.J. 36) explained as to what is a statutory tenant. It was held: "The expression "statutory tenancy" is something coined by the courts to explain the position of a tenant who continues to be in possession of the building during the pendency of Rent Control proceedings. Tenancy is strictly a matter of contract. If it is for a term it expires at the end of the term. If there is no agreed term, it can be terminated by due notice. When the tenancy is terminated either by efflux of time or by notice, the landlord - tenant relationship ceases to be there. But still the tenant cannot be turned out of the building except under the provisions of the Rent Control Act where that applies. S.2(6) of Act 2 of 1965 defines a tenant so as to include a person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy. That is, even after the termination of the contractual tenancy, he continues to be a tenant for the purpose of the Act. He will have all the rights and obligations of a tenant as defined in the Act, inspite of the termination of his tenancy. It is this peculiar position of his under the provisions of the statute that is denoted by the expression "statutory tenancy". He will have all the rights and obligations of a tenant as defined in the Act, inspite of the termination of his tenancy. It is this peculiar position of his under the provisions of the statute that is denoted by the expression "statutory tenancy". Under the scheme of the enactment of Act 2 of 1965, a person in occupation continues to be a tenant even if the tenancy is validly terminated and he is still entitled to the protection of the Act. 6. The next question to be considered is whether a civil court has jurisdiction to pass a decree of eviction when the defendant continues as a statutory tenant, and whether the tenant can waive this right or an order passed by the rent control court will operate as res judicata against the defendant in contending that the civil court has no jurisdiction. In M.P.B. Jaiswal v. Dossbai N.B. Jeejeebhoy (1970 (1) S. C.C. 613) a question of similar nature came up for consideration of the Supreme Court. In that case pursuant to a leave granted by the respondent the appellant constructed a residential building. His application for determination of standard rent under S.11 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act,1947 was dismissed on the ground that the Act did not apply to open land for constructing buildings and this order was affirmed in revision. In view of another decision of the Bombay High Court reported in I.L.R.1956 Bombay 827 the appellant filed a fresh petition in the court of small causes, as the area in which the land was situated was included within the limits of Greater Bombay. The trial court rejected the application on the ground that the question whether the Act applied to the case was res judicata since it had been finally decided by the High Court between the same parties in the earlier case filed for fixation of standard rent. The High Court confirmed the order. On appeal to the Supreme Court the Supreme Court held: "A question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of the Court, if by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the question would not, in our judgment, operate as res judicata. Similarly by an erroneous decision if the Court assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess under the statute, the question cannot operate as res judicata between the same parties, whether the cause of action in the subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise." In Isabella Johnson v. MASusai (1991 (1) SCC 494) the Supreme Court further emphasised that a court which has no jurisdiction in law cannot be conferred with the jurisdiction by applying the principle of res judicata. 7. Going by the decisions aforesaid it is clear that the civil court has no jurisdiction to consider the question of eviction, so long as the defendant continued as a statutory tenant. It is also not possible to hold that the defendant waived her right by stating that she has been in possession of the building by virtue of Ext.Bl agreement. It is not correct to say that after the execution of Ext.Bl agreement the possession of the building by the defendant as a tenant transformed into possession as per Ext.Bl agreement. It is clear that the plaintiff sent a notice to the defendant terminating tenancy and she also filed original petition under Art.2/65 for evicting the defendant. From these facts it is clear that the defendant after the termination of the tenancy was continuing as a statutory tenant enjoying all the protections of Act 2 of 1965. Act 2 of 1965 is a benevolent legislation intended to protect the interest of the tenant. The parties shall not be permitted to enter into any contract so as to defeat the provisions of Act 2 of 1965. If such a contract is entered into between the parties, the court will ignore such contract and decide the rights of the parties de hors" the terms of such an agreement. The lower appellate court was not correct in holding that the defendant was keeping in possession of the building as per Ext.Bl agreement and that she. waived her rights under Act 2 of 1965. 8. In Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra (1990 (1) SCC 193) it was held that the civil court has no jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction in respect of the building to which the Rent Control Act is applicable. It was further held that such a decree is a nullity. 8. In Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra (1990 (1) SCC 193) it was held that the civil court has no jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction in respect of the building to which the Rent Control Act is applicable. It was further held that such a decree is a nullity. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in East India Corporation v. Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. (1991 (3) S.C.C. 230) it was held that clear and explicit intendment of the legislature is that all questions relating to the special rights and liabilities created by the statute should be decided by th4 tribunals constituted under it. In paragraph 10 of the decision at page 237 it is further pointed out that: "Significantly, the jurisdiction of the civil court can be invoked only where the Controller comes to a decision, and records a finding, that the denial or claim by the tenant, as aforesaid, is bona fide. If the Controller were to come to the opposite conclusion, no question of invoking the jurisdiction of the civil court would arise." Therefore, I hold that civil court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction of the defendant and the Rent Control Court alone has jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction. In the result, I allow the second appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court which was confirmed by the lower appellate court and direct that the suit shall stand dismissed. The parties shall bear their respective costs. \