JUDGMENT: This appeal is directed against a judgment and decree passed by the Second Court of Additional District Judge, Bankura, dismissing an appeal preferred against a judgment passed by the Additional Subordinate Judge, Bankura. It appears that the plaintiffs-appellants filed a suit before the trial court for a declaration of their title to certain land and also for a permanent injunction against the State of West Bengal restraining them from interfering with their possession of the said land. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on can test with costs on a preliminary point that the suit was not maintainable under the provisions of clauses (b) and (c) of subs. (2) of s. 57B of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. On an 'appeal being preferred against the judgment of the trial court the learned Additional District Judge held that the suit was not barred under s. 57B(2) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, as held by the learned Subordinate Judge, but that the appeal itself was not maintainable as the order of the trial court was not a decree within the meaning of s. 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code. 2. The finding of the 1st Appellate Court that the suit was not barred under the provisions of s. 57B(2) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act is not challenged before me by the respondent State. The only point on which arguments were advanced by both parties was if the appeal was maintainable before the 1st Appellate Court. 3. On behalf of the appellants Shri Milan Bhattacharjee argues that the order of the learned Subordinate Judge was for all practical purposes a decree disposing of the matter in controversy between the parties finally. He submits that by tile impugned order the trial court dismissed the suit on contest with costs which meant that the appellants were precluded from claiming the right which was in issue in the suit over again by filing another suit unless and until the present judgment was set aside. 4 In support of his argument Shri Bhattacharjee cited an unreported decision of B.P. Sinha, J. in Ram Barai Bhagat & ors v. Munnilal Singh & ors. reported in AIR 1984 NOC 99 (Patna), The Short note reported therein is as follows: "A decision holding' that a suit is not maintainable conclusively determines the rights of the parties in the suit. reported in AIR 1984 NOC 99 (Patna), The Short note reported therein is as follows: "A decision holding' that a suit is not maintainable conclusively determines the rights of the parties in the suit. Such an adjudication on a preliminary point raised by the defendants. In a suit really results in the dismissal of the suit on that point alone. It thus amounts to a formal expression conclusively determining the rights of the parties and is a decree. AIR 1941 Oudh 590 and AIR 1941 Patna.385 followed". There cannot obviously be any objection to the above legal principle. A suit is decided on the several issues depending on the pleadings of the parties. Often preliminary issues striking at the root of the suit are taken up for hearing on the understanding that the suit may be disposed of on the basis of those Issues only and in that case decision on other issues need not be made. If such preliminary issues succeed in deciding the fate of the suit; such decision is final and is undoubtedly a decree in nature. In that context it is necessary to examine closely why such a decision striking at the root of the suit has not been accepted as a decree by the lower appellate court. 5. Reference has been made to two Division Bench decisions of this Court to elucidate the scope of filing an appeal against an order of abatement passed under the provisions of s. 57B of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. One is Jharna Ghosal v. Satyendro Prasad Dhar reported in 1978(1) CLJ 193 (and also in AIR 1978 Col. 274) and the other is Sudhabodh Misra v. State of West Bengal & Ors. (reported in 1978(1) CLJ 336). In both the cases it was decided that an order of abatement of the suits under s. 57B of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 is not a "decree" as defined in the Civil Procedure Code and is as such not appealable. It was further held in Jharna Ghosol's case that such an abatement order was not an appealable order. It was further held in Jharna Ghosol's case that such an abatement order was not an appealable order. Incidentally in both the cases the Courts set aside the order of abatement of the lower court in its revisional jurisdiction on the ground that the -bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court under s. 57B of the W. B. Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 was improperly' applied in those cases. Both the cases have been referred to by the lower courts and the learned lawyer for the respondent very much relies on these cases in support of the finding of the appellate court regarding the maintainability of the appeal against the impugned order. 6. The decisions of the two Division Benches cited above are good laws and are to be accepted. But then the question is do the aforesaid two decisions apply in the instant case? In both the cases it has been held after reviewing the previous decisions in this regard that a formal order of abatement made by the court without adjudicating the rights of the parties is not a decree. Coming now to the provisions of s. 57B of the W.B. Estates Acquisition Act it appears that the section bars the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of certain matters. Sub-section (1) provides that when an order bas been made under sub-so (1) of s. 39 of the Act directing the revision of a record of rights, no civil court shall entertain any suit or application for the determination of rent etc. as detailed therein. This sub-section further provides that if any suit or application in which the aforesaid matters are in issue is pending before a civil court, it shall be stayed until the disposal of an appeal under/sub-so (3) of s. 44 and that on the disposal of such appeal, the suit or application shall abate so far as it relates to any of the aforesaid matters. Sub-section (2) of s. 57B similarly provides that no civil court shall entertain any suit or application concerning any land or any estate, or any rights in such estate, if it relates to any of the matters described in clauses (a) to (c) of the sub-section and that any such suit or application which is pending before a civil court immediately before the commencement of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973 shall abate so far as it relates to any of the matters referred to in clauses (a) to (c) above. 7. In the instant case the lower court found the suit not maintainable as it found that the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred as the subject matter of the suit related to matters mentioned in clauses (b) and (e) of s.5/B. The suit was filed in 1976. So it was obviously not a pending suit from before the commencement of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973. There was, therefore, no question of abatement of the suit and. in fact no order for abatement of the suit was made by the learned Subordinate Judge. The suit was a live suit and the appeal was filed against an order of dismissal of the suit. In effect it was a question of bar of jurisdiction. The learned lower court dismissed the suit as it found that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the Suit in view of sub-so (2) of s. 57B of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. The scope of the appeal plainly was if the jurisdiction of the civil court was actually barred as decided by the trial court. The lower appellate court considered this point and decided correctly that the jurisdiction of the civil court was not barred under sub-so (2) of s. 57B so far as this suit was concerned. But it nevertheless held that the appeal itself was not maintainable. 8. The lower appellate court relied on AIR 1978 Cal 274 & 20 CLJ 476. I have already discussed the decision in AIR 1978 Cat 274. I have shown above that the Division Benches in both AIR 1978 Cal 274 & 1978(1) CLJ 336 have held that an order of abatement simpliciter is not a decree as it does not adjudicate the rights of the parties. I have already discussed the decision in AIR 1978 Cat 274. I have shown above that the Division Benches in both AIR 1978 Cal 274 & 1978(1) CLJ 336 have held that an order of abatement simpliciter is not a decree as it does not adjudicate the rights of the parties. I have also shown that there was no pending suit from before the commencement of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973. So neither of the decisions in AIR 1978 Cat 274 or 1978(1) CLJ 336 was a good ground for holding that the impugned order was not a decree. 9. Coming now to the definition of a "decree" in the Civil Procedure Code, a decree means the formal expression of an adjudication which so far as the court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. In the instant suit the plaintiffs-appellants prayed for a declaration of title in respect of one-sixth share each in the disputed suit property and also for a permanent injunction restraining the defendent respondent from interfering with their possession. The suit has been dismissed on contest with costs. The result is that the relief sought by the plaintiff has been denied and that the rights which have alleged to be infringed remain in the same position: But for the statutory bar the plaintiffs were entitled to have their rights adjudicated in a competent court by filing a suit of civil nature. If the bar is actually not applicable, dismissal of the suit on grounds of lack of jurisdiction is actually a final adjudication of the rights of the parties so far as the subject matter of the suit is concerned. A fresh suit on the same subject matter is clearly barred unless the bar is lifted. If a decision on the bar of jurisdiction is not a final adjudication of the rights between the parties, what else is? 10. The decision in the case of Kamini Devi vs. Pramatha Nath Mukherjee & anr. (20 CLJ 476) referred to by the lower appellate court in its judgment is also of no help. In that case the trial court deposed of certain preliminary issues in chiding the maintainability of the suit without deciding the main matters in controversy. 10. The decision in the case of Kamini Devi vs. Pramatha Nath Mukherjee & anr. (20 CLJ 476) referred to by the lower appellate court in its judgment is also of no help. In that case the trial court deposed of certain preliminary issues in chiding the maintainability of the suit without deciding the main matters in controversy. It was contended that the decision on these issues was a preliminary decree and that as such it was appealable. The District Judge dismissed the appeal bolding that the decision on the maintainability of the suit in favour of the plaintiff was not a final adjudication of the subject matter in controversy. On a second appeal Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee supported the District Judge. The facts of the present case are completely different. Here the issue regarding the maintainability of the suit has been decided against the plaintiffs and they have been non-suited for good. There is no scope of further deciding the rights in controversy between the parties. Here the decision on the preliminary issue is final and is in the nature of a decree. 11. It seems to me that both the trial court and the appellate court hovered under a misconception that there was an abatement of the suit while in fact there was no such abatement. Both the courts, therefore, proceeded on a wrong assumption of law. A court has jurisdiction to test its own jurisdiction and if the same is decided against the plaintiff there is an adjudication of the controversial rights between them. Such a decision must be held to be a decree. 12. On the basis of the facts stated and the law analysed above it must be held that the learned Additional District Judge was in error in holding that the appeal before him was not maintainable. That part of his judgment \ must be set aside. In the result this appeal succeeds to the extent stated above. As there was no cross appeal against the judgment of the Additional District Judge regarding the maintainability of the suit before the trial court his decision on point no. 2 in the appeal stands and the same is affirmed. The appeal is therefore allowed in part with costs. The learned Additional District Judge's finding on point no. 1 is set aside and his finding on point no. 2 is affirmed. 2 in the appeal stands and the same is affirmed. The appeal is therefore allowed in part with costs. The learned Additional District Judge's finding on point no. 1 is set aside and his finding on point no. 2 is affirmed. Let the suit be remanded to the lower court for a final decision according to law. As the disposal of the suit has already been delayed the lower court is directed to dispose of the suit within three months from the date of receipt of the records. Let the records be sent down to the lower court at once. Hearing fee assessed at 5 gold mohurs. No formal decree need be prepared. Appeal allowed in part; suit remanded to lower court.