JUDGMENT - M.F. SALDANHA, J.:---This criminal writ petition is directed against the common judgment and order passed in Criminal Revision Application No. 120 of 1989 and Criminal Revision Application No. 204 of 1989. This order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pune, dated 3/4 July, 1991 disposes of the two Criminal Revision Applications that were filed before him in respect of a dispute concerning a small tailoring shop situate at CTS 269, Ganesh peth, Pune. Briefly stated, the premises originally stood in the name of Tukarm Shankar Kalbare, and it is also relevant to mention that the licence in respect of the disputed premises stood in his name. Tukaram died on 6-5-1985, after which on 13-6-1985 the licence was transferred to the name of his widow Sundrabai. It is more or less common ground that the widow Sundrabai is advanced in years and her age as shown in the proceeding is 85 years. It is unnecessary for me to recount the genesis of the dispute that has ultimately culminated in this proceeding except to mention that one of the sons of Tukaram, who is present respondent No. 2, filed Regular Civil Suit No. 1779 of 1987 before the Pune Court for a declaration and injunction on 29-8-1987. It appears that in the month of September of that year, an ex parte ad-interim injunction, which was limited to the creation of third party interest, came to be granted. It also appears that the sisters filed affidavits in support of the plaintiffs in that proceeding. In November 1987, during the pendency of that suit, a dispute in respect of possession of the present premises arose and pursuant to the report from the Police regarding impending threats in relation to breach of peace the Sub-Divisional Magistrate commenced proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On 9-2-1989, the Magistrate issued a warrant of attachment pursuant to which the possession of the shop premises was taken over by the Police and the same continued to be sealed until an interim order came to be passed by this Court in the month of August 1991. 2. On 9-2-1989, the Magistrate issued a warrant of attachment pursuant to which the possession of the shop premises was taken over by the Police and the same continued to be sealed until an interim order came to be passed by this Court in the month of August 1991. 2. In the meanwhile, the proceeding continued before the learned Magistrate who, by his order dated 1-2-1989, came to the conclusion that on the basis of the material placed before him it was extremely difficult to decide as to which of the two sons was supposed to be in possession prior to the commencement of the section 145 proceeding. The attachment was, therefore, continued and the only modification made by the learned Magistrate was that the possession of the adjoining room was handed over to the mother Sundrabai. 3. It is relevant to point out that in the meanwhile, Regular Civil Suit No. 1779 of 1987 was withdrawn. The second respondent to this proceeding has, on 21-3-1988, filed a composite suit, being Special Civil Suit. No. 267 of 1988, claiming partition which suit is pending before the Pune Court. Since both the disputing parties were aggrieved by the order of the learned Magistrate the two Criminal Revision Applications that are referred to above were filed before the Court of Session at Pune, and the learned Additional Session Judge, Pune disposed of these Criminal Revision Applications through a common judgment which is the one with which we are at the moment concerned. At the stage when this matter was taken up for admission, Mr. Pathak, learned Counsel representing the petitioners, had seriously disputed the validity of the proceeding instituted under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, apart from his challenge to the correctness of the order on merits. Mr. Bhogal, learned Counsel representing the second respondent and the other respondents, contended with equal vehemence that the proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were justified in the facts of the present case and, consequently, it was his contention that no interference is called for. On an overall view of the record, it did not appear to me to be either correct or just that the shop premises should continue to remain sealed and, consequently, purely as a stop gap arrangement, I had directed that Sundrarbai should be allowed to retain the possession until further orders. On an overall view of the record, it did not appear to me to be either correct or just that the shop premises should continue to remain sealed and, consequently, purely as a stop gap arrangement, I had directed that Sundrarbai should be allowed to retain the possession until further orders. I had made it very specific to both learned Counsel who had appeared before me at that time that appropriate orders in this proceeding, which is a dispute in relation to rights concerning immoveable property, can only be passed by the competent Civil Court. Furthermore, since the civil proceedings were, infact, pending, the parties had been given sufficient time to approach the Civil Court and to obtain interim orders from that Court. At the hearing to-day, I find that this has not been done. Mr. Pathak, states that his clients are awaiting the outcome of this proceeding after which, if necessary, they will approach the Civil Court; whereas Mr. Bhogal contends that since he is in possession, he did not consider it necessary to move the Civil Court. Suffice it to say that this is a wholly unsatisfactory state of affairs. 4. I have, therefore heard both the parties on merits and I propose to dispose of this petition as no useful purpose will be served by keeping it pending. 5. As regards the first contention raised by Mr. Pathak for which he draws considerable support from the observation of the Supreme Court, he contends that the proceedings under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code were totally barred and were without jurisdiction and that, consequently, on a point of law this Court should quash and set aside the order of the learned Additional Session Judge. The argument proceeds on the footing that the section 145 proceedings were non est and that effectively they should be treated as such. The decision in question (Ram Sumer Puri v. State of U. P.)1, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 472, dealt with a situation wherein the section 145 proceedings had been instituted in the face of a concluded civil proceeding in relation to a property dispute. The Supreme Court, undoubtedly, in that case expressed the view that the criminal proceedings were uncalled for. The decision in question (Ram Sumer Puri v. State of U. P.)1, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 472, dealt with a situation wherein the section 145 proceedings had been instituted in the face of a concluded civil proceeding in relation to a property dispute. The Supreme Court, undoubtedly, in that case expressed the view that the criminal proceedings were uncalled for. In substance, what the Supreme Court had effectively held in that case was that there should not be multiplicity of litigations and, furthermore, that the competent and proper forum to adjudicate the dispute would be the Civil Court. This proposition is quite independent and distinct from the contentions advanced that there exists a legal bar to the section 145 proceedings and it was not laid down by the Supreme Court that under no circumstances would the section 145 proceedings be justified. The Supreme Court did contraindicate the commencement of proceedings under section 145 in such a situation. 6. Mr. Bhogal has sought to distinguish this decision of the Supreme Court by contending that in the present instance, according to him, regardless of the pendency of the civil proceedings, the opposite party is alleged to have taken the law into its own hands and is alleged to have forcibly dispossessed his clients. He states that in such a situation in order to resolve the issue through a legal forum there was no option except to commence the proceedings under section 145. I do not agree with this submission because the Civil Court was more than competent to deal with a situation of this type and it was certainly open to the parties before the Civil Court to have prayed for appropriate interim orders, and if any breach of those orders had been committed, the Civil Court was empowered to take appropriate action against the erring party. However, unfortunately, the section 145 proceedings have gone on, two orders have come to be passed and the entire matter has almost come a full circle. At this point of time, therefore, a challenge to the institution of those proceedings, howsoever ill-advised they might have been, will not be of much avail. The short question before me is as to whether the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge handing over the possession of the dispute premises to Sundrabai requires to be maintained or whether the same requires to be set aside. 7. Mr. The short question before me is as to whether the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge handing over the possession of the dispute premises to Sundrabai requires to be maintained or whether the same requires to be set aside. 7. Mr. Pathak has attacked the correctness of this order by drawing my attention to the reasoning adopted by the learned Additional Session Judge. There are references and, in fact, detailed references in the order to various affidavits that have been filed by the parties and to the pleadings before the Civil Court. As regards the first aspect Mr. Pathak has raised a technical plea which is to the effect that the learned Additional Sessional Judge has wrongly relied on certain affidavits produced by the opposite parties, which affidavits have been affirmed before the Civil Court. Mr. Pathak has relied on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of (Chhotan Prasad v. Hari Dusadh)2, 1977 Cri.L.J. 249, wherein the Supreme Court, after analysing the authorities before whom affidavits can be filed, has stated that as far as the section 145 proceedings are concerned that it is a requirement of law that the affidavits must be affirmed before the Magistrate who are empowered to exercise powers under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Technically, Mr. Pathak is right as far as this objection is concerned, but unfortunately this was not pointed out at the requisite time to the Appeal Court. Had this been done, the opposite party could have got the affidavits affirmed before the competent Magistrate or, in the absence of that, the Appeal Court would have decided on its course of action. I do not propose to be technical with regard to these aspects of the matter because the respective learned Counsel have drawn my attention to various documents, some of which have been produced for the first time in the course of this proceeding. It is necessary in the present dispute, which essentially concerns different factions of the same family, for the Court before which the dispute is pending to adopt a balanced, just and fair approach. It is necessary in the present dispute, which essentially concerns different factions of the same family, for the Court before which the dispute is pending to adopt a balanced, just and fair approach. Without going into those technicalities what needs to be pointed out is that the error committed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge while deciding the Criminal Revisions Applications before him was to refer to the various extracts of documents and to thereafter make observations which are in the nature of findings. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, to my mind, has, in the concluding part of the order, very correctly observed that the overall dispute will ultimately have to be resolved by the Civil Court before which the proceeding is pending. In this view of the matter, it was unnecessary on his part to have recorded findings because both learned Counsel before me have found fault with selected parts of the judgment and they have both contended that the findings were either incorrect or unjustified. Mr. Pathak has made a serious grievance by pointing out that some of the findings are uncalled for and that these could be used in other proceedings. Mr. Bhogal on the other hand, has contended that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has ignored relevant parts of the record and that, consequently, his observations with regard to the factum of possession are incorrect and, therefore, that he was also required to move the higher forum. Suffice it to say that the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge will have to be set aside to the extent that in the light of the conclusion arrived at by him, it was wholly unnecessary for him to have recorded the findings. It was within the province of the learned Additional Sessions Judge and it was well within his jurisdiction to have passed an interim order that would have taken care of the matter for a prescribed period of time, until the Civil Court substituted that order through one of its own. To this extent, the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pune, to my mind, will require interference with. 8. Mr. Bhogal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents Nos. To this extent, the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pune, to my mind, will require interference with. 8. Mr. Bhogal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents Nos. 2 to 7, submitted that whereas it is contended by his opponents that they were in possession as per the statement made in the Panchanama dated 14-2-1989, that he had filed an application before that very Court pointing out that three days prior to the Panchanama being drawn up that his clients were forcibly dispossessed. These rival contentions will ultimately have to be resolved by the Civil Court after examination of the material produced before it. It is for this reason that the limited part of the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge wherein he has effectively referred the parties to the Civil Court is correct and will have to be upheld. 9. Mr. Bhogal contends that the interim orders passed by this Court ought to be retained, whereas Mr. Pathak submits that, according to him, a fair order would be that the status quo ante be restored, that the premises be released and that the Civil Court be directed within a prescribed time to pass appropriate orders. In the circumstances of the case and having regard to the fact that this is an unfortunate family dispute touching a middle class family in the city of Pune, I do not subscribe to the view that the premises should be kept sealed. The parties ought to have obtained appropriate orders from the Civil Court but since they have not done so it would be in the fitness of the circumstances of this case to direct the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pune, to hear the parties with regard to an appropriate interim arrangement and to pass appropriate orders within an outer limit of two months from to-day In so doing, the learned Judge shall totally disregard the orders passed in the proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and shall adjudicate the matter before him strictly on merits on the basis of the material which is placed before him. It is further clarified that merely because this Court has passed an interim order in this proceedings as a stop gap arrangement directing that Sundrabai shall be permitted to retain the possession of the shop premises and that the petitioners to this proceeding shall not disturb her possession until appropriate orders are passed by the Civil Court that the learned Civil Judge shall not construe this to be an order passed on merits or for that matter that any rights have been conferred on Sundrabai as a result thereof. 10. It is necessary to observe on the facts of this case that there is considerable justification in the objection canvassed that the proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ought not to have been resorted to. It is for this reason that those orders are being disregarded and set aside and the rule is being made absolute accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. The criminal writ petition is disposed of accordingly. Order accordingly. -----