JUDGMENT Banerjee, J.: All the eight appeals had been heard together in view of the fact that the plaintiff-appellant Uma Sanyal had filed several ejectment suits being ejectment suit Nos. 932 of 1976, 1270 of 1978, 1285 of 1978, 1290 of 1978, 1295 of 1978, 1303 of 1978 and 788 of 1979 for ejectment of the respective tenants from the premises No. 10 B, Barasnashi Ghosh Street, P.S. Jorasanko, Calcutta. All the above suits were heard together by R.K. Kar, Judge, 5th Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta and by a common judgment dated 8th July, 1985 decreed the ejectment suit Nos. 1270 of 1978, 1285 of 1978, 1290 of 1978, 1295 of 19678, 1303 of 19678, 4788 of 1979 and the defendants therein were directed to vacate the premises no. 10B, Baranshi Ghosh Street, within three months form the date of judgment. By the said judgment the court below dismissed the ejectment suit No. 932 of 1976, all suits were heard analogously on the prayer of the parties and for the sake of convenience and similarly all the appeals had been together for the sake of convenience and on the prayer of the parties. The plaintiff-landlady purchased the premises No. 10B, Baranashi Ghosh Street, Calcutta by a registered deed of conveyance dated 11th August, 1975 form one Radhika Bibi who was the owner of the premised and landlady of the defendants tenants. The plaintiff-landlady resides in a rented flat at premises No. 10B, Dihi Entally Road, Calcutta comprising only three rooms on the ground floor. According to the plaintiff-landlady the accommodation available in the rented flat was neither suitable nor sufficient for her and her family member. The plaintiff-landlady and her husband are both advocates who are engaged in the legal profession. The said ejetment suit was filed on various grounds including the ground of reasonable requirement of the suit premises. The property was purchased on 11th August, 1975 and the title suit No. 932 of 1976 was filed within a year form the date of the purchase of the property. The said ejetment suit was filed on various grounds including the ground of reasonable requirement of the suit premises. The property was purchased on 11th August, 1975 and the title suit No. 932 of 1976 was filed within a year form the date of the purchase of the property. There are common questions involved in the suit and appeals which will be dealt with after the facts of each title suit are se out below : - In F.A. No. 120 of 1987 (Ejectment suit No. 932 of 1976) the plaintiff-landlady’s case was that the defendant was a tenant in respect of one room in the ground floor of the premises at a monthly rental of Rs. 3/- per month. The grounds of ejectment were that the defendant-tenant had Defaulted in payment of rent since March 1976 and the defendant-tenant was guilty of committing acts of waste and damages and had converted the room and the adjacent reak into a shop room without the consent of the plaintiff and had thereby acted contrary to the provisions of Clauses (m) (o) and (p) of s. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act and the defendant-tenant had converted the residential room into a tailoring shop. In F.A. No. 119 of 1987 (Ejectment Suit No. 270 of 1978) the plaintiff-landlady’s case was that the defendant-tenant was a tenant in respect of the two rooms on the first floor of the premises at a monthly rental of Rs. 50/- per month. The other ground of ejectment was that the defendant-tenant was guilty of committing acts of waste and damages and had thereby acted contrary to the provisions of Clauses (m) (o) and (p) of s. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. In F. A. No. 10 of 19S8 (Ejectment suit No. 1985 of .1978) the plaintiff-landlady's case was that the defendant was a tenant in respect of one room in the 'ground' floor and one room on the 1st floor of the premises at a monthly rental of Rs.43/- per month. The other ground of ejectment was that the defendant-tenant was guilty of committing acts of waste and damages and had thereby acted contrary to the provisions of Clauses (m) (o) and (p) of s. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. The other ground of ejectment was that the defendant-tenant was guilty of committing acts of waste and damages and had thereby acted contrary to the provisions of Clauses (m) (o) and (p) of s. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. In F. A. No. 117 of 1987 (Ejectment suit No 1290 of 1978) the plaintiff landlady’s case was that the defendant therein was 11 tenant in respect of two rooms and one kitchen on the 1st floor of the premises at a monthly rental of Rs. 30/- per month. the other ground of ejectment was that the defendant-tenant was guilty of committing acts of waste and damages and as such had acted contrary to the provisions of Clauses (m) (o) and (p) of s. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. In F. A. No. 220 of 1986 (Ejectment Suit No. 1295 of 19/5) the plaintiff-landlady's case was that the defendant therein was a tenant in respect of one room on the 2nd floor of the premises at a monthly rental of Rs. 25/- per month. The other grounds of ejectment was that the defendant-tenant was guilty of committing acts of waste and damages and as such bad acted contrary to the provisions of Clauses (m) (o) and (p) of s 108 of the Transfer of Property Act and that the defendant-tenant had constructed a kitchen without the consent of the plaintiff-landlady. In F, A. No. 118 of 1981 (Ejectment Suit No 1803 of 1975) the plaintiff-landlady's case was that the defendant therein was a tenant in respect of one room in the ground floor of the premises at a monthly rental of Rs.24/- per month. the other ground of ejectment was that the defendant-tenant was guilty of committing acts of waste and damages and as such had acted contrary to the provisions of Clauses (m) (o) and (p) of s. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. F. A. No. 221 of 1987 (Ejectment Suit No. 788 of 1979) the plaintiff landlady's case was that the defendant therein was a tenant In respect of one room in the ground floor of the premises at a monthly rental of Rs. 16/- per month. F. A. No. 221 of 1987 (Ejectment Suit No. 788 of 1979) the plaintiff landlady's case was that the defendant therein was a tenant In respect of one room in the ground floor of the premises at a monthly rental of Rs. 16/- per month. The other grounds of ejectment were that the defendant-tenant had defaulted in payment of rent since July 1979, that the defendant had converted the residential room into a shop room without the consent of the plaintiff landlady and that the defendant was guilty of committing bets of waste and damages and as such had acted contrary to the provisions of Clauses (m) (o) and (p) of s. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. 2. The defendants tenants the snits for ejectment by filing written statement. The defendant-tenants in some of the suits bad denied the plaintiff landlady's ownership in the premises No. 10B Baranashi Ghosh Street. According to them, the plaintiff-landlady's father purchased the said premises in the benami of the plaintiff. All the defendants-tenants denied the plaintiff-landlady’s reasonable requirement of the suit premises for her use and occupation and her family members They had also denied the plaintiff-landlady's present accommodation in the rented flat was not suitable and sufficient for the occupation of her and her family members. In this case at the time of filing of the ejectment suits, the petition was amended incorporating additional ground of eviction namely, the ground of reasonable requirement of the plaintiff and her family members for their use and occupation of the premises in question. Such an amendment was made on 30th November, 1979 and the said amendment was allowed by the court below on 15th April, 1980. It was the common contention of all the defendants-tenants in these appeals who are the appellants in some cases that in view of the provisions of s. 13(3) (A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Such an amendment was made on 30th November, 1979 and the said amendment was allowed by the court below on 15th April, 1980. It was the common contention of all the defendants-tenants in these appeals who are the appellants in some cases that in view of the provisions of s. 13(3) (A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. no suit could be instituted by any landlord within a period of three years from the date of purchase of the property on the ground of reasonable requirement of the new landlord and that in the Instant case, suits were filed within the prohibited period of three years and that even though the amendments were allowed for incorporating the ground on 15th April, 1980, but the said ground on the basis of the amendment could not be available to the landlord in view of express provisions of sub-s. 3(A) of s. 3 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. 3. In support of this contention reliance was placed to the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Sudha Mukherjee v. Sankar Mukherjee reported in AIR 1982 Col. 407: 86 CWN 841(D E.) which was followed in another Division Bench judgment of this court in the case of Inder Sengupta v. Sm. Prova Rani Chakroborty & Anr. reported 'in AIR 1985 Col. 218: 88 CWN 379 (D E.) and Division Bench Judgment of this court in the case of Geeta Bhose v. Machine Tools of India, reported in 1990(1) Calcutta Law Journal 455. The later two Division Bench followed the Division Bench judgment of this court in which it was held that a suit for eviction filed by a purchaser-tenant could not be Instituted by him within a period of three years from the date of purchase of the property and that the ground of reasonable requirement could not also be taken by way of amendment and that such amendment could not be allowed on the ground that amendment is to take effect from the date of the Institution of the suit and if the institution of the suit is barred for this ground, in that event, by amendment the said ground cannot be availed of. This case would not be fraud upon the statute. A contrary view was taken by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Samir Kr. This case would not be fraud upon the statute. A contrary view was taken by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Samir Kr. Sarkar v. Ajit Kr. Sarkar & Ors. reported in 1990 CHN 107 . The law of arguments bad been advanced by the counsels on the part of both sides with regard to this ground and it was a contention of the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the tenants defendants that the effect of amendment relates back to the date of the institution of the suit and as such amendment which was allowed for incorporating the ground of eviction on the ground of reasonable' requirement of the landlady, could not be allowed find in a suit which was filed within the prohibited period of three years, no such amendment could be made: which would have the effect of relating back to the date of institution of the suit and as such the suit would be barred and on the basis of the suit, a decree for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement, cannot be availed of. 4. Now this question is set at rest by the judgment of the Supreme Court In the case of Smt. Prova Rani Chokraborty & Anr. v. Inder Sengupta in Civil Appeal No. 1921 judgment delivered on 5th March, 1991. In this case the Supreme Court considered the issue in question. In this case, the appellant Prova Rani Chakraborty & Anr. purchased the premises in question on 5th June, 1973 and they instituted 11 suit for eviction against the tenant on 9th February, 1976. The plaint was amended on 28th April, 1977 as a result of which the ground mentioned in clause (ff) of sub-s. (1) of s. 3 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956 was specifically pleaded. 'The amendment was necessary because, at the time of institution of suit, i. e. 9.2 1976 three years from the date or purchase of the premises-bad not expired, as required by sub-s. (3-A) of the s. 13 of the Act, for seeking eviction on the ground mentioned under clause (ff) of sub-s. (1) of S. 13 of the said Act. On the expiry of the said period, the aforesaid ground of eviction under clause (ff) of sub-s. (1) of s. 13 was added as additional reason for seeking eviction. 5. On the expiry of the said period, the aforesaid ground of eviction under clause (ff) of sub-s. (1) of s. 13 was added as additional reason for seeking eviction. 5. After the rival contention of the parties it was held that the said amendment of the plaint for incorporating the new ground of eviction under clause (ff) of sub-s. (1) of S. 13 which was brought on record, was validly made. In that case, the Division Bench of this court held that the question of reasonable requirement cannot be considered on the basis of amendment when the suit was filed within the prohibited period of three years. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Division Bench of this court and directed the High Court with reference to the facts. and. law concerning the question of bonafide requirement of the landlord in accordance with law, or in other words, in short, it is the view of the Supreme Court that such a course of action is permissible and that even though the suit was filed within the prohibited period of three years an contemplated in s. 13 (3) (A) of the said Act, after the expiry of three years, amendment could be made in the petition for incorporating the ground mentioned in clause (ff) of subs. (1) of s. 13 of the said Act In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court on this point, it cannot be contended that in the Instant case, the ground of eviction as mentioned in clause (ff) of subs. (1) of s. 13 of the said Act cannot be, Invoked on the basis of the amendment as sought to be argued on behalf of the tenants-defendants. 6. Accordingly, we hold that the plaintiff. landlady was entitled to invoke the ground of eviction as mentioned in clause (ff) of sub-s. (1) of s. 13 of the said Act by amendment in suit which was filed within the prohibited period mentioned in subs. (3A) of s. 13 of the said Act end the decree passed by the court below on the basis of the additional ground for eviction as provided under clause (ff) of sub-so (1) of. S. 13 is valid and, cannot be challenged on this ground. 7. Accordingly, we do not find any substance to this contention raised on behalf of the defendants-tenants in this appeal. 8. S. 13 is valid and, cannot be challenged on this ground. 7. Accordingly, we do not find any substance to this contention raised on behalf of the defendants-tenants in this appeal. 8. In the said suits the following issues were framed: (1) Have the notices of ejectment been served upon the defendants of different suits? If so are the same legal, valid and sufficient? (2) Is the plaintiff owner of premises No. 10/B Baranashi Ghosh Street, Calcutta ? Does she reasonably require the said premises for the occupation of her own and her family members? Is the plaintiffs husbands brother a member of the plaintiff's family? Is the plaintiff in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation? (3) Have the defendants of different wits done any act contrary to the provisions of clauses (m) (o) and (p) of s. 108 of T. P. Act. (4) Are the defendants of different suits guilty of acts of waste and damages.? (5) Were the suit rooms let out to the defendants of suits Nos. 932/75 and 788/79 for resident purpose? If so, have they been using the same as shop rooms without the consent of the landlord? _. (6) Are the defendants of suits Nos. 932/76 and 788/79 defaulters in payment of rent as alleged ? (7) Is the suit for ejectment against the defendant of suit no. 932/76 on the ground of reasonable requirement for the plaintiff's own occupation maintainable under s. 13 (3A) of the W B P.T. Act? (8) Have the substituted defendants of suit No. 1290/78 inherited on the death of their predecessors, namely the original the tenancy defendant ? (9) Is the plaintiff entitled to decree for ejectment as prayed for? (10) To what other relief or reliefs Is the plaintiff entitled? 9. The plaintiff landlady filed eviction against all the tenants in respect of the premises in question by filing several suits. In F. A. No. 120 of 1981 (Ejectment Suit No. 932/76) the defendant-tenant was In occupation of one room measuring about 9' 4" x 7' 9", on the 8round floor of the premises at a monthly rental of Rs. 23/-. The ground of eviction initially was for default of payment of rent since March 1976 and also for committing acts of waste and damages and for converting the room and the adjacent roak into a shop room without the con cent of the landlady. 23/-. The ground of eviction initially was for default of payment of rent since March 1976 and also for committing acts of waste and damages and for converting the room and the adjacent roak into a shop room without the con cent of the landlady. In F. A. No 119 of 1987 (Ejectment Suit No, 1270/78) the defendant-tenant was in occupation of two rooms on the first floor of the premises paying a monthly rent of Rs. 50/-. The ground of eviction was of committing acts of waste and damages and thereby acted contrary to the provisions of (m) (o) and (p) of s. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. In F.A. No. 10 of 1988 (Ejectment Suit No. 1285/78) the defendant-tenant was in occupation of one room on the 2nd floor and one room on the first floor at a monthly rental of Rs. 43/- and the ground of eviction was acting contrary to the provisions of clauses (m) (o) and (p) of s. 108 of the Act. In F. A. No. 117 of 1987 (Ejectment Suit No. 1290/78) the defendant-tenant was' in occupation of two rooms and one kitchen on the first floor of the said premises at a monthly rental of Rs. 30/- and the ground of eviction in was acting contrary to the provisions of clauses (m) (o) and (p) of s. 108 of the said Act. Similar was the ground of eviction in respect of the defendant-tenant. In F.A. No. 220 of 1986. (Ejectment Suit No, 1295/78) where the defendant-tenant was in occupation of one room on the 2nd floor of the premises at a monthly rental of Rs. 25/-. Similar was the ground of eviction in respect of the defendant tenant in F. A. No. 118 of 1987 (Ejectment Suit No. 1303/75), where the defendant-tenant was in occupation of one room on the ground floor at a monthly rental of Rs. 24/-. In F. A. No. (Ejectment Suit No.788/79) the defendant was a tenant in respect of one room on the ground floor of the premises at a monthly rental of Rs. 16/-. 24/-. In F. A. No. (Ejectment Suit No.788/79) the defendant was a tenant in respect of one room on the ground floor of the premises at a monthly rental of Rs. 16/-. The ground of eviction was for default in payment of rent since July, 1979 and the other allegation was that the defendant-tenant converted the residential room into a shop room without the consent of the landlady and the defendant-tenant was also guilty of committing acts contrary to the provisions of clauses (m) (o) and (p) of s.198 of the said Act. 10. After bearing the parties and on the basis of the evidence on record, the court below had decided the issue No.1 regarding service of notice of ejectment in the following ground : (a) In all ejectment suits the court held that there had been valid service 'of the notice of ejectment as provided under s. 13 (6) of the West Bengal 'Premises Tenancy Act and that not only the service was made, according to law, the notice also held to be valid and sufficient. 11. With regard to issue No. 2 relating to the reasonable requirement of the landlady's own use and occupation and for her family members is concerned, the court below held that having regard to the evidence on record, the plaintiff-landlady became the owner of the suit premises by purchase and that the plaintiff-landlady reasonably requires one room as chamber to attend her clients, one room as chamber for her husband to attend his clients, one room for keeping books and documents, one room for typist and clerks of her and her husband, one bed room, one study room, one drawing from, one store room for keeping the food materials, one dining room, one room for keeping miscellaneous things of the family and one Thakur Ghar besides privy cum bath room and that the plaintiff-landlady also stated that she requires one room for garage of her car and there arc two road side rooms In the premises in question and the plaintiff-landlady stated that she requires a roadside room for garaging her car. The court below also held that the plaintiff-landlady's suit for eviction in respect of ejectment suit No. 932/76 under s. 13(1)(ff) of the said Act was hit by s. 13(3A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956. The court below also held that the plaintiff-landlady's suit for eviction in respect of ejectment suit No. 932/76 under s. 13(1)(ff) of the said Act was hit by s. 13(3A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956. The court below further held that there were 12 rooms and the plaintiff-landlady was already in possession of one room where 11 rooms were in occupation of the, tenants, The court below further held that the plaintiff landlady was not entitled to decree in respect of the defendant in F. A. No. 120/87 in Ejectment Suit No. 932/76. but the plaintiff-landlady bad been able to prove that she reasonably requires the remaining 10 rooms occupied by other tenants in the premises in question which was the subject matter of the other ejectment suits. The court below also held that the plaintiff-landlady bad been paying a sum of Rs. 300/- in respect of the tenanted flat while - she is receiving only a sum of Rs. 226/- per month from the defendants-tenants and as such the plaintiff landlady will be economically benefited if she comes in the suit premises. 12, With regard to issue Nos. 3 and 4 relating to acts contrary to the provisions of clauses (m) (o) and (p) of s. 108 of the - Transfer of Property Act and guilty of acts of waste and damages is concerned, the court held that the plaintiff-landlady failed to substantiate her case of acts of waste and damages against the defendants-tenants. 13. Issue No.5 has been decided against the plaintiff-landlady. 14. Issue No.6 has also been decided against the plaintiff-landlady on the ground that even though the payment of rent for the months of March and April 1976 but as the tenant had complied with the provisions of s. 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, no decree for ejectment on the ground of default should be passed against the said tenants. The court below also held that the defendant tenant in Ejectment Suit No. 788/79 defaulted in payment of reat since July 1979 and as the defendant-tenant had been once given protection under s.17(4) in the earlier ejcetment suit, the said defendant-tenant was not entitled to further protection in this suit. The court below also held that the defendant tenant in Ejectment Suit No. 788/79 defaulted in payment of reat since July 1979 and as the defendant-tenant had been once given protection under s.17(4) in the earlier ejcetment suit, the said defendant-tenant was not entitled to further protection in this suit. 15 With regard to issue No.7 is concerned, the court below held that the suit for ejectment in F. A. No. 120/87 in Ejectment Suit No 932/76 on the ground mentioned under s. 13(i)(ff) of the said Act was clearly hit by sub-s. (3A) of s. 13 of the said Act. 16. With regard to issue No.8 is concerned, the court below held that though the substituted defendants did not actually reside in the suit premises, they were still in possession thereof after the death of the original defendant and as such' the)' were the tenants within the meaning of s. 2 (h) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. 17. With regard to issue Nos.9 and 10 are concerned, the court below held that the plaintiff was entitled to Khas possession of the rooms excepting the room occupied by the tenant in Ejectment Suit No. 932/76. 18. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Prova Rani Chakraborty v. Inder Sengupta (supra), the decision of the court below is liable to be reversed, inasmuch as, in view of the above decision of the Sup-erne Court, it is permissible on the part of a landlady who has purchased the property and who has instituted a suit for eviction within a period of three years on other grounds to apply for amendment and ask for relief on the ground of eviction mentioned in clause (ff) of sub-s. (1) of s. 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. A purposive construction has to be given to the provisions pr sub-s. (3A) of s. 13 of the said Act, inasmuch as, the legislature has put an embargo on the right of a transferee landlady to a disputed suit within a period of three years. A purposive construction has to be given to the provisions pr sub-s. (3A) of s. 13 of the said Act, inasmuch as, the legislature has put an embargo on the right of a transferee landlady to a disputed suit within a period of three years. It was the view taken by three Division Bench judgments of this court that in respect of the suit for eviction instituted within a period of three years from the date of the purchase, the ground mentioned in clause (ff) of sub-s. (1) of s. t3 could not be invoked as that would amount to fraud on the statute, inasmuch as, the amendment could relate back to the date of the institutions of the suit and that if the institution of the suit is barred, the amendment is also barred. That principle does not hold good in view of the above decision of the Supreme Court and further the legislative intent could not be extended beyond what was contemplated by the legislative. The whole object of incorporating the provisions of sub-S. (3A) of S. 13 of the said Act Is that a transferee-landlady cannot file a suit within a period of three years. But it a suit is pending for 12 years and if a suit is pending for 10 years as because the suit was instituted within a period of three years from the date of purchase of the property, the landlady cannot be prevented from amending the plaint for taking benefit of grounds mentioned in clause (ff) of sub-s. (1) of s. 13 of the said Act, inasmuch as, this would result in unworkable, impracticable inconvenient and illegal result. If a suit for eviction is instituted that would take 10/15 years to get a decree for eviction on any grounds whatsoever. The purpose of the legislature was to give the tenant three years protection against the eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement of a transferee-landlady, but in the facts and circumstances of the Case. the court has to give a purposive construction. A construction which promotes the remedy provided by the law to cure a particular mischief is known as purposive construction. The purposive construction must obviously be in all cases, a construction which gives effect to the legislative intent. the court has to give a purposive construction. A construction which promotes the remedy provided by the law to cure a particular mischief is known as purposive construction. The purposive construction must obviously be in all cases, a construction which gives effect to the legislative intent. The contention that if a suit is filed by a transferee-landlady within a period of three years, she is debarred from taking help of the ground mentioned in s. 13 (1) (ff) of the said Act, for all time to come in that suit, that would resulted 'proportionate counter mischief. It is the cardinal principle of rules of interpretation that the court seeks to avoid a construction that cures mischief the enactment was designed to remedy only at the costs of setting up a disproportionate counter mischief since this is unlikely to have been intended by the legislature. (See para 326 at page 705 in Statutory Interpretation by Francis Beanion). The court is usually concerned to decide between opposing constructions of the enactment which are advanced by the parties in relation to the facts of the instant case. Consequential construction requires the consequences of adopting each of the constructions to be assessed. The position was thus described by Romer L. J. in Fry v. IRC (1959) Ch. 86 at page 105. "It seems to us that on the language of the section neither the view of the defendant nor that of the plaintiff can be said to be obviously wrong. the court, then when faced with two possible constructions of legislative language, is entitled to look at the results of adopting each of the alternative respectively in its quest of the true intention of parliament.” Applying this principle under the provisions of the Act in this case, it would be evident that if the construction was sought to be put forth by the defendants-tenants, the landlady is debarred from availing the ground mentioned in clause (ff) of sub-s. (1) of see 13 of the said Act for all time to come on the ground that suit was instituted by the transferee-landlady within a period of three years from the date of purchase of the property that would be a clear intention of the legislature. The legislature sought to protect the tenant from eviction for a period of three years and by this construction it would mean that three years protection would run upto 30 years. If the transferee-landlord is to file a fresh suit abandoning this suit that would inevitably extend the protection of three year- even to 30 years. A construction of a provision in an Act cannot be given literal meaning on the language used in a statute. 19. Accordingly, even though the Supreme Court, in the case mentioned above had not obviously given a detailed reason, but what was the reason' for which the Supreme Court bas taken this view, is not difficult to find it out. Accordingly, In this case, even though the property was purchased by the plaintiff. landlady on 11th August, 1975 and the plaintiff-landlady filed a suit for eviction on other ground on 18th August, 1976, the plaintiff-landlady was entitled to make an application for amendment on 15th April, 1980 for the purpose of taking advantage of the ground mentioned in s. 13(1)(ff) of the said Act. Accordingly, the Ejectment Suit No. 932/76 must be decreed on the ground of reasonable requirement of the premises in question for the plaintiff-landlady and for the members of her family under the provisions of s. 13(1)(ff) of the said Act and accordingly, the First Appeal No. 120 of 1987 must be allowed. 20. In F. A. No. 119 of 1987 (Ejectment Suit No. 1270/78) it was submitted by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant-tenant that there was non-service of notice of eviction and that there was no finding that the landlady had no suitable accommodation elsewhere. It is on evidence that notice of eviction was sent by registered post as well as under certificate of posting and that the defendant-tenant received the notice by signing the acknowledgement card. The notice was also served through special messenger. Postal receipt was produced. In view of this evidence on record, we do not find any substance to the submission that there was no service of notice. In the facts and circumstances of the case when the court below found that the plaintiff-landlady requires all the rooms in the premises excepting one room on the ground floor which is reversed in F.A. No 120/87, there was no scope for consideration of a partial eviction. In the facts and circumstances of the case when the court below found that the plaintiff-landlady requires all the rooms in the premises excepting one room on the ground floor which is reversed in F.A. No 120/87, there was no scope for consideration of a partial eviction. The question of partial eviction could only arise where there is a scope for meeting with the requirement of the plaintiff-landlady by partial eviction. In the instant case, when the court below has made conclusive finding that the plaintiff-landlady requires all rooms in the premises in question, in our view, there is no substance in this contention, the question of partial eviction was not' agitated and there is no scope for consideration of the question of partial eviction to the facts and circumstances of the case. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the tenants-defendants also cannot show from the facts and circumstances of the case how the partial eviction would satisfy the need of the landlady in the facts and circumstances of the case when the tenant was in occupation of two rooms on the first floor of the premises and it is on record that the plaintiff landlady requires 12 rooms in the premises in question. It is also on record that the landlady had no other suitable accommodation and that the landlady was staying in a three roomed rented fiat, whereas the landlady's requirement of 12 rooms was found by the court below. In that view of the matter, we do not find any substance to the submission. When on the basis of the evidence on record it is crystal clear that the landlady had no other alternative accommodation, we do not find any reason for making such submission before this court on this ground. 21. In the Instant case, both the plaintiff-landlady and her husband are practising lawyers and for practising lawyers it is the requirement for practice in chamber separately and for the purpose of carrying work and spaces for the clients to sit and spaces for the typist clerk for performing their jobs and spaces for keeping their books records and documents which are essential. Undisputedly the family of the plaintiff landlady includes herself her husband and a son Anurag who is now 17-18 years old. For the purpose of prosecuting bill studies, it is necessary for a room for his teacher. Undisputedly the family of the plaintiff landlady includes herself her husband and a son Anurag who is now 17-18 years old. For the purpose of prosecuting bill studies, it is necessary for a room for his teacher. The plaintiff-landlady's husband's brother is also residing with them. According to the plaintiff-landlady, her requirement was one room as chamber to attend her clients, one room as chamber for her husband to attend his clients, one room for keeping books and documents, one room for typists and clerks of both her and her husband, one bed room for her and her husband and their son who at the relevant time was a minor but by now he attained majority. But she at the relevant time considering the age of their son did not ask for any separate bed room for their son. She also requires one room for study of their son, one drawing room for the entire family, one dining room, one store room for keeping articles of food, one room for keeping miscellaneous articles of the family, one room for taking rest of the members of the family falling sick, one kitchen and one Thakur Ghar. She also stated that she has got a deity of Gopal which is worshipped by her everyday and she also performs' 'born' every night. She also requires two privy cum bath rooms and one bed room for her brother in law, namely, the husband's brother. 22. The only contention as against this requirement on the plaintiff-landlady made on behalf of the defendants-tenants before the court below was that the plaintiff's brother-in-law could not be regarded to be the member of the family and that in the absence of any evidence on record to show that the plaintiff's husband's brother was a member of the plaintiff's family, the court below accepted the contention and ultimately, the court below found on the basis of the evidence that the plaintiff requires one room as her chamber to attend her clients one room for her husband to attend his clients, one room for keeping books and documents, one room for the typists and clerk" both of her and her husband, one bed room, one study room, one drawing room, one dining room, one store room for keeping articles for food, one room for keeping miscellaneous articles of her family, one kitchen. one Thakur Ghar besides privy cum bath room. one Thakur Ghar besides privy cum bath room. There were 12 rooms altogether in the entire premises out of one room was already in possession of the plaintiff-landlady and that the evidence clearly shows which could not be disputed and has not been disputed before us on behalf of the tenants defendants that the remaining 11 rooms were not required by the plaintiff landlady. The requirement as found by the court below as reasonable requirement for the landlady's own use and occupation had not been and could not be disputed before us. It was sought to be argued that when the landlady wall in occupation of a rented house consisting of three rooms and when the landlady could accommodate her family in that three rooms, there was no requirement for a big house of so many room for her own use and occupation. We are of the view that this is wholly out' of the context. The power of the court is only to see whether the requirement was reasonable or not the role of the court in such a case is not to play the guardian of the landlady. As because the plaintiff-landlady had no sufficient space in the rented flat, she had every right to file an eviction on the ground of personal requirement and when on the basis of the evidence on record and considering the status and the needs of the plaintiff-landlady, It is found that the plaintiff-landlady requires these rooms and the requirement is all reasonable, the court's duty is over and the court cannot proceed any further in the matter and the court is not competent to make any further review on any other grounds whatsoever. Further when a landlady is residing in a tenanted house, she is entitled to apply for eviction and that this cannot be said to be unreasonable fanciful or absurd. It is one thing to stay as a tenant and it is quite a different thing to live. In his own house. Two things cannot be equated. Accordingly, we are of the view that the landlady having a house which is under tenant, living to a tenanted house, she is entitled to file a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement of the premises of which she is the owner. In his own house. Two things cannot be equated. Accordingly, we are of the view that the landlady having a house which is under tenant, living to a tenanted house, she is entitled to file a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement of the premises of which she is the owner. In such a case the Court cannot dismiss the suit on the ground that as the landlady is residing as tenant in a tenanted house in different premises, she is debarred from coming to own residence. This submission cannot be accepted on any grounds whatsoever. 22A. It is not necessary to go into the other questions raised in all suits, inasmuch as, when the court has found that all rooms under the occupation of the tenants, which is the subject matter to different suits and different appeal are reasonably required by the plaintiff-landlady and that when the court found that the finding of the court below is not perverse and further no attempt has been made to show that the findings are all perverse, we are of thro view that the decree passed by the court below in Ejectment Suit Nos. 1270/78, 1285/78 1290/78, 1295/78, 1303/78 and 788/79, are affirmed first Appeal No. 118 of 1987 filed, by the appellant Smt. Punia Devi, First Appeal No. 220 of 1986 filed by the appellant Ram Shankar Mishra, First Appeal No. 221 of 1986 filed by the appellant Pursottam Jaiswal, First Appeal No. 10 of 1988 filed by the appellant Sudama Singh, First Appeal No. 119 of 1987 filed by the appellant Pursottam Jaiswal and the First Appeal No. 117 of 1987 filed by appellant Sakuntala Jaiswal, stand dismissed without any order as to costs. The First Appeal No. 120 of 1987 filed by the plaintiff-appellant-landlady Uma Sanyal stands allowed and the Ejectment Suit No. 932 of 1976 is reversed and she is entitled to a decree for eviction against the defendants respondent Monorsnjao Sinha in respect of one room on the ground floor of the premises in question which is the subject matter of the title suit concerned. The First Appeal No.120 of 1987 is allowed and all other appeals stand dismissed without any order as to costs. Bhattacharji. J.: J agree. Appeal No. 120 of 1987 allowed. All other appeals dismissed.